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AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF HOW LAW SCHOOLS
EVALUATE STUDENTS, WITH A PREDICTABLE
EMPHASIS ON LAW SCHOOL FINAL EXAMS
Steve Sheppard*
Finalexams play on a law student 'sworld like some weirdly orbitingmoon. They
are always in sight; but while they're at a distance, they serve merely to create the
tensions which swell daily like tides - to read to keep pace, to understand As
exams draw close, however,... theirgravitationalforce startsto shake the whole
place to pieces.'

American law schools currently employ one essential, formal method of student
evaluation - course-end examinations.2 While informal evaluation, particularly
observation of student oral class performances, does occur, the exams are usually the
exclusive method by which a record of student performance is created. Examinations
serve to measure the ability of the student to use the material assigned, whether they are
fit or unfit for the practice of law, or for the recognition by the school that sufficient
skill is had to award a law degree,3 whether they should be recognized and identified
for the employers as outstandingly fit,4 and to signal the strengths and weaknesses of
a student's work for the student's future development, as an incentive both to learn as
much as possible during instruction and to review that instruction later.5 The exams
of the many American schools now follow a surprisingly few patterns based on a few
hypothetical questions and, less often, on a group of many multiple-choice questions.
This pattern - of hypothetical essay examinations being the sole record of the
students' performance - is a recent stage in the evolution ofU.S. legal education. Once
exams were only one form ofevaluation to judge fitness, used in conjunction with class
recitations, notebook inspections, and moot court performance. This complicated

*. Associate Professor, Thomas M.Cooley Law School. I thank the editors of the UMKC Law
Review for their invitation to write this article; without their exhibition ofblind faith in agreeing to publish
the unwritten, it would have remained so. Iam also grateful to the Thomas Cooley librarians, particularly
Sharon Bradley, Ardena Walsh, and Steve Boudette in locating some of the more obscure material for this
odyssey, to Kristin Keck, Jill Pullum, and Cindy Hurst for their typing assistance. Frank Lorenz of
Hamilton College, Kent McKeever and Whitney Bagnall of Columbia, and David Warrington and David
DiLorenzo of Harvard were particularly helpful in locating some of the more critical bits of academic
flotsam on which this paper is based.
1. ScoTT TuRow, ONEL 157 (1986).
2. This near-uniformity of method is no accident The American Bar Association demands it of
schools that would remain accredited. Standard 304 requires the scholastic achievement of all students
in lecture-hall courses to be tested with a "written examination of suitable length and complexity." ABA
Standard 304(b) (1996).
3. These goals for examinations and their resultant grades are well established. See, e.g., Karl N.
Llewellyn, Lawyer's Ways and Means, and the Law Curriculum, 30 IOWA L. REV. 333 (1945).
4. Again, these goals are old hat. See, e.g., John L. Grant, The Single Standardin Grading,29
COLUM. L. REv. 920 (1929).
5. These goals are, unsurprisingly, less often noted in the literature of this century.
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evaluation scheme was replaced by graduation exams, designed to measure the specific
knowledge acquired over the whole course of study.
These in turn were followed by annual and course-end examinations. The
questions of these exams evolved from brief didactic questions designed to measure
rote memory to complicated hypotheticals designed to measure application. In this
century, the objective question, the spiritual descendent of the then-obsolete didactic
question emerged, allowing both faster evaluation of the student submission and
broader coverage in the evaluation. This article describes this evolution, commencing
with its English antecedents and influences.'
. THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE TO 1900: TRIAL AND ERROR
A. Moots

Blackstone maintained that the English Inns of Court arose in response to the
operation of Magna Carta and other acts fixing a permanent location of the law courts
in London. "Here exercises were performed, lectures were read, and degrees were at
length conferred in the common law, as at other universities in the canon and civil." 7
From the Fourteenth to the early Seventeenth Century, the Inns were power-houses of
legal instruction,8 and their primary form of education was the argument of moot
cases, 9 which when done by the students, served as the student's oral examination.
The most spectacular of these moot arguments were performed semi-annually by
senior barristers in the Readings, held in the Lent and Autumn vacations; student
attendance was compulsory."0 As reported by Nathaniel Bacon, the senior barristers
would select a reader, who would choose a statute to describe and criticize, offering an
6. American legal education through the nineteenth century was strongly influenced by English
traditions and practices. The moot court and the written examination had both been pursued in English
institutions prior to independence, and this essay begins with a consideration of their methods of student
evaluation. See, e.g., MARIAN C. MCKENNA, TAPPING REEVE AND THE LTcHiELD LAW SCHOOL 1-7

(1986); 1 CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF THE EARLIER LEGAL
CoNDmoNs IN AMERICA 31-45 (1970); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 84-88
(1973); Roscoe Pound, Dedication Papers: The Law School and the ProfessionalTradition,24 MICH.
L. REv. 156, 160 (1926). For the influence of Oxbridge graduates in early American colleges, see MARY
LovET SMALLWOOD, AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF ExAMINATIONs AND GRADING SYSTEMS IN EARLY
AMERICAN UNivERsnrEs: A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE ORIGINAL REcoRDS OF HARVARD, WILLIAM AND
MARY, YALE, MOUNT HOLYOKE, AND MICHIGAN FROM THEIR FOUNDING TO 1900,
7. 1 WLLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23

3-5 (1935).
(1765). For a more

specific history of the origins of the Inns, see S.E. Thome, The Early History ofthe Inns ofCourt with
Special Reference to Gray's Inn, in S.E. THORNE, ESSAYS IN ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 137 (1985).
8. Not that the Inns were the sole professional law schools in Britain. For a discussion of the legal
instruction in the Scottish Faculty of Advocates, see Steve Sheppard, Casenotes, Commentaries,and
Curmudgeons, - IOWAL. REv. - (1997).
9. J.H. Baker identifies the term "moot" as a basis for both the description of the case and the
forms of the disputation as in use by 1428. J.H. Baker, LearningExercises in the Medieval Inns ofCourt
andChancery, in J.H. BAKER, THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE COMMON LAW: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 15
(1986).

10. Richardson describes these readings in detail. W.C. RICHARDSON, A HISTORY OF THE INNS OF
COURT, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PERIOD OF THE RENAISSANCE, 101-27 (1978). The proceedings
from Readings and Moots are in S.E. Thome's Readings andMoots at the Inns of Courtin the Fifteenth
Century. Vol.1 (Selden Society, vol. 71, 1954).
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argument for reform of the statute. This argument would then be challenged by other
barristers in a debate that would last three or four days per week for two or three
weeks." Besides these showpiece arguments by the senior lawyers, the seniors
observed student moots and arguments throughout terms and vacations, with varying
degrees of participation by senior banisters. 2 The Readings set the standard and the
style of the student moots. The problems assigned for student mooting, as for many
of the Readings, tended to be hoary and well-tested, but this did not make the
disputation easier. Professor Baker illustrates a typical moot problem from Lincoln's
Inn:
Two coparceners, seised of a manor by descent, have a tenant who holds the manor
by homage and fealty and by the services of 20s. a year, repairing the mill and
roofing the hall of the manor, the tenant grants part of the manor to a stranger, to
hold of the chief lord of the fee by the services due; one of the parceners commits
felony, for which she is attainted; the lord enters as in his escheat; and then they
make partition between themselves, so that the mill is allotted to the lord and they
hold the hall and the other services in common; and then they grant the hall to a
man pur terme d'autre vie, during whose time the hall is unroofed; he for whose
life the hall was leased dies; they enter as in their reversion; the lord makes a
recognizance to a stranger to pay certain money at a certain day, at which day he
does not pay, and so the other sues execution and has execution in respect of the
mill; and during that time the mill falls down; the money ispaid; the lord enters and
distrains them; the tenants make replevin. Ceux?"3
In observing students in the arguments lasting several hours, the senior lawyers both
evaluated and coached their apprentices. The Inns' moots, however, were interrupted
by the English civil war, an event from which they never fully recovered.' 4
B. Examinations
In the mid-sixteenth century, an oral examination was required of candidates to
be called to the bar, examining, primarily, for satisfaction of residence, mooting,
religious observance, and attendance requirements. 5 In 1596, the Readers of each Inn
were given quotas of students who should be called, from the "fittest for then learning
and honest conversation," although even such students should only be qualified to
practice "very sparingly, in respect of the great multitude that there be already."' 6
11. Nicholas Bacon et al., An Analysis of the Structure,Government, and System of Education in
the Inns of Court and Chancery(1540), reprintedin EDWARD WATERHOUS, FORTESCUE ILLUSTRATUS

(1663), reprintedin RICHARDSON, supra note 9, at 409. Holdsworth considered Bacon's report to be "the
most authentic account" of the Inns' instruction. 2 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, HOLDSWORTH'S HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 503 (1923).
12. DAvID LEMMINGS, GENTLEMEN AND BARiERs: TuE INNS OF COURT AND THE ENGLISH BAR,

1680-1730 77 (1990).
13. Reprintedand translatedin J.H.Baker, The Old Moot Book of Lincoln's Inn, in J.H. BAKER,
supra note 8, at 25, 28.
14. LEMMINGS, supra note 11, at 78-83. Lemmings collects citations of various scholars who
disagree slightly over the dates of the beginning of the decline of the moots in the century prior to their
interruption in 1642. Id at 78 nn.7-9.
15. Inner Temple passed such a requirement in 1556. 1 Inner Temple Records 225-26 cited in
RICHARDSON, supra note 9, at 171 n.15.
16. Rules of Government of the Inns of Court and the Inns of Chancery, Appendix 5, June 20,
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Thus, the exams were mere formality, and students were selected for professional
qualification based on interview and on observation in such moots as were held, a state
of affairs lasting from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth century.' By the early

Nineteenth century, however, even the moots had deteriorated to a series of desultory
mechanical exercises held over lunch.'
Oxford, which had held lectures in Roman and, until Henry VII, canon law, since
the twelfth century,'9 established examinations in its reforms under the Caroline Code
of Archbishop Laud of 1636. o During the years of study,2' a law student would be
expected to attend lectures and to give disputations on set topics; thus, the education
was said to be analytic and dialectic. The topics for argument in the disputations were
usually posted on college walls, and the arguments were usually conducted in the
afternoons before the officers of the university. Each student performed at least one
disputation per term, and there were then four terms.'
The examinations to conclude the degree were oral, initially conducted with three
examiners questioning a single student, although by the eighteenth century, students
were examined in pairs.' Responding to the increasingly lax curriculum, the exams
steadily eroded to a relatively ceremonial, formal exercise in which performance was
often based on simple rote memory and in which failure was almost unknown.24 By
1596, art 11. reprintedin RICHARDSON, supranote 9, at 175.
17. LEMINGS,supra note 11, at 63, 261-63.
18. Bagehot recounted his moot from 1850:
A slip of paper was delivered to you, written in legible law stationer's hand, which you were
to take up to the upper table where the Benchers sat, and read before them. The contents
were generally not intelligible: the slip often began in the middle of a sentence, and by long
copying and no revision the text had become quite corrupt. The topic was, "Whether C.
should have the widow's estate?" and it was said that ifyou pieced all the slips together you
might make a connected argument for and against the widow.... [I1n 1850 the trial "case"
had dwindled down to the everlasting question, "Whether C. should have the widow's
estate?" The animated debate had become a mechanical reading of copied bits of paper,
which it was difficult to read without laughing. Indeed, the Benchers felt the farce, and
wanted to expedite it. If you kept a grave countenance after you had read some six words,
the senior Bencher would say, "Sir that will do," and then the exercise was kept. But this
favor was only given to those who showed due gravity. If you laughed you had to read the
"slip" all through.
Walter Bagehot in 3 LrERARY STUDIES 252-53 (R.H. Hutton, ed., 1905), quoted in RCHARDSON, supra
note 9, at 321-22.
19. The origins of Oxford legal education in the use of Vacarius's Liber Pauperum and the later
vicissitudes of legal education there, are briefly described in Sheppard, supra note 7.
20. 1 OxFoRD UNIVERSrrY STATUTES, Caroline Code or Laudian Statutes, PromulgatedA.D.
1636 (G.R.M. Ward, trans., William Pickering 1845). For the apparent novelty of examinations as a
degree requirement, see L.S. Sutherland, The Curriculum,in5L.S. SuTHERL4ND & L.G. MrrCHELL, THE
HISTORY OF OXFORD UNIVERSITY: THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 469 (1986).
21. A student for the Bachelors of Laws would spend three years in residence, or five years if not
a Master of Arts at his matriculation, the other two spent studying logic, moral philosophy, politics, and
humane letters. 2 CHARLES E. MALLET, A HISTORY OF THE UNiVERSITY OF OXFORD 325 (1927), citing
CarolineCode, VI, S,iv, c. I.
22. SUTHERLAND & MrrcHELL, supra note 19, at 470-71.
23. Id at 472.
24. MALLEr,supra note 20, at 325. The experiences of Jeremy Bentham and others are reported
in SUTHERLAND & MITCHELL, supra note 19, at 474.
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1770, the examinations had become almost perfunctory, as witnessed by Lord Eldon's
famous description of his examination for a double bachelor's degree:
I was examined for a degree in Hebrew and in History.
"What is the Hebrew for the place of a skull?"
I replied, "Golgotha."
Who founded University College?"
I stated (though by the way, the point is sometimes doubted), "that King Alfred
founded it"
"Very well sir," said the Examiner, "you are competent for your degree."'
Oxford's examination system was overhauled in 1800, with newly appointed
examiners instructed to be more rigorous,26 which had a rather interesting and
unintended effect on instruction in common law. Law examinations were set solely for
the bachelor's in civil law, and neither it nor any other degree required instruction in
common law. Thus, even after Charles Viner established a professorship to teach the
common law, held by William Blackstone and then Robert Chambers, there was little
student demand for such instruction." Still, common law instruction continued
sporadically, even after civil law instruction had declined. By the mid-nineteenth
century, the Professors of Civil Law in Oxford and in Cambridge had ceased to lecture,
although the Vinerian lectures still attracted thirty-eight students who still were not
examined in common law.'
Of course, Victorian Oxford was a time of reform, and the exams finally given
in Oxford, which were printed and distributed in the United States, reflect a more
thorough-going scrutiny of the preparation of the student than Lord Eldon suffered. The
1871 examination in Real Property lists a dozen questions, testing by rote the student's
knowledge of the field.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

What do you mean by tenure? What are the practical results of the fact that
no one can have more than an estate in land?
Explain the following tenures - in frankalmoigne - by comage - in
gavelkind - ancient demesne.
The statute De Donis created estates tail. Show the exact meaning of this
statement.
Trace successive means by which the holding of land in mortmain was
restrained.
State the rule in Shelley's case, and show how it is related to the original
interpretation of a gift to a man and his heirs.
What was the object of the Statute of Uses, and by what means was it
evaded?

25. Oxford University Commission Report, 1852, p. 59, quoted in MALLET, supra note 20, at 16.
Note the skepticism as to Lord Eldon's veracity. Id Lord Eldon was, of course, correct to suggest he
answered one of his two questions inaccately but to the happiness of the examiners; his answer conforms
with what is now politely called the "Aluredian myth." Its origins as part of a fourteenth-century property
fraud by the college fellows are illustrated in JAN MoRRIs,THE OxFoRD BOOK OF OxFORD 23-24 (1978).
26. OxFORD UNrvERsrry STAlTUES, supra note 19, at 29, University Statutesfrom 1767 to 1850.
27. J.L. Barton, Legal Studies, in SuTHERLAND & MrrcHELL supra note 19, at 604-05.
28. Report of the Select Committee on Legal Education, 10 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 1,

iv, xvi (25 August 1846), describedin W.L. Twining, Laws, in THE UNIvERsrrY OF LONDON AND THE
WORLD OF LEARNING 1836-1986,81-83 (F.M.L. Thompson, ed. 1990).
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Explain the terms generaloccupant, corruptiosanguinis,vivum vadium,
reversion, defeazance.
Enumerate the various forms of life estate, and specify the differences
between them as regards the rights of the tenant over the land.
What changes were made in the rules of intestate succession by the statute
3 and 4 Wm.IV c.106? Show by examples the importance of the changes.
Explain the exact nature of Livery of Seisin, and show how the Statute of
Uses was employed to evade it.
What is the origin of Dower? Trace the successive changes in the law on
this subject.
Explain the effect of each of the following, and the reason for each: (1) Feoffment to A and his heirs (before and after the Statute of Uses)
(2) Grant to the use of A, to uses as B shall appoint.
(3) Feoffinent to A on condition that B dies before Christmas.
(4) Verbal lease to A for five years.29

These exams were printed and then widely distributed, including distribution in the
United States. 0
Of course, the university exams were not alone in their reformation. The Law
Society, which oversees the training of clerks who wish to become solicitors, introduced
a compulsory written examination in 1835, a requirement enshrined in statute in
1843.2 This examination was not an overwhelming burden, however, and a
Parliamentary committee considered it no more than a "guarantee against absolute
incompetency."32 Indeed, the select committee, finding that legal education in England
was nearly non-existent, found that what little existed was overly concerned with the
technicalities of law and insufficiently concerned with more general, doctrinal
instruction.33
It was about this time that England, or at least many of its public institutions,
embraced the written examination. In 1853, the India Act made positions in the Indian
Civil Service dependent upon performance of an examination, rather than upon
patronage as had been the case; competitive exams for appointment were partially
mandated for the Home Civil Service in 1855, becoming compulsory in 1870.' In
29. OxFoRD EXAMINATION PAPERS, SECOND PUBLIC EXAMINATION, PASS, MICHAELMAs TERM,

1871. Only one component of the exam is reproduced above. The whole examination required fifteen
sections, including several more on property, as well as several special sections on elective topics.
30. Harvard Law School has mid-nineteenth century examination papers from Oxford and from
London that appear to have been received fairly contemporaneously to their publication. See UNlvERsrrY
OF OXFORD, OxFoRD UNivERsrY EXAMINATION PAPERS IN LAW AND MODERN HISTORY FOR THE
ACADEMIC YEARS ENDING JULY, 1867 To 1872 (Oxford, J. Parker, 1872); THE EXAMNATION QUESTIONS,
wrrH FULL ANSWERS, FOR 1859 AND 1860 (London: T.F.A. Day, 1860). Furthermore, the general

university collection held similar papers. See UNIVERSrrY OF OXFORD, EXAMATON PAPERS INLAW AND
MODERN HISTORY, FOR THE AcADEMncAL YEARS ENDING JULY, 1863 TO 1868 (1868).
31. L.C.B. Gower, EnglishLegal Training, 13 MOD. L. REv. 137, 140 (1950).
32. Report of the Select Committee on Legal Education, 10 BRrr. PARLIAmENARY PAPERS 1, Xvi
(25 August 1846). Examples of early Law Society examinations, which were not all that difficult, may
be found in The Legal Observer. See, e.g., Questions at the Examination, Trinity Term, 1853, 46 THE
LEGAL OBSERVER, DIG. & J. OF JURISPRUDENCE 93 (1853).

33. A good description of this report and its effects is in Twining, Laws, supra note 27, at 81.
34. For a discussion ofthese statutes and a summary of the examination culture of the Nineteenth
Century, see JOHN ROACH, PUBLIC EXAMINATIONS IN ENGLAND 1850-1900 (1971).
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1850, secondary school admissions were first based on external examinations, and in
1857 and 1858, Oxford and Cambridge followed suit. By 1862, even governmentsupported elementary schools were required to give written examinations in reading,
writing and math. As a whole, examinations were seen as a method for the competitive
and democratic movement from social preferment to merit as a means of access to
education and position. The exams allowed classification of students, testing their
skills for those believed to be needed in the professions, and providing opportunity in
a slightly more egalitarian fashion.35
The Inns of Court first required trainee barristers to take a written exam in 1844,
creating the Council of Legal Education in 1852 to create a standard exam, which was
initially only required of students who had not attended lectures.' The exam became
a universal requirement in 1872."' It was partly written and partly oral, and it was not
demanding."
The 1853 English Bar Exam questions are reproduce in full in part one of the
Appendix to this article. It is clear that the exam questions performed several
functions. The four preliminary questions echoed the ancient concerns of how long,
what about, and with whom the student studied. Most of the questions in the five areas
of subject matter - common law and practice; conveyancing; equity and procedure;
bankruptcy and practice; and criminal law and procedure - require specific recitations
of definitions or pleading elements. A significantly smaller number of questions are in
the form of brief hypothetical requiring the student both to supply a particular doctrine
and to give an opinion of its application to a few specific facts. There are some
idiosyncratic questions, as well. Question eighteen requires the drafting a pleading and
ajudgement. Question twenty requires recitation of a history of conveyancing. (Many
of these questions styles are also to be found in American bar exams in the following
years, as in the New York exam also reprinted in part one of the Appendix.)
The University of London commenced a course in English Law leading to the
Bachelor's of Laws degree, graduating three students in 1836 and 135 by the century's
end.39 University-run legal education in nineteenth century England was not seen as a
serious academic enterprise, remaining an unpopular professional option in the face of
renewed instruction in the Inns and in local crash courses designed to prepare students
for the Law Society exams.'
Despite these efforts at reform, the close of the nineteenth century found the
professional examination still foundering. At the turn of the century, both English and
35. See ROACH, supranote 33, at 8-34. That this rationale was somewhat of a driving force in the
adoption of the exams may be seen in considering the arguments made by James Booth, vice-principal of
the Liverpool Collegiate Institution in 1847. James Booth, Examinationthe Provinceof the State: or the
Outlines of a PracticalSystem for the Extension ofNationalEducation (1847), discussed in ROACH,
supra note 33, at 56-60.

36. The idea of examination as requirement for entry to the bar was highly controversial. An effort
to require examinations in classics in order to enter the Inns and to require an examination in law in order
to be called to the bar was killed in the 183(Ys. See RAYMOND CocKs, FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN BAR
23 (1983).
37. Gower, supra note 30, at 141.
38. A popular student guide at the time noted that "The whole examination is an easy one - in fact,
a great deal too easy, still it is impossible to pass it without some knowledge of the subject." WALTER R.
BALL, THE STUDENTS' GUIDE TO THE BAR 22 (1879).
39. N. HARTE & JOHN NORTH, THE WORLD OF UNivERsrrY COLLEGE 1828-1978, 106 (1986).
40. Twining, Laws, supra note 27, at 96.
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American critics were alarmed at English instruction that represented about a third of
the instruction of an American school and examinations that "do not afford any
trustworthy test of adequate knowledge of the law."4'
It is, perhaps, unfair not to describe the renaissance of English legal education and
examination in this century, leaving the reader with an unwarranted impression that
matters are as they were a century ago.42 The parochial focus of this essay, however,
is to consider English forms of educational evaluation and their contributions and their

influence on American programs, which waned considerably in the twentieth century.
That said, a useful summary of later styles of the English law exam is still had in the
review of exam technique by University of London law professor L.C.B. Gower.
Considering the English law exam in its collegiate and professional forms, he
summarized its question formats in 1950 as falling roughly into three classes:
1. Pure tests of memory on points of detail. For example: "What is the order of
succession in the case of deaths after 1925?" This type is common in the
professional examinations.
2. Essay questions. For example: "Sketch the history of freehold tenures." This
type is found principally in the university examinations.
3. Hypothetical problems. This type is now increasingly common in both
university and professional examinations and there is no need to give examples.43
Of these forms, Gowers believed the hypothetical problem to be the most valuable, as
it tests understanding of principles and practical proficiency more than mere
knowledge."

41. James Barr Ames, The Vocation of the Law Professor,in JAMEs BARR AMES, LECTURES ON
LEGAL HISTORY

354, 356 (1913).

42. Although they have, indeed, improved markedly. See Twining, Laws, supranote 27, at 100-02

for a picture of the later years. An early description of the new reforms can be found in Dicey's rather
unusual ad for B.C.L. students. See Albert V. Dicey, The Extension ofLaw Teaching at Oxford, 24

HAv. L. REV. 1(1910). Inpart, these reforms were led by the departure from the study of civil law as
the sole basis for the degrees in civil law. See, e.g., UNiVERsrrY OF OxFoRD, FACULTY OF LAW,
EXAMINATION IN THE FACULTY OF LAW FOR THE DEGREE OF B.C.L. (1930); OXFORD UNvEgsrrY,
REQuntEmar FOR DEGREES, 1996 (1996). For a contemporaneous discussion of the 1922 requirement
that Law Society examinees who would become solicitors complete a year of study in a law school prior

to examination, see Frederick Pollock, Learningthe Law. 159 LAw Q. REv. 287 (1924). For a reasonably
current comparison of American and English programs, see Sandra R. Klein, Legal Education in the
UnitedStates and England:A ComparativeAnalysis, 13 LoY. L. A. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 601 (1991).
43. Gower, supra note 30, at 137, 193.
44. Id. at 193.
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II. THE AMERICAN EXAMINATION EXPERIENCE, PART I: EXAMS
OF THE COMMENTATORS 45
Examinations were part and parcel of early American legal pedagogy. While
there were graduation examinations, the evaluation of the student through frequent
written or oral questioning was integral to the lecture. Given the relationship of the
lecture to the commentary style, the examination was really a measure of how well the
student had recognized and could later remember and repeat the information in the
commentary or, later, the treatise. This system was made longer and more thematically
comprehensive in the graduation examination. As the commentary system came into
competition with case method instruction, and as bar exams and foreign exams became
more hypothetical, the questions evolved into the application of a doctrine or two to
solve a simple fact pattern, requiring the student not only to recall the doctrine that
applies in such facts, but to apply it to determine which hypothetical party's interests
are favored under it. While these exams were often showpieces, many were given as
graduation exercises that were held to high standards and that could be barriers to
promotion into the second year or to graduation. Finally, as the exams became less
frequent and more summary, used to conclude a course of study over a semester or a
year, the exam began to test a smaller sample of the student's work.
A. Classroom Exercises and Annual Essays
The first professional law school in America, the Litchfield Law School of
Tapping Reeve and James Gould, held examinations of its students every Saturday.'
These quizzes, usually oral, were overseen by Judge Reeve during his ownership of the
school, although Judge Gould hired two assistants, Jabez W. Huntington and Origen
Storrs Seymour, to examine the students in his stead beginning in 1820."" The
questions were meant to give "a thorough investigation of the principles of each rule,
and not merely of such questions as can be answered from memory without any
exercise of the judgement." Given the structure of the Litchfield lectures,49 it is a
45. This section and the next, concerned as they are with the evaluation of matriculated students,
generally omit discussion of entrance examinations. The struggle to impose a uniform system of entrance

examination was resolved with the advent of uniform use of the products of the Law School Admission
Service, but that is a struggle beyond the scope of this essay.
46. Paul D. Carrington, Trainingfor the Public Professions of the Law: 1971, reprinted in
DIRECrIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 95, 170 (1972). Judge Reeve

HERBERT L. PACKER ET AL., NEw

oversaw the school from 1782 or 1784; he retired in 1820, and Judge Gould oversaw it until 1833. See
James Gould, The Litchfield Law School, 1U.S.L. J.401-05 (1823). An overview of the school's history
and a description of the teaching practices of Judges Reeve and Gould can be found in Sheppard, supra
note 7.
47. MCKENNA, supra note 5, at 120, 171-72; ALFRED Z. REED, TRADMG FOR THE PUBLIC
PROFESSION OF THE LAW 121, 356 (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Bulletin No.
15, 1921) (1976). While Seymour's contributions were late in the day and rather slight, Professor, later
Justice, Brandeis seems to have been in error in declaring that Jabez Huntington, along with Reeve and
Gould were "the only instructors whom the school ever had." Louis Brandeis, The HarvardLaw School,
1 THE GREENBAG 10, 12 (1889).
48. Catalogueofthe Litchfield Law School, quoted in McKENNA, supra note 5, at 85.

49. Few of the Litchfield notebooks have anything other than weekly lectures in them. None
reviewed by the author to date had weekend questions, although it is likely that some of them do. For a
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reasonable assumption that these questions were quite specific, created to measure the
degree with which students could recall specific points of the week's lectures.
In the earliest days of Harvard's law school under Asahel Steams, students were
given oral or written examinations weekly as well as at the end of each text or topic. 0
Written examinations were not apparently required in every course, however. In 1826,
Steams' report to the school's overseers described the system of instruction included
in regular exercises of the school: "1. Recitations and Examinations in several of the
most important text books, such as Blackstone's Commentaries, Cruise on Real
Property,Saunders on Uses, Fearne on Remainders, etc."'"
A final examination, of a kind, was also required, covering the content of the
entire course, in the form of set dissertations. The students were given topics set by the
faculty, which they answered in descriptive essays. The 1820 dissertation questions
were these:
1 - The Rules of Descent and Distribution of Real and Personal Property by the
Civil Law, the Law of England and the Law of Massachusetts.
2 -- The several injuries to which the Heir is liable in relation to his right of
succession to Real Property, and the several remedies by Entry or Action which are
furnished by the laws of England and of Massachusetts.52
After 1829 Judge Story and Professor Greenleaf gave quizzes and examinations
in class, often several times a week, but these examinations were as voluntary as was
class attendance.53 This system persisted through Joel Parker's deanship.'M So, from
1829 to 1871, Harvard seems to have had no formal examination of student
performance that could bar a student from the degree. While this became a criticism
of the program, the absence of exams was obviously not seen by Story, Greenleaf,
as sufficiently
Parsons, and the other lights of mid-nineteenth century Harvard
55
problematic to cause them to institute any tests of greater rigor.
B. The Graduation Examination and Annual Examinations
Of course, that Harvard abandoned the exam did not mean that it was not in
flower elsewhere. The University of Virginia Law School, reorganized in 1829 under
discussion of the notebooks, see Sheppard, supra note 7. The time available in the drafting of this article
did not allow review of the Litchfield notebook holdings in Yale. The publication of a transcribed
Litchfield notebook in the Yale collection is forthcoming.
50. REED, supra note 48, at 357.
51. Asahel Steams, Report to the Overseers, January 9, 1826, quoted in WARREN, supra note 5,
at 334.
52. Report of John Lowell, Chairman of Examination Committee, August 29, 1820, 9 Harvard
College Papers, quoted in WARREN, supra note 5, at 339.

53. ANNUAL REPORT ON HARVARD UNIvERsmTY, 1829-30 xxvmI; ANNuAL REPORT OF THE
UNIVERsrrY OF CAMBRIDGE, 1847-48, 31, cited in REED, supranote 48, at 356 n.3; see also WARREN,
supra note 5, at 434-36; Sheppard, supra note 7.
54. 2 CHARLEs WARREN,A HISTORY OF THE HARvARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF THE EARLIER LEGAL
CONDmONs iN AmERICA 344-45.
55. Parker maintained that the professional examination was a task for the bar, not the schools,
which provided an honorary certification with the degree. JOEL PARKER, ThE LAW SCHOOL OF HARVARD
COLLEGE 32-32 (New York, Herd & Hoffman, 1871); WARREN, supra note 55, at 368-70 n.6.
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John Taylor Lomax, required its graduates not only "to display a competent knowledge
ofthe Common Law and the Law Merchant - embracing generally all of the branches
of what is commonly considered 'municipal law,' [but also] to have passed an
examination in English grammar and literature."' The Virginia exam was tough.
Indeed, during the tenure of John B. Minor, who took up his post in 1845, a candidate
was required to answer five-sixths of the questions on the graduation examination. In
the first ten years of Minor's tenure, only fifty-nine of the 649 students who
matriculated were awarded degrees.57
Examinations in law were necessary for those law schools whose students
benefitted from the diploma privilege and could be admitted to the bar of the schools'
states with no further exam. As schools were granted the right for their graduates to
enter the profession without further examination by the local bar, the schools'
examinations took on the role of both professional certification and justification of the
privilege.5 Thus, Theodore Dwight secured the diploma privilege for Hamilton
College in 1855, under a legislative act allowing the court to appoint a committee of
lawyers to examine Hamilton law students at the school.59 In 1859, Albany Law
School persuaded the New York legislature to designate its own faculty as bar
examiners.' Dwight worked his magic again when he moved to Columbia, not only
securing the diploma privilege for his own school's graduating class of 1860, but also
representing both Columbia and New York University in suits to defend the privilege.6 '
By 1870, nine schools held this privilege in their own states, although Oregon, which
had no law school of its own, extended it to the graduates of everyone else's.62
In carrying out the new obligations of professional bar examiner, the faculties
usually resorted to written exams, as well as daily or weekly quizzes. Thus, the
Columbia course of instruction in 1864 included obligations for the student in two
forms of examination. He must "prepare himself each day upon a subject selected by
the Professor. He is then examined upon the subject studied. Having grappled with
some of its difficulties, he is then prepared for the oral exposition which accompanies
the examination." 6 Further, he was obliged to complete a "pass" or final examination
56. University of Virginia, Faculty Minutes, April 5, 1828, quoted in JOHN RrrCHIE, THE FIRST
YEARS: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA FOR THE PERIOD 1826-1926, 15
(1978).
57. Id at 41. Virginia's exams remained tremendously exacting into this century. In 1901, UVA
HUNDRED

professor Raleigh Minor argued for strenuous standards for all law school graduation exams, even though
"[o]bjection is frequently raised to a high and fixed examination standard" being unjust, particularly

because of the examiner's potential, even if nonexistent, caprices. Raleigh C. Minor, The Graduating
Examinationin the Law School, 7 VA. L. REG. 468, 471 (1901).

58. For a history of the bar exams, see Robert M. Jarvis, An Anecdotal Historyof the Bar Exam,
9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 359 (1996), reprintedin CLOssEN ET AL., HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION
(forthcoming). For a history of the diploma privilege, see James Peden, A History of Law School
Administration, in CLOSSEN ET AL., HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION (forthcoming).
59. N.Y. Laws 1855, c.310 (1855); see also REED, supra note 48, at 251.

60. N.Y. Laws 1859, c.267 (1859); see also REED, supra note 48, at 251.
61. N.Y. Laws 1860, c.202 (1860). Regarding the validity of the privilege for Columbia, see Matter
of Graduates, 10 Abb. Pr. 348 (1860). Regarding New York University's privilege, see In re Cooper,
22 N.Y. 67 (1860).
62. REED, supra note 48, at 252-53 n. 1.
63. Report of the Board of Trustees to the State Regents, 1863, reprintedin A HISTORY OF THE
SCHOOL OF LAW, COLUMBIA UNIVERsrIY 60 (Julius Goebel, ed., 1955) [hereinafter, HISTORY].
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at the close of the senior year, which were held before the Law Committee, a group of
faculty and external examiners, and which lasted for three days.' These examinations
were oral, and "adopted to secure greater familiarity with the subjects in which they had
been instructed, every effort being made to avoid cramming."65 Columbia also held
prize exams administered to students prior to graduation, but which do not appear to
have led to sanction for poor performance," and daily quizzes held under third-year
student tutors.67 There are no apparent records of failures in these exams.
Whether through the influence of law-school examiners on the bar, or bar
examiners on the schools, or both, a strong similarity in question form is evident
between law school exams in the middle of the century with the bar exams. Bar exam
questions in New York as late as 1888, reprinted in part one of the Appendix, mirror
the patterns of the school exams.
That schools with the diploma privilege carried on examinations does not suggest
that this is the only reason for them to do so. Virginia actively sought to avoid such a
privilege, although it continued to require a rigorous exam," and other schools, such
as the St. Louis Law School, began to examine students without such a privilege.
The University of Iowa first required an examination for graduation of its class
matriculating in 1865, a bar-like examination that included not only knowledge of the
law but of character.' Four local attorneys were jointly appointed by the school and
the Iowa Supreme Court as examiners, who held, apparently, oral examinations over
three days. The earliest known written record of Iowa's exams is that of its Fall 1868
examinations. These were held on two days in its fall term, with two more
supplementary days of exams of fall material given in January of the following year.7"
Each question was an elemental inquiry, requiring a recitation of a term, definition, or
specification of a legal doctrine, and each exam drew questions from several topics of
law. The first day's examination consisted of fifteen questions, which include
intermingled questions of constitutional law, property, contracts, and commercial
paper:
1.
2.
3.

What are the sources of the Law of Nations?
When have the Federal Courts jurisdiction in common law cases?
What are the sources of municipal law in this country?

64. Id. at 62; REED, supra note 48, at 356.
65. Theodore W. Dwight, Columbia College Law School, New York, 1THE GREEN BAG 141, 152
(1889).
66. Id, at 154.
67. Id. at 157.
68. The diploma privilege statute passed in Virginia in 1842 allowed graduates of the College of
William and Mary and of the University of Virginia to enter the bar based solely on their law school
diplomas. This statute was repealed in 1849 at the request of Virginia's Professor John B. Minor, who
argued that the law school and its graduates would be better off if the students' "fitness to practice law
should be tested in the same way with students in private offices or in private law schools."
COMMONWEALTH oF VIRGINIA,

REPORT OF THE REvisoRs

824 (1849), quoted in REED, supra note 48, at

350.
69. Helen S. Moylan, Note, A ManuscriptRecord of the Early Days ofthe Iowa Law School, 22

IowAL. REv. 108, 109 (1936).
70. List of Questions Propounded at Examination, Fall Term,in Journal of William G. Hammond

58 (Special Collection, University of Iowa Law School Library). This journal is described more fully in
Moylan, supra note 70, at 108.
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4.
5.
6.
7.
S.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
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State the absolute rights of persons, and define each.
What constitutes a valid marriage at common law?
What interest had the husband at common law in each kind of his wife's
property?
When is a father responsible for his child's contracts and torts?
State the distinction between real and personal property.
What are the essential elements of a valid contract?
What did the Statute of Frauds provide?
Define a bailment, and enumerate the various kinds.
What is the difference between a bill of exchange and a promissory note?
What is an easement?
State the difference between the present legal rights of [a] mortgagee, and
those he had at common law.
What are the chief differences between our rules of descent and those of the
common law?7

The second day's exam included questions, similarly constructed, touching on civil
procedure and trial evidence, contracts, torts, and crimes. This exam's first question
was a question of case reading, "What is an issue, and how is it to be reached?"'
These questions followed instruction by Professors Hammond and Cole with student
readings assigned in Kent's Commentaries, Stephen on Pleading, the Iowa Code of
1860, and Greenleaf on Evidence. Professor Hammond's Torts lectures appear not to
have corresponded to a particular book.' Iowa's supplemental exams, given half on
January 16 and half on January 30 of the next term, included more questions of a
similar style, drawn from similar topics of law, but on a slightly more sophisticated
plane. These are the questions of the first day:
1.
2.
3.

8.

State the difference between the Law of Nature and the Law of Nations.
Who are entitled to the rights of the native-born citizens of the U.S.?
Of what do the written and the unwritten law of this country severally
consist?
What are the powers belonging to a corporation as such?
When & how far is a husband liable for his wife's debts?
When is the endorser of a note liable upon it?
How does a fee differ from a freehold, and what are the different kinds of
fees?
How does a mortgage differ from a conditional sale?

9.

Define each of these terms, reversion, vested remainder, contingent

10.
11.

remainder.
What are the essential parts of a deed.
What do we mean by recording a deed, and what will be the effect of
omitting to record it?

4.
5.
6.
7.

12.

What is a noncupative will, & when is it valid?

13.
14.

How may a will be revoked?
What is the difference between the English rules of descent, and the
American?

71. Journal of William G. Hammond 58 (Special Collection, University of Iowa Law School
Library).
72. Id.
73. Moylan, supra note 70, at 110-11.
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What is the right of eminent domain?74

Questions of the second day were based largely in pleading, evidence, tort, and
crimes."

The University of Chicago Law School, opening in 1859, required examinations
of its students prior to graduation, and the exams were first given over three days in
July of 1861.6 Similarly, the St. Louis Law School, of Washington University in St.
Louis, required an examination of the students of its first entering class, in 1867.7
These students took not only termly exams that were written and graded by the
professors but also graduation exams given at the end of the second year that were
written and graded by an outside board of lawyers and judges.78 Boston University
Law School, opening its doors to the many who sought to avoid the Harvard case
method in 1872, commenced its instruction with both annual and graduation
examinations. 79
The idea ofthe annual or termly examination as the sole method of evaluation did
not, however, gain universal acceptance, and many schools continued to hold weekly
or daily examinations. The University of Michigan established a general examination
in 1860,' but it also hired recent graduates and young lawyers, called "quizmasters,"
who oversaw daily oral and written examinations of the material covered in earlier
lectures, beginning in 1859." These oral exams became increasingly rigorous over the
years,2 and, by 1883, students were barred by poor performance from promotion to the
second year."3
74. Id. at 59.
75. Id.

76. The ChicagoDaily Tribune of July 1, 1862, reported the content of the examination questions
in detail. The property question entailed a fair portion of Washburn's property treatise, which was the
assigned text:
The intricate questions as to real estate were extremely well handled. In connection
therewith, the various modes of holding property, from feudal days down to our own times,
were closely examined and contiasted, and peculiar relations of lessors, lessees, tenants for
life, tenants at will, and the various modes of conveyancing, fully considered. The
'multitudinous questions arising out of wills, divorces, and the rights of husbands in the
property of wives were next entered into. The subjects of dower and jointure were treated.
quoted in James E. Babb, Union College ofLaw, Chicago, 1 THE GREEN BAG 330,337 (1889).
77. REED, supra note 49, at 357. Charles Warren believed that this was the first law school
examination in the country to be required for a degree. WARREN, supranote 5, at 364 n. 1.
78. Charles C.Allen, The St. Louis Law School, 1 THE GREEN BAG 283, 285, 287-88 (1889). For
examples of the questions of the examiners, which are not unlike those of the Iowa exam described above,
see

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, CATALOGUE WITH MOOT COURT AND EXAMINATION

1882-83 (1882).
79. George W. Swasey, Boston UniversityLaw School, I THE GREEN BAG 54, 58 (1889).
80. ELIZABETH GASPAR BROWN, LEGAL EDUCAION AT MICHGAN 1859-1959, 740 (University of
Michigan Law School, 1959).
81. Id. at 192-94.
82. An example of the written questions of the quizzes appears to be found in the numerous quiz
books that came from Michigan during this era. See, e.g., CHARLES CLINTON WALSH, THE STUDENT'S
QUIZ BOOK, CONTAINiNG QUESTIONS, ANSWERS AND A HISTORY OF THE LEADING CASES IN ANSON ON
PAPERS FOR THE ScHOOL YEAR

ComiRAS AND

BLACKSTONE,

As TAUGHT BY

THE PROFESSORS IN THE MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL

(1892).

83. University of Michigan Law School, Announcement 1885-1886, quoted in BROWN, supranote
81, at 197.
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This form of dual evaluation, of frequent quizzing with annual or graduation
examinations, was not uncommon in many schools toward the last quarter of the
century. Iowa's curriculum, designed by William Hammond, required quizzing, three
termly final exams, and a graduation exam." Cornell held daily examinations in all of
its lecture classes, particularly in its elementary law class, as well as termly and
graduation exams.' Penn held frequent examinations as well as a graduation exam."
Columbia's combination of daily quizzes, annual prize exams, and graduation exams,
has been discussed. 7
III. THE AMERICAN EXAMINATION, PART IT: EXAMINATIONS OF
THE CASE SCIENTISTS
Famously, the 1870's saw the advent of the case method of instruction, starting
first at Harvard under the aegis of Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell. At the same
time, Harvard reintroduced examinations.' The exams that accompanied case method
instruction came, fairly quickly, to emulate the style of instruction, with examinations
built around full-blooded essay questions of a complexity that increased over time.
Over the century from 1870, these questions have placed a greater emphasis on
developing the facts that might lead to a decision, on identifying the various doctrines
that would govern those facts, on demonstrating the rationale of the doctrine and the
manner in which it applies to the facts, and on an expectation that the student might
criticize the rightness of the application of the doctrines that would seemingly govern
the outcome.
These essay questions have required an increasing depth of analysis of fewer
issues and subjects. The questions represent increasingly complicated choices by the
examiners in the method of evaluation, sometimes requiring a greater portion of the
anser to be occupied by policy analysis and criticism than by recitation or application
of the applicable rules. For these reasons, and because of the influence of the bar
exams, the essays have been augmented with the addition ofbatteries of short machinescorable "objective" questions, which were initially true-false and then multiple choice.
Student performance on these end-of-term exams, whether or not they include
shorter or machine-scorable questions, form the basis, almost universally in this
century, of grades. The grades are, of course, averaged, allowing a student to be placed
in rank order among other students, as well as given honors, allowed to graduate, or
asked to leave.

84. Emlin McClain, Law Departmentof the State University oflowa, I THE GREEN BAG 374,383-

84 (1889).
85. Harry B. Hutchins, The Cornell University School of Law, I THE GREEN BAG 473, 484-85

(1889).
86. C. Stuart Patterson, The Law School ofthe Universityof Pennsylvania, I THE GREEN BAG 99,
107 (1889).
87. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
88. The case method is well-known to any survivor of the modem law school. Its dawn at Harvard
and pre-dawn antecedents are described in Sheppard, supranote 7; see also WaIlAM P. LAPANA, LOGIC
&EXPERmENCE: THE OIGIN OF MODERN AMERCAN LEGAL EDUCATION (1994).
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A. From Quiz to Hypothetical Essay
Alfred Reed described Harvard's renewed use of annual exams as being made
under the influence of the English examination movement and, perhaps, in recognition
of disappointing bar exam performances by its graduates.8 The Harvard Law School
Circular of 1871 announced that the LL.B. would only be conferred upon
students who shall pass satisfactory examinations in all the required subjects and
in at least seven of the elective subjects,' after having been in the School for not
less than one year ....
The examinations for a degree will be ofa thorough and searching character,
but will be limited in scope to the ground covered by the instruction given in the
School in the several subjects.9
This announcement "came upon the public as an innovation of a most startling
character."' These exams were first administered between June 14 and 22, 1871.
Printed questions were submitted in June to the candidates, covering all the
principal topics of Law and Equity. These questions they were required to answer
in writing; the answers being written in the presence of some member of the
faculty, without consultation with other persons or with books.
The examinations occupied six days, and judging by the questions and by
such of the written answers as have been inspected .... it was an honest and
thorough test of the acquirements of the student."
A critical facet of the newly reconstituted Harvard exam was not only that it
served as a guide to student progress, but also that it could be a bar to further
attendance or receipt of the degree. With the 1872 exams, students who failed to pass
the first-year exam were made ineligible for the degree, even though the degree would
not have been conferred until the end of the second year.' In 1872, twenty-six students
89. REED, supranote 48, at 174, 357. For the institution of exams, see JOEL PARKER, supra note
55. For the timing of the exams with the institution of bar exams in Massachusetts, see ROBERT STEVENS,
LEGAL EDUCATION INAmERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s,

94-95 (1983). The state of affairs prior

to the reinstitution of exams is described by Louis Brandeis. "[Priorto 1875, any person who had for

three terms or eighteen months been enrolled as a member of the school was entitled to a degree without
having necessarily attended a lecture or passed an examination." Brandeis, supra note 48, at 18.
90. Required courses were real property, personal property, contracts, torts, criminal law and
procedure, civil procedure at common law, and evidence. Elective courses were (Commercial law) Sales
of Personal Property, Real Property, Evidence, Domestic Relations, Marriage and Divorce, Wills and
Administrations, Bailments, Agency, Partnership, Shipping and Admiralty, Insurance, Debtor and Creditor
including Bankruptcy, Jurisdiction & Equity Procedure, Principal and Surety, Corporations, Conflicts of
Law, and Constitutional Law. Circularofthe School ofLaw, 1870-1872 (Harvard University Law School

Special Collections, Red Set).
91. Id., quoted in WARREN, supra note 55, at 365.
92. Id. at 364.
93. Report of the Visiting Committee, October 1871, reprintedin WARREN, supranote 55, at 377-

78.
94. A critical effect of the examination requirements was effectively to enhance the residence
requirement of the law school. In 1878, Harvard extended its examination requirement to successful
completion of each of the annual exams inall three years. By 1889, only seven men of the eighty-six who
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sat for the first-year exams, of whom nineteen passed but seven failed, disqualifying
them for further study."5 Passing a first-year exam required performance of at least
seventy percent, and students could fail no more than two of the subject-specific
exams.' In the 1871 second-year exams, which qualified for the degree, thirty-one had
been examined; twenty-eight passed and three failed. This pattern continued in 1873,
when forty-six of the fifty-six first-year examinees passed.97
Dean Langdell's exams followed the pattern of examinations in England, as well
as in Litchfield, Columbia, and Iowa, in asking specific questions to measure specific
knowledge of points of law. Thus, in 1871, typical questions from the exams were
quite in keeping with the earlier models. Each question is designed to elicit a specific
rule or law or definition. Agency questions included mere recognition of limits on
capacity for agency of infants and married women," and corporations, equity, and
property questions all included demands for simple definitions." This form of specific
question was soon modified by the questions propounded by Langdell's faculty, if not
by himself.
In his collection of examinations published in 1899, Northwestern Professor John
Wigmore argued that the "most fair and practical test of the results of a law-student's
work, and of his capacity to apply his knowledge and to give sound legal advice to
future clients, is an examination consisting of practical problems in the form of
concrete hypothetical cases."100 Wigmore gave the credit for implementing these
problems as the exclusive basis for an examination paper to James Barr Ames, in his
1873 examinations.' 0 '
In Harvard's 1878 exams, while Langdell's style remained as of old, and John
Chipman Gray used hypotheticals on an earlier model, James Barr Ames was casting
his questions in brief and more dramatic hypothetical. Langdell demanded a recitation
of the use a particular pleading. Gray's exam was something between the extremes of
Langdell and Ames, asking a more narrow question that would not have been out of
place on the older English bar exams, designed to elicit an opinion on behalf ofa sheep
farmer.l" Meanwhile, Ames has his students advise an employer about actions against
a Lothario who seduced the employer's servant, making her leave his employ. Ames
had set the stage for a the use of a number of specific facts for the application of a
particular rule, which was not in itself novel. What made his stage important was to
place the student in the role of acting in the drama. He made the student the lawyer, not
sat for the first year exams, and no one in the upper years, had not attended regular law school classes in
Harvard. See REED, supra note 48, 174 n. 1.
95. Christopher C. Langdell, Report 1871-1872, reprinted in WARREN, supra note 55, at 385 n. 1.

96. These standards were set by faculty vote on June 24, 1872.

WARREN,

supra note 55, at 385

n.2.
97. Id Such pass/fail ratios were not uncommon. Hastings College of Law examinees in the late
1880's fared similarly. In 1886, twenty-five seniors passed and five failed; in 1887, the ratio was twentyone passed to three; in 1888 twenty-five passed to three, and in 1889 eleven passed but two were advised
not to appear. Similar academic attrition occurred in lower-class annual exams. Charles W. Slack,
Hastings College of the Law, 1THE GREEN BAG 518 (1889).
98. See Appendix, part 2.
99. Id
100. JoHN H. WIGMORE, EXAmnATIONS ni LAw: CoNSISTING OF PRACICAL PROBLEMS AND CAsES

COMPLED FROM PAPERs CoNTRBuED BY VARous LAW ScHooLs iii (Chicago. Callahan & Co., 1899).
101. Id
102. See Appendix, part 2.
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merely the expositor of the law. In this way, the hypothetical essay question came,
perhaps ironically, to resemble the moot court arguments of the early Inns. By giving
the hypothetical characters a more human dimension, and by adding sufficient details
to tailor the result to the problem assigned, the "practicality," which Wigmore cheered
was achieved.
With Ames's hypothetical problems also came a greater range for student
creativity became possible, including the pursuit of some ability to criticize the law or
to discuss matters of policy. One sees questions of policy interjected into James
Bradley Thayer's exams of 1887, which are profoundly evident in the significantly
more fact-intensive questions he propounded in 1890."3
Thus, within the first decade of its re-employment at Harvard, the most essential
ideas of the modem essay question had appeared and become the norm. Wigmore
claimed that this exam style had, within ten years, become nearly universal in "a dozen
schools."' 4 One of the most important features of the new Harvard-exam was that it
not only determined whether students passed or failed but that it was graded. 5
Under the leadership of Harvard poachee William Keener, Columbia's exams
took on the character of the Harvard models, adapting them somewhat but employing
both the short hypothetical and policy question, emphasizing the rationale for any
conclusion. These questions were interspersed with questions in the older style
demanding definition or explanation of specific points of law. The Spring 1894 exams
illustrate this point nicely.'0 6
First-year students were examined in separate exams on the elements of
jurisprudence, contracts, and equity on May 24; common law pleading and practice on
May 28; criminal law on May 29; torts on May 31; persons and domestic relations on
June 4; real and personal property on June 5. Each examination begins with the
italicized instruction, "Give your reasons for every answer." Second- and third-year
students were examined on a similar schedule in their respective courses.
Some questions are clearly willing to represent unusual behavior for the purpose
of eliciting an application of particular doctrines, such as the first question in equity.
"1. A, who has already assaulted B, threatens to assault him daily and to enter upon his
lands for that purpose if it is necessary. What are B's rights?"'0 7 The examination in
first-year property is in a style typical of the other exams, and several of its questions
are reproduced in the Appendix. It consists of three printed pages of nine questions.
Two questions require specific doctrinal information to be related, mainly in the extent
of current application of ancient doctrines. The other seven are hypotheticals
presenting a set of facts among parties, from which the student is to ascertain the
claims and defenses of various parties, including those rooted in minority doctrines,
103. Id
104. WIGMORE, supra note 101. Wigmore noted that he drew his six-hundred-odd pages of exam
examples from all of the schools known to him to employ the hypothetical question. Id These included,
in 1899, Cambridge, Colorado, Cornell, Harvard, Illinois, Iowa, NYU, Northwestern, Penn, and Oxford.
105. REED, supra note 48, at 357.
106. COLUMBIA COLLEGE, SCHooLOF LAw ExAmNATION PAPERS FOR THE ACADEMIC YEAR 1893-94
(Woodbridge, Connecticut, Research Publications, 19th-century legal treatises, no. 52235). These exams
are typical of the national trend at the time. See, e.g., EXAMINATIONS INLAw, CONSISNG OF PRACrICAL
PROBLEMS AND CASES COMPILED FROM PAPERS CONTRIBUTED BY VARious LAW SCHooLS (John Henry

Wigmore, ed., 1899).
107. COLUMBIA COLLEGE, supra note 103, at 15.
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always giving "reasons for your answers." Each of these questions tends to require the
application of several doctrines.
The new-fangled annual examination approach to the degree was not, however,
readily and universally embraced. For instance Yale, during the 1880s, responded to
what its dean saw as Harvard's over-reliance on an otherwise unchecked examination
system." Yale allowed office study to count toward time required for its law degree,
and it gave a law degree to a student with one year's study, if that student had already
passed a state bar exam.'°9
Other programs, unaffected by the squabbles of the East coast, continued to
employ a graduation exam rather than an annual exam." ° Hastings, under the rule of
John Norton Pomeroy, required an examination at the close of the third year, covering
topics from all three years, with an emphasis on recognition of doctrine rather than
applications to facts."' Thus, an 1882 Hastings question in constitutional law asked
Has the State of California, or any other State, power by statute to prevent Chinese
or other foreigners from coming within the State to reside? Give the reasons for
your answer. Where does the power of exclusion reside? Assuming that there are
no treaties concerning the subject, has or has not the United States Government the
power, under the International Law, to prevent the people of any foreign country
from coming to and residing within the limits of the United States?"'
The graduation examination continued in fitful popularity well into this century,
popular because it could serve as a bar examination in itself and because it resembled
the comprehensive examinations of graduate students in other academic departments
of the university. In 1931, Cornell instituted a comprehensive examination at the end
of its third year. The test was partly oral and partly written, and it was often drawn
with elective questions that emphasized areas in which the student had performed
poorly in the preceding five series of semester examinations."3 This era seems to have
one in which law comps. test were popular, judged at least by one attack against
them." 4 As well as the graduation exam, some schools continued to rely on the
effectively "comprehensive" bar examinations rather than internal examinations as
their tests of fitness." 5
108. Simeon E. Baldwin, Graduate Courses at Law Schools, 11 J. Soc. Sci. 123 (1880).

109. REED, supra note 48, at 174-75. Yale did, however, administer examinations in the course of
its regular lectures, at least in 1889. See Leonard M. Daggett, The Yale Law School, 1 THE GREEN BAG
239, 250 (1889).
110. Tulane, for example, appears to have required its graduates to complete a "searching, accurate,
and extended" exam after the "improved method of modem professional education." Lamar C. Quintero,
The Law School of the Tulane University of Louisiana,2 THE GREEN BAG 116, 118 (1890).
111.

THOMAS

G. BARNES,

HASTINGS COuLEGE OF THE LAW:

THE FIRsT CENTURY 115 (1978).

112. EXAMINATION PAPERS FOR SENIOR CLASS 1882 ON CoNsTrnnoNAL LAW, (Bancroft Library,
Keith papers, shelf mark CB595 (carton 3)) quoted in BARNES, supra note 108, at 115.
113. Charles K. Burdick, The Comprehensive Examinationat Cornell,7AM. L SCH. REv. 1124
(1934).
114. Francis W. Jacob, Comprehensive Examinations in Law Schools, 7AM. L SCH. REv. 1133
(1934).
115. In 1889, the newly-opened Buffalo Law School required essays in certain courses, but it seems
to have given no examinations; its graduates merely passed the state bar exam. See Charles P. Norton, The
Buffalo Law School, I THE GREEN BAG 421, 435-36 (1889).
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By the turn ofthe century, the procedure of annual examination had spread among
law schools, in part because of the influence of the American Association of Law
Schools. At the Association's first meeting, Virginia Professor Raleigh C. Minor
argued for the written examination as a requirement for law school graduation.'16 In
the 1903 AALS meeting, St. Louis Law School Professor William Curtis described the
parameters of the contemporary examination."' The exam for a given subject should
last three or four hours and not much longer to avoid it becoming an endurance test for
the students. He was also concerned that the exam receive neither a perfunctory nor a
long-delayed review.
Necessarily, then, the examination cannot extend beyond ten to twenty questions,
supposing, of course, the questions to be carefully prepared in presenting concrete
problems for the application of principles as well as calling for abstract rules and
definitions. With fifteen questions the examiner, I contend, may test the student's
knowledge of any one of the well-known topics in which the law finds itself
divided. With a class of from fifty to seventy-five, the examiner cannot well report
the results short of a week or ten days, employing his fragments of time, or of fortyeight hours in case he does nothing else. Long-delayed examinations are8 as great
a nuisance as long-delayed decisions, and for much the same reason."
Clearly, the questions Curtis had in mind were not dissimilar to the early Iowa
questions or to Ames' Harvard questions, a group of fifteen or so specific questions of
reasonable simplicity designed to identify, or to identify and apply, discrete knowledge
of particular doctrines of law. One of the more important of Curtis's observations
clearly applies no matter the form of the question, that the students should have
feedback following the exam. He argued that individual students should be told the
percentage of performance, with a mark on each question, not merely a pass or fail for
the whole, because the student has a right to know both the nature of his error and the
idiosyncrasies of the examiner. Further, he suggested that all of the papers written by
the class should be accessible, so that students can compare answers and marks." 9
One last component ofthe examination process was, perhaps, inevitable with the
raised stakes the exam represented, the institution of standards against cheating. Law
schools responded through the use of proctors to0 observe students in examination
2
rooms and through the adoption of honor codes.

116. Raleigh C. Minor, The GraduatingExamination,in AMERICANAssoCITiONOF LAW SCHOOLS,

(1901).
117. William S. Curtis,Examinationsin Law Schools, in AMERICAN ASSOCATION OFLAW SCHOOLS,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD ANNUAL MEETING 41 (1903).
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST ANNuAL MEETNG 41

118. Id at 43-44.
119. Id
120. See William Draper Lewis, The Honor System ofConducting Examinations in Law Schools,

5 AM. L. ScH.REv. 454 (1910). For an example of the preference for honor codes, see William Minor
Lile, The HonorSystem, 5 AM. L. SCH. REV. 456 (1910), describing the adoption of Henry St. George
Tucker's honor code at UVA in 1842, which required each candidate to certify on his examination
answers, "I,A.B., do hereby certify on honor that I have derived no assistance during the time of this
examination from any source whatever, whether oral or written or inprint, ingiving the above answers."
Id at 457. Lile's support for this system was unequivocal. When asked whether he believed inthe honor
system, he replied, "Yes, as I do in the Christian religion." Id at 456.
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As the mechanics of the exam began to reach a rough uniformity, the exams
themselves did so, too. Through the first half of the twentieth century, an apparently
uncoordinated but national transformation took place in the evolution of the essay
questions. Slowly over the century, particularly in the years following the second world
war, the forms of the essay exam evolved. Various customs grew up, as schools
adopted local icons to replace, or at least supplement the venerable exam characters,
the widow X, the son Y, and the devisee Z, or seller A, buyer B, and squatter C, who
had so often had their rights to Blackacre and Whiteacre, located in the neverland ofthe
common law assessed. In their place, Harvard examinees found themselves in the State
of Ames, and Columbia's discovered their practice was in the State of Kent, as students
of other schools moved in similarly mythic states and, as often, in real ones, to
represent clients with ascribed names rather than letters.
Harvard exam questions collect in part two of the Appendix illustrate this
transition. The questions of the 1870's move from stale statements of A sells to B in
order to locate, gratuitously, the parties in Boston, New York, and Concord. By 1890,
the parties to the hypotheticals include not just A, B, X, and "the owner" or "the
carrier" but "The Corporation of Harvard College" and William Kemmler, the first
convict to be executed in the electric chair. By 1935, the hypotheticals regularly include
names or real and fictitious clients, decedents, beneficiaries, contractors, and so on, in
a tremendously rich factual environment. By 1956, the exam questions include
hypothetical statutes, and are . Rather well established in the pattern apparent in the
survey of recent examinations in part five.
Similar patterns of evolution are apparent in the sample exam questions from
Columbia, in Appendix part three, and Michigan in Appendix part four. Among the
innovations in these examples, Karl Llewellyn's clear allowance for the student to alter
or complete the hypothetical deserves special mention. His 1928 exam typically
requires the student to "State any facts you find it desirable to assume." This
instruction has become a commonplace, and a typical example of its current use is in
Steven Shifflin's exam in Appendix part five.
A modern question often demands the students to work with complex facts, which
disguise multitudes of claims and defenses. The student must isolate the issues
involved and perform a variety of forms of analysis in order to give reasoned support
for conclusions about the interests ofthe hypothetical parties. Moreover, the questions
themselves have grown more complicated and lengthy. Fact patterns began to include
facts that were unnecessary to resolve the issues designed for student evaluation; they
began to acquire red herrings. 2 '
In response to this complexity, students both became more prolix and resorted to
numerous artifices to give the appearance ofscrutiny to the question and ofrecollection
and reason in its reply.' In response, time, space, word, and page limits were devised,
121. Dean Goodrich defended the red herring in 1931.
We cannot, in an examination, test the man's ability to dig out information and get together
the factual material he needs. But we can test his ability to analyze his facts by giving him
a more elaborate story than he needs, and watching his selection of the legally significant
material out of it. That kind of test is worth making, although it cannot be done in every
question for the practical reason that it takes too long a time.
Herbert F. Goodrich, Law Schools and Bar Examiners 18 A.B.A. J. 101, 103 (1932).
122. Some unfortunately accurate depictions of putative student responses to a modern question are
presented in C. Steven Bradford, The Gettysburg Address as Written by Law Students Taking an Exam,
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which both required the student to prioritize arguments and allowed the professor a
shorter reading time in the evaluation. Harlan Fiske Stone threatened wordy students
with a reduced grade, a penalty often asserted by his successors. Among the more
entertaining solutions to student prolixity are admonitions to emphasize issue
designation and legal reasoning over mere prose, such as Llewellyn's instruction to
"Thinkfirst,and don't write until you see where you aregoing." This instruction is
compounded by his caveat that he would grade the questions on the structure of the
analyses more than on their fullness, "It is not necessary to finish any question. State
the law before you discuss or criticize it."
A signal degree of comparison in the form of exam instruction is that between the
exams prior to the 1960's with many of those collected in part 5, offered over the last
several years. Besides admonitory language such as LarryTribe's "Concise answers
will be rewarded in grading; unduly long answers will be penalized," he gives
instructions on legible handwriting and clear typing. Similar instructions are given by
Frank Michelman. These are brief compared to the instructions given by Ronald
Rotunda at Illinois, which include similar concerns for clear thought and good
organization, along with requests to be polite when leaving the examination room. It
seems certain that the greater degree of specificity in these instructions is in response
to occurrences within institutions, which in turn provoke clarifying instruction. If this
is so, some unusual insight to student behavior in the examination room may be
gleaned from such clarifications.
Beginning in the early years of the twentieth century, political, or at least
theoretical, ideology began to be seen as a basis for examination. In Laura Kalman's
study of legal realism at Yale, she noted that most of the realists' exams were
conservative, or typical of the exams then used nationally. Even so, she noted that
Morris Cohen's and Harold Laski's jurisprudence finals tended to be more daring. In
1930, Cohen required students to "state and criticize various views as to what law is
and what it should be.- When is a case wrongly decided? Indicate the relation of a
science of law to the social sciences, to logic, to ethics, and to psychology."" z In 1931,
Laski asked his administrative law students to illustrate and discuss the gobbet, "[i]n
a field where every case involves a multitude of pertinent elements which vary in
importance from case to case it is impossible to find the criteria out of which legal rules
emerge." Such concerns for policy in the Yale exams were not unusual, as in Fred
Rodell's 1939 exam question, asking for criticism or defense of this: "It is practically
useless to pass a pro-labor statute in these United States. The courts will emasculate
it .... They already have."' 24
A later, and more common, approach combines require the student to
deomonstrate both substantive evaluation and critical theory in providing a case for the
student to analyze either as clerk or justice. A classic example of this genre is question
one of Herbert Wechlser's 1976 Constitutional Law exam, reproduced in full in part
three of the Appendix.
The desire to increase the effectiveness of the exam as a tool for evaluation, and
the desire to do so more efficiently, and sometimes a wild-eyed desire to fiddle around
have led professors into the design of numerous experimental questions. There have,
of course, been experiments in question design that have failed. In the 1928-29
86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1094 (1992).
123. LAuPA KALmAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960,95 (1986).
124. Id. at 96.
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academic year, Leon Green reportedly set a Torts examination at Yale in which he
posed eight complex hypotheticals and directed the students to list the questions posed
by the problems but not to attempt to answer them. As Arthur Corbin related the story,
"[h]ow happy that made the young pups! And how miserable they made Green. Not
even the best ones, or Green himself, would know all the questions."2 5 Green may
have merely used Corbin's contracts grades for126the same students instead of compiling
his own grades from the botched torts exam.
Despite such experimentation, which continues somewhat, there is a profound
similarity in the construction of the essay questions offered by different professors in
different faculties in American schools. The examinations collected in part five of the
Appendix were chosen somewhat randomly, albeit from schools of national influence
that distribute their exams. While there are differing emphases among them, there are
dramatically more frequent similarities. Examinees are given a story, a narrative
requiring the recognition of particularly appropriate legal doctrines, enunciation of the
component requirements of the doctrines, application of those components to the
myriad facts, which must be prioritized so that irrelevant facts are discarded, and, often
criticism or extrapolation of the current rule.
The modem essay question was described by Tulane Professor Ferdinand Stone
in his popular 1952 Handbook ofLaw Study as a test, not of knowledge of the law, but
of its use. The essays are designed not to reward memorization but to reward
application, which itself requires memory of the law being applied." 7 Such advice to
students has been often echoed, not least in Stanley Kinyon's currently popular West

125. Letter From Arthur L. Corbin to Karl Llewellyn, (Dec. 1, 1960) (Llewellyn Papers, University
of Chicago Archives), quoted in KALMAN, supra note 117, at 261 n. 113.
126. Id Lewis Becker, at Villanova, describes a war-horse story of an experimental question failure.
There is the probably apocryphal story of the professor whose examination question was: "Write an
appropriate examination question for this course." The student response in the examination booklet was,
"Write an appropriate examination question in this course." The student's answer is either an A or an F.
Electronic Mail from Lewis Becker to Steve Sheppard, dated December 13, 1996. Notably, many stories
of failed experiments in exams seem to be located in Yale, such as this one from John-Mark Stensvaag.
Some Yale Professor apparently had an essay fact pattern in torts (or some such thing) concluding with
the question "Can the Plaintiff recoverT Earlier, in the exam instructions, this teacher had said something
like "the shorter the answer the better." One brash student turned ina bluebook with a single word: "Yes".
This student got an "F". When the student complained to the teacher, sputtering about the
instructions-"the shorter the answer the better"-the teacher brought the student up short: "There was
nothing wrong with the brevity of your response. The problem was that a shorter, and accurate answer
would have been: 'No'!" Electronic mail, John-Mark Stensvaag, of the University of Iowa College of
Law, to Steve Sheppard, December 12, 1996.
127. FERDINAND F. STONE, HANDBOOK OF LAW STUDy 134-37(1952). For an argument to the
contrary, recognizing the benefits of repetitious, ungrammatical misspelled, incomplete, and disorganized
answers, see Jerry Phillips, Thirteen Rulesfor Taking Law Exams, 24 J.LEGAL EDUC. 76 (1971).
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Nutshell, Introductionto Law Study andLaw Examinations.'s The specific details
of this "use" are, though, sometimes the subject of disagreement.
One of the more careful expositions of examination performance, by Philip
Kissam, suggests that the blue book grade measures more than just use. Rather, he
concluded that blue book performance measures more a series of work-performance
capabilities.
Successful performance on Blue Book exams appears to require some imprecise
combination of four complex but general attributes. I call these attributes the
internalization of doctrine; conventional legal imagination; the quality of legal
productivity; and the capacity for self-study and self- learning in diffuse, complex,
and uncertain situations. 29
There have been occasional paeans to the modem hypothetical essay question as
a measure of, or a mismeasure of, the student's ability to make a lawyerly application
of the subject matter ofthe course to a particular problem. 3 The heart of this process
of application is multi-faceted, although there is some continuity in the merit of each
facet. In 1931, the Dean of Penn, Herbert Goodrich, quoted the New York board of bar
examiners' instructions to candidates as a model of the component tasks of any essay
examinee.
The answer should show: A recognition of the problems; an analysis of the
material facts; the doctrine of law applicable thereto; the solution, and the different
steps of reasoning relied on by the applicant to support his solution. Clearness of
expression and conciseness of statement will count. The applicant should confine
himself to the particular problem presented and should not volunteer information
that is not material to the solution. The value of an answer depends not upon its
length, nor upon the mere correctness of conclusion, but upon the evidence it
displays of the elements above mentioned.
Unnecessary length and verbosity
3
detract from the value of an answer.'
128. STANLEY KINYON, INTRODUCION TO LAW STUDY AND LAW ExAMINATIONs (1971). This
pamphlet is the successor to Lawrence Vold's Suggestions on Studying Law and Writing Law
Examinations, which was also published by West. Void presents models of sucessful and unsuccessful
essay answers in Types of Essay Law Examination Answers - Good and Bad, 3 HASTINGS L.J. 85
(1951).

Of course, the desire of the student taking the test is restricted in many cases merely to passing
the damned test rather than incommandingly demonstrating the knowledge sought by the examiner. See
Louis B.Schwartz, How To Pass Law School Examinations, IIJ. LEGAL EDuc. 223 (1958) (noting that,
while some students have passed without knowing anything about the subject, it would be a mistake to
assume that ignorance is helpful).
129. Philip C. Kissam, Law School Examinations, 42 VAND. L. REv. 433, 458 (1989). This
concern contrasts with earlier, more assured statements of what the examiner seeks in evaluating a blue
book. See Frank J. Trelease, Panel: What Examination Techniques Best Test Legal Capabilities?
CriteriaofGrading,23 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 118 (1950)
130. See, e.g., Edwin W.Hadley, Law Teachingand Problem Analysis, 3 CASE AND COMMENT 2
(1932).
131. Goodrich, supranote 115, at 103. Dean Goodrich went on to characterize this task: "What we
want to get at, then, is the examinee's ability to handle legal problems; to tear his set of facts apart, dissect
out the problems and build up a solution, either inthe form of a legal opinion, or a plan for action on the
part of the client." Id.
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Throughout this century there has been an increasing pattern ofprofessors writing

their tests alone, although this practice is still not universal.'32 Even so, professors still
very rarely provide feedback or evaluation of the final examination essay. Indeed, in
many schools, return of the students' examination answers to the students is rare.'33
Exams have been given with greater concern for time between one exam and another.'"
Examinations have become anonymous. 3 ' One other development in examination
administration in recent years is the growth of technology, primarily in allowing or
on computers and in using multimedia
requiring students to perform examinations
13 6
components of the test construction.
There are differing views as to the reliability of essay grading as an objective
measure of student performance. 3 ' In Ben Wood's experiments at Columbia in the
1920s, there was greater variation among student performance on essay question
Even so, in an
performance than there was in the answer of true-false questions.'
LSAC study twenty years later, seventeen contracts law professors in the study tended
to agree on their evaluations of any typical essay. This result may not say so much
about the particular exactitude of law professors; that same study showed that
non-lawyers39tended to also assign the same grades to the essays that the professors
gave them. 1

One other function that the essay question performs is to guide future student
review to emphasize applications of the law to particular situations rather than rote
memorization. This, along with encouraging professorial emulation, motivated
Wigmore's decision to publish a comprehensive collection of exams in 1899.40
Moreover, many law schools make institutional provision for universal access of their
students to past exams, a practice that seems to have become relatively common at the
beginning of the twentieth century.'" Columbia published and distributed bound
132. See examples in the Appendix. There is an increasingly common practice of inter-school
borrowing of exam questions, brought about by the exchange of questions through the Internet. It must
be stressed that the mere fact, however, that two professors use the same exam question does not,
depending on the question, lead to a conclusion that the professors would similarly or should similarly
evaluate a particular answer to that question.
133. For a plaintive, if not lighthearted, explanation of the reasons for this national phenomenon, see
James D. Gordon, III, How Not to Succeed in Law School, 100 YALE L.J. 1679, 1692 (1991).
134. A seemingly early example of this is the practice, established in North Carolina in the 1950's to
space exams with at least one day between them. See Richard B. Amandes, How We Examine, 11 J. LEGAL
EDuc.566 (1959).
135. Id at 568 ("One school" was exploring anonymous grading in 1959.).
136. Vincent R. Johnson, The Video Essay Question: An Experiment in Teaching Professional
Responsibility, 50 Mo. L. REv. 591 (1985).
137. In particular, see the analyzes in Kissam, supra note 128; Steve H. Nickles, Examining and
Gradingin American Law Schools, 30 ARK.L. REV. 411 (1977).
138. See Ben D. Wood, The Measurement ofLaw School Work, 24 COLUM. L. REv. 224 (1924);
Ben D. Wood, The Measurementof Law School Work 11, 25 COLuM. L. REV. 316 (1925); Ben D. Wood,
The Measurement ofLaw School Work-II, 27 COLUN. L.REv. 784 (1927). These articles are discussed
in Hadley, supra note 123, at 23.
139. Stephen P. Klein & Frederick M. Hart, Chance andSystematic FactorsAffecting ssay Grades,

I REPORTS OF LSAC SPONSORED RESEARCH, 1949-1969, 511 (LSAC Report 68-4).
WIGMORE, supra note 106, at iii-iv.
141. St.Louis Law School Professor William Curtis argued that exams should be printed in sufficient

140.
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copies of its examinations every year from 1891 to 1945.142 The University of
Michigan continues to do so, a practice it began by at least in 1904. 4 Chicago and
Indiana began to do so in 1906." Cornell has done so at least since 1911. "4Stanford
published its finals in 1934." Many law schools disseminate these examinations
widely. Harvard published its examinations in the "red books," paper-bound copies
of each year's questions, apparently first published in 1947 or 1948.4' Each year,
copies of the red books were placed in crates throughout the law school, which were
taken away by students 148 as well as distributed to subscribers, usually to law
libraries. 49 Harvard's last year for this practice was 1996, when examination
questions were distributed through posting on the law school's web page. 0
B. The Objective Test: True-False and Multiple Choice Questions
Of course, the essay question is not the only form of the modem law school exam.
In the 1920's, in response to the new educational theory developed in schools of
education and elsewhere, greater concern about the validity of measurement in the law
school examination led to the development of short-answer questions. These questions
could be answered by giving the student a statement regarding a doctrine or its
application to a set of facts and then requiring the student to mark the statement as true
or false.' The answers to such questions can then be quickly, and mechanically,
tabulated and scored against a set of predesignated correct answers.
In 1921, Northwestern professor Albert Kocourek performed an experiment
comparing student performance on "ratiocinative" or essay questions, compared to
"dogmatic" questions that were answerable with a "yes or a "no" or by the shortest
possible answer if a yes or no were not possible.' In that experiment, the dogmatic
number for the students who take them to keep them and to freely distribute to subsequent classes. William
S.Curtis, Examinations in Law Schools, in AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE THIRD ANNUAL MEETING 41, 43 (1903).
142. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, EXAMINATION PAPERS (Columbia Law School

Treasure Room shelf mark CU C735 Ex15).
143. See, e.g., LAW SCHOOL EXAMINATIONS - 1904 (University of Michigan Library).
144. UNIVERSITYOFCHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, EXAMINATION QUESTIONS (Columbia Law School shelf
mark T C43e); INDIANA UNIvERsrrY SCHOOL OF LAW, EXAMINATION QUEsTIONs, THE INDIANA
UNIVERsITY SCHOOL OF LAW (Columbia Law School shelf mark T In27e).

145. The Columbia law school catalog lists publication beginning in 1911.
Examinations (Columbia shelf mark T C8141).
146. STANFORD UNIvERSITY

SCHOOL OF LAW, FINAL EXAMINATIONS

Cornell Law

(Columbia Law School shelf

mark T L5368f).
147. In 1996, access to the Red Set at Harvard Law Library was curtailed owing to renovation and
construction. Based on a review of the catalogs, David Warrington, director of special collections of the
library, assessed the belief that the first entries for red books of exams was either 1947 or 1948. Telephone
Interview with David Warrington, Director of Special Collections (Dec. 9, 1996).
148. TUROW, supra note 1,at 157.

149. Telephone Interview with Mark Slassen, Assistant Registrar, Harvard Law School (Nov. 18,
1996). Inrecent years prior to 1996, approximately 85 copies were annually distributed in this way.
150. Id.
Harvard Law School Web Page (visited December 15, 1996)
<http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/registrar/95-96_exam.htnl>.
151. Albert Kocourek, Objective Law Examinations, 16 ILL. (Nw. U.) L. REV. 304(1921).
152. IdKocourek's views were, to say the least, controversial. For an assault on both Kocourek's
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or "objective" questions were asked aloud, and the student wrote the answers in a brief
time following the reading of each of fifty questions, the first of which were:
1. Which is the broader term, "chattels" or "personal property."
2. Were chattels subject to feudal tenure?
3. Do chattels pass to the heir or to the executor?
4. May a gratuitous bailee maintain a possessory action?
5. Suppose that A is the owner of a chattel which he has leased to B for a year. If
A retakes the chattel from B wrongfully before the end of the term, can B recover
against A in trespass?" 3
From 1922 to 1925, Ben Wood at Columbia conducted similar research,
administering true-false examinations, based in part on the construction of the federal
civil service exams, to the contracts and property courses initially before expanding
into twenty-two different courses." 4 One of his most significant conclusions was to
find a strong correlation between objective question performance and essay question
performance.'" In 1928, Charles Clark reported that both Yale and Columbia had for
several years been using true-false questions in combination with essays on their
exams, and their use at Yale was no longer considered experimental but part of the
regular program." He acknowledged the difficulties in creating careful questions but
dismissed concerns that the tests cannot examine lawyering skills, such as the
recognition of causal effect, by stating that such limitations were only caused by the
limits of the ingenuity of the author of the exam.
By the time of a 1929 survey, true-false examinations were given in forty-four of
sixty law schools. 57 In those schools that used such tests, they were distributed across
practically all courses, but two-thirds were used in first year subjects. Forty-nine
professors of sixty-three surveyed believed the tests were successful, and the tests were
generally more often employed in larger courses. 5 8 Eight professors relied solely on
true-false questions, although most used the question for roughly half of the test. 59
Despite such wide acceptance, however, strong voices of doubt persisted, particularly
that the chance to guess the right answers made these questions "an insult to the good
student's abilities" but a "healthy gambling chance" for the poor student."" 6 Despite
such concerns, the AALS, during and soon after World War II examined the use of
objective questions
and recommended them in lieu of essay questions in
6
examinations.' '
methods and his conclusions by a professor at Northwestern, see George P. Costigan, Jr., Objective Law
Examinations, 20 MlcH.L. REv. 514 (1922).
153. Kocourek, supra note 143, at 309.
154. See Wood, supra note 131.
155. Id
156. Charles E. Clark, Experiments with the New Type Law Tests, 1928 J. PUB. TEACHERS OF L. 23,
29.
157. Thomas E. Atkinson, The Use ofTrue-FalseExaminations inLaw Schools,6 AM. L. SCM REv.
702 (1930).
158. Id at 703.
159. Id at 704.
160. M.Ray Doubles, Law School Examinations, 8 AM. L SCH. REV. 254, 255 (1935).
161. ASSOCATIONOFAMERaCANLAW ScnooLs, 1945 REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON TEACHING AND
EXAMIATION METHODS 147-48 (1945).
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The objective question format did not long remain tied to the binary limitations
of answers that are either true or false. There was considerable interest in the design
of law exam questions to test a student's analytical skills with the precision being
developed by the Educational Testing Service, the initial authors of the LSAT. 62 The
Law School Admission Test was first developed in 1947, employing multiple-choice
questions that are designed in a style similar to those of the true-false questions
pioneered in the 1920's, in which there were objectively correct answers. 63
By 1950, the true-false question was already fading from preference in favor of
multiple-choice questions and, occasionally, questions that required sentences to be
completed and questions that required matching of definitions to terms from a list.'
The first use of a multiple choice question at Harvard appears to have been in
Robert Braucher's 1956 Legislation exam. A question from that exam required the
student to mark one answer to the following:
Check the best statement:
A Lawyer who is retained to perform legal services in seeking the enactment of a
private bill by Congress
____(a)
is guilty of a federal crime if he contracts for a fee contingent on
success.
__ .(b) is engaged in unethical practice if he charges a fee.
(c)
regularly finds that any bill enacted contains provisions limiting
his fee.
(d) may properly offer to pay fair compensation to a Congressman
who sponsors and supports the bill, subject only to any
limitation enacted as a part of the bill.'
Although interest in and use of multiple choice questions grew during the 1960's, the
great interest in law school administration of such exams with such questions followed
the advent of the multi-state bar examination. The Multi-State Bar Examination was
first given in February 1972.' 66
The pedagogical advantages to the examiner of using multiple-choice questions
were significant, beyond those of the earlier true-false format. The multiple-choice
162. See Munroe H.Freeman, Testing For Analytic Ability in the Law School Admission Test, 24
J. LEGAL EDUc. (1958).

163. LSAS/LSAC, The Law SchoolAdmission Test: Sources,Contents, Uses 1-2 (September 1991).
The questions were initially designed after the structure of tests given by the U.S. Navy and by the PepsiCola Scholarship Test, which later became the NMSQT. Thomas 0. White, ARetrospective Examination
ofLaw School Admission, the Law School Admission Council,and Law School Admission Services, in

1984-2001: SELECTING LAWYERS FOR THE TWENTYFIRsT CENTURY 25 (Walter B. Raushenbush, ed., Law School Admissions Service, 1986).
WALTER RAUSHENBUSH, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS,

164. Henry Weihofen, Panel: What Examination Techniques Best Test Legal Capabilities? Types

of Questions,23 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 110, 112 (1950). Weihofen also described short answer and
"master list" questions inwhich a student identified gobbets from opinions according to the author, as well
as a matching and comparison questions that require a logical sorting of statements that support or oppose
other statements. This form of matching and comparison question was then used in federal civil service
exams for lawyers. See Henry Weihofen, The Written FederalAttorney Examination, I I U. OF Cm. L.
REv. 154, 167 (1944). Weihofen's example of a multiple choice question has a complicated fact pattern
from which the student is to identify the principal issue in dispute.
165. Examinations, supra note 99, at 16.
166. Jarvis, supra note 59, at 380-81.
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format reduces the benefit of students' guessing answers'67 and gives a correspondingly
higher degree of validity." It also allows for the construction of a greater variety of
question formats by requiring students to judge among particular rationales or
conclusions, rather than merely accepting or rejecting them. Furthermore, the examiner
can test student ability to apply a specific doctrine with less distraction in ascertaining
which doctrine is to be applied.'69 The objective question cannot easily be used to
measure the student's process of analysis in reaching a conclusion, or style or
correctness in writing the analysis or conclusion, and so many environments in which
objective questions form a portion of the exam continue to incorporate essay
questions.' 70
In a 1995 survey of law professors teaching traditional lecture class subjects, fully
two-thirds did not report using computer-graded questions, although use was higher in

167. For a careful discussion of the manner in which questions are constructed in order that this
might be the case, see Howard J. Gensler, Valid Objective Test Construction,60 ST. JoHN4's L. REv. 288
(1986). See also Wood The MeasurementofLaw School Work III,supra note 131, at 803-26. For an
illuminating argument that "multiple guess" questions do not achieve this goal, see Eileen N. Wagner,
Multiple Choice Exams are Ineffective for Teaching the Nuances ofLaw. True or False?, 20 STUDENT
LAW.

42 (Dec. 1991).

168. See Lawrence W. Ross, Jr., The Construction and Selection of Objective Business law
Examination Questions, 17 AM. Bus. L. J. 547 (1980); Howard J. Gensler, Valid Objective Test
Construction,60 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 288 (1986).
169. John A. Winterbottom, The Use of Essay and Objective Techniques in Bar Examinations,38
ThE BAR ExAmDmR 5 (1968). Interestingly, Dr. Winterbottom took pains to discredit the use of truelfalse
questions, recommending only the use of multiple-choice questions in lieu of the essay.
170. Of course, there is still controversy regarding the effectiveness of both essay questions and
objective questions and which is the superior in these tasks. See Vaughn C. Ball, Objective Questions in
Law Examinations, 12 J. LEGAL ED. 567 (1960). A fine sample of the recent debate is in Norma Redlich
& Steve Friedland, ChallengingTradition: Using Objective Questions in Law School Examinations,41
DEPAUL L. REv. 143 (1991); Norma Redlich & Steve Friedland, A Reply to ProfessorJacobs: Right
Answer, Wrong Question, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 183 (1991); Michael S. Jacobs, Law School Examinations
and ChurchillianDemocracy: A Reply to ProfessorsRedlich andFriedland,41 DEPAUL L. REv. 159
(1991).
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classes in the first year and in statutory or code courses. 7' Of those professors who did
use them, most used them for twenty-five percent of the examination or less."
73
C. A Brief Word on Examinations and Grades

An essential function of the modem law school examination is to serve as the
method for generating grades. These grades in turn place the examinee into strata,
including those unfit for graduation, those fit for graduation, those who are outstanding,
74
and many gradations among them, including individual location in a class rank.
171. Question 122 of the survey asked, "How much of your typical examination is computer-graded?
(1) none (2) 1-25% (2) 25-50% (3) 500/-75% (4) 75-99% (5) all."

Of all respondents teaching lecture courses, the responses were (1) N--278 or 66%; (2) N= 69 or 16%; (3)
N=I5 or 4%; (4) N=I or 0%; (5) N=5 or 1%.
When answers were sorted according to the year in which the course was taught, the responses for firstyear classes were (1) N= 160 or 70%; (2) N=50 or 22%; (3) N=10 or 4%; (4) N=0 or 0%; (5) N=3 or 1%.
In contrast, responses for second- and third-year courses were (1) N=103 or 80%; (2) N=I5 or 12%; (3)
N=4 or 3%; (4) N=I or 1%; (5) N=2 or 2%.
When answers were sorted according to the subject matter of the course, the responses for statutory or
code courses were (1) N= 37 or 49%; (2) N--9 or 12%; (3) N=3 or 4%; (4) N=4 or 5%; (5) N=10 or 25%.
In contrast, responses for common law courses were (1) N=177 or 74%; (2) N=47 or 20%; (3) N--9 or
4%; (4) N=1 or 0%; (5) N=3 or 1%.
The results of question 122 roughly correspond to the results of question 125, which asked "How much
ofyour typical examination is an essay you evaluate personally? (1) none (2) 1-25% (2) 25-501/ (3) 50c/ 75% (4) 75-99/c (5) all." Of all respondents teaching lecture courses, the responses were (1) N=7 or 2%;
(2) N= 25 or 6%; (3) N=80 or 20%; (4) N=47 or 12%; (5) N=205 or 49%. When answers were sorted
according to the year in which the course was taught, the responses for first-year classes were (1)N= 4 or
2%; (2) N=14 or 6%; (3) N=57 or 25%; (4) N=30 or 13%; (5) N=l 17 or 51%. In contrast, responses for
second- and third-year courses were (1) N=3 or 2%; (2) N=! I or 9%; (3) N=17 or 13%; (4) N=15 or
12%; (5) N=77 or 60%.
When answers were sorted according to the subject matter of the course, the responses for statutory or
code courses were (1) N= 9 or 12%; (2) N=4 or 5%; (3) N=52 or 68%; (4) N=0 or 0%; (5) N=0 or 0%.
In contrast, responses for common law courses were (1) N=3 or 1%; (2) N=13 or 5%; (3) N=47 or 20%;
(4) N=32 or 13%; (5) N=141 or 591/6.
The methodology and distribution of this survey are described in Steve Sheppard, State of the Art: A
Survey of TeachingMethods in American Law Schools (forthcoming in STEVE SHEPPARD, HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL (Salem Press, 1999)).
172. Id.
173. While inexorably linked in a modem discussion of exams, the subjects of grades, grading
systems, and the history of their use in law schools is too large a subject to be reasonably treated here
except in the most cursory fashion. Still, some few points seem necessary in order to place the evolution
of the method of evaluation through law school exams in some context.
174. For a general description of grades and their relationship to examinations, see Jay L. Feinman,
Grades,65 UMKC L. REV. 647 (1997); Nancy H. Kaufnan, A Survey of Law School GradingPractices,

44 J.LEGAL EDUC. 415 (1994);Nickles, supra note 136; W.B. Schrader, Law School GradingPractices,
1970 Survey (LSAC Report 71-6), in LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COuNcIL, 2 LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION
REsEARCH 165 (Law School Admission Council, 1976). For the origins of grading systems in America,
see SMALLWOOD, supranote 5, at 40-45. For the idea that the examinations are designed to separate the
fit student from the unfit, see STONE, supra note 121, at 134. For the idea that such a division is necessary
as part of the case method see sources collected in WnAjAM R JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAWYERS: A STUDY
INTHE CLASH OF PROFESSIONAL CULTURES 126-27 (1978). For the effect of the stratification of students
upon self-image, see WAGNER THIELENS, JR., THE SOIALIZATION OF LAW STUDENTs

331 (1980). For the
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There appears to be no record of grades in the modem sense being given in
colonial and early federal law classes: the result of unsatisfactory quizzes was either to
improve or to be dismissed, and the result of failure of the graduation exam was to be
denied the degree.
Standards of performance required throughout the nineteenth century varied
widely by time and school. Harvard, at mid-century, had no real standards at all, while
Virginia failed a high percentage of its graduates. In 1901, Raleigh Minor reported that
of nineteen of the "most prominent law schools," the standards to pass examinations
were widely scattered. Two had no fixed percentage standards, one required fifty-five
percent, three sixty percent, one sixty-five percent, five seventy per cent, three seventyfive percent, three eighty percent, and one eighty-three percent."
Throughout this century, there have been numerous attempts to experiment and
modify grading systems in order to achieve various ends. There has long been concern
for grades that are not uniform among instructors in a single faculty. In 1920, Dean
Wigmore at Northwestern calculated the percentages of good grades to all grades
awarded by each member of his faculty. Among all courses, good grades accounted for
anywhere between forty-one and one hundred per cent, although teachers in the large
lecture courses varied only from fifty-six percent to seventy-four percent. 76
In his 1921 report on legal education, Alfred Reed presented six concerns of the
modem annual or semester-end exam, of which two were based on the integration of
annual and semi-annual courses. He advocated intermittent recitations or quizzes by
students, which would both provide an alternate method of testing proficiency and deter
procrastination in student study. Perhaps more effectively, he also suggested that some
differentiation among marks be made, allowing recognition of both unusual excellence
in performance and greater significance of a course content. He argued for a more
scientific method by which grades among instructors can be equalized.'
In line with such calls for reform, several schools re-evaluated their examination
procedures. Columbia, under Dean Harlan Fiske Stone, adopted a new system of
recording and averaging student grades in the annual examinations, based on Wood's
research and requiring a minimum level of performance to remain enrolled. In its first
year, the system led to the dismissal of seventy-eight students of an enrollment of
692. "" This system replaced an older pass-fail system that had led to considerable
attrition in its own rights," 7 but this system was itself replaced. 8" There is continuing
idea that grades and examinations affect the development of a student's character, see Duncan Kennedy,
Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in DAVID KAIRYS, TE POLTcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 40 (1982); Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 591 (1982). For the idea that the methods by which this is done are generally invalid, see,
e.g., Douglas A. Henderson, Uncivil Procedure:Ranking Law Students Among their Peers, 27 U. MICH.
J.L.REFORM 399 (1994).
175. Minor, supra note 58, at 474-75.
176. Kocourek, supra note 143, at 305 n.2.
177. Lastly, he argued for a reduction in the labor necessary to grade, to avoid "this deadening
intimacy with ignorance and mental fog," which saps a professor's strength from classrooms and ambition
from scholarship. REED, supra note 48, at 359-60.
178. COLUMBNIA REPORTS, 1922, 70, cited in HISTORY, supra note 64, at 233. See also the Wood
studies, supra note 131 and accompanying text. The last study related to this change is John Grant's
survey of grading practices at Columbia through 1928. John L. Grant, The Single Standard in Grading,
29 COLUM. L. REV. 918 (1930).
179. In 1900, Columbia lost one-third of its class between matriculation and graduation, a currently
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concern, however, that these changes and reforms have yet to produce consistency in
grades, and that, perhaps, such consistency is unattainable.'"
Despite the general abandonment of pass-fail exams in favor of graded exams,
pass-fail examinations have continued to find intermittent popularity, used both in
particular courses and in particular years. Michigan even allowed students to opt for
graded or pass-fail credit in any one course per semester in 1970, an option taken by
thirty-one percent of the students, with mixed results."
Further evolutions ofthe role of grades and the manner of grading have continued
throughout this century, notably with the advent of targeted curves or distributions for
a course grade list.'1 Students have sought and received greater procedural guarantees
both within the law schools in the courts that grades are not overly arbitrary.'" The
most salient feature of these changes has occurred in the years following World War
H,and particularly in the 1980's and 1990's. Law schools have markedly reduced the
rigor of their grades and diminished the level of academic attrition; they have inflated
their grades." This change in standards may be attributable to increasing emphasis
on careful admissions processes, competition among law schools for applicants,
dissatisfaction by students, competition among schools for prestige, or, perhaps
charitably, an increase in the quality of law school applicants.
IV. EVALUATION ALTERNATIVES
A. Alternatives, Part I:
Oral Performance: Moot Courts and Class Questions" 6
As the brief review of pre-revolutionary English legal education made clear, the
moot argument was an essential tool not only of student instruction in the Inns and at

unknown percentage of which apparently left for failing exams. HISTORY, supra note 64, at 188.
180. John L. Grant, Justice in Grading, 9 J.LEGAL EDUC. 186, 187 (1956).
181. See, e.g., John L. Grant, Justice in Grading, 9 J.LEGAL ED. 186 (1956). For an argument that
the pursuit of such uniformity in grading is chimerical at best, see Janet Motley, A Foolish Consistency:
The Law School Exam, 10 NOVA L.J. 722 (1986).
182. Richard Lempert, Law School Grading: An Experiment with Pass-Fail,24 J. LEGAL EDUC.
251 (1972).
183. An illustration of this common practice is in Richard A. Epstein, GradeNormalization, 44 S.
CAL. L.REv. 707 (1971)(USC's grade curves).
184. See Penn Lerblance, Legal and EducationalAspects of Student Dismissals:A Viewfrom the
Law School, 33 SOUTHWEsTERN L.J. 605 (1979); Thomas Doniger, Grades: Review of Academic

Evaluations in Law Schools, 11 PAC. L. J. 733 (1980). An interesting related question now moving
through the legal community is the degree of accommodation a student with disabilities, including learning
disabilities, must be given in law school. See James Peden, The ADA in the Law School (forthcoming).
185. Carl T. Bogus, The Death ofan HonorableProfession,71 IND. L. J. 911,929 (1996); J. Harvie
Wilkinson III, Legal Educationand the Ideal ofAnalytic Excellence, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1659, 1662
(1993).
186. This section presents but a cursory glance through the history of moot arguments. For a fuller

description, see Ralph Brill, Legal Researchand Writing Programs,in CLOSSEN ET AL., A HISTORY OF
LEGAL EDUCATION (forthcoming). See also William Adams, Trial Practice,Clinicaland Moot Court
Programs. Id.
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Oxbridge but also of student evaluation. This was the state of affairs in the eighteenth
and throughout the nineteenth century in American schools as well.
William and Mary held moot courts and mock legislatures under George
Wythe. 8 7 James Wilson held "law exercises" every Saturday morning at the College
of Philadelphia." Litchfield held regular moot courts on weekday afternoons. 1 The
predecessor of Yale Law School, the New Haven law school owned by Samuel J.
Hitchcock, opened in 1824, and its first annual announcement specified that, "[a] moot
court is held once a week, or oftener, which employs the students in drawing pleadings
and investigating and arguing questions of law.""9° Moot courts, required in the
curriculum, were long organized at Harvard under the auspices of student clubs, such
as the Coke, Marshall, PowWow, Thayer, Ames, and Langdell clubs, which also held
discussions, quizzes and other activities to enhance student understanding of the law. 9'
Indeed, the Langdell club also begat the first staff of the HarvardLaw Review. 9 2
Other schools' student associations were active in moot courts, perhaps most notably
Michigan's Lawyer's Club. 3 Most schools opening in the nineteenth century included
moot courts as part of their curriculum.'
Two changes in moot courts in the twentieth century are particularly of note.
First is the advent of course credits and grades led eventually to participation and
supervision of moot court programs receiving academic credit, albeit often on a
pass/fail basis or writing credit only.'
The second major change is the development of interschool competitions. The
Association of the Bar of the City of New York began sponsorship of a national
competition following an interschool competition between Yale and Columbia in 1947,
which was expanded by 1950 to a national competition." In 1950, Georgetown beat
Kansas, 197 arguing in the State of Jefferson the case of Fayerweatherv. Wetmore and
Rain Control,Inc., over whether "a landowner can restrain an adjoining landowner
from increasing the productivity of his soil by artificially withdrawing moisture from

187. LYON G. TYLER, EARLY COURSES AND PROFESSORS AT WILLIAM AND MARY COLLEGE (1904),
cited in REED, supra note 46, at 117 n. 1.
188. REED, supra note 48, at 122.

189. The account of Augustus Hand's unfortunate moot argument one Friday afternoon in 1828 is
reprinted in McKENNA, supra note 5, at 170.
190. Yale College Catalog, November 1826, reprintedin Frederick C. Hicks, Yale Law School: The

Founders andthe Founders' Collection 24-25 (Pamphlet 39, Tercentenary Commission of the State of
Connecticut) (1935).
191. WARREN, supra note 55, at 319-31.
192. Samuel Williston, Joseph Henry Beale, A Biographical Sketch, 56 HARv. L. REv. 685, 686

(1943).
193. BROWN, supra note 81.
194. For example, Iowa established an organized moot court in its first program in 1868. Moylan,
supranote 70, at 110-11. Despite the relative universality of moot court programs until World War II, see
ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION INAMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s, 229 n.88
(1983), they were not uniformly applauded. See Law Apprenticeships, 5 ALBANY L. J. 97 (1872).
195. See, e.g., COLUMBIA UNIERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, CATALOG 1985-1986, 104 (moot court
participation satisfies writing credits requirements).
196. AssocIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CrIT OF NEW YORK YOUNG LAWYER'S COMMrrEE, 1
NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPErmON: 1950 (William S. Hein Co., ed., 1983).

197. Id
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clouds above his land."'" In the intervening years, several other competitions have
developed, the most famous of which may be the Jessup competition in international
law, which includes many foreign law schools and was begun in 19602"
As well as moot courts held apart from the lecture hall, an important form of
student evaluation based on oral performance occurs in student recitations in class. 2'
Central to the case method, student response to questions is often the basis by which
a student perceives success of failure in the classroom and by which teachers signal
acceptable or poor performance,"' ° but student participation is only occasionally a
portion of the grading for a course. 2'
B. Alternatives, Part II:
Writing Exercises, Legal Writing Programs, and Seminar Papers
The idea of a student writing requirement has been nearly a constant element of
American legal education and has taken many forms. Students in England and early
American schools maintained common-place books, in which definitions and
applications of every doctrine they learned were recorded, subject to review by their
teachers.'0 3 Students at Litchfield and other early schools not only copied their lectures
in inspected notebooks but took written quizzes from oral questions. 4 As well as
these programs, however, nineteenth century law schools frequently had graduation
dissertation requirements and course thesis requirements. °5
198. Id.
199. ASSOCIATION OF STUDENT INTERNATIONAL LAW SOCIETIES AND THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PHILIP C. JESSUP INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION,

1960-1968 (William
S. Hein Co., ed., 1981). The first competition, then named the International Law Moot Court Competition,
was argued over Cuban agrarian reform, among Harvard, Yale, and Columbia. Harvard won. An
illustration of the use, not only of Jessup arguments but of moot arguments in general as a basic learning
device is in Craig Brown, The Jessup Mooting Competition as a Vehicle for Teaching Public
International Law 16 CAN. YRBK. INT'L L. 332 (1978).
200. A discussion of class recitations both before and after the adoption of the case method is in
Sheppard, supra note 7. For the purposes of this essay, the importance of oral student questioning prior
to the case method may be seen in Butler's plan for the first-attempted New York University Law School,
in 1835, which required the use of occasional interrogatories, such that the Professor should put at least
one question to each member of the class every lecture. See Benjamin F. Butler, A Plan for the
Organization ofa Law School in the University of the City ofNew York, reprinted in THE GLADSOME
LIGHT OF JURISPRUDENCE: LEARNING THE LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE 18TH AND

19TH CENTURIES 164, 178-79 (Michael J. Hoeflich, ed., 1988).
201. For the idea that students must not be discouraged by rejecting class answers as "wrong" see
Paul T. Hayden, On Wrong Answers in the Law School Classroom, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 251 (1990). For
opposing views see Joseph R. Paul, Yes, Virginia, There Are Wrong Answers: A Reply to Professor
Hayden, 40 J.LEGALEDUC. 473 (1990). See also David P. Leonard, On "Right" and "Wrong" Answers:
A Reply to Professor Hayden, 40 J. LEGAL EDuC. 477 (1990).
202. There have been occasional attempts to restore the oral exam as a basis for the grade. See, e.g.,
Steven I. Friedland, Towards the Legitimacy of Oral Examinations in American Legal Education, 39
SYRACUSE L. REV. 627 (1988).
203. For a description ofcommonplace books, including John Marshall's student book, see Sheppard,
supra note 7.
204. For copybook examples, see Sheppard, supra note 7. For a discussion ofthe oral quiz, see supra
notes 171-186 and accompanying text.
205. Buffalo required theses on set topics concerning the constitution in its first constitutional law
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At the turn of the century, a new device for encouraging student writing arose, the
student-edited law review. The first student-edited journal, the Albany Law Journal,
was published in 1875, lasting only a year.' The first student journal of any influence
appears to have been The Columbia Jurist,a publication started by six Columbia
students in 1885, which, though also short-lived, influenced the founding of the
HarvardLaw Review, which published its first issue in 1886.' The Harvard journal
served as a prototype for other schools, and in short order, law reviews had spread
through the major law schools of the country.' Students selected for the staffs of law
reviews are given considerable supervision in writing and editing, and the reviews are
supported by their schools in many ways, both to enhance the prestige of the schools
and to provide a writing and editing lab for their students. In most cases, however, only
a small percentage of a law school class is needed for journal membership, and the
remaining students are excluded from this experience.
The twentieth century law school, however, more often segregates instruction in
legal writing into programs distinct from large-lecture courses. 2' The specialized
writing programs are usually offered as classes in a first-year legal writing course,
although there are upper-year seminar papers in which little writing instruction is given.
The legal research and writing course, in some regard, is an outgrowth of early
courses in legal bibliography and programs in advocacy and rhetoric connected to moot
courts.2 " One of the earliest legal writing programs, and still one of the best known,
is that led by the Bigelow Teaching Fellows at Chicago, which was established in
1938.2" In this year-long program, the first-year student was called on to write twelve
assignments, including five legal memoranda, a precis, a radical condensation of a prior
memorandum, two editorials, a preliminary question list, a preliminary definition of a
field of research, and a book review. An early description of the program noted that the
legal memorandum is the staple of the program and the other forms of assignment "are

class, in the 1890's. Norton, supra note 110, at 433. Boston University required a graduation thesis of
all of its students in the 1880's. Swasey, supra note 80, at 60.
206. Michael I. Swygert & Jon W. Bruce, The Historical Origins, Founding, and Early
Development of Student-EditedLaw Reviews, 36 HASTINGS L. J. 739, 764 (1985).

207. Id. at 766-69.
208. The history of this movement is amply described in Swygert & Bruce, supranote 190, and in
Michael Clossen, The History and Influence ofthe Law Review Institution,30 AKRON L. REV. 15 (1996),
reprintedin CLOSSEN ET AL, HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION (forthcoming). Representative views of the
modern and future law review are to be found in Peter Stein, Essay: Law Reviews andLegal Culture, 70
TUL. L. REV. 2675 (1996); Bernard J. Hibbitts, Last Writes? Reassessing the Law Review in the Age of

Cyberspace, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 615 (1996).
209. There are, of course, other methods of evaluating students through their writing of current
vintage; one of these being the studentjournal. James R.Elkins, WritingOur Lives: Making Introspective
Writing a PartofLegal Education,29 WILAME1M L. REV. 45 (1993) (journals used in lieu of exams

in West Virginia's Introduction to Law course).
210. For antecedent legal bibliography courses and their influence on early writing programs, see
Maijorie Dick Rombauer, First-YearLegalResearch and Writing: Then and Now, 25 J.LEGAL EDUC.
538 (1973). For antecedent advocacy courses, see infra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
211. Harry Claven, Law School Trainingin Research andExposition: The University ofChicago
Program, 1 J.LEGAL EDUC. 107 (1948). The fellows are named for the former Dean, Melville M.
Bigelow.
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added for fun." ' The students averaged roughly 300 hours of work time and wrote
25,000 words, receiving eight hours of credit from the year's forty-hour load.213
Other schools followed suit, some focusing on developing remedial skills, and
others following Chicago's more developmental approach. 1 4 A typical course of this
expansion is the second-year course in legal research and writing instituted at Michigan
in 1957. It was staffed by instructors, recent graduates of Michigan and other law
schools, under the supervision of a faculty member, initially Jack Pearce." 5 The
Dean's Report of 1957-1958 described the program:
The principal aim of the program was to train students to apply legal principles
studied in their regular courses to legal problems presented in hypothetical fact
situations. During the first semester, the students, in groups of 15 to 20, met
weekly with the instructors for the purpose of discussing such problems as the
drafting of wills, contracts, and forms of business transactions, statutory research
and interpretation, and the elicitation and analysis of facts. Small groups made
possible a large measure of individual participation together with criticism and
evaluation of individual work. It was expected that the program would lend
additional meaning to the regular classroom studies and this proved to be the case.
Furthermore, it served to provide the students with more direct and personal
familiarity with the law library and the research tools of the legal profession.
During the second semester, each student was required to engage in individual
research in the preparation of a memorandum on some reasonably difficult legal
proposition. Instructors met with the students individually during the progress of
this work. In effect this phase of the program gave to all members of the secondyear class the kind of opportunity that had hitherto been made available only to
editors of the Law Review."'
Legal writing programs have proliferated,217 increasingly run with tenured or
tenure-track directors supervising contract instructors, who teach both research and
212. l at 110.
213. Id. at 109.
214. See Rombauer, supra note 194, at 542. A typical developmental program, built deliberately on

the Chicago model, but with some remedial modifications, is that of Wisconsin. See Stewart Macauley
& Henry G. Manne, A Low-Cost Writing Program - The Wisconsin Experience, II J.LEGAL EDuc. 387
(1959). For a later view of the Wisconsin programs, see Barbara J. Cox & Mary Bamard Ray, Getting
Dorothy Out of Kansas: The Importance ofan Advanced Component to the Legal Writing Programs,
40 J.LEGAL EDUC. 351 (1990).

215. Dean Stason's Report to the President, 1957-1958, reprintedin BROWN, supra note 81, at 223.
216. Id.
217. Descriptions of specific legal writing programs may be found in Maureen Arrigo-Ward, How
to Please Most ofthe People Most of the Time: Directing (Or Teaching) ina First-YearLegal Writing

Program, 29 VAt. U.L. Rv.557 (1995), and in Jan Levine, Response: "You Can'tPlease Everyone,
So You'd Better Please Yourself': Directing(Or Teaching in) A First-YearLegal Writing Program,29

VAL. U.L. REV.611 (1995); John Sonsteng et al., Learning by Doing: PreparingLaw Studentsfor the
PracticeofLaw, 21 WM. MrrcHEL L. REv. 111 (1995) (Legal practicum course, a hybrid between a
clinical and lecture hall environment); Franklin M. Schultz, Teaching "Lawyering" to First-Year
Students: An Experiment in ConstructingLegal Competence, 52 WASH. & LEE L.REv. 1643 (1995)
(small section late first-year course in law office problems, moot court, drafting). A description of
Columbia's Legal Research and Writing Program is in Lome Sossin, DiscoursePolitics:Legal Research
and Writing's Searchfor a Pedagogy ofIts Own, 29 NEW ENG. L. REv. 883 (1995).
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writing in courses lasting two semesters of the first year, assigning grades based on the
sufficiency of analysis and accuracy of writing." These programs often include
appellate brief writing exercises coupled with oral argument in a moot court, although
moot court instruction in these programs has declined in recent years." 9 Legal writing
classes usually include lectures,' 2 although a critical feature of most legal writing
programs is that of feedback. Students receive specific criticism of their work, which
is usually the basis for subsequent redrafting of assignments, a trend increasing in
recent years. 221
V. SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS
The exam as the sole method of grading has led to some obvious advantages,
particularly in reducing faculty work-load. But its disadvantages are profound,
particularly the difficulty of student improvement with so rare and sparsely evaluated
feedback, the common limitation of oral performance and intermediate writing
experiences from calculation in the grade, and the calculation of the grade from
stressful and artificial circumstances. Part and parcel with these concerns is what
Kissam has accurately described as the disengagement of professors from the learning
ofthe student at the point of examination.' Not only do these disadvantages affect the
utility of the evaluations for student improvement, they lead to a continuing skepticism
among law students that the construction of their exam questions' 2 or the review of
218. Regarding supervision, see Jan M. Levine, Voices in the Wilderness: Tenured and TenureTrack Directors and Teachers in Legal Research and Writing Programs,45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 530
(1995). While this staffing is the norm, it is not universal. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, for example,
has five tenured or tenure-track professors teaching legal writing courses full time. Regarding semester
requirements, see Jill Ramsfield, Legal Writing in the Twenty-First Century: A Sharper Image
(forthcoming publication on behalf of the Legal Writing Institute).
219. Id See also supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text
220. For a criticism of the standard lecture pedagogy of the legal writing classes, see Mary Kate
Kearney & Mary Beth Beazley, Teaching Students to "Think Like Lawyers": IntegratingSocratic
Methodwith the Writing Process,64 TEMP. L. REv. 885 (1991) (encouraging the use of a Socratic inquiry
method in legal writing classes).
221. Id. at nn.46-55. For a view that the content of these writing exercises should be expanded to
include documents and instruments more akin to the first Chicago program, see Lucia Ann Silecchia,
Legal Skills Training in the FirstYear ofLaw School: Research? Writing? Analysis? Or More?, 100
DicK. L. REV. 245 (1996).
222. Kissam, supra note 129, at 436, 489-90.
223. Cooley Howarth at Dayton reports a complaint of unfairness based on insensitivity to student
ideology. The exam question revolved around the proper interpretation of the word "creed" in an
antidiscrimination statute. The statute prohibits discrimination on the basis of"race, color, creed, religion,
ancestry, national origin, etc.
The fact pattern has a luncheon delivery business refusing to deliver to an abortion clinic
on religious grounds. The clinic owner sues claiming that her "non-religious philosophical
moral and political beliefs" in support of abortion fall within the statute's prohibition on
discrimination on the basis of "creed."
The student objected to having to answer this question because of her "strongly held
pro-life" beliefs and her reluctance (I guess that's the right word, perhaps distaste might fit
as well) to having to make arguments on behalf of the clinic's interpretive position. She
added that such a topic was particularly inappropriate in the context of an examination given
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their essays is thorough or fair.' Many variables may enter into the accuracy of the
examination as an evaluation of student performance, not the least being stress. 5
in the curriculum, particularly in its
Thus it is no surprise that many calls for reform
26
evaluation methods, have been made of late.
One of the most interesting of the recent efforts at reform has been the reinclusion of written work into the lecture course, alleviating many of the problems of
absent feedback and improvement attendant with the course-end exam, " 7 although, as
in so many other "reforms" this movement not only echoes nineteenth century practices
but also represents only the most recent incarnation of a cyclical reformation. 22 The
under a time limit and its inherent "pressures." She felt that I should have been more
sensitive to such issues in the design of the examination.
My response to her was that while I regretted her discomfort, this exam question was based
upon a legitimate issue of statutory interpretation taken from a real case and not an issue of
constitutional law, and, from a practical point of view, there seemed little I could possibly
do for her at ten minutes into the exam. She did not feel that I was really "sorry" and left
quite abruptly.
Electronic mail, Cooley R.Howarth, Jr, to Steve Sheppard, Friday, December 13, 1996.
224. Alex Tanford relates this story from his 1975 second-year exam in Trusts and Estates at Duke
under Bertel Sparks, then known as "a cranky and feared old codger."
We were all convinced, based on the randomness of our Ist year grades, that the professors
did not read our exams. One student wrote on the next-to-last page, "I am certain you will
not actually read this. The class will be at the student union at [a certain date and time] to
buy you a milkshake. If you don't show up, our belief that professors never read the exams
will be confirmed." At the appointed hour, there must have been fifty law students waiting
to see if he would show up - he did.

Electronic Mail, Alex Tanford to Steve Sheppard, December 13, 1996.
225. Joshua Dressier, at McGeorge School of Law, examined an English-speaking law student who
wrote her entire 3-hour exam in French, her undergraduate major, and did not realize that until it was
brought to her attention when he tried to grade it. Electronic mail, Joshua Dressier to Steve Sheppard,
Friday, December 13, 1996.
226. See, e.g., Section on Legal Education &Admission to the Bar, American Bar Association, Legal
Education and Professional Development -- An Education Continuum (The Report of The Task Force

on Law School and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap) (American Bar Association 1992) (The "McCrate
Report"); Edward J.Imwinkelried, On Achieving Synergy in the Law School Curriculum, 66 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 739 (1991); Kristine Strachen, Curricular Reform in the Second and Third Years:
Structure, Progression, and Integration, 39 J. LEGAL EDuc. 523 (1989). For the specific complaint that

the grade is insufficient feedback and a call for other forms, see Michael E. Elvine, Toward Descriptive
Grading, 44 S.CAL. L.REv. 696(1971).
227. The scholarship in this field is imposing. Jay N. Feinman & Marc Feldman, Achieving
Excellence: Mastery Learning in Legal Education, 35 J. LEGAL EDUc. 528 (1985); Jay N. Feinman &
Marc Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEO. L.J. 875 (1985) (Rutgers-Camden program integrating
writing into classroom work in contracts and torts); Kathleen Bean, Writing Assignments in Law School
Classes, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 276 (1987); Gordon D. James III, An Integrated First-Year Legal Writing
Program, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 609 (1989) (BYU's program of legal writing requirements in substantive
law courses); John M. Burman, Out-of-Class Assignments as a Method ofTeaching and Evaluating Law
Students, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 446 (1992Xincluding examples of assignments); Nancy M. Maurer & Linda
Fitts Mischler, Introduction to Lawyering: Teaching First-Year Students to Think Like Professionals, 44

J.LEGAL EDUC. 96 (1994) (Albany's first-year program combining clinical experiences with legal writing
coursework).
228. At the turn of the century, Penn professor Owen J. Roberts, joining ain and responding to
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use of written problems allows detailed feedback and guidance of individual student
work concerning the course materials, as well as a broader base for formal evaluation
of the student's performance.229
It is clear that, whatever changes there may be to evaluative methods, certain
functions of the formal evaluation system will likely be retained. First, some method
that faculties believe to be fair and valid will continue to be used to rank student
performance within each group of students and graduates. This method will account
both for changes in technology and in culture that attend not only other law school
systems of evaluation but also examinations for law school admission and for bar
admission. More than likely, this method will include components of measurement of
both analytic skill in applying law to new situations and rote skill in recalling specific
doctrines, thus measuring both depth and breadth of student ability to recall and apply
the substance of each law course. Changes will likely also include a greater frequency
of evaluation, coupled with methods of reducing professorial labor.
Student evaluation has almost universally been a part of the law school
experience. With brief exceptions in the nineteenth century, the demands of the
profession and of the faculty to evaluate the success of student learning have made
some form of exam practically inescapable to the law student, even while the forms of
the exams have evolved. That this will continue to be the case is practically certain.
That it will remain in its current forms is doubtful.

criticism of the case method, instituted the distribution of exam-like hypothetical questions for his students
to solve during the semester. Owen J. Roberts, Methodsfor Review and Quiz in "Case System" Law
Schools, I AM. L. SCHOOL. REV. 222 (1904).
229. The author of this article employs frequent written assignments for courses in property and
constitutional law and finds this to be the case; in his school institutional policy even bars scores from these
assignment being factored into a final grade. For a experiments in a similar, but graded, exercise regime
see John M. Burman, Out-of-ClassAssignments as a Methodof TeachingandEvaluatingLaw Students,

42 J.LEGAL ED. 447 (1992). For a similar experiment based more strictly on exam question answering,
see Louisa D. Del Duca & Donald B. King, Student Examination Answers: Education Tool or

IncineratorFuel?, 13 J. LEGAL ED. 499 (1961). For a spiritual antecedent, see Henry W. Ballantine,
Teaching Contracts With the Aid of Problems, 4 AM. L. S. REv. 115 (1916).
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PART 1. VICTORIAN BAR EXAMINATION QUESTIONS
English Bar Exam Questions
QUESTIONS AT THE EXAMINATION
Trinity Term, 1853
I. PRELIMINARY.
1. WHERE, and with whom, did you serve your clerkship?
2. State the particular branch or branches of the law to which you have principally
applied yourself during your clerkship.
3. Mention some of the principal law books which you have read and studied.
4. Have you attended any, and what, law lectures?
II. COMMON AND STATUTE LAW, AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS
5. Is a verbal undertaking to pay the debt of another person obligatory in law, and if
not, why not?
6. When is a master answerable for damage done by his servant? In the case of a
coachman driving against, and injuring a cart, must the master be present to be liable?
7. What persons cannot bring actions in their own names, and how can they proceed
to recover damages for an injury?
8. A notice to quit being given by a landlord to a tenant, what pecuniary liability does
the tenant incur by holding over?
9. What preliminaries must be observed before an attorney can bring an action on his
bill?
10. Is their any appeal from the decisions in the County Courts, and in what cases,
and what is the practice in County Court Appeals?
11. State the different steps taken in conducting an ordinary action in one of the
Superior Courts from its commencement to its termination.
12. How long does a wi-t of summons remain in force, and how may it be continued?
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13. By whom may an affidavit of increase be made?
14. How, and in what cases, are the costs of "cross issues" allowed?
15. A man was born 11:30 p.m., on the 1st January, 1800; at what hour, and on what
day and year, did he become capable of making a will?
16. Are there any degrees of secondary evidence? Illustrate your answers by
instances.
17. What are the rules affecting actions by paupers?
18. Make out a plaintiff's bill of costs on ajudgment by default, with a Judge's order
to proceed as if personal service had been effected, on both scales.
19. What is the derivation and meaning of the term "Nisi Prius?"
IlI. CONVEYANCING
20. What was the origin of conveyancing - what were the usual methods of
conveying or transferring property, and which of those methods has ceased by Act of
Parliament?
21. State the parts of general outline of a conveyance of freehold property by a vendor
seised in fee to a purchaser, and that the widow of the latter may not be dowable, and
under what Act of Parliament?
22. To convey a lake or piece of water, what words should be used to assure the
freehold thereof to a purchaser, and if the water alone be conveyed, what would pass
to the purchaser?
23. By what tenures may property be held, and how are they respectively assured?
24. As to properties in registered counties - when should the conveyance of them be
registered, and what may be the consequence of delay in doing so?
25. Two persons (not partners) are to give their bond to A for the payment of money
- how is the obligation to be framed - that if one of such two persons die, A may claim
upon the deceased's estate?
26. Suppose the two obligors are partners,and they give theirjoint bond to A and
one of the obligors die, what claim has A upon the surviving obligor and upon the
deceased's estate?
27. A joins in a bond with B to C. A being merely a guarantee for B - what should
A require for his indemnity against his obligation?
28. A conveyance is made to a purchaser in fee of certain defined land, but the
buildings upon it, or mines or minerals under it, are omitted to be noticed-what would
be the result to vendor or purchaser? State any legal maxim applicable to the question.
29. B. is tenant in tail in possession of an estate, and has agreed to sell the fee simple
to C.-by whom and under what authority can that fee simple estate be assured to C.?
30. In examining an abstract of title with the title-deeds, state what should be
carefully attended to.

31. Suppose the title-deeds are not in the vendor's possession but in the hands of
another person, what course is to be adopted to examine them with the abstract?
32. The deeds or instruments abstracted are on record-and the originals cannot be
produced-and the conditions of sale are silent as to any attested copies of such deeds,
&c., how is the purchaser to obtain such attested copies, and at whose expense?
33. To avoid searching for incumbrances until immediately before the completion of
the purchase -what should be done?
34. When do judgments bind leasehold estates, and where should searches be made
as to such incumbrance?
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IV. EQUITY AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS.

35. Name the several Courts of Equity in England, and state what appeals lie from
them respectively?
36. Specify some of the objects attainable through a Court of Equity.
37. What are the necessary proceedings to bring a defendant, having privilege of
peerage, before the Court?
38. State the nature and object of a bill of discovery and name some cases in which
it does and does not lie.
39. What is the nature of a bill to perpetuate the testimony of witnesses? and state
under what circumstances it is advisable to file such a bill.
40. What is the nature and object of a bill of interpleader, and what must the plaintiff
show by his bill to enable him to maintain it?
41. Specify the various matters which must now be commenced before a Judge at
Chambers.
42. Has the Lord Chancellor power to appoint a guardian of the person, and a receiver
of the estate of a lunatic, without a previous inquiry under a commission of lunacy?
43. Can a married woman sue separately from her husband, and if so, under what
circumstances ?
44. Is, or is not, a plaintiff examining a defendant as a witness, prevented from taking
a decree against him? and give a reason for your answer.
45. What steps must be taken by a as regards a defendant, whom he has caused to be
taken upon an attachment for not answering, and in default of such steps being taken,
is the defendant entitled to his discharge?
46. A trustee having power to advance his trust fund upon mortgage of real estate,
can he advance the same upon leaseholds for lives renewable for ever?
47. Is a power directed to be executed under the hand and seal of the donee well
executed by a will not under seal, but executed in conformity with the Statute 7 Wm.
4, and 1 Vict. c. 26.
48. A. having a judgment against B., issues an elegit, under which he gets possession
of B.'s estate; B. afterwards charges this estate with the payment of an annuity to C.,
and subsequently to this A. takes a conveyance of the estate from B. in consideration
of his judgment debt, has this conveyance any, and what, effect upon C.'s annuity?
49. What are the four general cases in which an agreement will not be binding in

Equity?
V. BANKRUPTCY, AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS.
50. What must be the amount of a creditor debt in order to enable him to petition for
adjudication of bankruptcy against his debtor?
51. What mode or modes are there which a creditor should proceed if he desire to
compel his debtor to commit an act of bankruptcy?
52. In what way can a trader voluntarily and intentionally commit an act of
bankruptcy?
53. In what cases and under what conditions can a trader petition for, and obtain, an
adjudication of bankruptcy against himself?
54. In what cases does a trader remain liable to his creditor, notwithstanding that the
has obtained his certificate of conformity ?
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55. Within what times and in what various modes (if any) has the trader the power
of disputing the adjudication, and in what cases.
56. To what Court does an appeal lie for any party from the decision of the
Commissioner, and how is such appeal to be preferred and prosecuted?
57. Can an Englishman, a trader, resident abroad, and having his only house of
business out of the county, be made a bankrupt in our court, in any, and what cases, and
by what proceedings?
58. If a grader, adjudged bankrupt, do not surrender after having received proper
notice of the adjudication, to what penalty or punishment is he liable, and how can the
same be enforced?
59. What are the facts that must be proved in order to obtain an adjudication of
bankruptcy on the petition of a creditor?
60. What is the nature of the evidence that must be produced, and of what facts in
order to obtain such adjudication? State several instances or examples of what would
be sufficient, embracing all the facts to be proved in each case.
61. What constitutes an act of fraudulent preference by a trader?
62. In what cases will a sale be a trader in insolvent circumstances be upheld, and
when will it be set aside as against the assignees?
63. State under what circumstances a payment made by a trader on the eve of
bankruptcy will be upheld, and in what cases will the assignees be able to recover the
amount for the benefit of the estate?
64. Which, if any, of the officers of the Court of Bankruptcy are protected in relation
to acts done by them in the bankruptcy, and in what cases are they answerable to third
parties, or to the bankrupt.
VI. CRIMINAL LAW, AND PROCEEDINGS BEFORE MAGISTRATES.
65. Have all the Superior Courts at Westminster a concurrent jurisdiction in criminal
matters, or is it confined to any, and which of them?
66. State the nature of the jurisdiction of the Court of Queen's Bench in regard to
felonies and misdemeanors.
67. On a conviction in a criminal case is there any, and what, right of appeal, and to
whom?
68. What is the mode of proceeding to exercise that right?
69. When can, and when cannot, a new trial be granted in criminal cases?
70. What is the mode of proceeding in exhibiting articles of the peace?
71. What are the allegations necessary to be stated in support of an application to
exhibit articles of the peace?
72. State what will be required of the party against whom a successful application is
made.
73. Can the party against whom the articles are exhibited controvert the statement,
and it he bound to submit, what remedy has he if the statement is untrue?
74. Will the compounding an offence in any, and what, instances subject the party
compromising to an indictment?
75. Are any, and what, precautions necessary to protect parties effecting a
compromising to an indictment?
76. Define a common nuisance.
77. How is a nuisance redressed, and is the remedy the same in all cases?
78. Will an indictment lie for a private as well as a public nuisance?
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79. In an indictment for a nuisance can the prosecutors be compelled, and by what
means, to deliver to the defendant a particular of the acts of nuisance intended to be
relied upon?
New York Bar Exam Questions
Note: Each department of the Supreme Court, which is New York's trial court,
administeredits own exam, with different questions, albeit of similar character.

Supreme Court Examination
First Judicial Department
Saturday,November 171, 1888, 10 o'clock; A.M
PLEADING AND PRACTICE.

1. What is a pleading in a Civil Action?
Name the various pleadings in Courts of Record?
2. What is the rule as to folioing papers? What advantage can be taken of neglect to
folio?
3. What do you understand to be the difference between a bill of particulars and a copy
of items of account, and how would you proceed to obtain each?
4. What is the effect of a bill of particulars as to limiting a party's right to give
evidence on the trial?
5. What is the effect of serving a pleading defectively verified?
6. Within what time may a pleading be amended of course?
7. Where an answer sets up a counter claim what further pleading is required from the
plaintiff?.
8. What is a supplemental pleading and how would you obtain your right to serve it?
9. Upon a judgment rendered in the City Court of New York, state what steps you
would take to examine defendant in supplementary proceedings and where you would
obtain your order?
10. "A" being the owner of two adjacent city lots, mortgages them in one description
to "B." Subsequently he mortgages one of the lots (No. 1)to "C," and afterwards the
other one (No. 2) to "D." He then again mortgages No. I to "E""B" forecloses his
mortgage against both lots, and the decree of sale directs the property to be sold in
parcels in the inverse order of alienation as to the subsequent mortgages, and further
directs the property to be sold, "or so much thereof as shall be sufficient to discharge
the mortgage debt, costs," &c. Both parcels are required to be sold to realize the
necessary amount but a surplus arises more than sufficient to pay off "C"'s mortgage.
To whom is the surplus next distributable?
REAL ESTATE.

1. What is a freehold estate?
2. What is a qualified fee?
3. What is the rule in Shelley's case[?] give an example?
4. Wherein does an executory devise differ from a contingent remainder?
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5. State the requisites to a valid deed of real estate?
PERSONAL PROPERTY.

1. What are the essentials for a valid title of personal property?
2. What is meant by a conditional sale of personal property?
3. On a sale of personal property, what is sufficient to constitute an implied warranty
of title?
4. Where one dies leaving a wife and no children, how is his personal property
divided?
5. What is the statute regarding the filing of chattel mortgages. How and when would
the mortgage be renewed?
CONTRACTS.
1. What are the essential elements in general of every legal contract?
2. State and define the classes into which contracts are divided with respect to time.
3. How are contracts divided with regard to grade; state them in their rank, and define
them; give examples.
4. When may there be a valid contract without consideration?
5. What is the effect on the liability of the remainder of the release of one of several
joint debtors; state the reason what is the exception of this rule; give an example?
PARTNERSHIP.

1. What Court has almost exclusive jurisdiction over this subject and why?
2. What is the interest of a partner in the assets of the firm?
3. How may persons be liable on their contracts as partners who have never intended
to occupy that relation to each other; give the principle of law which occasions the
reasons for the rule in each case?
4. What is the effect as to third person on the liability as partner, of a person who
makes an agreement to share in the profits as such, if he stipulates that he shall not be
liable for its debts?
5. What is the legal relation which each partner bears to the others, and how far will
the acts of one bind the others as to third persons?
NEGOTIABLE PAPER

1. In what respect does the liability of the indorser of a promissory note differ from
that of an ordinary security.
2. What is meant by "certification" of a check?
3. What is acceptance of a bill of exchange?
4. Can an indorser dispute the genuineness of the signature of the maker of a note?
5. If a promissory note is made and delivered in Connecticut,
payable in New York, to the laws of which state is it subject?
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

1. Give an illustration of what must be shown in order to justify the arrest of an agent
in an action for money had and received to his principal's use?
2. Explain what is meant by a del credere factor?
3. What are the rights of a factor who has made advances to his principal on goods in
the former's hands?
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4. Assuming that a factor has advanced generally to his principal on the consigned
goods, and has guaranteed the sales he has made, can the factor transfer a good title to
a debt not yet due, arising on a sale of the consigned property before calling on the
principal to repay the advances?
5. Has an agent who is directed in general terms to ship goods by a certain carrier, the
authority, as between the principal and the carrier, to agree to a shipment on terms that
limit the common law liability of the carrier?
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.

1. Is mere indulgence of the principal debtor by a creditor sufficient to discharge the
surety? Give your reason for your answer.
2. Is it competent for one or two makers of a promissory note when sued thereon to
show by oral evidence that he signed the note as surety only, and that the holder of the
note, with knowledge of the suretyship, and without the consent of the surety, made a
valid agreement with the other maker of the note, as principal, to give the latter an
extension of time?
It is assumed that on the face of the note both defendants appear as makers, without
any indication of suretyship.
3. Does the right of contribution exist in favor of a surety who did not know that there
was another surety until after paying the debt? Give your reason for your answer.
4. Is it possible for the principal and the creditor to arrange to give the principal an
extension of time without discharging the surety? If so, how?
INSURANCE.

1. Define the contract of insurance?
2. What is the difference between a warranty and a representation in the law of
insurance?
3. What is re-insurance?
4. What is double insurance, and in case of loss how much can the insurer recover?
5. What are "time" and "voyage" policies in marine insurance?
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

1. What is an executor, an administrator; an administrator with the will annexed; an
executor de bonis non?
2. In case there is no will, and an administrator is appointed, state in what order the
right of administration exists.
3. State the duties of an executor or administrator in order of time.
4. What is a general legacy; what is a special legacy. Give examples; which class is
to be paid first; if the legatee dies, what becomes of the legacy?
5. What is an advancement; what is its effect?
BAILmENTS.
1. Is it a defense for a common carrier, sued for non-delivery, to show that the goods
were taken from his custody under judicial process, and that he notified his bailor
promptly thereof, or must he show also that under such process they were delivered to
the true owner?
2. Assuming that a common carrier, by a contract containing no limitation of common
law liability, has agreed to carry a horse by sea from one port to another, and that the
horse receives injuries caused partly by more than ordinary bad weather and partly by
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the conduct of the horse himself, by reason of fright and struggling, but without
negligence of the carrier, is the carrier liable or not? Give your reason for your answer
3. Does the relation of bailor and bailee exist between a bank and its depositors?
4. A bailee receiving property under instructions to deliver it to no one except upon a
written order from the bailor, delivered the property to the bailor's wife upon an order
that proved to be forged, what rights, if any, has the bailor? Give your reason for the
answer
5. Assuming that goods are shipped, and the transportation by the carrier begun under
an oral contract, does the acceptance and retention by the shipper later in the same day
of a bill of lading containing provisions inconsistent with the oral contract merge the
prior oral contract in the subsequent written contract so us to make the written contract
prevail? Give your reasons for your answer. It is assumed that there is no evidence of
any prior course of dealings between the parties.
CORPORATIONS.

1. Into what classes are corporations divided; define them?
2. What was the effect of the Dartmouth College decision with regard to corporate
charters?
3. Since that decision, how has its effect usually been nullified in the State Constitutions subsequently adopted; what is the effect of such a provision?
4. What is ultra vires; give an illustration?
5. State the grounds for which an action may be maintained in this state; 1, to
sequester the property of a corporation; 2, to dissolve a corporation; 3, to annul a
corporation; where are these provisions to be found? By whom must these actions
-e brought respectively? What becomes of the property of a corporation after
sequestration; after it is dissolved; after
its charter is vacated?
PERSONAL RIGHTS.

1. State in substance Section I, of the XIV. amendment of the U.S. Constitution?
2. Section I. of the XV. amendment U.S. Constitution?
3. What is an ex postfacto law? Are such laws valid?
4. What is the principle governing the use of your own possessions with reference to
those of your neighbor?
5. What is false imprisonment?
DOMESTIC RELATIONS.

1. Can either husband or wife convey land directly to the other?
2. Is a husband who has deserted his wife liable to his mother-in-law for the amount
expended by her in supplying her daughter with necessaries after his desertion?
3. A married woman having died intestate, leaving personal property and next of kin,
but no issue, who is entitled to letters of administration, and for whose benefit is the
personal property administered?
4. What effect, if any, does the marriage of a woman have upon a will that she executed before marriage?
WILLS.

1. What is a holographic will; what is a noncupative will?
2. At common law, when could a married woman make a will?
3. What is the effect of war upon the capacity of persons to take under a will?
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4. State the doctrine of moral duress in the law of wills-give an example.
5. Give the requisites of the statutory attestation clause in New York State.

PART 2. SELECTED EXAMINATION QUESTIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS:
TRANSITIONS IN EXAMINATION STYLES AT HARVARD
1871 Agency [Holmes]'
In what case can an infant be an agent? or a married woman?
1871 Contracts [Langdell]
Can a simple contract be put an end to in the same modes before and after breach; if
not, what will be sufficient for that purpose in one case and not in the other?
1871 Corporations [Holmes]
Give a brief and general definition of a corporation.
1871 Equity [Holmes]
What is the essential purport of the maxim, "Aequitas sequitur legem"?
1871 Real Property [Emory Washburn]
What are Alluvion and Accretions? What is the rule as to ownership of islands formed
in rivers not navigable? What is the filum aquae ? What is the effect of a sudden or
material change in the course of a stream upon the boundary line between of opposite
riparian owners?
1875 Contracts [Langdell or Ames]
A, in Boston, writes to X, Y, and Z, in Concord, offering X a certain estate at a certain
price, offering Y a certain horse then in Y's stable, and offering Z a certain mare then
in Z's stable. X and Y reply according to A's request, by return mail, accepting their
respective offers. Z, according to A's request, deposited the purchase money for the
mare with A's banker in Concord. A dies before receiving any intelligence of the
acceptance of his offer. Were any contracts, unilateral or bilateral made, or not, and
why?
1878 Civil Procedure at Common Law - Langdell
What is the proper return to a fi. fa. under all the different circumstances which may
arise? State in particular what the return should be when the sheriff has made a levy
upon goods, but has not sold them; also what proceedings should be taken after such
a return?

1. Names given in brackets are not identified on the face of the exam but nonetheless designate the
lecturer responsible for that course in that year's examination cycle.

UMKC LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 65:4

1878 Real Property - Gray
A, having held a farm for three years, has put up a shed for sheep; it consists of a roof
supported by posts driven into the ground. A's tenancy is about expiring and he is
desirous to remove the shed, which can be done without injury to the soil. The shed can
be removed in sections and set up elsewhere. The landlord forbids the removal. Has A
the right to remove ?
1878 Torts - Ames
M contracted to be a servant in the house of A in Boston from November 1 to May 1
in each of the three following years, and also contracted to be a servant in the house of
B in Newport, from May 1 to November 1 in each of the same three years. In December
of the first year she was seduced by X, and in the following June was obliged to retire
from service. Has A or B a right of action against X, or not, and why? If either has a
right of action, from what moment would the Statute of Limitations begin to run, and
why?
1883 Contracts [Langdell]
1. A, in New York, writes to B, in Boston, offering to sell to him bales of cotton and
enclosing a sold note in due form and duly signed. B answers, accepting the offer and
enclosing a bought note; but, while his letter is on the way, he telegraphs to A, rejecting
the offer. What are the rights of the parties, and why? Suppose the facts to be as stated
above, with the additional fact that B encloses his check for the price of the cotton, and
requests A to forward the cotton.
2. A writes to B, requesting insurance on a certain vessel then at sea. B makes out a
policy and forwards it to A, but while it is on the way, he telegraphs to A, declining the
risk. What are the rights of the parties, and why ?
3. A sent a writing to B by which he agreed, in consideration of$1, to sell to B 10,000
bushels of barley on certain terms; upon receipt of which B sent to A the $1, together
with a writing by which he agreed in consideration of $1, to buy of A 10,000 bushels
of barley on the same terms, but neither the money nor the writing was ever received
by A. What are the rights of the parties respectively and why?
4. A agreed with B, in consideration of $1, to sell to B 1,000 bushels of wheat at $1
per bushel, and B agreed with A, in consideration of $1,to buy of A 1,000 bushels of
wheat at $1 per bushel. How many contracts are there between A and B, and are they
unilateral or bilateral, and why? Is the delivery of the wheat conditional upon the
payment of the money, or the payment of the money upon the delivery of the wheat, and
why ? If yea, is the condition precedent or concurrent, and why ?
5. A, having committed a crime, requested B to do his endeavor to obtain for him a
pardon. B accordingly did his endeavor and obtained a pardon, and A, in consideration
thereof, promised to pay B $1,000. Can B recover $1,000 or any other sum, and why?
If yea, what should be the form of his declaration, and why?
6. A had a summer house near an extensive forest. While the house was shut up, the
forest took fire and the house would have been destroyed, but for the services of B in
fighting the fire. B was only occupied himself in this service for several days, but he
employed several other men and paid them. Upon learning the facts, A promised B to
pay him for his services. Can B recover, and why? If yea, what should be the form of
his declaration, and why?
7. If an executory contract for the sale of chattels be not performed by either party,
what must each allege and prove to enable him to recover against the other? Why?
8. If a contract for the sale of land be not performed by either party, what must each
allege and prove to enable him to recover against the other? Why?
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9. Under a charter-party, a portion of the freight-money was payable upon the vessels
sailing, and the remainder upon the right and true delivery of the cargo. During the
loading of the vessel the master committed several breaches ofthe charter-party in not
attending at the broker's office to sign bills of lading, and in refusing to receive cargo
on board. At length, however, all the cargo was received and the vessel sailed. Can the
owner recover the first instalment of the freight-money and why? Suppose the vessel
had finally sailed with an incomplete cargo, in consequence of the master's refusing to
receive cargo?
10. A agreed to furnish straw to B at the rate of one load per week for one year at $5
per load. Upon the first load's being delivered, B refused to pay for it, claiming that the
straw was not to be paid for till it was all delivered. A claimed that each load was to
be paid for on delivery; and accordingly A furnished no more straw. What are the
rights of the parties respectively, and why?
1887 Constitutional Law - Thayer
To what extent, if any; can the Congress of the United States forbid discrimination
against passengers by common carriers in Massachusetts on the ground of color? Why?
1890 Constitutional Law [James Bradley Thayer]
1. A fruit dealer in Massachusetts bought strawberries at the South, and a carload of
them arrived on the first of May; he was taxed for them. No sales were made until May
2. Taxes are regularly assessed in that State as of May 1. Is the tax lawful? Why?
2 "It has been determined," said a text writer, "that the word "law" [in the phrase 'law
impairing the obligation of contracts] comprehends. . . judicial decisions of State
courts of last resort, rendered subsequently to the making of the contract in question
... and altering by construction the constitution and statutes of the State in force when
the contract was made," citing Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175. State, if you know,
whether this is a true interpretation of that case. Is the doctrine, in itself, a sound one
? Why?
3. The Congress of the United States charters a railroad corporation in the District of
Columbia, and reserves therein the right to amend, alter, or repeal the charter. The
corporation incurs large debts, and there is reason to fear that it may become unable to
pay them. A station is needed at a certain point. Congress enacts a law purporting to
be in amendment of the charter and requiring the corporation to build a station of a
certain specified kind at the said point, and also requiring it to pay into the United
States Treasury annually a certain sum to constitute a sinking fund for the payment of
said debts. Are these enactments valid ? Why?
4. "The deliberate decision," says ajudge of the Supreme Court of the United States,
"ofthe national legislature... would determine me [in considering the validity of a
statute], if the case was doubtful, to receive the construction of the legislature." Is this
sound? Does the same doctrine extend to the enactments of State legislatures? Why?
5. The Corporation of Harvard College owns a large tract of flats on Charles River
which is becoming pestilential. The legislature passes a statute requiring the
Corporation to raise the flats by filling. The Corporation also owns, in common with
six other parties, a lot of swamp land, which some owners desire to improve; but others
refuse. The legislature enacts that the land shall be drained by commissioners and the
expense assessed proportionately upon owners. Are these statutes valid ? Why ?
6. A charter for an elevated railroad is granted by the legislature along two streets in
the crowded part of a city; the fee of one street is owned by the city; of the other by the
abuttors. The constitution requires compensation where property is taken for public
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use. The charter makes no provision for compensation, but the city government assents
to the charter. Is it constitutional? Why?
7. "A uniform tax imposed by a State on all sales made in it, whether the goods sold
are the produce of that State enacting the law or of some other State, is valid." Is that
a sound proposition? Why?
8. Can the New York legislature repeal the law for executing Kemmler by electricity
and substitute a law under which he may be hanged, or imprisoned for life? Assume
that ex post facto laws are constitutional there. Give your reasons.
9. A State enacted that all lawyers and physicians shall take out and pay for a license,
and in default thereof shall not be permitted to practise or to continue practising their
professions. Assuming the ordinary provisions to be in the constitution, is this valid?
Why?
10. A statute enacts that the judges of the Supreme Court shall prepare the headnotes
for the official reports of their decisions. Making the same assumption as in the last
question, is this valid ? Why?
1883.
1895 Contracts [Williston, or Langdell, or Ames]
1. A wrote B a proposal for a contract of partnership, setting forth terms and
conditions. B replied promptly: "Iam preparing to make the arrangements with you on
the terms you name." A received the letter. Is there a contract between the parties?
2. A, by letter, offered to sell B a piece of land, stating the offer would remain open a
week. The next day A wished to revoke the offer, and on that day and the following
days made all possible endeavor to find B or to communicate with him, and sent a letter
of revocation to B's house. B, however, had closed his house and left without leaving
his address. Within a week B telegraphed his acceptance of the offer, being at the time
in ignorance of A's wish to revoke it. The telegram was duly received. Is there a
contract?
3. A offered to sell B a horse, the offer to remain open till June 20. On June 21 B
accepted the offer by letter. On June 23 a servant of A led into B's yard the horse and
offered to deliver him to B, who refused to accept him. What are the rights of the
parties?
4. A had a claim against B and C for money lent, and against D for the non-delivery
of a horse according to contract. All the claims were barred by the statute of
limitations. B said to A: "I shall pay you half that debt in monthly instalments." C said
to E: I owe A some money and I am going to pay it." E repeated this to A. D said to A:
"I will deliver your horse to you at once." What are A's rights?
5. A, for good consideration, promised B to pay C a debt B owed him, and A informed
C of the agreement. Thereafter B released A from his promise by a duly executed
release under seal. What are C's rights?
6. A agreed to sell and deliver on July 1 certain goods, and B agreed to buy and pay for
them on that day. June 30 B wrote A:
"I shall not fulfil my contract." July 2 A sued B. At the trial B offered evidence to
prove (1) that A had made no tender of the goods, (2) that on June 30 A had not in his
possession goods which would fulfil the requirements of the contract, and that from the
peculiar character of the goods it would have been impossible for A to have obtained
them by July 1. The evidence was objected to as immaterial and irrelevant and the court
excluded it. Should it have been admitted?
7. A, an inventor and applicant for letters patent, assigned his invention to B, who
agreed in consideration thereof to pay all expenses in obtaining the patent, to use all
reasonable efforts to put the patented article on the market, to manage the business for
the joint benefit of both, to advance all requisite funds and look to the business for
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repayment. After part performance of this agreement, B died and C was appointed his
administrator. What are the rights of the parties?
8. A, B, and C owned property near a building belonging to D. In order to increase the
value of their property A, B, and C severally agreed to pay D $200 a year if he would
lease his building to the United States for a post office at a nominal rent D leased his
building accordingly, the low rent being the chief inducement to the United States for
taking the building. Can D recover the sums promised by A, B, and C?
9. A made a contract with B for the repayment of money lent with 12 per cent interest
The contract was within the province of a statute against usury. The statute declared
that all usurious contracts were void. Before the money was due according to the terms
of the contract the statute was repealed. What are the rights of the parties?
1895 Criminal Law - Peale
Defendant, the head of a labor organization, ordered a couple of workmen, who were
servants merely at will, to refuse any longer to work for their employer A, until the
latter should induce a friend of his to pay higher wages to his servants. The result of the
order was a strike; and many ill-disposed persons, none of them strikers, took
advantage of the occasion to commit acts of violence upon the property of A.
Defendant, though he expected this result, did not wish it, and ordered the strikers to
take no part in it. Is he guilty of a crime?
1908 Sales - Williston
B went into a ready-made clothing establishment kept by A, and selected a suit of
clothes, the price of which was $25. The clothes were not a perfect fit, and B said he
would not take them unless certain alterations were made, and declined to pay the price
until the alterations were made. A said they should be made within twenty-four hours
and B agreed to return the next day and pay the price and take the clothes. The
alterations were made on the same day on which the parties had this conversation. During the following night a fire destroyed A's shop and the suit of clothes in question. A
now brings suit against B for the price. Can he recover?
1926 Contracts - Page
A planned to publish a book containing pictures of the Prince of Wales, expecting to
sell it to various residents of Boston, New York, and Long Island, in view of an
announced visit of the prince to these shores. B, a bookseller, contracted to buy from
A 1000 copies of the book, and C, a clothing-merchant, contracted to insert an advertisement of "The Wales Knicker." The book had been published when the visit of the
prince was called off. B refuses pow to buy the books, and C refuses to pay for the
advertisement. Very few copies are being sold. What are the rights ofA ?
1926 Criminal Law - Pound
Indictment for assault with intent to do great bodily harm. The evidence is that A and
B were in an automobile, A driving very' fast. B said to A, "Ibet you can't run over that
dog.'-' A said, "Watch me," and steered for the dog, going as fast as he could. At that
moment P, whose dog it was, came around the comer and was hit by- the car and badly
injured. Motion to direct a verdict. What ruling?
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2
1935 Property II - Joseph Warren

Give reasons in all cases. Thirty pages in a suitable maximum.
George R. Gray by will after providing for his wife and the children of a deceased
brother directed his executors, "to divide the balance of the said one-half of said residue
into the number of shares that I have brothers and sisters, who survive me, and to pay
over as soon as conveniently may be done, the said shares to my said brothers and
sisters, with the exception of the shares to John Norman Gray and Albert Howard
Graham Gray. The shares intended for the benefit of John Norman Gray and Albert
Howard Graham Gray shall be invested by my trustee and the income from each share
paid to each of said brothers during their respective lifetime, and if any special
circumstances arise, which in the sole discretion of my trustee justifies the drawing on
the principal of the said two shares or either of them going to the said John Norman
Gray and Albert Howard Graham Gray, my trustee is hereby empowered to draw on
said principal and pay it out for the benefit of these two brothers; and whatever amount
may remain of the share of either of said brothers at his death, to divide the balance of
said share equally among his surviving brothers and sisters other than either the said
John Norman Gray or Albert Howard Graham Gray."
The testator was survived by three brothers John Norman, Farquharson, and Albert
Howard Graham.
The testator told his attorney that he wanted to provide for Albert and Norman and to
see that their interests were properly safeguarded but the attorney understood the
testator to say, "John Norman Gray" and "Albert Howard Graham Gray." Should this
evidence be admitted and should the property be distributed?
1956 Constitutional Law - Brown, Freund and Howe
On March 5, 1956 the Governor of South Carolina approved a Bill passed by the
Legislature of that State requiring all wholesale and retail establishments in the State
dealing in Japanese textile goods, or garments made therefrom, to display prominently
so as to be visible and clearly legible throughout their establishments a sign or signs
reading "Japanese Textiles Sold Here." By resolution the Legislature requested other
southern and New England states, where the textile industry is important, to adopt
similar legislation. Alabama has since done so. The legislation imposes substantial
fines for violations.
Importers of Japanese textiles, who have been developing a growing market in this
country because of slightly, but appreciably, favorable price differentials report that
orders and re-orders from wholesalers and retailers in South Carolina and Alabama
have fallen off to zero since the enactment of this legislation. In April, 1956 the
Japanese Ambassador in Washington delivered to the Secretary of State a Note reciting
these facts, stating that he was informed that this legislation was at best of questionable
validity and protesting that in any event it was in contravention of those provisions of
the 1953 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the
United States which, in Art. XVI, state: "Products of either Party shall be accorded,
within the territories of the other Party, national treatment and most-favored-nation
treatment in all matters affecting internal taxation, sale, distribution, storage and use."
[The Ambassador's Note omitted reference to the Protocol to the Treaty which, in § 7,
permits regulation of the sale of goods to comply with marking requirements "to assure

2. Reprinted from BERNARD JOSEPH RUBENSTEIN, RuBENSTEIN'S ARRANGEMENT OF HARVARD
LAW EXAMINATIONS: Bills and Notes, Business Organizations II, Equity II, Evidence, Property II, Sales,
Trusts (By Harvard A.B., LL.B., Private Tutor of Harvard Law Students, Author of several Law Texts).
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that the true geographic or commercial origin of such goods is correctly represented."]
The Note concludes:
"In view of the foregoing, the Ambassador, under instructions from the
Government of Japan, has further the honor to request the Government
of the United States urgently to take appropriate measures to meet this
regrettable situation and to prevent similar situations from arising in
other states."
You are on the Legal Staff of the State Department. Prepare, for the Secretary's
consideration, an analysis of the legal aspects of the situation presented, together with
your recommendations as to the tenor of the Secretary's reply to the Japanese Note.
1956 Legislation (b) - Braucher
Check the best statement:
A lawyer who is retained to perform legal services in seeking the enactment of a private
bill by Congress
(a) is guilty of a federal crime if he contracts for a fee contingent on success,
is engaged in unethical practice if he charges a fee,
regularly finds that any bill enacted contains provisions limiting his fee
properly offer to pay fair compensation to a Congressman who sponsors
and supports the bill, subject only to any limitation enacted as part of the bill;
-

-(b)
-(c)

-(d)may

Taxation, 1956 - Griswold
Commander Edward Whitehead has a luxurious red beard, and is well-known as a
corporate executive and a photographers' model. The Commander is invited to appear
on a television show. One of the other participants is a wealthy sportsman. During the
course of the show, the sportsman says to him: "Commander, if you will let me shave
off your beard, I will give you $100,000." In considering this, the Commander wants
to know what the tax consequences would be if he received the $100,000. He comes
to you for advice. Give it.
Property I, 1956 - Casner
Jane Zendman bought a diamond ring for $12,000 at an auction held at the gallery of
Brand, Inc., on the Boardwalk in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Harry Winston, Inc., a
diamond merchant located in New York City, claims ownership of the ring. Brand and
Winston had done business together for years. It was the custom of Harold Brand, the
owner and proprietor of Brand, Inc., to visit Winston's premises in New York several
times a month and select article that were later sold at the gallery in Atlantic City. In
October of 1947, Brand chose the ring - later purchased by Miss Zendman - advising
that he wished to show it to a customer, and, at his request, that one item was mailed
to the gallery in New Jersey. Accompanying it was a memorandum, reciting that the
goods were only for Brand's examination and that no title was to pass "until you have
made your selection, notified us ofyour agreement to pay the indicated price [$11,000]
and we have indicated our acceptance thereof by sending to you a bill of sale."
Upon receipt of the ring, Brand placed it in one of its public show windows, such
display being with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner Winston. The ring
remained on display until, more than a month later, it was put up at auction and, after
some bidding, "knocked down" and sold to Miss Zendman for $12,500. She received
a bill of sale from Brand and knew nothing about the written memorandum or the
circumstanced under which Brand had obtained possession. Sometime in January
1948, Winston discovered that Brand had sold the ring to Miss Zendman and, on
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February 2nd, demanded its return. On the following day, an involuntary petition in
bankruptcy was filed against Brand.
Section 23 of the Uniform Sales Act is in force in New Jersey and New York Personal
Property Law, Section 104, is identical. Section 23 is as follows:
"Subject to the provisions of this act, where goods are sold by a person who is not
the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under the authority or with the consent
ofthe owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless
the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller's authority
to sell."
The decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Zendman v. Harry Winston, Inc.,
305 N.Y. 180 (1953) was based on the facts recited above. Miss Zendman sought a
declaratory judgment as to the title to the ring and Winston filed a counterclaim for
replevin.
Give your opinion as to how this case should have been decided and set forth the
reasons in support of your conclusion.
PART 3. SELECTED EXAMINATION QUESTIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS:
TRANSITIONS IN EXAMINATION STYLES AT COLUMBIA
Questions for First Year Papers: Real and Personal Property
Columbia, June 6, 1894
Give reasonsfor your answers.
1. Describe the evolution of the fee, or feud, from its beginning to its present form.
What was subinfeudation,and how was it affected by legislation? To what extent does
it still survive?
2. What were the modes by which lands could be conveyed at common law? What
characteristic had they in common? How did the Statutes of Uses and of Enrolments
affect conveyancing?
3. X, having three sons, devised his lands to them as follows: to A for life, remainder
to the heirs of B for life, remainder to U for life. A conveys the lands in fee simple in
the lifetime of B and C. What is the effect of the conveyance on his own estate? On
those of the remaindermen respectively? Who is the reservioner, and what is the effect
of A's alienation upon him? What would be the present operation of such a
conveyance, and how has this result been brought about?
6. In an action of ejectment brought to recover possession of a tract of 1250 acres of
land, defendant shows (1) that he entered under a will devising the property to his wife
under the description of testator's "Rock Hill Farm;" (2) that he and his wife had been
in possession for upwards of twenty years; (3) that his possession had consisted in the
habitual cultivation of a tract of about 250 acres, and in cutting fire-wood in the woodlands forming a part of the farm. The plaintiff claimed under a later will, which was
duly established; he proved that the farm consisted of two distinct tracts of land: "farmlands," a part of which was occupied by the defendant, and "wood-lands," which law
at some distance from the other parcel. He showed that the defendant had himself been
in possession less than twenty years, and that he took the estate as tenant by the curtesy
from his wife, who had been the original disseisor. What are the rights of the parties?
Would it have made any difference if the order of succession had been reversed, the
husband taking the lands under the will, and the wife succeeding as doweress?
8. (a) Land is conveyed by a deed which describes its boundary line as running from a
point 100 rods west of a certain highway to a stake standing by the west side of said
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highway, thence along said highway to another stake and stones on the west side of the
same, thence westerly at right angles with the highway 100 rods, etc. The highway is
six rods wide. What is the length of the grantee's side-line?
(b) What presumption arises when land is conveyed bounded upon a stream or
highway? Upon the sea-shore? Upon a private way? Upon a "paper" road, - never
actually laid out? How may this presumption be rebutted? What conflicting views
have the courts taken upon this point?

Harlan Fiske Stone, Trusts, 1922
If a candidate for graduation in June, 1922, write above your name on the cover of your
answer book Candidate for Graduation-June, 1922
First give your conclusion, then state your reasons. Answers should not exceed two
pages in length. Books not complying with these requirements will be marked only "C"
or "F."
1. B owed A $1,000. B at A's request and on A's agreeing to relinquish his debt,
notified C that he, B, held $1,000 in trust for C. At that time B had no money but
shortly after he inherited $1,000 with which he purchased Blackacre, a piece of
unproductive land. B paid from salary earned by B, to C, at intervals, sums of money
which he represented to be income from the trust. At the end of seven years Blackacre
was worth $2,000 and B was bankrupt. What are the rights of the parties?
2. A devised land and buildings worth more than $10,000 to B, subject to a charge of
$10,000 in favor of C. B exchanged the land with X, who knew nothing of the charge,
for Whiteacre. Whiteacre was worth $8,000 and the buildings on it were worth $4,000.
B then sold Whiteacre to W for $53,000 who had notice of the charge. The buildings
on Whiteacre then burned. What are the rights of C?
3. X having given to A a covenant to convey Whiteacre to A offered to give to A a
similar covenant to convey Blackacre to A ifA would render certain specified services.
A assigned all his "right, title and interest" in and to "the covenants and to Whiteacre
and Blackacre" to B in trust for C. A retained possession of the covenant relating to
Whiteacre. Thereafter he rendered the services and X executed and delivered to A the
covenant with respect to Blackacre. What are C's rights?
4. A orally declared himself trustee of Blackacre and the proceeds thereof, if sold, for
B. A carried out the trust for a time, paying to B the rents and profits of Blackacre.
Thereafter X, A's wife, who knew of the trust, persuaded A to convey one-half of
Blackacre to her and to sell the other half. A invested the proceeds in Whiteacre which
he afterward conveyed to X as a gift. What are B's rights?
5. A, the owner of a promissory note, not yet due, for $1,000 declared himself trustee
of the note for X, a volunteer. A then endorsed the note "Pay $500 of this note to Y,"
signed A, and delivered it to Y as security for a loan of $500. Y had no notice of any
claim by X. What are the rights of the parties?
(b) Suppose Z, the maker, had paid Y $500 without notice of the declaration in favor
of X. What would your answer be?
6. A, trustee for B, deposited $2,000 of the trust funds in the X Savings Bank in A's
name as trustee for Z. The X Bank at A's request then applied $1,000 of the deposit
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in satisfaction of A's mortgage on Blackacre to the X Bank. Both A's and X Banks
property being liquidated in insolvency proceedings what are the rights of B and Z?
7. A, trustee for B, an infant, loaned trust moneys to X, whose credit rating was of the
highest, on his demand note payable to A as trustee for B, secured by stock collateral
having a market value of three times the face of the note. Seven years later B came of
age. X has not paid the note and the collateral has become worthless. What are the
rights of A and B?
8. A, trustee for B, pursuant to his powers as trustee leased a store, trust real estate,
to X, A covenanting in the lease to keep the leased premises in repair. A in violation of
the covenant neglected to repair certain shelving in the leased premises which fell and
damaged X's merchandise. A being personally insolvent what are X's rights?
Sales, Mid-Year Examination, January, 1928,
Columbia, Llewellyn
PART-I
To be given first. Time two hours.
If a candidate for graduation in February 1928, write above your name on the cover of
your answer book "Candidate for Graduation, February, 1928." The student may use
his casebook, the mimeographed materials, and any notes of his personal manufacture.
Use not more than 40 minutes on Question 1 and divide the balance of your time
between Questions 2 and 3. Thinkfirst, and don't write untilyou see where you are
going. It is not necessary to finish any question. State the law before you discuss or
criticize it. State any facts you find it desirable to assume.
1. B was a jobber in groceries working a limited territory. - S was a canner
whose trade was national. On June 1, 1923, B and S signed a written agreement
whereby B agreed to buy and S to sell all B's requirements of canned fruits and

vegetables for the following two years, price to be seller's opening price for the season,
but B to receive the benefit of any lowering in S's quotations before shipment; sizes,
qualities, kinds, and quantities for any month to be specified by B before the 10t' of
such month, otherwise S to have option not to ship. On June 15, B placed a large order
with S for July shipment. On July 1, S announced an opening price list well above the
market, filled B's order, and billed B accordingly. B took and used part of the shipment,
which he needed once, but contested the bill; the balance he rejected. B, on July 5,
placed a second order, conditioned on some reduction of S's price. S refused to lower
his price for B or other of his customers in like case, who together accounted for 80 per
cent of S's output. B can take the goods at S's price and still do business at a profit, but
the margin to him will be much less than is customary in the line. S's goods command
no important premium from the retailer or the consumer.
Is B liable in regard to any of the goods ordered or shipped, and to what extent?
Is he liable for damages for not ordering more goods out? If he has or should be held
to the contract for the future, can you advise him of any way to reduce or end his
liability?
2. S had the "New York agency" for the sale of Atlas steam boilers. He made
contracts for their sale in his own name, and collected the price. He paid the Atlas Co.
For each boiler ordered, irrespective of his own collections, although the boilers were
often on his instruction, shipped direct to a purchaser. B was solicited by S to put an
Atlas boiler into the plant B was constructing. B gave the specifications he required,
including ability to stand 150 pounds pressure. S said: "The Atlas 2XX is exactly what
you want. A contract was signed calling for delivery to B of one Atlas Giant 2XX
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boiler: the contract contained the clauses: "To stand 150 lbs. pressure safely. Money
back if B not satisfied after test." When installed, the Atlas Giant 2XX boiler (which
had been shipped direct by the Atlas Co.) had a defective pressure gauge, so that in the
higher ranges it registered forty to sixty pounds under the true pressure. B's engineer
looked the boiler over and reported: "It looks good; it looks quite O.K" A
painstakingly careful inspection would have revealed the defect. On the second day of
use it became necessary to use full pressure; the engineer, misled by the gauge, raised
the pressure to 200 lbs., believing he was only reaching 150. The boiler burst, injuring
X, Y and Z (the entire force of engine room helpers) and damaging the building. B
promptly notified S, saying: "rm going to see my lawyer. I'll hold you to the limit" S
claims the price, urging that the boiler complied with the contract, that it cannot in any
event be returned in statu quo, and that the test which burst it was improper and due
to B's negligence. He has brought suit. The law of the state makes B liable to the
engine room force, but leaves them free to pursue other remedies, if any, at their option.
X is suing B. Y is suing S. Can Y or Z recover? Can S? Advise B as to his rights and
course of action.
3. S of Bayonne made three contracts to sell, and B of Philadelphia, to buy naphtha.
The terms of each contract were identical: one carload 10 dollars a barrel f.o.b.
Bayonne, less freight charges to Philadelphia; terms net 30 days. (a) the first carload,
shipped out according to contract, was destroyed by accident en route. S claims the
price. B damages for non-delivery.
(b) Before the second carload was shipped, S heard that B was in financial
difficulties, took a bill of lading to his own order with sight draft attached, and present
it to B through a Philadelphia bank. B refused to honor the draft, and brought suit
against S for non-delivery, attaching the naphtha in the hands of the carrier. S
contested the attachment. B then offered to call off all legal action on either carload if
S would deliver on 15 days' credit. S agreed. The attachment was dissolved, and S
instructed the carrier to deliver the naphtha to B. The carrier had on June 1just placed
the car on B's siding and B had begun to affix pumps for unloading, when orders from
S reached the carrier to withhold delivery; S had heard of B's insolvency, which
supervened on May 31. S now insisted on cash against delivery. B's trustee (who had
all B's rights) on June 2 offered, "expressly reserving all his rights, however," to pay
cash if the naphtha proved, on inspection, up to contract, and asked S to have a test
made by a local chemist. S refused. The market on June 2 was $10.50 a barrel for
naphtha of this grade. During the negotiations, however, it suddenly broke, dropping
to $8.00 a barrel on June 15, and S, fearing further decline, resold the carload at that
price without notice to B's trustee. The demurrage charges of the railroad came to an
additional dollar per barrel. B's trustee believes he has an action either in trover or for
non-delivery. S believes he has a claim for damages of $3.00 a barrel to prove against
B's estate.
(c) B's trustee (as he had legal power to do) insisted on performance ofthe third
contract, the market for naphtha having more than recovered, and on demand S he
remitted the price. S was engaged in loading the car, and had filled it three quarters full.
He had asked the railroad to make out the bill of lading straight to B's trustee as soon
as the measurement and loading was completed; but this bill of lading had yet been
signed or delivered by the railroad. At this juncture the naphtha in the car and in S's
tanks was attached by a creditor of S. S then became insolvent. It developed later that
the naphtha being loaded was of a lower grade than that called for by the contract. B's
trustee intervened in the attachment proceeding, claiming the naphtha in the car, and
an undivided share of that in the tank. Discuss the claims and rights at the parties.
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Federal Courts and the Federal System - Final Examination - April 1976
Columbia, Wechsler

ANSWERS MUST BE WRITTEN IN INK OR TYPEWRITTEN.
IF YOU ARE A CANDIDATE FOR GRADUATION IN MAY, 1976, WRITE
PROMINENTLY ON THE FIRST SHEET OF YOUR EXAMINATION ANSWER
"CANDIDATE FOR GRADUATION IN MAY 1976."
Instructions:
This is an open-book, take-home examination. You may consult any published
sources you like, and of course your notes, but you will be expected to conform with
the required pledge that you have not discussed examination questions with anyone or
given or received any aid in answering the questions.
Do not permit your answers to exceed the specified length. Ealain your answers.
There is a premium on clarity, brevity, organization and good prose. Place your
number at the top of each page ofyour answer. It is recommended that you keep a copy
of your answer for the unlikely contingency that your answer is lost.
The examination should be handed in to the Chief Proctor no later p.m. on the
following dates: degree candidates, Friday, April 30 in Room F; non-degree
candidates, Thursday, May 6 in the Dean's Office.
[Question Number] I [Space Maximum: 750 words]
In 1-4y1p V. St. Vincent Hospital 369 F. Supp 948 (D.. Mont. 73), the plaintiffs%
a married couple, sued in the United States District Court to enjoin the hospital, a
charitable non-profit Catholic institution, from refusing to permit the plaintiffs'
physician to perform a sterilization procedure on the woman after completing a contemplated Caesarean delivery of her second child. The hospital was the recipient of
federal and state grants of funds and was the only institution in the area in which the
plaintiffs lived.
In the view that the receipt of public funds gave the hospital a public character and
that Griswold and Roe conferred as against public authorities the right of competent
adults to elect sterilization, the Court granted a preliminary injunction. Immediately
thereafter Congress enacted Section 401(b) (2) (A) ofthe Health Programs Extension
Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 95, providing that a hospital's receipt of federal funds under the
Public Health Service Act (the source of St. Vincent's public funding) "does not
authorize any court or any public official or other public authority to require.., such
entity" to "make its facilities available for the performance of any sterilization
procedure or abortion if the performance of such procedure or abortion in such facilities
is prohibited by the entity on the basis of religious beliefs moral convictions .... "
Upon the enactment of the statute the Court dissolved the injunction and dismissed
the complaint, saying that "there can be no doubt that Section 401 (b) which restricts
the course and power of inferior federal is a valid exercise of Congressional power.
Under Article I of Constitution, Congress can establish such inferior courts as it
chooses. Its power to create those courts includes the power to invest them with such
jurisdiction as it deems appropriate for the public. Lcker v. Phillips .. [Further,]
Congress is free to legislate with respect to remedies the inferior Federal courts may
grant. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. H

....
"

1. Assuming that the complaint asserted a substantial federal claim on the merits and
that the plaintiff could establish jurisdictional amount was the judgment of dismissal
correct?
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2. The legislative history of Section 401(b) makes clear that the enactment was
inspired by the temporary injunction granted in the IaJ case and that the purpose of
Congress was to terminate it if it could. Do these facts have any bearing on the
correctness of the decision?
3. If the plaintiffs had brought suit in a Montana state court and the defendant
invoked Section 401(b) in support of a motion to dismiss the complaint, what issues
should the court resolve?
[Question Number] II [Space Maximum: 900 words]
The decision and opinions of the Supreme Court in Vachon v. New Hampshire, 415
U.S. 478 (1974), are reproduced hereafter. [Ed. note: footnotes were provided in the
exam, which reproduced the opinion as a photocopy from the U.S. Reports advance
sheets. The footnotes are largely omitted here.]
VACHON v. NEW HAMPSHIRE
No. 73-573
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
[414 U.S. 478; 94 S.Ct. 664; 1974 U.S. LEXIS 148; 38 L. Ed. 2d 666]
January 14, 1974
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.
On the basis of evidence that a 14-year-old girl bought a button inscribed "Copulation Not Masturbation" at
a store operated by him, appellant was convicted of "wilfully" contributing to the delinquency of a minor in
violation of aNew Hampshire statute. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. Held: An independent
examination of the trial record pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 40 (lXd)(2) discloses that evidence is
completely lacking that appellant personally sold the girl the button or that he was aware of the sale or
present in the store at the time, a fatal void in the State's case that was not filled by appellant's concession at
trial that he "controlled the premises" at the time. A conviction based on a record completely lacking any
relevant evidence as to a crucial element of the offense charged violates due process.

PER CURIAM. A 14-year-old girl bought a button inscribed "Copulation Not
Masturbation" at the Head Shop in Manchester, New Hampshire. In consequence,
appellant, operator of the shop, was sentenced to 30 days in jail and fined $100 after
conviction upon a charge of"wilfuly" contributing to the delinquency of a minor in
violation of New Hampshire's Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169:32 (Supp. 1972).' In affirming the
conviction, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the "wilfully" component of
the offense required that the State prove that the accused acted "'oluntarily and
intentionally and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.' 113 N.
H. 239, 242, 306 A. 2d 781, 784 (1973). Thus, the State was required to produce
evidence that appellant, knowing the girl to be a minor, personally sold her the button,
or personally caused another to sell it to her. Appellant unsuccessfully sought
dismissal of the charge at the close of the State's case on the ground that the State had
produced no evidence to meet this requirement, and unsuccessfully urged the same
ground as a reason for reversal in the State Supreme Court. We have reviewed the
transcript of the trial on this issue, pursuant to Rule 40 (1)(dX2) of the Rules of this
Court.
Our independent examination of the trial record discloses that evidence is completely
lacking that appellant personally sold the girl the button or even that he was aware of
the sale or present in the store at the time. The girl was the State's only witness to the
3. The statute provides in pertinent part:
"Anyone.. . who ...has knowingly or wilfully done any act to... contribute to the
delinquency of [a] child, may be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars
or by imprisonment for not more than one year or both."
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sale. She testified that she and a girl friend entered the store and looked around until
they saw "a velvet display card on a counter" from which they "picked out [the] pin."
She went to some person in the store with the button "cupped in [her] hand" and paid
that person 25 cents for the button. She did not say that appellant was that person, or
even that she saw him in the store. Rather, she testified that she could not identify who
the person was. We therefore agree with Justice Grimes, dissenting, that "there is no
evidence whatever that the defendant sold the button, that he knew it had been sold to
a minor, that he authorized such sales to minors or that he was even in the store at the
time of the sale." 113 N. H., at 244, 306 A. 2d, at 785. This fatal void in the State's
case was not filled by appellant's concession at trial that he "controlled the premises on
July 26." That concession was evidence at most that he operated the shop; it was in no
way probative of the crucial element of the crime that he personally sold the minor the
button or personally caused it to be sold to her.
In these circumstances, the conviction must be reversed. "It is beyond question, of
course, that a conviction based on a record lacking any relevant evidence as to a crucial
element of the offense charged.. . violate[s] due process." Harris v. United States, 404
U.S. 1232, 1233 (1971). (DOUGLAS, J., in chambers); Thompson v. Louisville, 362
U.S. 199 (1960); Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596 (1968); see also Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 44 (1966).
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the New Hampshire Supreme
Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE
WHITE join, dissenting.
Appellant Denis M. Vachon operates the Head Shop in Manchester, New Hampshire,
where he sells various beads, dresses, posters, and the like. In July 1969, a 14-year-old
girl, accompanied by her girl firiend, went to the shop seeking to purchase a button or
pin like the one purchased by her friend the previous week. She found the button,
inscribed "Copulation Not Masturbation," and purchased it from a salesperson in the
store. It was conceded in the New Hampshire courts that appellant was in control of
the premises where the sale was made. At ajury-waived trial, appellant was convicted
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a statutory offense proscribed in these
words:
"Anyone ... who shall knowingly or wilfully encourage, aid, cause, or abet, or connive
at, or has knowingly or wilfully done any act to produce, promote, or contribute to the
delinquency of[a] child, may be punished... ." N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169:32 (Supp.
1972).
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed appellant's conviction. 113 N. H.
239, 306 A. 2d 781 (1973).
The Court decides that appellants conviction under this statute violates rights secured
to him by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, concluding on the
basis of its "independent examination of the trial record" that "evidence is completely
lacking that appellant personally sold the girl the button or even that he was aware of
the sale or present in the store at the time."
I
In one sense there can be no doubt that the Court's conclusion is based upon an
"independent examination of the trial record," since the claim sustained here was
neither made in constitutional form to the Supreme Court ofNew Hampshire, nor even
presented by appellant in his jurisdictional statement in this Court.
A litigant seeking to preserve a constitutional claim for review in this Court must not
only make clear to the lower courts the nature of his claim, but he must also make it
clear that the claim is constitutionally grounded. Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203
(1945). The closest that appellant came in his brief on appeal to the Supreme Court of
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New Hampshire to discussing the issue on which this Court's opinion turns is in the
sixth section (at 17-18), which is headed: "The State's failure to introduce any evidence
of scienter should have resulted in dismissal of the charge following the presentation
ofthe State's case." Appellant in that section makes the customary appellate arguments
of insufficiency of the evidence and does not so much as mention either the United
States Constitution or a single case decided by this Court. The Supreme Court of New
Hampshire treated these arguments as raising a classic state law claim of insufficient
evidence of scienter; nothing in that court's opinion remotely suggests that it was
treating the claim as having a basis other than in state law.
The Court purports to decide the scienter question on the basis of Rule 40 (1)(dX2)
of the Rules of this Court, which provides:
"1.Briefs of an appellant or petitioner on the merits shall be printed as
prescribed in Rule 39, and shall contain in the order here indicated "(dX2) The phrasing of the questions presented need not be identical
with that set forth in the jurisdictional statement or the petition for
certiorari, but the brief may not raise additional questions or change the
substance of the questions already presented in those documents.
Questions not presented according to this paragraph will be
disregarded, save as the court, at its option, may notice a plain error not
presented."
The very language of this rule makes it clear that it applies to this Court's review of
cases in which it has previously either noted probable jurisdiction or granted certiorari.
The cases cited by the Court in support of what it does here are therefore necessarily
cases in which review had been granted and which had been orally argued; in addition,
each of those cases arose in the federal courts. See Columbia Heights Realty Co. v.
Rudolph, 217 U.S. 547 (1910); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941);
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313
(1971).
Whatever the import of Rule 40 (1XdX2) in cases arising in the federal courts, it
surely does not give this Court the power to simply ignore the limitations placed by 28
U. S. C. § 1257 on our jurisdiction to review final judgments of the highest court of a
State. That jurisdiction permits review in this Court by appeal where a state statute has
been upheld against a federal constitutional challenge, or by writ of certiorari where a
federal constitutional challenge is "specifically set up or claimed" in state court. Our
prior cases establish that we will "not decide federal constitutional issues raised here
for the first time on review of state court decisions." Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S.
437,438 (1969). See Crowell v. Randell, 10 Pet. 368 (1836). Since the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire was not presented with a federal constitutional challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, resolution ofthis question by the Court is inconsistent with
the congressional limitation on our jurisdiction to review the final judgment of the
highest court of a State.
II
Even if appellant's sufficiency-of-the-evidence contention in the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire could be said to have been presented as a federal constitutional claim
based on Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960), I would nonetheless be unable
to join in the Court's disposition of it. In Thompson, the only state court proceedings
reaching the merits of the case were in the Louisville Police Court from which there was
no right of appeal to any higher state court, and there was therefore no state court
opinion written which construed the statute under which Thompson was convicted.
This Court therefore had no choice but to engage in its own construction of the statute
and upon doing so it concluded that the record was "entirely lacking in evidence to
support any of the charges." Id., at 204. Thompson was obviously an extraordinary
case, and up until now has been saved for extraordinary situations; it has not heretofore
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been broadened so as to make lack of evidentiary support for only one of several
elements of an offense a constitutional infirmity in a state conviction.
Here, however, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire construed the state statute
defining contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and held that the evidence adduced
at the trial was sufficient to support a finding on each element of that offense. While
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire did say, as the Court indicates, that the State
was required to prove that the accused acted "'voluntarily and intentionally and not
because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason,"' 113 N. H., at 242, 306 A. 2d,
at 784, it said this in a context of several paragraphs of treatment of the elements of the
offense. Just as those reading and relying upon our opinions would be ill-advised to
seize one phrase out of context, I think we are ill-advised to so treat the opinion of the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire. That court had several observations to make about
the statutory offense which bear on the issue of "wilfulness" upon which this Court
focuses:
"It is uncontested that the defendant was in control of the premises
where the sale was made. There was evidence that a girl friend of this
minor had previously purchased there a pin 'like that.' These pins were
displayed on a card on a counter. The trial court saw the minor and had
an opportunity to conclude whether her minority should have been
apparent to whoever sold the pin. The court could find that the
defendant was aware of the character of the pins which were being
offered for sale and sold in his establishment.
"Defendant is charged with wilfully contributing to the delinquency of
a minor by selling or causing to be sold to her the button in question.
To act wilfully is 'o act voluntarily and intentionally arid not because
of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.' [Citations omitted.]
The trial court could properly find and rule that the sale of this button
to the minor was intentional. The trial court could further conclude that
the seller of this type of button should have realized that it would tend
to be harmful to the morals of the purchaser or others. R. S.A. 169:32
(Supp. 1972). This would warrant a finding and ruling that the
defendant wilfully contributed to the delinquency of this minor as
charged in the complaint. [Citations omitted.]" Id., at 242, 306 A. 2d,
at 784.
The Court simply casts aside this authoritative construction of New Hampshire law,
seizes one phrase out of context, and concludes that there was no evidence to establish
that the appellant "[knew] the girl to be a minor, personally sold her the button, or
personally caused another to sell it to her." The word "personally" is the contribution
of this Court to the New Hampshire statute; it is not contained in the statute, and is not
once used by the Supreme Court ofNew Hampshire in its opinion dealing with the facts
of this very case. Indeed, the entire thrust of the opinion of the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire is that appellant need not personally have sold the button to the minor nor
personally have authorized its sale to a minor in order to be guilty of the statutory
offense. The only fair reading of the above-quoted language from the Supreme Court
ofNew Hampshire is that the word "wilfully" in the statute does not mean "personally,"
and the facts that the appellant controlled and operated the shop, that the same type of
pin had been previously purchased at the shop, and that the pins were prominently
offered for sale were sufficient evidence on the issue of willfulness.
This may seem to us a somewhat broad construction of the language "wilfully" or
"knowingly," though our own cases make it clear that we are dealing with words which
may be given a variety of meanings by their context:
"The difference between willful failure to pay a tax when due, which is
made a misdemeanor, and willful attempt to defeat and evade one,
which is made a felony, is not easy to detect or define. Both must be
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willful, and willful, as we have said, is a word of many meanings, its
construction often being influenced by its context. United States v.
Murdock, 290 U.S. 389. It may well mean something more as applied
to nonpayment of a tax than when applied to failure to make a return.
Mere voluntary and purposeful, as distinguished from accidental,
omission to make a timely return might meet the test of willfulness."
Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497-498 (1943).
But since our authority to review state court convictions is limited to the vindication of
claims of federal rights, we must take the meaning of the statute, and of the words
"wilfully" and "knowingly" which it uses, as given to us by the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire. I would have thought such a proposition well settled by our prior
decisions:
"We of course are bound by a State's interpretation of its own statute
and will not substitute our judgment for that of the State's when it
becomes necessary to analyze the evidence for the purpose of
determining whether that evidence supports the findings of a state
court." Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 166 (1961).
We do have constitutional authority in appropriate cases to hold that the State's
construction of its statute is such that the statutory language did not give a criminal
defendant fair warning of the conduct which is construed to be embraced within it.
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347
(1964). But this is a far cry from our own rewriting of a state statute in order to make
it require a highly specific intent, and then turning around and saying that there was no
evidence before the state courts to prove the kind of intent which we have said the
statute requires. I would at least note probable jurisdiction over the appeal and set the
case for oral argument. Since the Court instead chooses, without ever having heard
argument, to rewrite the New Hampshire statute and substitute its interpretation for that
of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, I dissent.
1. Did the Supreme Court properly take jurisdiction on AR n from the New
Hampshire Supreme Court?
2. If you were a law clerk to a Justice when the case was in the Court and he asked you
for your views, would you have recommended that he subscribe to the er ciam or the
dissent or that he write something on his own, and if the latter, what?
3. On the remand, is there anything that the New Hampshire Supreme Court could
properly have done or said to vindicate its judgment that the statute is violated by a
person in control of premises on which obscene material is offered for sale and in fact
sold to a minor?
[Question Number] Ill [Space Maximum: 600 words]
Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure deals with derivative actions by
shareholders and requires, inter ali, that the complaint allege that "the plaintiff was a
shareholder.., at the time of the transaction of which he complains."
In Bangor Punts Operations v. Ban-or & A.R. Co. 417 U.S. 703, 708 n. 4 (1974),
Mr. Justice Powell said:
"The 'contemporaneous ownership requirement in shareholder derivative actions was
first announced in Hawes v. Oakland 104 U.S. 450 (1882), and soon thereafter
adopted as Equity Rule 97. This provision was later incorporated in Equity Rule 27
and finally in the present Rule 23.1. After the decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), the question arose whether the contemporaneous ownership
requirement was one of procedure or substantive law. If the requirement were
substantive, then under the regime of Eie it could not be validly applied in federal
diversity cases where state law permitted a noncontemporaneous shareholder to
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maintain a derivative action. See 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice M23.1. 31-23.1.15 [2].
Although most cases treat the requirement as one of procedure, this Court has never
resolved the issue. Ibid."
1. If the validity of the requirement is challenged in a shareholder's action arising solely
under state corporation law, with jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, when
no such requirement is imposed by the state of the governing law, what should the
ruling be?
2. If the shareholder's action referred to above was brought in a state court and
properly removed by the defendant and the contemporaneous ownership rule is held
applicable and valid, should the District Court dismiss the action or remand to the state
court?
[Question Number] IV [Space maximum: 900 words]
The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence under the
chairmanship of Milton S. Eisenhower reported in 1969. One of its major
recommendations was that Congress enact legislation "that would confer jurisdiction
upon the United States District Courts to grant injunctions, upon the request of the
Attorney General or private persons, against the threatened or actual interference by
any person, whether or not under color of state or federal law, with the rights of
individuals or groups to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, peaceful assembly
and petition for redress of grievances."
Senators Hruska and Hart, who were members of the Commission, thereupon
introduced S.3976, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., providing in major part as follows:
CERTAIN CONDUCT UNLAWFUL
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person or group, except as
authorized by law, to interfere, either willfully by the use of physical
force, by the use of disruptive noise with specific intent to interfere, or
by the unreasonable withholding or limitation under color of Federal or
State law of any required permit, license, or other permission (1) with the orderly conduct of any meeting, address, discussion,
worship, or other assembly, or with the free passage of persons Or the
conduct of business or research in any street, building, or other place
incidental to the exercise of the constitutional rights of religion, speech,
press, assembly, or petition; or
(2) with the exercise by any person or group, by demonstration,
picketing, publication, or other means, of the rights of free speech, free
press, peaceable assembly, or petition to the Government for redress of
grievances.
ENFORCEMENT BY PERSONS AGGRIEVED
SEC. 3 (a) Any individual, group, institution, or other public or private
person who claims to have been injured, or who believes that he will be
irreparably injured, by conduct in violation of section 2 of this Act, may
bring a civil action for appropriate relief.
(b) The United States district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
civil actions under this Act. A civil action under this Act may be
brought without regard to the amount in controversy in the United
States district court for the district in which the unlawful conduct is
alleged to have occurred or to be about to occur.
(c) In any civil action under this Act, the district court may grant as
relief, as it deems appropriate, any permanent or temporary injunction,
temporary restraining order, or other order, and may award damages
together with court costs.
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(d) Upon timely application in any civil action under this Act brought
in a United States district court, the court shall permit the Attorney
General to intervene if he certifies that the case is of general public
importance.
The bill was promptly attacked on constitutional grounds, namely, that insofar as the
bill purports to make unlawful the conduct of private as distinguished from official
individuals or groups, not acting under color of federal or state law, it exceeds the
power of Congress. You are a law assistant to one of the sponsors of the bill and he has
asked you to consider whether there is any way the bill can be revised to meet the
constitutional objection (whether or not you believe that it has merit). Specifically,
since the conduct that it is the purpose of the bill to prevent (breaking up meetings, etc.)
is bound to be unlawful under state law even if it is not unconstitutional, the important
goal is not the federal declaration of illegality but the enlistment of the federal courts
in its prevention.
Is there any way the bill can be revised to serve this purpose? If so, how? If not, why
not?
[Question Number] V [Space Maximum: 400 words]
Would the enactment of the Proposed Federal Court Jurisdiction Act (Judicial Code
Pamphlet, p. 631) lead to a different result in such a case as:
1. Qmily v. First National Bank in Meridian Casebook, p. 884?
2. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. Casebook, p. 891?

PART 4. SELECTED EXAMINATION QUESTIONS:
TRANSITIONS IN EXAMINATION STYLES AT MICHIGAN
University of Michigan, Department of Law
Questions on Common Law Pleading
Second Semester, 1895-96
1.

Define an action. What are the classes of actions. Define each. How were real
actions divided.

2.

What is the real distinction between real and personal actions.

3.

Name the superior courts of the common law, give the jurisdiction, and number
ofjudges in each. Have these courts encroached upon the jurisdiction of each
other. How.

4.

How were actions commenced originally (a) in the courts of King Bench (b) in
the common pleas (c) in the exchequer.

5.

What was this original writ. Out of which court did it issue. Was it under seal.
To whom was it directed. What did it contain. What was its object. What was
the effect of a failure to comply with this writ..

6.

Were there different forms of original writ. How many.

7.

What were the different writs used in real actions. Define each.

8.

Name the modem mixed actions.
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9.

What can you say of the action of forcible entry and detainer.

10.

May a judgment in the action of "forcible entry and detainer" be plead in bar
of an action of ejectment.

11.

What can you say of the possession necessary to maintain this action. Must the
possession be actual. May it be constructive. May one in wrongful possession
have benefit of this action.

12.

What can you say of the force necessary in order to maintain this action. Will
a mere trespass be sufficient. Is entry by means of keys a forcible entry. May
this action be maintained where the original entry was lawful. When. When
not.

Constitutional Law, May 26, 1924
Please do not repeat the questions. Give only your answers. Give reasons in all cases
as clearly and concisely as possible. Discuss all reasonably possible constitutional
objections to the legislation involved in these questions.
I.
A state constitution provides that "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation." A railroad company built its road along one side of A's
farm but did not at any point cross the boundary line with its road-bed. Cinders from
the many passing locomotives caused A some inconvenience and injuriously affected
certain crops. The jarring caused by passing trains shook down much earth from a
railway embankment at a certain place, upon A's land and so diverted water in a ditch
running parallel to the road as to flood a part of A's farm after heavy rains. Has A any
remedy?
II.
A state statute subjects all who are "engaged in mining or producing iron or other
ores" within the state to the payment of an "occupation tax" equal to 6% of the value
of the ore mined or produced during the preceding year. B is engaged in mining ore.
Practically all of his output is mined to fill existing contracts with persons outside the
state, and passes at once into the channels of interstate commerce. Steam shovels sever
the ore from its natural bed and lift it directly into cars, which are then run into the
railroad yards, where they are put into trains which start the ore on its interstate
journey. Must B pay the tax?
I.
The A Co. deeded a lot with a residence upon it to B, expressly reserving to the
grantor the right to mine and remove all coal under the surface, the grantee taking the
premises with the risk and waiving all claims for damages that might arise from mining
the coal. Thereafter the legislature passed an act forbidding the mining of coal in such
way as to cause a subsidence of structures used as human habitations. Can the act be
applied to B's land?
IV.
A state statute created a drainage district, describing it by bounds, and provided for
taxing all property therein, for the construction of a sewer for house drainage only.
Plaintiff brought an action to cancel the assessment as to his property, on the ground
that his land was so situated that it could not benefit from the improvement, unless the
district would construct a branch sewer not yet planned, and that he had had no notice
and had been given no hearing upon the fixing of the boundaries of the district or the
assessment of the tax. Should he succeed?
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V.
A state statute imposed what it called an "occupation tax" of 2% upon all premiums
paid by corporations of the state and by foreign corporations doing business in the
state, to insurance companies outside ofthe state not authorized to do business with the
state. Is the statute valid?
VI.
A city having legislative authority therefor, constructed subways, tunnels and roadbeds and leased this property to a railroad company, to operate as a public railroad.
Thereafter the company became insolvent, and the state legislature thereupon passed
a special Act, creating a board of trustees to take over and operate the railroad, and to
pay dividends if earned, to the stock holders. The statute also provided for the
assessment of taxable property in the city to meet a deficit if any should arise from
operation of the road. The rentals provided for in the lease were to be paid to the city
from net earnings, if any. Was this action constitutional?
VII.
Suppose an Act of Congress by Sec. 1 conferred upon the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction in all cases brought by municipal corporations of one state against
municipal corporations of another state; and by Sec. 2 conferred original jurisdiction
upon the District Courts, in all cases brought by or against foreign ambassadors and
ministers; and by Sec. 3 gave to the parties in cases arising under Sec. 2, the right to
appeal such cases from the District to the Supreme Court. Discuss the validity of the
statute.
VIII.
A state constitution provides that juries shall be made up of "citizens of the state, of
the age of 21 years or above." The state supreme court had construed this clause to
mean "male citizens" of the required age. What if any effect has the adoption of the
"equal suffrage" amendment to the U.S. Constitution upon the eligibility of women to
jury service in said state?
Ix.
The "Pure Food Act" of Congress requires manufacturers of canned foods to attach
labels to the cans, giving in a described manner the contents thereof, in the case of all
such products carried in interstate commerce. A state pure food act requires a different
and somewhat conflicting label on all canned goods offered for sale within the state.
At what time, if any, may the state labels be attached to canned goods, brought in from
other states (a) to the separate cans, and (b) to the wooden boxes in which such cans
are packed?
X.
Would a state statute authorizing a state commission, created for that purpose, to
acquire under eminent domain, all slaughter-houses in the state slaughtering annually
more than 1,000 animals for food purposes, and to maintain and operate such plants,
and to sell meat and the by-products at "reasonable prices, the cost of production and
marketing considered," be valid?
END
University of Michigan
Law School,
Constitutional Law
May 25, 1935
Pleasedo not repeat the questions. Give only your answers. Give reasons in all
cases as clearly and concisely as possible. Discuss all reasonably possible
constitutionalobjections to the legislationinvolved in these questions.
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I
A state statute provided for the allowance of a reasonable attorney's fee not exceeding
$25 to successful plaintiff in any suit in which an attorney is actually employed upon
a claim not exceeding $250 against any person or corporation doing business in the
state, for personal services rendered, labor or material furnished, or for overcharges on
freight or express by such person or corporation, where such claim is not paid within
thirty days after demand, and the recovery is for the full amount claimed. A railway
company operating its lines in that state and adjoining states had judgment for the full
amount claimed by plaintiff and a $25 attorney's fee entered against it. Is the judgment
good?
Another statute concerns the furnishing of cars by railways to shippers, and provides
that when cars applied for, in accordance with the statute, are not duly furnished, the
railway company shall be liable to the shipper for a penalty of $10 a day for each car
not furnished, and for a reasonable attorney's fee. Shippers who fail to load cars within
two days after they are placed at their disposal are liable to the company for a similar
penalty, but not for attorney fees. Is ajudgment carrying attorney fees against a railway
good?
II
A state statute provides that in every attachment suit brought in any of the courts of
the state by non-residents of said state, the plaintiff shall file an indemnity bond in
favor of the defendant, the bond to be for an amount equal to double the value of the
property attached, and to be approved by the court, before the issuance of the
attachment writ. Residents of the state bringing attachment were not required to file
indemnity bonds, unless the judge of the court so decided and then in an amount to be
fixed in the discretion of the judge.
P, a non-resident, sued D, a resident, for an amount claimed to be due upon D's
promissory note, but by mistake of P's lawyer, and through inadvertence of the judge,
who had not observed thst P was a non-resident, the bond was filed in conformity with
that section of the statute relating to resident plaintiffs in attachment and it was for an
amount fixed by the judge at less than double the value of the property attached. Three
months after the filing of the suit, it was dismissed on defendant's motion for noncompliance with the statute. The statute of limitations on the cause of action had run
one month before the dismissal. A month after the dismissal of the suit, the state
legislature passed an act directing the court to reinstate the case when and if the
plaintiff should file a proper bond within thirty days after the passage of the Act. D,
at the appropriate time, objects to the reinstatement. Discuss the validity of both
statutes.
1II
The Detroit Street Railway Company is incorporated under a Michigan statute, and
is authorized to operate cars in certain Detroit streets, after securing appropriate
franchises from Detroit for a period of thirty years. It is required to maintain its tracks,
cars and equipment in good condition, to provide adequate service for the districts it
serves and charge fares at not to exceed six cents each. The Company secured proper
franchises from the City of Detroit to operate its lines for the period of thirty years.
After the Company had operated for five years, the Mayor of Detroit, alleging that the
Company was not maintaining "adequate service" for certain neighborhoods and was
violating the provision as to fares, because it refused to give transfers from one to
others of its lines, issued an order suspending the right of the Company to operate, and
directed the police to enforce the order. Is the order valid?
IV
The National Recovery Act of Congress, after declaring the existence of an economic
emergency, authorizes the President, upon the application by one or more trade or
industrial associations or groups, to approve a code or codes of fair competition for the
trade or industry, if the President finds (1) that such association or group imposes no
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inequitable restrictions on admission to membership; and (2) that such code or codes
are not designed to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises;
provided that such code or codes shall not permit monopolies or monopolistic
practices.
The Act further declares that after the President has approved any such code, the
provisions thereof shall be the standards of fair competition for such trade or industry,
and that any violation thereof shall be deemed an unfair method of competition in
commerce. It further provides that whenever the President shall find that destructive
wage or price cutting, or other activities contrary to the policy of the Act are being
practiced in any trade or industry, and, after such public notice and hearings as he shall
specify, shall find it essential to license business enterprises, in order to make fair codes
or fair competition, no person shall, after the date fixed by the President, engage in or
carry on any business in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, unless he shall
have first obtained a license pursuant to such regulations as the President shall
prescribe.
The shoe manufacturing industry was organized conformably to the Act, and adopted
a Code which, among other things, contained a schedule of wages and hours of labor
for employees. M, a manufacturer, is found guilty by the code authorities of violation
of this schedule, fined and "ordered" to conform. The finding supporting the code of
schedule of wages is that "this schedule of wages is reasonable and fair to employers
and employees". M claims that compliance with the schedule would involve him in loss
and insolvency. He imports leathers from other states and sells his finished product
throughout the country. His manufacturing is all done in Ohio. Is the order valid?
V
During the period prior to 1900, the R telephone company had established a system
of long distance telephone communication over large parts of the states of Iowa and
Missouri. It also owned and controlled local telephone exchanges in many cities and
towns in this territory. The American Telephone and Telegraph Company by license
and stock ownership controlled the R company so that the latter, with its local and long
distance lines, became allied to the Bell system extending throughout the United States.
There also existed in the two states named many independent local telephone exchanges
which competed with the local exchanges of the R company. Said competition was not
comprehensive and complete because the independent exchanges were not connected
with each other by long distance lines and hence could not give long distance service
to their patrons. The R company refused to permit the independent exchanges to use
its long distance lines.
For the purpose of furnishing long distance service to these independent exchanges,
the U company was organized as an independent long distance company. It expended
several million dollars in constructing its lines, and made contracts with the
independent local exchanges providing for an interchange of business so as to develop
a comprehensive and adequate independent telephone system which competed with the
Bell system; and by 1910 was furnishing long distance service for one thousand
independent exchanges. In the latter year the R company changed its policy and
solicited exchange of business with the local independent companies. Several
independent companies entered into contracts with the R company despite the fact
known to all parties that the contracts of the U company with all of the independent
companies provided that for points reached by that company the independent
companies should give their long distance business exclusively to it. The U company
gave much lower rates than did the R company, but its lines did not reach so wide a
territory, though they were being rapidly extended.
The U company filed bills for injunction, asking that the independent companies be
restrained from entering into contracts with the R company, setting up the above facts
and alleging that the purpose of the R company associated in soliciting business of the
local independent exchanges was to create a complete monopoly in the telephone
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business and that such would be the effect if the new contracts were allowed to stand.
Defendants demur. The R Company was incorporated under the laws of Maine and a
statute of that state forbade monopoly and restraint of trade. Should the demurrer be
sustained under either the Maine Act or the Sherman Anti-Trust statute?
VI
P, a manufacturer in Detroit, contracts to sell one hundred automobiles to B, a dealer
of New York, fifty of said cars to be delivered at his place of business in New York and
fifty at his plant in Jersey City. To save transportation expense, P ships the parts of the
cars "knocked down": to his own assembling plant in New York, there to be "set up"
ready for delivery. The cars arrive in New York March 1. New York property taxes
become due April 1. On that day all of the cars are still in P's New York plant.
Twenty of them are set up and marked and put aside for delivery to B in New York
whenever he shall ask for them; twenty more are ready and set aside and marked for
delivery to B in Jersey City, as soon as the transportation company has trucks available
to take them to Jersey City, the order for said trucking having been given already. The
remaining sixty cars are still being set up in P's New York plant. B has not paid for
the cars. Can the New York taxes be enforced against either P or B, as to any or all of
these cars?
VII
A shot and killed B. After arrest and arraignment he pleaded guilty. As the law stood
when the homicide was committed it was provided that if the defendant pleaded guilty,
sentence of death should not be pronounced unless the jury in their verdict should find
that the killing was deliberate and premeditated. Before A's trial the law was so
changed as to provide that where the plea was guilty ajury should be impanelled to try
the question whether or not the killing was deliberate and premeditated and the sentence
made to depend upon their verdict. The new procedure was followed in A's case. The
jury found that the homicide was deliberate and premeditated and A was sentenced to
death. Decide the case on appeal.
VII
Eighty retail dealers in hardware, some of them doing business in the state of
Michigan and the others in the state of Ohio, organized an association under an
agreement which recited that "recognizing that we as retail dealers cannot meet
competition from those from whom we buy, we pledge ourselves as members of this
association to buy only from manufacturers and wholesalers who do not sell direct to
consumers, where there are retail hardware dealers who carry stocks commensurate
with the demands of their communities, and we pledge ourselves not to buy from
hardware commission merchants, agents and brokers who sell to consumers but do not
carry stocks, nor from a manufacturer who sells to such hardware commission
merchant, agent or broker". The association was open to any reputable hardware
dealer. The agreement and by-laws provided no penalty for violation ofthe pledge and
it is not shown that any was ever imposed. The association made no schedule of prices
at which its members should either buy or sell, but prices were stiffened and raised by
the activities of the Association. The state of Michigan on relation of its AttorneyGeneral filed a bill to enjoin the Michigan dealers from continuing membership. The
Attorney-General ofthe United States filed a bill for the dissolution of the Association.
Decide the cases.
IX
A state legislature having constitutional authority therefor caused the issuance of state
bonds for the building of a railway within the state to be operated by the state. The
bonds provided for their payment in gold coin of the United States of the then specified
weight and fineness. A purchased some of these bonds. After the purchase Congress
passed an Act authorizing the President of the United States, in his discretion, to reduce
the weight of the dollar by not more than thirty per cent. On the maturity of the bonds
the State tendered the specified number of dollars of a weight reduced 20%, in
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accordance with an order to that effect issued by the President under authority of the
Act mentioned. Meantime, A had sold his bonds to Ohio for their full face value. Ohio
refuses to receive the specified number of reduced dollars in full payment and sues to
recover a number of dollars equivalent in value to the amount specified in the bond.
Decide the case.
X
A state legislature created a state commission for the conservation of petroleum and
allied products, and authorized it to make rules and regulations designed for the
intelligent, just and economic production of petroleum and associated products.
Among other provisions the Commission ordered that where several persons own
separate lots in a common oil field, such owners shall be allowed to drill wells and
pump or otherwise withdraw oil or gas only upon permits issued by the Commission,
and then in such quantities as should be specified. The Commission further provided
that the oil and gas taken from such common and regulated pools or fields should be
measured and that each I owner should be paid from the sales his pro rata share of the
proceeds, as determined by sound engineering methods. W, who is the owner of wells
capable of producing far more oil than he was allowed to take under these regulations,
contests the validity of the Act and the regulations referred to.
First Year Property
May 31, 1935

I
A's car was stolen by B. Later is was levied on as B's property and sold on execution
sale to satisfy a judgment of a creditor of B. C Who bought at the sale had no notice
of A's ownership. After C had improved the car by putting on two new tires, a new
horn and a new battery, A sued B in trover and secured a judgment for the value of the
car at the time of the defendant's conversion. This judgment being unsatisfied, A
thereafter sued C in an action in the nature of replevin. C counterclaims for the value
of the horn, tires and battery. What decision?
U
While engaged in painting A's barn, B observed in an abandoned bird's nest under the
eaves three twenty dollar bills. Reaching as far as he could with his paint brush, he
knocked the nest down so that the bills fell on land of C adjoining A's farm. B then
climbed down and picked up the money. A admitted that he knew nothing about the
bills. But when it appeared that the real owner could not be found, A sued B in
replevin for the bills. At the trial it appeared that A had bought the farm in January and
taken possession shortly thereafter; that the barn was painted by B the following
March; and that the eaves in which the bills were found projected above land of C.
How should the court decide?
IIl
A purchased a new car of a dealer B, trading in his old car as half the purchase price
and giving his unsecured note for the balance. B was induced to make the sale to A
only on the representations of the latter that the used car traded in had been driven
carefully by no one but A and that the mileage, 3500 miles, indicated by the
speedometer represented the total distance which the car had been driven. But as A
well knew, the car had been used for taxi service prior to the time when he acquired it,
and had been drive some 25,000 miles. Some time after A bought the new car, he took
it to C's garage for repairs. A few days later B discovered the fraud which had been
practiced on him, and demanded the new car back, indicating his willingness to return
the used car which A had traded in. C, however, refused to give up the car he had
repaired until his charges had been paid. B thereupon sued C in replevin. What
decision?
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IV
A had $800 on deposit in a savings account in X bank. A lived at the home of B, and
C, the daughter of B, was a great favorite with A. One evening while Mr. and Mrs. B
and A were sitting at the dining room table in their home, A referred to his bank
account and said: "I've got a will here** I understand I have got to have two
signatures". Thereupon, at the request of A, Mr. and Mrs. B. signed the following
document as witnesses: "Dear Carlotta: I give to you my money in X bank. (Signed)
A". As soon as this instrument was signed by the witnesses, A put it in his bank book
and stepped into the parlor where C was, saying, "Carlotta, I will give you this", and
he handed her the bank book with the quoted document folded inside. Though A was
apparently in good health at the time, he died two months later, leaving one sister, the
defendant, who resided in Denmark. C filed a petition for the probate of the quoted
document as a will, but probate was denied because of ineffective attestation. The
administrator of A's estate starts an action in court designed to determine whether the
savings account should be paid to C, or whether it should be distributed to A's
surviving relatives. What result?
V
In 1600, A, owning Blackacre in fee simple, without consideration executed and
delivered to his brother B a deed in which the conveying language was to the effect that
the grantor A "bargains and sells Blackacre to the use of B so long as he shall reside
on the premises, remainder to the use of the heirs of B". B lived on the premises for
his lifetime and died devising the land to C, who then entered. B's only heir D sues C
in an action in the nature of ejectment. What decision?
VI
L, the owner in fee of Blackacre, leased the premises to T for ninety-nine years.
Thereafter, but before the ninety-nine year term had expired, L and T got together and
executed a new lease of the same premises, the new lease running for a term of fifty
years. The new lease contained a provision to the effect that the lease was made subject
to the condition that in case the sale of intoxicating liquors should become illegal, then
"this lease shall thereupon become null and void, and the lessor or his successors may
re-enter upon the premises and repossess themselves of the same as if this lease had not
been made". Ten years after the new lease took effect, the sale of intoxicating liquors
became unlawful by virtue of a constitutional amendment, and thereupon L went upon
the premises and demanded possession thereof from T, who refused to leave. L now
sues T in ejectment. What result?
VII
At the request of A, a form deed was signed by 0, the deed naming A as grantee. At
the time 0 signed the deed it contained no description of any land to be effected
thereby. That part of the deed was left blank. A took the deed away with him, and
after procuring the description of the land owned by 0, which was typewritten on a
separate piece of paper, he pasted this typewritten description onto the deed in the
blank space where the description would normally be found. A then persuaded a notary
public to fill out and sign and seal the certificate of acknowledgment as if 0 had
appeared before him. A then took the deed to plaintiff bank, which loaned money to
A, taking as security for the loan a mortgage by A on the premises described in the
deed. The bank knew nothing of the circumstances just related. A, having failed to pay
the debt secured by the mortgage, the bank proceeded to foreclose and 0 claims the
premises free of any mortgage lien. What result?
VIII
A executed a deed of Blackacre to B and his heirs, the deed containing full covenants
of title. As a matter of fact, at the time of the execution of this deed, Blackacre was
owned by X instead of by A. Later on, however, A bought the land from X, who gave
him a deed therefor, and shortly thereafter A died. The land was vacant at that time,
and P, the only child of A, (who had died intestate) took possession. Not long
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thereafter, the defendant entered into possession, ousting P from the land. In an action
now by P against defendant in'ejectment, the latter seeks to rely upon the above facts,
showing that the right to the possession of the premises is in B, and that, therefore, P's
action should fail. What result?
IX
0, the owner in fee of four tracts of land, was confined to a hospital suffering from
the effects of a severe fall. She also had irregular heart action from which her doctors
expected sudden death at any time. In that situation she sent for her undertaker, who
at her request prepared four deeds in favor of four grantees, relatives of O's deceased
husband. 0 properly executed these deeds and handed them to the undertake saying:
"Take those papers and keep them, and then in a few days when I get better I will be
up and get them". The following day her condition was obviously worse and an
intimate friend who then visited her testified that 0 said that she knew she was dying
and that "I have made some deeds and they are all right, and I am only sorry that I
haven't time to make arrangements for my personal property". She later sent for her
minister who prayed for her, and she expired early the next morning. In an action by
the grantees in these four deeds to recover possession of the land, which action was
contested by O's heirs, the foregoing facts appeared, and also that 0 had a strong
prejudice against wills, having a firm belief that wills could be broken, as her mother's
had been. It further appeared that she had conceived a hatred of her own relatives on
account of injustices to which she thought they had subjected her in early life. What
result?
X
On February 10th, 0, the owner in fee of Blackacre, executed and acknowledged a
written contract to sell it to B for $10,000, of which one-half was paid in cash, balance
to be paid in installments as stated in the contract. This contract was not recorded. On
April 5th, 0 executed a deed, effective in form, conveying Blackacre to X and his heirs.
X paid value therefor and knew nothing of the arrangement between 0 and B. On April
20th, B recorded his contract, and a month later, when he had tendered the balance of
the purchase price, demanded a deed from 0 and X. The latter refused, and B sued to
compel the giving of the deed. It may be understood that a statute of the State where

the land is provides: "All deeds, mortgages and other instruments affecting the title to
land shall be acknowledged and recorded in the county in which the land lies, and if not
so recorded within ninety days of the time of execution, they shall be void as to all
subsequent purchasers for value without notice." What result?
Constitutional Law
P.C. Kauper
May 30, 1950
The first part of this examination consists of objective questions printed separately.
The second part consists of the five essay questions printed below.
I
The statutes of State M governing elections and the qualifications of voters provide,
inter alia, that no person shall be eligible to vote in any state election unless he is a
citizen of the United States and unless he is properly registered as a voter at the city
clerk's office.
At an election for state officers held in State M, X was refused a ballot by Y, the
election official, on the ground that he was not a citizen of the United States and also
on the further ground that he had not registered in advance. X thereafter brought a civil
suit for damages in the state court against Y for alleged unlawful denial of X's right to
vote. In his suit X claimed that he was a citizen of the United States by birth; he also
claimed that he had properly registered in advance and that the city clerk had failed to
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keep a proper record of his registration. The case reached the supreme court of State
M which held that X stated no cause of action. The state supreme court found that X
had not proved his citizenship since evidence in the record did not prove his birth in this
country; it also found that X had not proved his advance registration as required by
statute.
Sec. 1257 of the Federal Judicial Code, defining the appellate jurisdiction of the
United States Supreme Court, reads as follows:
"Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in the question the validity of a statute of any state on
the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.
(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States
is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in question on the
ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States,
or where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the
Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised under,
the United States."
Under the language of the Judicial Code quoted above, does the Supreme Court ofthe
United States have jurisdiction to review the state supreme court's decision in X's
case?
II
X, a Negro, was indicted on a manslaughter charge in a state court. It was alleged in
the indictment that X through the grossly negligent and careless driving of his
automobile had run down a pedestrian named Y and caused his death. The grand jury
which indicted X consisted of both Negroes and whites. X, who was competently
represented by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty and asserted his right under state
law to a jury trial. Six Negroes were included in the venire of persons called for trial
jury service. Under state law the prosecutor and defense were each allowed ten
peremptory challenges in their examination of jurors. The prosecutor in this case
exercised his right of peremptory challenge to exclude all six of the Negroes on the
venire. As a result X was tried by ajury of all white persons.
At the trial the prosecutor did not produce any eye-witness of the alleged negligent
homicide. The one witness called by the state testified that after he had turned the
corner at the intersection where the homicide was alleged to have occurred, he saw X
getting out of his car to examine Y's body which was lying a few feet from the front
wheel of X's car. The same witness testified that he had smelled liquor on X's breath
at that time.
X did not take the stand on his own behalf. The trial court gave the jury the usual
instruction that they were not to find the defendant guilty unless they were satisfied
beyond all reasonable doubt as to his guilt. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. The
trial judge imposed a prison sentence of five years, the minimum allowed by statute in
case of conviction on a manslaughter charge.
An appeal was taken by X to the state supreme court alleging a number of legal errors
in the trial court proceeding, including some that raised questions under the
Constitution of the United States. (It may be assumed that X's attorney in the course
of the trial made timely and proper objections and motions to preserve the right to
review of all legal questions raised in the course of the trial.) The state supreme court
on review affirmed the judgment. It held that there was no legal error in the selection
of the petit jury; that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilty by the
jury on the negligent homicide charge; that in any event the evidence supported a
finding that the defendant was guilty of the crime of driving a car while intoxicated an offense which under state law also carried a minimum penalty of five years in prison.
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Does X have any substantial basis for petitioning the Supreme Court of the United
States to review his case on the ground of denial of constitutional rights?
III and IV
A municipal ordinance of the City of Centerville in State M provides that no public
meeting or assembly shall be held in the municipal park unless the persons sponsoring
such a meeting shall first secure from the chief of police a license authorizing the same.
A license fee of $1 is required to be paid at the time application is made for the license.
The chief of police is required under the ordinance to grant the permit unless he finds
the proposed meeting will conflict with a previously scheduled and licensed meeting in
the park or unless he finds that the proposed meeting because of its anticipated size will
interfere with the general public's enjoyment and use of the park's recreational
facilities. The ordinance further provides that in all cases where a license is issued, the
municipal police shall give maximum protection to the meeting when held and directs
the chief of police to deputize as many assistants as needed in order to preserve order
and protect the meeting. In case a meeting is held or attempted to be held in the
municipal park in violation of the licensing requirement, each person sponsoring such
a meeting or attempted meeting is subject to a fine of $100 and 30 days jail sentence.
A meeting of Jehovah's Witnesses was advertised to be held on Sunday afternoon in
the municipal park of Centerville. X, a resident of Centerville and leader of the local
group of Witnesses, sponsored the meeting. No attempt was made to secure a license
as required by the ordinance. The advertised meeting was in the nature of a regional
rally of Jehovah's Witnesses. Members of the sect residing in the nearby town of
Smithville in State R were invited to attend.
On the Sunday afternoon when the meeting was scheduled to be held, a group of
hostile residents of Centerville under the organized direction and effort of A, B and C,
blockaded the road leading from Smithville to Centerville and attempted to prevent the
caravan of cars carrying Smithville Witnesses from entering Centerville. Violence
ensued and assaults were made on the Witnesses. However, the Witnesses succeeded
in breaking through the blockade and proceeded to the municipal park in Centerville
where they then assembled with the local group of Witnesses and started to conduct a
religious assembly which was to consist of hymns, prayers and addresses. But again
the same group of hostile residents led by A, B and C, interrupted the meeting,
assaulted the speakers on the platform, including X, and in the end forced a disorderly
breaking-up of the meeting. P, the local chief of police, and other police officers were
present and witnessed the entire affair but made no attempt to give protection to the
meeting or to arrest those who interfered with the meeting.
As a result of this incident the following three proceedings are now instituted. Give
your opinion on the question raised with respect to each of them:
(1) X is arrested and tried in the municipal court of Centerville on the charge of
sponsoring a meeting attempted to be held in the municipal park without having applied
for a license as required by the ordinance. Does X have a valid defense under the
Constitution of the United States?
(2) X institutes a damage action in the federal district court against P, the chief of
police, under the authority of Sec. 43 of Title 8 of the U.S. Code, reading as follows:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
Does X have a valid basis for a damage action under this statute?
(3) The federal district attorney initiates a criminal proceeding in the federal district
court against A, B and C under authority of Sec. 19 of the U.S. Criminal Code, reading
as follows:
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If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen
in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the
same ....
they shall be fined not more than $5,000 and imprisoned not more than ten
years ......
Is there a valid basis for indicting A, B and C under this criminal statute?
V
A statute of State M makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate in the hiring
and discharge of employees on the ground of race, religion or national ancestry.
Violation of the statute is made a criminal offense. The statute provides that in a
proceeding brought in a state court against an employer for alleged violation of the
statute, where the complaining witness charges that he was denied ajob because of his
race, religion or national ancestry, evidence shall be admitted to determine the
numerical proportion in the community of the racial, religious or ancestral group to
which the complaining witness belongs and by reference to which the discrimination
is alleged. The statute further provides that in the event it is determined that the
employer does not employ a proportionate number of employees in such a group equal
to the groups proportion in the community, the employer shall be found guilty of
violating the statute.
The Y Products Corporation which operates a small factory in the City of Brownville
in State M, is now charged with a violation of the statute on the ground that in refusing
employment to X, a citizen of Japanese ancestry, it discriminated against him because
of his national ancestry. Evidence was introduced at the trial court showing that 5%
ofthe residents of Brownville were persons of Japanese ancestry and that the defendant
Corporation employed only 2% of persons of such ancestry. In defense the Corporation
challenged the constitutionality of the statute on several grounds. It was permitted to
introduce evidence which showed that X was not qualified for the position he had
applied for; also that under a union contract it had with its employees, the job
classifications that could be filled by persons of Japanese ancestry were limited and that
the hiring of X for the position he had wanted would have violated the union agreement.
The trial court overruled the constitutional objections to the statute and instructed the
jury to consider the evidence and return a verdict in accordance with the terms of the
statute. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and the court imposed the statutory fine
of $1,000 on the defendant Corporation.
Does the Corporation have any substantial basis under the Federal Constitution for
appealing the case on the ground of invalidity of the statute?
Property
Allan F. Smith & Ralph W. Aigler
June 1, 1950
I
A state statute provides: "The owner of any motor vehicle shall be responsible for any
damages caused by the negligent operation thereof, regardless of whether said owner
is himself driving said vehicle at the time such damages are caused."
On January 1, 1943, Black was the owner of a certain Ford car. It was taken on that
date by Clark, who repainted it and used it for his own personal and business purposes
until January, 1948. During that month Clark negligently drove the Ford into P's car.
Through the police, Black learned that the Ford was in a local garage, and without
Clark's consent he repossessed it. Two days later, he was sued by P, who asked
judgment for the damages caused by the negligent operation of the car. The statute of
limitations for actions to recover personal property is four years. Can P recover from
Black? Why or why not?
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II
John Jones left his 1948 Ford sedan in a parking lot owned and operated by D. The
lot was merely an unenclosed vacant comer lot in the business district of Detroit. Two
driveway entrances were cut through the curbs on each side of the lot, and a small
building housed the attendant. Plaintiff left his car, with the keys in it, in the lot about
9:00 am., telling the attendant he would return about 6:00 p.m. He received a check
with a number on it, and a similarly numbered check was placed on the car windshield.
The attendant parked the car. It was customary for patrons to pay charges at the
attendant's building and then drive their cars away themselves.
About 3:00 p.m., X appeared at the attendant's building with a letter reading as
follows:
"To the parking lot owner: The bearer of this letter is my brother. Please allow him
to use the keys to my car to remove some things from the back of the car. My car is
a '48 Ford, license JX-43-44, and the parking check I hold is numbered F-4374-49.
You will greatly oblige me by doing so."
The letter was signed "John Jones."
D himself was in charge. He found the car in question, verified the parking check
number, the license number, and checked the registration slip which was attached to the
steering wheel. He found the car was registered in the name of John Jones. He
thereupon gave the keys to the bearer of the letter and returned to the building. About
five minutes later, X returned to the building carrying a small cloth sack and a suitcase.
He returned the keys to D, and thanked him for his co-operation. John Jones picked up
his car at 6:00 p.m.
X was an imposter. The letter was a forgery. The suitcase, reasonably valued at
$25.00, belonged to Jones, and the cloth sack contained jewelry owned by Jones,
having a value of $ 10,000. Jones brings suit against D to recover $10,025.00. Can he
recover? Why or why not?
III
0 was the owner in fee of Blackacre on which there is a ten-story hotel. One of the
passenger elevators needed replacing. 0 made an arrangement for the purchase of such
elevator from the Otis Elevator Company, the purchase price of $ 10,000 being payable
$1,000 in cash, the remainder payable in three years, secured, as to the latter sum, by
chattel mortgage. The elevator was delivered to the premises by the company by March
1st, and installed March 5th. On February 29th the mortgage was duly executed by 0
and recorded March 18th in the office of the County Clerk of the county in which 0
resides. On March 12th 0 sold and conveyed Blackacre to P, who paid value therefor,
knowing nothing about the circumstances of the installation or of the unpaid purchase
price of the elevator.
A statute of the state declares that "chattel mortgages shall be deemed fraudulent and
void as to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees of the chattels mortgaged, unless the
mortgage shall be recorded within thirty days in the office of the County Clerk of the
county of the residence of the mortgagor."
On maturity of the debt for which the mortgage was given as security, it was unpaid,
and the Elevator Company, pursuant to a provision in the mortgage authorizing the
mortgagee in such event to repossess himself of the subject matter, started the work of
removal. P started action to restrain the company from continuance of such work.
What result?
IV
Blackacre and Whiteacre are adjoining lots. In 1927, the former was owned and
occupied by A, the latter by B, the two being brothers. In that year, A completed a
building on Blackacre, the wall on the side towards Whiteacre being built up to the line
between the two lots. The windows in that wall were of the casement type, opening
outward. When opened these windows swung in an arc over Whiteacre. They were
often opened and left open. No communication ever took place between A and B
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regarding this encroachment. In 1940, B died, leaving a will by which he devised
Whiteacre to X for life, remainder to Y in fee. After B's death, the operation of the
windows continued as before until the present time. X died in 1946. Y is now erecting
a building on his lot designed to occupy its full width. Realizing that when erected this
building will prevent the use of his windows as he has been using them since 1927, A
starts suit to enjoin Y from such interference. What result?
V
0 is the owner in fee simple of Blackacre. He wants to place the legal ownership
thereof in T in fee and the equitable ownership in fee in B. He consults you as a lawyer
as to what he should do to bring about that result. How would you advise him if you
were face with the question in
(a). 1500?
(b). 1550?
(c). 1800?
VI
Pursuant to a valid written contract for the sale of Blackacre from V to P, V signed
a warranty deed with all the formalities required in the state. Under an agreement
executed by V and P, the deed was given to John P. Absconder, with instructions that
he was to keep it until P had paid the sum of $2,000, and then he was to give P the
deed. The payments of $100 a month were to be made to Absconder and by him
remitted to V. For 18 months P paid the amounts regularly. Mr. Absconder, however,
remitted only $200 to V, and has now disappeared, leaving no assets or forwarding
address. P tenders $200 and demands the deed. V insists that he will give him the deed
only upon the payment of $1,800. What would be your opinion? Why?
VII
D, owner in fee simple of the land described below, executed and delivered an
effective conveyance thereof to P. The deed described the premises as follows: "The
Northeast Quarter of Section 9, Township 2, North, Range 6, East, County of X, State
of Y, except the South thirty feet thereof, reserved for road purposes." The deed was
properly recorded. D also owned the Southeast Quarter of the above mentioned Section
9. Two years after the execution of the deed, D began to erect a barn which was to be
located principally on the Southeast Quarter, but extending some twenty feet into the
south thirty feet of the Northeast Quarter of Section 9, described above. Has P any
grounds upon which he may prevent the erection of the barn?
VI
A state statute provides: "The term 'heirs' or other technical words of inheritance
shall not be necessary to create and convey an estate in fee simple, and every estate in
lands which shall be granted, conveyed or devised, shall be deemed a fee simple unless
it appears that by express limitation, by construction or by operation of law that a
lesser estate has been granted."
0, owner of Blackacre, executed and delivered an effective conveyance thereof, in
which he conveyed Blackacre, "To P so long as P shall continue to operate a retail store
thereon." P continued to operate a retail store on Blackacre until his death on January
10, 1950. His widow is still operating the store, claiming a common law dower interest
in Blackacre. 0 brings an action of ejectment to recover possession of Blackacre.
What result? Why?
Ix
A state statute provides: "In cases where, by the common law, any person or persons
might become seized of lands in fee tail, such estate tail shall be and remain an absolute
estate in fee simple to the issue of the first donee in tail."
By an effective deed 0 conveyed Blackacre to "X and the heirs of his body." At the
time of the conveyance X had two children, A and B. On June 3, 1944, while X was
still living, A and his wife executed and delivered a warranty deed, with the usual
covenants, in which he purported to convey to P an undivided one-half interest in
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Blackacre. A died intestate in 1947, leaving surviving a widow W and child C. X died
intestate in 1949. Your client asks you to tell him what person or persons he should
negotiate with to buy Blackacre. What is your advice? Why?
X
A owns Lots 1 and 2, Smith's Subdivision, City of X, Y County, state of your
preference. A and his family live on Lot 2, and B wants to buy Lot 1. They have
agreed on the following terms:
(1) B will pay $2,000 for the lot.
(2) A is to have the right to use the westerly six feet of Lot 1 as part of a common
driveway.
(3) B is to have the right to use the easterly six feet of Lot 2 as a part of a common
driveway.
(4) A cannot furnish an abstract of title, but B is willing to accept a deed by which
A will guarantee that he, A, owns the lot; that there are no mortgages or
judgment liens on the land; and that if anything ever happens in the future so
that B or his successors lose the land, A will have to make good the damages.
(5) B is married and wants to own the land with his wife, C, so that it will all
belong to the survivor of himself and his wife.
(A) Draw the deed which will accomplish the desires of A and B.
Tell in detail how you will have the deed executed, explaining your reasons for
(B)
your requirements.
Constitutional Law
Paul C. Kauper

May 24, 1960

This examination consists of eight essay questions.
1.
Congress enacts a Fair Election Code containing inter alia the following provision:
"Every person eligible to vote at a general election to fill a national or state office
shall be entitled to absent himself from his place of employment for the purpose of
voting for a period of two hours during the time polls are open, without penalty or
deduction of wages on account of such absence, provided that the period may be
designated by the employer."
An employer denying a person the statutory right or penalizing the exercise of it is
subject to fine.
Thereafter, on the day of an election for state officers the polls are open in Ann Arbor,
Michigan, from 7:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. The regular hours of employment for the office
force of the Pioneer Insurance Co. in this city are 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. with an hour
off for lunch. The company authorizes dismissal of all office employees at 4:00 p.m.
on election day for the purpose of enabling them to vote. Several employees
nevertheless leave at 3:00 p.m. and suffer deductions of an hour's compensation each.
The company is charged with violating the statute.
Does the company have any substantial constitutional arguments it may assert in
defense? Discuss.
II.
In 1804 the United States with the consent of the Tuscarora Indians who then lived
in North Carolina arranged the sale of their lands in North Carolina under an agreement
with this tribe whereby they agreed to move to upper New York on land purchased for
them by the United States out of the proceeds of the sale of the North Carolina land.
The land purchased for their ownership and occupancy in New York consisted of about
4,000 acres. In connection with the acquisition of this land and the settling of the
Tuscaroras there, the United States entered into a treaty with the tribe which contained
the following clause:
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"Now the United States acknowledges all the lands within the aforementioned
boundaries to be the property of the Tuscarora Nation, and the United States will
never claim the same, nor disturb the Tuscarora Nation in the free use and enjoyment
thereof; but it shall remain theirs, until they choose to sell the same to the people of
the United States. .. "
A Congressional statute adopted in 1834 provides as follows:
"No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim
thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or
equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the
Constitution."
The State of New York is now interested in developing a public power project that
will utilize the water power potential of the Niagara River. This is a large project and
will require the flooding of a very large ground area in order to develop the reservoir
planned as part of the project. Under this plan the flooded lands will include about
1000 acres of the land owned by the Tuscaroras.
Under the Federal Power Act of 1935 the Federal Power Commission is authorized
to grant licenses to public and private agencies for the development of water power
projects on navigable waters of the United States, and in this connection is authorized
to empower licensees to exercise the power of eminent domain to the extent needed to
carry out the licensee's project as approved by the Commission. The State of New
York applies to the Federal Power Commission for a license to develop the water
project on the Niagara River and incident thereto asks for authority to condemn the
1000 acres of land owned by the Tuscaroras.
After hearing and over the objections of the Tuscarora Indians the Commission grants
the license and condemnation authority to the State of New York as requested.
Determinations of the Commission are subject to review for errors of law by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Do the Tuscarora Indians have any substantial
basis for attacking the legality of the Commission's action? Discuss. (It may be
assumed that all objections were properly raised in the first instance before the
Commission.)
III.
Police of the City of Lewisburg in State K entered a cafe where they observed that D
was dancing by himself in that part of the cafe reserved for dancing. D would dance
for a while, then rest, then resume his dancing. Patrons sitting in the cafe were mildly
amused and voiced no objections to the owner of the cafe. Upon inquiry by the police,
the owner of the cafe stated that D had not had any drinks, that he had been there about
half an hour, and that he had no objections to D's action so long as he did not offend
his patrons. The police recognized D as a person who had previously successfully
resisted several arrests on minor charges by demanding counsel and the right to a
hearing. They questioned D about his presence in the cafe, and he stated that he was
simply passing the time while waiting for a bus. The police thereupon arrested him on
a charge of loitering, and when D, without offering physical resistance, resorted to
spirited argument in objecting to the arrest, the police further charged him with
disorderly conduct.
The loitering charge was based on the local ordinance which provides as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person.., who cannot give a satisfactory account of
himself... to sleep, lie, loaf or trespass in or about any premises, buildings, or other
structures within this city, without first having obtained the consent of the owner or
controller of said premises, structure, or building..."
The disorderly conduct ordinance simply reads that "whoever shall be found guilty of
disorderly conduct in the city shall be fined..."
D was tried before a municipal court judge on these two charges. The evidence
consisted solely of the facts as stated above. Notwithstanding the request of D's
counsel that the case be dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence and that a conviction
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would result in denial of D's constitutional rights, thejudge found D guilty and ordered
him to pay a fine of $100 or, in the alternative, to spend 60 days in the municipal jail.
Under local law no appeal is permitted in any case from a conviction by a municipal
judge unless the fine exceeds $100 or the jail sentence exceeds 60 days.
D's attorney applies to the state supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus, but this
is denied on the ground that the court has no authority to issue the writ under these
circumstances. However, the state supreme court grants a stay of execution of the
sentence for thirty days to permit D to pursue any remedy available to him in order to
raise his claim of denial of federal constitutional right.
Does D have any basis for attacking his conviction, and what remedy, if any, may he
have in order to get his case before the United States Supreme Court?
IV.
State R levies an excise tax on the privilege of purchasing common carrier
transportation tickets at the rate of 5%of the purchase price paid by the passenger for
the ticket. Under the statute the duty is imposed on the carrier selling the ticket to
collect the tax by adding it to the price of the ticket and to forward the tax so collected
to the state authorities.
The City of Smithville in State R levies a municipal business tax on all persons doing
business in the city at the rate of 3% of gross receipts derived from the business.
X operates a travel agency in Smithville. He has contractual arrangements with a
number of steamship companies that operate between the United States and foreign
countries, whereby he is authorized to sell steamship tickets, subject to approval at the
home office. He receives a commission on all tickets sold at the rate of 10% of the
ticket price.
During 1959 X sold tickets for the National Steamship Lines as well as for other
steamship companies. National, which is incorporated in New York, has no office,
furniture, or employees in State R. Pursuant to the company's instructions, X did not
include the 5%tax as part of the price of tickets sold for the company. State R now
brings a proceeding against National in the state court of the county where X operates
his travel agency to collect the tax which under the statute should have been charged
to the customers who bought the tickets. Under the statute any company selling
transportation tickets is made personally liable for the tax in case it fails to collect the
same as part of the purchase price. The suit is commenced by serving process on and
sending notice by registered mail to National Steamship Lines.
A suit is also brought by City of Smithville against X to collect the 3% business
receipts tax which X failed to pay with respect to the commissions he received in 1959
for his services in selling transportation tickets.
Do National Steamship Lines and X have any substantial constitutional defenses they
may assert in these proceedings? Discuss.
V.
The City of Centerville in State M adopted a master plan for the development of the
city's resources and at the same time enacted a zoning ordinance which implemented
the general plan and which classified all land in the city with respect to permissible land
uses. One land use established by the ordinance is M-1 which permits use of the land
for purpose of light industry only. The city is very much interested in attracting new
light industry in order to increase employment and add to the tax base.
0 owns a substantial piece of undeveloped land which is classified as M-1. He has
no intention of developing a factory which fits the light industry definition. X
Manufacturing Co. has approached him and made an offer for the purchase of the land
which it would like for purpose of light industrial use, but 0 feels that he would rather
hold on to the land since he is sure that with the city's future development he will get
a substantially higher price for it five years from now. This matter is called to the
attention of the city council which then enacts an ordinance which provides that if the
City Planning Commission, after a hearing, determines that a present owner's failure
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to develop land as permitted under the zoning ordinance will interfere with the city's
economic development as projected by the master plan, the Commission may direct the
sale of this land at a fair price to be determined by the Commission and on such terms
as it sees fit, to any person who is interested in buying and who agrees to develop the
land in accordance with the use for which the land is zoned. The ordinance further
provides that the Commission may in such case grant the prospective purchaser an
option to purchase the land at the fair price determined by the Commission, provided,
however, that the option period may not extend beyond three years.
Acting under this authorization and following a hearing, but over O's objection, the
Planning Commission grants X Manufacturing Co. an option to buy O's land for
$75,000, subject to the conditions (1) that before the company can exercise the option
it must secure the Commission's approval of its plan for the factory it proposes to
develop and to post bond or other security to assure that it will go ahead with its plans
when approved, and (2)that the option will expire unless exercised within three years.
0 now files a declaratory judgment proceeding in the federal district court, naming the
City and X Manufacturing Co. as defendants, and asking for a declaration that the
City's action in forcing the option agreement on him is invalid under the Constitution
of the United States, and that the option is null and void. Does 0 state a good case?
Discuss.
VI.
The owner of a department store operates a lunch counter as part of the store's
services and facilities. The management has no rules restricting who may patronize the
store generally, but it permits only white persons to be served at the lunch counter.
A group of Negro students enter the store and sit down at vacant seats at the lunch
counter. The waitresses refuse to serve them, but the Negroes persist in occupying the
seats. The manager of the store then calls the police who arrest the Negroes on a
charge of criminal trespass. The Negroes are tried by the circuit court of the state and
found guilty and given jail sentences. They appeal the case to the state supreme court,
raising questions on the interpretation both of the state's criminal trespass statute and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The state supreme court
affirms the conviction. In meeting the arguments of the appellants, the state supreme
court holds (1) that the criminal trespass statute makes it a crime for anyone to enter,
occupy or stay on property contrary to the expressed will of the owner; (2) that
although as a matter of state law, any person who engages in a business establishment
and holds himself out to the public to do business has an obligation to serve all the
public, nevertheless, he may at his discretion refuse to serve any particular class or
classes of people if he has reason to believe that his business will otherwise be injured;
(3) that in any event the owner's policy in this case in restricting the use of his
luncheon facilities to white persons was in accord with the state's general policy of
requiring racial segregation in public places. The court concluded that the recognition
and enforcement of the owner's property rights raised no question under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Negro defendants apply to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari to review the state supreme court's affirmance of their conviction. The
Supreme Court grants the application.
What issues may be raised before the Supreme Court in this review proceeding, and
how should it dispose of the case? Discuss.
VII.
A statute of State M makes it a criminal offense for any person to sell to any person
below 18 years of age any book, magazine, or other publication which because of its
contents, including any part thereof, tends to corrupt the morals of youth.
D operates a store which carries a large stock of books and magazines. Two months
ago he received a communication from the police office stating that the chief of police
in conjunction with the local prosecuting attorney had determined that the books listed
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in the communication were books that came within the prohibition of the statute
referred to above. The chief of police stated that the sales of any of these books would
lead to arrest and prosecution under the statute. Included in the list was the book
"Forbidden Allurement" which D had for sale in his store.
Four weeks later D sold a copy of "Forbidden Allurement" to a young man. D made
no inquiry about his age. Do had not read the book and was not familiar with its
contents. The book in some of its passages vividly depicts sexual relations in a context
of violence and crime. D is now arrested and prosecuted in the state court for violating
the statute. In the hearing before the local court, the prosecutor tenders the book in
evidence, calls the court's attention to the objectionable passages, and proves that D
had received notice from the chief ofpolice that the book was on the proscribed list that
D sold the book to the young man in question, and that the young man was 17 years old
What constitutional defenses, if any, may D assert in this proceedings
ViI
New York State levies an income tax on all the income of persons residing in the state,
regardless of source, and on the income earned within the state by nonresidents.
Nonresidents are taxed at the same rate as residents except that they are not allowed the
benefit of any personal exemptions or deductions in determining their taxable New
York income. With respect to income by way of compensation for services, the New
York law requires employers to withhold the income tax from salaries and wages and
account for the same to the state tax authorities.
The taxation by New York of income earned in New York by nonresident commuters
who work in New York but live in other sates has provoked the ill-will of neighboring
states who have threatened various forms of reprisal measures.
To meet this situation New York amends its income tax law to provide that effective
January 1, 1961, it will exempt from its income tax law income earned in New York
by a nonresident who is taxable on that income by his home state, provided that New
York is authorized by that state to compel the employer to withhold the tax and remit
the same to the employee's home state. In response to this New York legislation, New
Jersey, which does not levy a general income tax, passes a statute which levies a tax on
income earned in New York by New Jersey residents, this tax to go into effect on
January 1, 1961. The tax is levied on the same basis, with the same exemptions and
deductions, and at the same rate as the New York income tax. The New Jersey statute
authorizes New York to impose on employers the duty of withholding the New Jersey
income tax from salaries and wages paid persons who are New Jersey residents.
What constitutional objections, if any, may be urged against this arrangement when
it goes into effect, and who would have standing to raise the question? Discuss.
END
Property (Section 1)
O.L. Browder

May 15, 1970

I.
Griffith owned Lots 42 and 43 in a certain subdivision. He lived in a house on Lot 42.
Lot 43 was vacant. Griffith laid out a driveway along the side of Lot 42 which was
adjacent to Lot 43. He also grew a hedge along the outer edge of the driveway, which
extended the full length of Lot 42 from front to rear. In 1952 Griffith duly executed
and delivered a deed describing Lot 43 to Eddy. Eddy took possession and built a
house thereon. Nothing was said between them about the boundary between the two
lots, but after the conveyance Griffith continued to use the driveway and trimmed the
hedge.
In 1962 Griffith died leaving a will which devised Lot 42 to his son Samuel. Within
a year the decree of distribution of the probate court awarded Samuel title to Lot 42.
Samuel took possession and within two months leased Lot 42 to Thayer for a term of
five years. In 1968, at the end of Thayer's term, Samuel took possession of the lot and
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made it his place of residence. The driveway continued to be used by these successive
occupants of Lot 42.
In 1969 Eddy decided to sell Lot 43, and before doing so, had a survey made of his
lot. The survey showed that the driveway and hedge encroached five feet onto Lot 43.
Thereupon Eddy began suit to quiet his title to Lot 43. The applicable period of
limitation for actions to recover possession of land is 15 years.
What defenses, if any, might Samuel assert against this suit? Discuss.
II.
Murphy owned a tract of land which he duly platted and subdivided into 495 lots. He
sold 69 lots, each deed containing the following restriction, among others:
"Clause 4. No building of more than two apartments shall be erected
on less than sixty (60) feet of frontage, except lots 134, 135, 136, and
137."
Later Murphy died devising by his will the remaining lots to his two sons. The sons
issued deeds to 354 other lots, which contained the same restrictions imposed in the
original 69 deeds, except that clause 4 was amended to read as follows:
"No building of more than two apartments shall be erected except on
lots no. 134, 135, 136, 137."
The remaining 72 lots were sold by the Murphy sons, the deeds containing only the
statement that they were "subject to restrictions record."
One Potter bought Lot 67, which was one of the original 69 lots. One Pierce bought
Lot 254, which was one of the second group of 354 lots. One Dobbins bought Lot 165,
which was one of the third group of 72 lots.
(a) Dobbins undertook to build on his lot a building consisting of more than two
apartments, but the frontage of this lot was 75 feet. In other words, this building would
not violate the restriction imposed in the deeds to the original 69 lots, if applicable, but
would violate the restriction imposed on the second group of 354 lots, if applicable.
Until this time only single family dwellings had been built on any lot. Does either
Potter or Pierce have the right to object to the building which Dobbins proposes to
build on his lot? Explain.
(b) Suppose Pierce, whose lot had a frontage of 55 feet, undertook to build there on
a building consisting of four apartments. Again assume that until this time only single
family dwellings had been built on any lot. Would Potter have standing to object?
Explain.
In.
Grimes owned a parcel of land which he contracted to sell to Evans. The contract
called for delivery of a deed by Grimes, naming Evans as grantee, to the Fidelity
Abstract and Title Company, and for payments to be made on the purchase price by
Evans to the company over a period of five years, upon completion of which, at any
time during the five-year period, Evans was to be entitled to receive Grimes' deed.
Grimes' wife, Helen, was not a party to this contract. The contract was not recorded.
Grimes prepared and signed a deed to Evans, which was also signed by Helen Grimes,
had the deed duly acknowledged, and delivered it to the title company. Evans took
possession of the land as provided by the terms of the contract.
Three years later Grimes died leaving a will by which he left all his real estate to his
son George, and which named his wife Helen executrix of his estate. Helen was duly
appointed executrix, and she listed the above land in the inventory of Grimes' estate.
She renounced her interest in certain personal property given her by the will, and
elected to take dower in all of the testator's real estate, as she was permitted to do by
the law of the state. Then she went to the title company and persuaded an employee to
return the Evans deed to her, saying that the deed no longer was any good. In due
course the probate court decreed a life estate in Helen in the land in question, with a
remainder in the testator's son George. Soon thereafter Helen and George joined in a
contract with one Bonner to convey this land to him in fee simple, in consideration of
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the promise by him to pay the purchase price stated therein. At this time Bonner had
no knowledge of the contract with Evans.
Soon thereafter Bonner discovered that Evans was in possession of the property,
asked Evans what claims he had upon the property, and told him what had happened.
Evans informed Bonner of his contract with Grimes. Evans then tendered to the title
company the balance of the purchase price under his contract and demanded delivery
of Grimes' deed. When told that the deed was no longer in their possession, he sought
advice as to his rights and remedies in respect to the land in question. How would you
advise him?
IV.
One Simms, aged 86, entered a hospital for an operation. After entering the hospital
and before the operation, Simms directed an attorney to prepare a power of attorney in
favor of his nephew, Clay Smith. A written power of attorney was prepared, signed by
Simms, and delivered to Smith. It authorized Smith to act for Simms in making
deposits and withdrawals in all of Simms' bank accounts and to provide for the
support, care, and maintenance of Simms.
Upon the suggestion of a bank official, Smith opened an account in a bank in the
name of "L. Clay Smith, Trustee." Funds from all accounts in Simms' name were
withdrawn by Smith and deposited in this account. Smith drew several checks on this
account to pay expenses and bills of Simms and to provide him money for his personal
use.
Simms died two months after entering the hospital, without having recovered from his
operation.
Smith filed a claim against Simms' estate by which he asserted that the balance of
$25,400 in the account at Simms' death was his by way of gift. Testimony was heard
from the attorney who prepared the power of attorney that when directions were given
to prepare that instrument, Simms said further that all his funds on deposit should be
placed in one account and that "if there is anything in that account after I get through
all of this and after Clay has taken care of me, I want Clay to have whatever remains
of the cash in the bank." Two other witnesses testified that they heard Simms tell Clay
Smith, "I expect you to have whatever is left."
The probate court disallowed the claim on the ground that no valid gift had been
made. If the statements attributed to Simms are taken as having been proven, is there
a basis for challenging the court's ruling on appeal? Discuss.
END
Constitutional Law
Grant S. Nelson
May 1970
This is a closed book examination. You will have three hours to complete the
examination. The examination contains five questions, each with a suggested allotted
time. The suggested time for each question is intended as a guide to aid you in
budgeting your time over the entire examination and is indicative of the approximate
grading value of each question.
Please note the precise form of the question in each case and comply therewith.
Answer the question upon the basis of the facts given. If additional facts appear to be
necessary to give an adequate answer, state what these facts would be and why they
would be important. Consider all the issues presented by each fact situation; do not
stop just because you feel that a court would clearly resolve one issue in such a way as
to make consideration of the other issues unnecessary. Point this out, but go on to
discuss the other issues.
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I
(50 minutes)
This question consists of 8 statements. With respect to each statement state your
views as to its validity and justify your position in a brief comment and analysis.
Primary credit will be given to your comment and analysis. You should devote no more
than a few sentences to each statement.
a) The "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution gives Congress power to
enact any legislation which will promote the "general welfare" of the people of the
United States.
b) In determining the validity of a particular state regulation of an instrument of
transportation under the commerce clause, the degree to which the state regulation is
consistent with the regulations imposed by other states is a relevant and often important
factor.
c) In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Stell Corp., the Supreme Court could have ruled in

favor of the government on the commerce clause issue on a much narrower basis than
was actually used.
d) In United States v. Butler, the Court adopted a "Madisonian" view of the federal

spending power.
e) A federal excise tax conditioned specifically on an activity or a product being
unlawful under state law will be held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme
Court.
f) Marburyv. Madison exemplifies a case where the United States Supreme Court
could have reached the desired result on a narrower ground, but instead chose to reach
its result by establishing a broad constitutional principle.
g) A state may not constitutionally apply its ad valorem property tax to an interstate
railroad with respect to the land and fixed tangible assets of the railroad permanently
located in the taxing state unless the value is apportioned to reflect the railroad's
intrastate operations in the taxing state.
h) "Under the Compact Clause... the federal questions are the execution, validity
and meaning of federally approved state compacts. The interpretation of the meaning
of the compact controls over a state's application of its own law through the Supremacy
Clause and not by any implied federal power to construe state law ...
II
(40 minutes)
An Arizona statute provides that no vegetables or fruit produced in the state shall be
shipped out of the state unless crated in accordance with regulations issued by the
Commissioner of Agriculture and labeled "Quality Produce Grown in Arizona, The
Sunshine State." Under the authority of this statute the Commissioner has issued
regulations relating to the crating of cantaloupes grown in the state designed to secure
the shipment of only ripe, suitable cantaloupes and also to require that the crating be
done in such a way that the product be evenly distributed in the crate and that there be
no deception or fraud practiced by putting only the better products on top. The
California statute similarly provides that no produce grown in California shall be
shipped out of state except in accordance with crating regulations issued by its
Commissioner of Agriculture and labeled to show it was grown in California. The
California law further provides that any fruit crated but not grown in the state shall not
be shipped out of state except in accordance with crating regulations issued by the
Commissioner and shall carry a label showing it was crated in California and giving the
name and address of the shipper.
A federal statute gives the United States Secretary of Agriculture the authority to
prescribe crating requirements for all produce moving in interstate commerce and to
require labeling which will identify the product and the name and location of the
shipper. Under this authority the Secretary has issued regulations which provide
crating standards for all cantaloupes shipped to wholesalers and retailers in interstate
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commerce and require a labeling to show the name and location of the shipper. The
crating standards are the same as those prescribed under the Arizona and California
regulations.
Quality Fruit Producers, a California corporation with its principal land holdings,
processing plants and home office in Sun Valley, California, is engaged in the
production and marketing of high quality fruit which is shipped throughout the United
States. Cantaloupes are one of its principal products. In 1964 it purchased an
extensive tract of land in Arizona near the California border in order to increase its
cantaloupe production. The land acquisition, clearing and irrigation equipment costs
totaled $2,000,000.
This land yields a very high quality cantaloupe known as Pot-of-Gold. Indeed, this
particular variety, grown only in Arizona because of the unusually favorable soil and
weather conditions there, is considered the best cantaloupe grown in all the Southwest
and commands the best market. Since the company also grows cantaloupes in
California and has a large cooling, processing and crating plant in California only about
thirty miles from the Arizona border, it has until recently shipped all its Arizona-grown
cantaloupes in bulk by truck to its California plant where the cantaloupes are cooled,
inspected, sorted, and crated in accordance with the California requirements and labeled
Pot-of-Gold Cantaloupe, Quality Fruit Producers, Sun Valley, California.
The Arizona authorities now insist that under the Arizona statute the company must
process and crate its Arizona-grown cantaloupes in Arizona, subject to Arizona
inspection, crating and labeling requirements, including the requirement that it be
labeled "Grown in Arizona the Sunshine State", so that distributors, retailers and
consumers will be sure to identify this high quality cantaloupe as an Arizona product.
The company asserts that in order to comply with this requirement it will have to build
a processing, cooling and crating plant in Arizona at a cost of $200,000, duplicating
the plant in nearby California. The Arizona authority now brings suit in the state court
to enjoin the company from shipping any Arizona-grown cantaloupes from the state
except in conformity with the Arizona statute and regulations.
What defense or defenses may the company assert? Discuss.
in
(45 minutes)
In August 1963, Harry Beret, an Army Captain assigned to an American military
advisory mission in Asialand shot and killed an Army Sergeant in a night spot in
Coupville, the capital of Asialand. Both Beret and the victim were off-duty and on a
rest and relaxation leave from their duties as advisors to Asialand armed forces fighting
insurgents in the rural areas of the country.
At the time of the above incident, an Executive Agreement dated July 15, 1962, was
in effect between the United States and Asialand under which exclusive jurisdiction was
conferred on American courts-martial with respect to "any activity by American
servicemen in Asialand constituting an offense under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice of the United States in force as of the date of this agreement." The Agreement
among other things further provided that the United States would initiate proceedings
to exercise that jurisdiction in all instances involving violence whenever reasonably
requested to do so by the Asialand government. As a result of such a request, Beret
was charged with murder under the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("Uniform
Code").
Beret was tried two months later in Coupville by a U.S. Army General Court-Martial,
was found guilty under the murder provision of the Uniform Code and was sentenced
to life imprisonment. During the course of the trial, the government offered evidence
tending to establish that the killing resulted from animosity created by the mutual
interest of both Beret and the victim in a local young woman. Beret's conviction was
approved at all military appellate levels and was finally upheld four years ago by the
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United States Court of Military Appeals. Beret has now served 62 years of his
sentence.
A few days ago Beret requested the legal assistance of our law firm in seeking release
from confinement. I am considering the initiation of a habeas corpus proceeding in an
appropriate federal district court challenging the jurisdiction of the court-martial that
tried Beret. Will I be successful? Explain fully and be sure to discuss all constitutional
issues and problems reasonably raised by the above fact situation.
IV
(35 minutes)
You are a legal research assistant to a United States Senator and the Senator has
informed you about his concern over the safety and environmental problems associated
with the recent onslaught of snowmobiles in certain parts of the country. Snowmobiles
are small snow vehicles utilized primarily for recreational purposes, and, in particular,
to gain access in winter to remote wooded areas. Such vehicles generally are used
personally by their owners in their state of residence, although a very small percentage
of the vehicles are used by ranchers and others for commercial purposes. Although the
manufacturers of these vehicles have been incorporating additional safety and antipollution devices annually in new models, the Senator is convinced that federal
regulatory legislation is needed to insure that after the initial purchase, each owner will
be required to install the latest safety and anti-pollution devices as they are
subsequently developed by technological advances. A summary of this proposed
legislation follows below.
Under the proposed legislation every owner (present and future) of a snowmobile in
the United States will be required to equip his snowmobile with such "additional safety
devices" as the Research Council of the American Recreation Vehicle Association
(ARVA) determines from time to time to be "necessary or highly desirable for safety
purposes." ARVA is a non-profit industry research group financed by the major
manufacturers of recreation vehicles. In order to control air pollution and its effects on
wildlife and vegetation, the legislation provides that each such owner of a snowmobile
shall keep his vehicle equipped with a pollution control device that at all times complies
with the then current pollution emission standards established from time to time by the
United States Public Health Service as being "conducive to the protection of the natural
environment." Any wilful failure to comply with the statute will be a misdemeanor.
Please advise the Senator as to whether Congress would have power to enact such
proposed legislation and as to any other constitutional problems inherent in such
legislation. Include any suggestions as to steps he should take in the legislative process
that would enhance the chances that the legislation ultimately would be upheld in the
courts.
V
(10 minutes)
Reggie Righteous, a federal taxpayer and citizen of the United States has brought an
action in a federal district court against the Secretary of Defense, challenging on
constitutional grounds appropriations and expenditures for the Viet Nam conflict.
Reggie has asked for a declaratory judgment that the appropriations and expenditures
are unconstitutional and a permanent injunction against such action in the future. A
motion to dismiss has been filed by the defendant emphasizing non-substantive
grounds for dismissing Reggie's action. What are those non-substantive grounds?
How should the court rule on them? Discuss very briefly.
END
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PART 5. SELECTED EXAMINATION QUESTIONS:
RECENT EXAMINATIONS
Constitutional Law
Professor Tribe - Harvard
December 15, 1996
EXAM INSTRUCTIONS
This is a take-home, open-book exam. You may use any material you wish in
preparing your answer. There is one question. Your answer should not exceed 2,000
words. Concise answers will be rewarded in grading; unduly long answers will be
penalized. Please type if at all possible, but whether you write or type, use only e
other line and one side of each page. If you write, please make an extra effort to be
legible. If your handwriting is hard to read, please consider printing.
Please do not talk to anyone about the question or your answer. Good luck.
Ames is the fifty-first State of the United States. Orange, a suburban area with a
population of around 35,000 near a major city in Ames, is a largely bedroom
community most of whose adults must commute to their jobs between 20 and 30
minutes away in the city. Some of Orange's residents work locally; many more would
do so if suitable jobs were available in Orange.
Under the Ames Constitution, Orange is governed as a privately owned, for-profit
corporation which is authorized, subject to preemption by state legislation, to
promulgate municipal rules regulating private conduct within its borders; to raise
operational revenues by incurring debt through sales of municipal bonds, by levying
taxes on real and personal property, by operating or investing in profit-making
businesses, and by selling shares of stock to interested investors; and to operate local
police, fire, transportation, and other basic municipal services. The Ames Constitution
specifies that each such corporation is to be governed by a five-member board of
directors, to be called its "Board of County Commissioners," elected by the
corporation's shareholders on a one vote per share basis. The 100,000 outstanding
shares of Orange stock are owned by three shareholders: a large microchip company,
a babyfood manufacturer, and a church.
A multi-billion dollar Silicon Valley giant, Apple Computer, Inc., proposes to build
a $100 million office complex on a 130-acre site in Orange that Apple would like to
lease from Orange. As inducement, Apple offers to sell Orange an equity interest in
Apple Computer, Inc., in the form of a substantial block of (attractively discounted)
Apple stock, and submits a business plan that promises to provide over 3,500 hightech, high-wage jobs for Orange residents by the year 2,000. Apple's office complex
would include space for numerous businesses, as well as a large shopping mall
featuring the latest in interactive information services and video games.
To make this plan financially attractive for Apple, the firm says it must receive a
significant abatement on the amount it would otherwise have to pay under the property
tax that Orange levies on every commercial establishment owning or leasing land there.
Specifically, Apple would need to have its property taxes reduced by $500,000 per year
for each of the first five years of its Orange operation. The Orange Board of County
Commissioners is glad to lease the 130-acre site to Apple; is eager to buy the equity
interest offered by Apple; and is considering Apple's request for a five-year, $2.5
million property tax abatement. But three things about Apple concern various
members of the Orange Board of Commissioners:
First, Apple confers employee health benefits not only on the spouses and children of
all its employees but also on their unmarried partners, regardless of sex, whenever the
employees designate such partners as "long-term companions." This has led some
commissioners to object that "Apple's health policy undermines traditional family
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values - not to mention how it encourages sodomy and extramarital sex, both of which
internal policies and will simply abandon its plans to launch an office complex in
Orange, accepting an offer from Mexico City to locate its new facility there instead,
unless the tax abatement is unconditionally approved, the special fee is rescinded, and
the municipal rule is repealed.
The Orange Board rejects Apple's ultimatum. Because this decision threatens to hurt
both the fiscal health and the reputation of Ames, the state's Governor -- after
unsuccessfully trying to persuade the State Legislature to preempt the actions taken by
the Orange Board - calls the White House to urge President Clinton to telephone all
five members of the Board of Commissioners personally. The Governor reminds
President Clinton ofhis "campaign pledge to promote tolerance and economic growth"
and pleads with him to "jawbone some sense into these fools."
The President seeks the advice of Attorney General Janet Reno as to his legal
authority to pressure the Orange County Board of Commissioners into changing its
vote. He hopes to invoke a long-ignored Act of Congress, passed in 1866, that says:
"The President may rescind congressionally authorized and appropriated federal
expenditures in any state or locality that declines to exercise its fiscal or rule-making
powers in a manner the President deems to be required by the United States
Constitution,"
The President's plan is to inform the county commissioners that some $15 million in
currently projected 1994-95 federal expenditures for Orange (mostly in connection with
the space program) will be canceled within a month unless the commissioners promptly
reverse themselves on the three matters of concern to Apple - the tax abatement, the
special fee, and the rule.
The Attorney General, however, tells the President that, much as she would like to
give him a green light, "principles of federalism and separation of powers are too
important for me to ignore here." "Besides," she adds, "even if the commissioners are
being stupid or bigoted, there's nothing in the Constitution that requires a corporation
like Orange to give Apple a bite of its revenue pie, or to let businesses in its midst
interfere with the adoption choices of their employees." "Infact," the Attorney General
concludes, "I'm not at all sure that the U.S. Constitution even permits the managers of
companies that receive tax benefits to interfere with the parental decisions ofthose they
hire."
The President has serious doubts about the adequacy of this analysis and asks his
White House Legal Counsel for a memo on the constitutional principles at stake and
how he should resolve them. He tells his Counsel:
"You know I used to teach constitutional law, but that was some years ago, and the
Court has changed course on lots of things since then. I guess it might help to have a
sense of how individual Justices would approach this problem, but what I really need
is some thoughtful guidance on what the Constitution itself tells me here, partly about
the relevant structural issues -- like my authority to apply this 1866 Act of Congress
to impose my constitutional conclusions on Orange - but especially about substance:
Would the Orange Board's denial of the tax and other economic benefits involved in
this situation in fact violate any substantive constitutional prohibition? Would the
recently enacted Orange rule be constitutionally enforceable against Apple? What
about the Attorney General's remark that the Constitution might itself prevent
companies that get tax benefits from interfering with the parental decisions of their
employees? I have enough time to read only 2,000 words on all this, so you'd better
stay within that limit in your memo to me. Unfortunately, I need it by the close of
business today, since I'm leaving tonight for a summit meeting on world trade."
Please prepare the memo requested by the President.
END
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Property I
Professor Michelman - Harvard
January 12, 1994
OVERALL WORD LIMIT. The combined length ofall your answers to all the Parts
may not exceed 3,000 words. This is equivalent to twelve double-spaced pages if you
type or word-process using 12-point fixed-width type and normal margins. In any case,
monitoring the length of your answers is your responsibility. I will deal with
substantial violations of the word limit by disregarding whatever portion of an
offending exam exceeds the limit.
The word limit may push you to prune extraneous and non-responsive material out of
your answers. Clear and orderly presentation of the basic points about a problem
should be your first aim, before getting into more extended refinements and more
marginal possibilities. An answer that includes material not directly relevant to a full
response to the problem or question presented is not as good as an answer that is free
of such material.
PART I
Some Background Facts
(The "Background Facts are mainly relevant to Question I-C, but you should read
them before tackling any of the Questions in Part I.)
Oscar died in 1940. At the time of his death, Oscar owned in fee simple absolute a
certain 500-acre parcel of wooded land in Green County (hereafter called "the parcel"
or "the land"). By his will, Oscar devised the parcel
"to my son Albert and his wife Alice and their heirs as tenants by the entireties,
believing that they and each of them will cherish the land as nature made it and
treat it with the same respect as I have done. "
At this time, Albert and Alice had been living together since 1935, ostensibly as a
married couple (as they were to do until 1955 when Alice died). However,
unbeknownst to Oscar and just about everyone else, the two were never formally
married.
In 1950, Albert executed a will. This will included the following provision:
"My 500-acreparcel of land in Green County, received by will from Oscar in
January 12, 1940, 1 hereby devise to my beloved daughter Bess, as long as she
remains a resident of Green County, Ames; and in case my saiddaughtershall ever
remove her residencefrom Green County, title to the said parcel shall then
immediatelypass to the National Society for the Preservationof Wildlife.
Albert's 1950 will further included a residuary clause proving as follows:
"Any interests that I may own in any property, otherwise undisposedof by this
will, I hereby give, bequeath, and devise to Opus University."
Apart from Albert's will just mentioned, neither Albert nor Alice ever made any deed,
will, lease, or other instrument purporting to affect in any way the title to the parcel.
During the lifetimes of Albert and Alice, neither Albert nor Alice nor anyone else ever
entered or occupied the land, which was left undisturbed in its natural state.
Alice died in 1955, leaving no will.
Albert died in 1960, survived by his daughter Bess.
At the time of Albert's death in 1960, the parcel was still vacant, wooded, and
undisturbed from its natural state. Thereafter, neither Bess nor anyone else ever
entered, occupied, or disturbed the land, except as specifically described below. Bess
remained a resident of Green County, Ames, from her birth until her death in 1989.
QUESTION I-A
In 1965, Bess executed and delivered to the Green County Conservation Society
(GCCS) a deed to the parcel. By this deed, Bess granted the parcel
to the Green County ConservationSociety in fee simple, it being a condition of
this grant thatneither the Society nor any successor shall ever improve the land or
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alter itfrom its naturalstate, or allow the land to be improved or altered,but shall
devote the land to preservation of the naturalhabitatand wildlife for the benefit
and enjoyment of the Christianpublic of Green County.
The Green County Conservation Society (GCCS) was then, and remains to this day, a
private organization supported by gifts from private donors.
At the time of her grant to GCCS in 1965, Bess owned one and only one other parcel
of land -- a residence in Green County about five miles distant from the 500 acre
parcel.
For the first several years after receiving the deed from Bess, the GCCS left the parcel
completely alone. In 1973, the GCCS cleared and graded a small area on the parcel
(less than one-quarter acre), adjacent to one of its edges, for use as a parking lot
capable of holding about 30 cars, and also cleared some footpaths through brush
growing on the land to make it easier for visitors to get into the land for walks, birdwatching, and the like. Members of the public were thereafter made welcome by the
GCCS to use the parking lot and footpaths whenever they liked, as long as they stayed
on the cleared areas and left undisturbed the plant and animal life on the land. GCCS
made no attempt to restrict entry to Christians. In the succeeding years, modest
numbers of people including non-Christians - averaging about fifty visitors each week,
year 'round - came to the land and complied with the rules set by GCCS. Bess was not
consulted about the parking lot, footpaths, or invitation to the public, and she never
said anything to anyone about any of these matters. Bess herself visited the land
infrequently, only two or three times during her lifetime after granting the land away
in 1965.
Suppose it is now 1978. Bess is still alive. You are the legal assistant to the
Executive Director of the GCCS. The Director wants to know whether Bess might
have any plausible claims for any form of relief against the GCCS, based on the abovedescribed 1965 deed and arising out of GCCS's manner of using, and allowing others
to use, the parcel since 1973. The Director is getting ready for a Board meeting and
wants a quick, preliminary response. With regard to any plausible claims Bess may
have, the Director also wants to know what lines of resistance and defense may be
available to GCCS, along with your best preliminary guess as to the likely outcome of
any litigation that might be brought by Bess against GCCS. The Director has
specifically said to you: "I know you're pressed for time right now, so be sure to tell me
what lines of analysis and argument you think may need further consideration even if
you can't fully work them through today. Remember, I'm a lawyer, too, so you don't
have to spell everything out for me as you might to a non-lawyer. Also, let me make
it as clear as I can that, right now, I only want to hear about possible claims that Bess
may have against GCCS (even if there may be other conceivable claimants to interests
in this land), so for purposes of this inquiry please just assume that Bess was the sole,
rightful owner of the parcel (in fee simple absolute) when she made her deed to GCCS
in 1965."
Please prepare a draft of your memorandum responding to the Director's inquiry.
QUESTION I-B
Now add the following to the facts you already have.
Bess never asserted any claims against GCCS. Instead, in 1980, Bess executed and
delivered to GCCS a deed by which she "conveyed, quitclaimed,and released" to
GCCS
"whatever right,title, or interestI may own in [theparcel], including any interest
I may own in the nature of a real covenant or equitable servitude."
Late in 1992, the GCCS, badly strapped for funds, sold the parcel to the DEF
Corporation. DEF promptly fenced in the land, shut out public visitation, and began
clearing, grading, and hard-topping the land for use as an industrial site. The
governmental authorities of Green County are so anxious to have DEF's industrial
development on the land, as a counter to a serious problem of unemployment in Green
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County, that they have negotiated with DEF a partial forgiveness of County real estate
taxes on the land for the first ten years of industrial operations on the site.
As a direct consequence of DEF's alterations of the parcel, rain water that used to be
absorbed harmlessly into the ground has been diverted into the bed of a stream, causing
that stream to overflow in a torrent on land owned by Charles, one mile distant from
the parcel, causing great damage to Charles's house.
You now work as an associate of DEF's General Counsel. On your desk this morning
you find a note from the Counsel. Attached to the Counsel's note is a history of the
parcel recounting the events and transactions detailed in Questions I-A and I-B of this
exam. The counsel's note asks: "What can you tell me before leaving work today about
our possible liabilities to Charles? Please tell me what claim or claims Charles might
conceivably assert against DEF, indicate our possible responses and defenses, give me
your preliminary assessment of the likely outcome, and tell me about any additional
facts we may need to find out or additional legal research we may need to do in order
to make a fully informed assessment. Thanks."
Please prepare a draft of your response to the Counsel's inquiry.
QUESTION I-C
Refer again to the "Background Facts" above, and also keep in mind the later history
of the parcel recounted in Questions I-A and I-B. Now add the following to the facts
you already have.
First, Bess died in 1989.
Second, it seems that Albert was a prominent figure during his lifetime in Green
County. Recently Albert's unpublished memoirs have come to light, revealing the fact
that Albert and Alice were never married. DEF's General Counsel now wants to know
whether this revelation, or any other part of the history contained in the "Background
Facts "might conceivably give rise to any outstanding claims to entitlements of any
kind respecting the parcel, which could cause trouble for DEF. Counsel inquires:
"Does this history suggest any claims that anyone might press to any sort of entitlement
to the parcel? If so, please tell me who the possible claimants might be, what claim or
claims each possible claimant might assert, based on what transaction(s) or event(s),
indicate our possible lines of response, and tell me any additional facts we may need
to find out or additional legal research we may need to do in order to make a fully
informed assessment of the situation. Again, my thanks."
Please prepare a draft of your response to the Counsel's inquiry.
END
The University of Chicago
The Law School
Property II
Professors Israel and Kauper
June 9, 1995

I
The Elementary Education Aid Act passed by Congress appropriates money to be
spent by public school boards in expanding and improving their educational programs
by various means which contribute particularly to meeting the special educational needs
of educationally deprived children, defined as children coming from families with
annual income of less than $3,000. The federal statute authorizes and requires school
boards that receive grants from the federal government to make the benefits of these
special educational programs, financed with federal funds, available to all children
attending schools within the boundaries of the public school district, including children
attending private schools. The federal statute stipulates, however, that the control of
expenditures of all funds must remain in the public school board, that no part of the
federal funds may be used to finance the acquisition of facilities and equipment for
private schools or to finance sectarian religious teaching.
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A local school board in State M has received a grant from the federal government to
enable it to engage in some special educational programs. Under one program it will
hire remedial English teachers who will give special training during the school day at
public schools to children with reading deficiencies. Children from private schools,
including parochial schools, will be permitted to enroll in the public schools for the
limited purpose of attending these classes. Under a second program, the public schools
will send out speech therapists to all schools in the district, including parochial schools,
on a regular schedule in order to give special attention to children with speech
difficulties. Federal funds will be used to rent rooms at parochial schools in order to
provide facilities for the speech therapy instruction.
The Constitution of State M provides that no public funds or property shall be used,
directly or indirectly, in aid of parochial schools or sectarian education. This provision
has been strictly construed by the supreme court of the state which has in the past
invalidated the use of tax-raised funds to provide bus transportation and free textbooks
for children attending parochial schools.
T, a local taxpayer and a parent of children in the public schools, brought a suit in the
federal district court against the local school board, alleging that the proposed use of
the federal funds and the administration of the same by the public school board,
especially in so far as the benefits are made available to children attending parochial
schools, violates both the United States Constitution and the Constitution of State M.
He requests a decree enjoining the school board from extending the benefits of these
special educational programs to any parochial school children. The district court held
(1) that there would have been a violation of the state constitution but the force of the
federal act made the state constitution inapplicable under the supremacy clause and (2)
there was no violation of the federal constitution.
Discuss the possible dispositions of the case on review by the Supreme Court. (It may
be assumed that all constitutional issues were properly raised in the proceedings
below.)
II
John Smith was recently expelled from the Michiganda Educational Association
(M.E.A.) and he has hired you to represent him in attacking the constitutionality of his
expulsion. The M.E.A. is a non-profit organization incorporated under the laws of
Michiganda with a membership of approximately 98% of all the teachers employed in
the state's public schools. Although a state statute prohibits all state employees from
joining a labor union, that statute specifically exempts the M.E.A. from this
prohibition. In fact, the state presently recognizes the M.E.A., by virtue of a collective
bargaining agreement, as the exclusive bargaining agent for all the teachers in the state.
The agreement gives the association, inter alia, a veto power over any proposed
changes in curriculum, teacher's hours, working conditions, etc.
All action of the M.E.A. is taken by an executive council that is composed of one
representative from each of the state's 17 counties, the representative in each case
being elected by all of the teacher-members in his county. The state recognizes the
additional work burden carried by a county representative by assigning him a lighter
teaching load. During the past year, your client, Smith, an ardent segregationist, was
elected to the executive council. Soon after his election, Smith made the following
announcement to the newspapers: "Acting as a private citizen of the United States, I
have drafted a petition to the United States Senate requesting that it start impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice ofthe Supreme Court on the ground that he has
violated his oath of office by forcing the mongrelization of the races at the direction of
his superiors in the Kremlin. I urge all patriotic citizens to support me in this venture."
The executive council of the M.E.A. called an immediate session and questioned
Smith about his petition. Smith attempted to support his allegations against the Chief
Justice by reference to an article, generally regarded as totally false, in a publication of
a well-known "hate" group, The World Fascist Party. Although Smith apparently had
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acted in good faith, the council felt that his action had seriously injured the M.E.A.'s
image and its announced position in favor of integration. A motion was made to expel
Smith from the M.E.A. and it carried by a vote of 16-1 (only Smith voting against it).
Smith believes the M.E.A. will reinstate him as a member if the action of the council
is shown to violate his rights under the federal constitution. Prepare a memo on his
behalf noting the weaknesses as well as the strengths of your arguments.
I
The government of Slobonia, a nation engaged in a nationalization program, sues in
a federal district court of the United States to recover 3 tons of sugar which it
expropriated while the sugar was still in Slobonia and which the owner, 0, an American
citizen who owns a sugar refinery in Slobonia, subsequently managed to ship out of
Slobonia and has in his possession on a vessel at a wharf in the United States. (The
jurisdiction of the federal court is based on the Article III power to decide controversies
between citizens and foreign states.)
A treaty between Slobonia and the United States, executed in 1945, provides that
Slobonia will not under any circumstances expropriate property of American citizens.
The Slobonian confiscation decrees provide for compensation in case of expropriation
but the value is measured in a depreciated currency and compensation is paid in nonnegotiable bonds payable at the end of thirty years out of net profits from the
government's operation of the sugar refineries.
Immediately after the suit was instituted by the government of Slobonia against 0 to
recover the sugar, Congress enacted a law which provides that in any proceeding
brought in a federal court by a foreign government resting on a claim based on
expropriation ofproperty owned by an American citizen, the federal court shall dismiss
the proceeding if it finds that the expropriation violated the accepted rules of
international law. The statute moreover explicitly states that the rule that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation is a rule of
international law. The statute provides, however, that if the President of the United
States files a written statement with the court saying that it would embarrass and
prejudice the President's handling of foreign affairs for the court to pass on the legality
of the foreign government's act of expropriation, the court shall not entertain any
defense based on this ground.
In the proceeding initiated by the Slobonian government, the defendant 0 tenders as
a defense that the act of expropriation was contrary to treaty and international law.
Slobonia offers proof that no principle of international law forbids expropriation
without compensation so long as aliens and citizens are treated the same way. But at
this point the court receives a statement from the President of the United States in
which he asserts that the State Department, in the process of negotiating with Slobinia
with respect to protection of American property interests, already has accepted the
validity of the expropriation act,and that a decision by the court passing on the legality
of the expropriation of O's property would prejudice the Executive Department in its
further dealings with Slobinia.
Prepare a memorandum advising the district judge on the constitutional issues
presented by this case and the possible course or courses of action open to him.
IV
On May 1, 1965, Julie Jones received the following letter from the Washington
County Prosecutor: "At the request of Judge Justice, I have examined the record in
Jones v. Haven, a paternity action brought by yourself on behalf of your child. On the
basis of that record, I have filed in Circuit Court an information (copy attached)
charging you with violation of state code §1240. That section makes it a misdemeanor
(punishable by a maximum of 30 days imprisonment) to give birth to an illegitimate
child. Please note that conviction under §1240 will bar further prosecution under
§1242 which makes it a misdemeanor (same punishment) to commit adultery. Knowing
that you are indigent, the court has appointed John Student, a 3rd year law student at
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State U. to represent you. Arraignment is set for May 10th. Please call me if that date
is inconvenient."
On May 10th, Julie appeared in court with Student. She pleaded not guilty and
requested ajury trial. The case was assigned to Judge Justice and went to trial on May
15th. The prosecutor introduced into evidence (1) a doctor's certificate reporting the
birth on March 15th of Allen Jones to Julie Jones, (2) a birth certificate for Allen Jones
listing his mother as single and father unknown, (3) the following portion of the
transcript in Jones v. Haven, a civil case decided on April 15th in favor ofthe plaintiff:
Judge Justice, "Miss Jones, since you brought this suit by yourself and have no
lawyer, I feel that I should advise you of your rights. Are you aware, for example, of
your privilege against self incrimination."
Witness Jones, "Yes."
Judge Justice, "Very well, please tell your story."
Witness Jones, "Last month, I had a little boy. Although he and I aren't married,
Mr. Haven is the father. I first met him at... etc."
Julie introduced no evidence on her behalf and did not take the stand. In charging the
jury, Judge Justice stressed (1) Julie was not required to take the stand and her failure
to do so cannot be held against her, and (2) although, as presiding judge in Jones v.
Haven, he had ruled in favor of Julie, the standard of proof there was considerably
different from that in a criminal case, so an acquittal would not be inconsistent with the
previous verdict.
The jury found Julie guilty and the judge sentenced her to 3 days in jail. The state
supreme court affirmed without opinion and the case is now before the United States
Supreme Court on certiorari.
What constitutional issues are presented. Discuss. (It may be assumed that Student
raised all relevant objections at the trial and appellate levels.)
END
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
COLLEGE OF LAW
Examination Questions
Fall 1995
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
(Law 313), Section B
Monday, December 11, 1995
[A - M: Room D; N-Z: Room C; Typing: Rooms G, J, & K]
Read All Instructions Before Starting the Exam
PART II: Professor Rotunda
10:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m.
This examination consists of TWO PARTS, weighed equally. This is Part II, which
consists of two essay questions. This part will be passed out at 10:00 a.m. and
collected at 11:30 am. This is an OPEN BOOK exam. That is, you may bring in your
casebook and supplement, your own notes, or any outlines prepared by you or by other
students so long as you have not purchasedthe study aid. You MAY NOT bringwith
you any commercial outlines or hornbooks. If you have any such material with you,
leave them in the front of the room until after you have turned in your examination.
PLAN the answer before writing. Credit will be given for clarity, good organization,
and conciseness. Do not consider yourself to be paid by the word. If added facts are
needed to answer a question, articulate your assumptions of facts and alternative
assumptions of fact and answer the question as to all such assumptions. Discuss all
issues reasonably raised in the problem even though your resolution of a prior issue in
the problem may technically make decision ofthe other issues moot. However, lengthy
displays of irrelevant learning, even if erudite, will be penalized. Please use your time
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not only to answer the question but TO THINK. Remember: ORGANIZE YOUR
ANSWER.
AS A COURTESY TO YOUR FELLOW STUDENTS, IF YOU LEAVE THIS
EXAMINATION EARLY, PLEASE DO SO QUIETLY. If you leave the room before
you finish the examination, you may not take the examination or your answers with
you. Once you handin this essay answer, you may not retrieve itfor any reason.
BEGIN EACH ESSAY IN A SEPARATE BOOK. Please write on only one side (the
right side) of the paper (except for inserts), and use a pen (or typewriter) for this
portion of the examination. Then it will be easier for me to read your essay. If you use
more than one examination book to answer an essay, mark each book clearly: e.g.,
"book I of 2 books." That way, I will be able to find all of your books in case they are
separated. Write your examination number on each booklet. [Ifyou forget your
examination number, use your socialsecurity number.] It is also a good idea to use
tried and true writing techniques such as paragraphs, margins, complete sentences, etc.
Please avoid unusual abbreviations.
Before you begin this examination, please reread lines 31-40.
ESSAY I
[ONE HOUR; this essay will constitute one-third of the final exam.]
[Write on one side of the page only.]
The States of East Dakota (hereinafter "Dakota") and West Carolina
(hereinafter "Carolina") are historic and competitive rivals. The competition is
unbalanced, because East Dakota is a State blessed with more natural resources, a
larger population, and a more educated citizenry.
SearMart, a national retailing chain, is headquartered in Dakota. The
headquarters office employs over 5,000 employees. Carolina, in an effort to attract
more business, is encouraging SearMart to move its headquarters to (and build its new
SearMart Tower in) Carolina. Carolina promised SearMart that, if it relocates, it will
give SearMart a property tax holiday for 5 years (i.e., there will be no property tax on
the new SearMart Tower for 5 years). In addition, Carolina will contribute $40 million
towards the $160 million construction costs for the new SearMart tower, and build a
new highway to this new building.
Dakota is reluctant to engage in competitive bidding with Carolina because other
companies also located in Dakota might get similar ideas. Therefore, Dakota's
congressional delegation lobbied Congress to enact legislation to kill Carolina's
proposal. Congress, in response to Dakota's lobbying, enacted a law that created a
Commission to study the problem. The Commission, under this legislation, is to study
the problem and then propose a bill to Congress. The Speaker of the House and the
Senate Majority leader each nominated four people (two Democrats and two
Republicans ), half of whom must be members of Congress. The legislation creating
the Commission also provided that Congress (after receiving the Commission's
recommendation) must then approve or disapprove of the Commission's proposal on
an up or down vote. That is, no one would be allowed to propose any amendments to
this legislation unless two-thirds of each House voted to suspend its rules and allow
amendments.
The Commission's hearing showed that many states and localities are giving
tax holidays and other benefits in an effort to attract business from other states or from
different parts of the same state. In addition, states and localities are also raising taxes
and spending that tax money to attract major team sports (such as national baseball,
football or basketball leagues). The tax money is then used to help construct buildings
like the proposed SearMart Tower or major sports stadiums. Sometimes it is also used
to build highways to the new stadiums, or other buildings to make them more
convenient. Witnesses testified before the Commission that - if the states and localities
were not competing against each other in this way - then state and local taxes could be
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lower or the taxes could be used for worthier purposes, such as increased support for
grade schools or for higher education, instead of being used for tax holidays, or sports
stadiums, or private buildings.
The Commission proposed a new federal law. The proposed law prohibits any state
(or locality) from offering any more tax holidays in an effort to entice businesses or
major league sports teams to their state (or locality) from other states (or localities).
It also prohibits any businesses or major league sports teams from accepting any tax
holidays if they are used to entice the businesses or major league sports teams to
relocate to another state (or locality). It also provides that if the state accepts any
federal highway funds, it cannot spend any funds to build new highways to the new
buildings or stadiums. Also, if the state or locality accepts federal highway funds, it
cannot grant property tax holidays to businesses or major league sports teams that are
enticed from other states or localities. It also provided that, if states have raised extra
tax money in an expectation of using that money to lure businesses or major sports
teams, then the states must now use that money to increase state support for higher
education.
The proposed law was hotly debated in Congress, and a 55% majority of the Senate
went on record as opposing the provision of the Bill that would apply to major league
sports. However, under the rules under which the Senate (and House) were operating,
no amendments could be proposed unless two-thirds ofthe Senate (and House) agreed.
This condition was not met. Thus, both Houses of Congress voted on the Bill on an up
or down vote with no amendments allowed. The law was passed, the President signed
it, and it went into effect.
DISCUSS THE LAW THAT CONGRESS ENACTED. This question raises various
issues, and so it is important to organize your answer so that you can discuss these
issues in a logical order. If you think that the law may raise one or more constitutional
problems, also discuss whether Congress might avoid these problems.
ESSAY 2
[Begin this essay in a new examination book.]
[Write on one side of the page only.]
[ONE-HALF HOUR; this essay will constitute one-sixth of the final exam)
Assume the following. Congress and the President, in an effort to compromise their
dispute regarding the balancing of the budget, decide to reenact the law invalidated in
Bowsher v. Synar [casebook, p. 300]. However, to respond to the majority's complaint,
the new law provided that the Comptroller General is removable only at the initiative
of Congress and only by impeachment.
DISCUSS.
University of Illinois
Property §A
Fall 1995
Prof. Freyfogle
FINAL EXAMINATION
1.

This is a closed notes, closed book exam. You may not use any materials in

answering it. The time indications on the questions are only estimates of how long you

ought to spend on each question; you need not follow them exactly, but don't fall too
far behind.
2.
Write your examination number on the front cover of each exam booklet that
you use, along with a notation ofthe number of booklets that you have used (e.g., Book
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1 of 3, Book 2 of 3). Do not write your name or your social security number anywhere
on your answers. There is no need to return the exam questions.
3. This is a three-hour exam. Please be prompt in turning in your answers. I will be
available throughout the exam in my office, Room 134, to answer questions.
4. This exam includes a total of 4 pages, including this cover page. Before beginning
the exam, please check to make sure you have all of the pages.
Good luck!
1.
(50 minutes) In November of this year, Hal approached landowner Lance and
asked whether he could gain permission to enter Lance's land to do some hunting.
Lance was willing to allow it, but only if Hal paid money. After some negotiation, Hal
and Lance signed a short, written agreement in which Hal agreed to pay $200 and
Lance gave to Hal the "exclusive right to hunt on Lance's land from December 1
through December 8, 1995." Immediately upon signing the agreement, Hal paid the

$200.
During the first few days of December Hal did some hunting without incident
On December 5, he returned to hunt on Lance's land, this time bringing his friend,
Hank, with him. While they were hunting, Hank spotted and shot a wild turkey,
wounding it but not so much that the turkey could not fly into the underbrush. Hank
and Hal went after the turkey, and soon got snarled in the dense brush. While they were
looking, Hank noticed something strange, on the ground, close to Hal's foot. He
shouted to Hal to look down. Hal did so, and noticed a very expensive pair of
binoculars, partially covered by dirt. Hal picked up the binoculars, and then worked his
way out of the brush. Because it was lunchtime, Hank and Hal hopped in their truck
and headed into a nearby town for lunch.
About an hour later, Hank and Hal returned from lunch, with Hal wearing the
binoculars around his neck. As they were walking on Lance's land, intending to
continue hunting and to look for the turkey that Hank had shot, they saw Lance
approaching them. In Lance's hand was a dead turkey. Lance stared at them coldly.
To make conversation, Hal mentioned that he had found the binoculars. Lance simply
responded: "Is that so." Hank then said, "Well, I see you found my turkey." Lance
simply scowled, and said: "I think you guys have done about enough hunting on my
land, and I want you off, right now." Hal objected, but Lance seemed sufficiently angry
that he decided not to press the point. Both Hal and Hank then departed.
Identify and discuss the legal issues by these facts. What rights do the relative
parties have? What remedies might the parties have against one another?
2.
(30 minutes) As a young associate in a hot-shot Washington, D.C., law firm,
you have been given an unusual assignment. The newly independent African nation of
Zantu (a client of your firm) is in the process of revising its laws. One issue that has
arisen is the matter of wildlife. The northernmost province in Zantu has extensive
wildlife populations, including reasonably large numbers of grazing and browsing
animals (antelopes, zebra, giraffes, etc.) that roam over large areas in the province. The
land in Zantu is largely owned by a few dozen private landowners, with each owning
one or more large tracts of land. You have been asked the following: Ignoring any
customs and laws (including constitutional protections for property) that might already
be in effect in Zantu, what are the principal options that Zantu has in writing laws
dealing with the ownership of wildlife? What are the chief advantages and
disadvantages of each of these options? Which option would you recommend for
Zantu?
3.
(70 minutes) In March of 1993, Alice and Bob Talent signed a lease covering
a single family home in a Midwestern university community. The landlord-owner was
Sarah Lance. The lease was a periodic tenancy from year to year, beginning July 1,
1993. The lease contained two pertinent clauses, one stating that the tenants could not
sublet without the landlord's consent, the other stating that tenants would be
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responsible for "ordinary repairs." Just before the lease began, Lance moved to New
York City, where she intended to study wildlife populations (particularly populations
of the familiar urban tenant, Ratus ratus).
During the first year of the lease, all was fine. The Talents made occasional
repairs, but none was particularly expensive. In July, 1994, the house next door was
purchased by the city. The city proceeded to remodel the house, adding a new wing, a
third floor, and a 6-car garage that covered nearly the entire lot. In October of 1994,
the city began operating a half-way house for recently released felons, including felons
convicted of violent crimes and serious narcotics offenses. Some of the felon-tenants
were reasonably behaved, but many were exceedingly noisy, playing loud music at all
hours of the day and night. Some of the tenants seemed to have extraordinary numbers
of visitors, and at times every parking spot within several hundred meters was taken.
Many of the tenants would congregate on the sidewalk and street, including the
sidewalk in front of the Talents' rented home.
During the winter of 1994-95 the Talents viewed the situation as tolerable,
given that the weather was cold, windows were closed, and few people stayed outside
very long. By late spring 1995, the problem become severe. The Talents found it
uncomfortable to sit outside anywhere near the half-way house, and they complained
regularly to the city about the noise. In July, 1995, several rocks were thrown through
the windows of the Talents' rented home. The first time they repaired the window with
a new window; after that they simply began putting up plywood over the broken
windows. In August, they began complaining also to Lance, demanding that Lance do
something about the situation. In October, the Talents' car tires were slashed, and a
tape deck was stolen from their car while it was parked in their garage. When asked
about it, the city claimed that its investigation produced no evidence who had engaged
in the criminal conduct.
As their frustration increased, the Talents began to look closely at the half-way
house next door. They realized that the large garage seemed to encroach on Lance's
land, and they immediately notified Lance of the situation. At Lance's request (and
expense), the Talents hired a surveyor, who determined that indeed the city's garage
intruded some 3 feet into the side yard of Lance's lot. Once the city learned about the
problem, it immediately offered to pay Lance for the right to maintain the garage. After
a brief negotiation, Lance agreed to the compensation, and a deed was signed allowing
the city to maintain the garage.
While this was happening, the Talents were getting increasingly angry, and they
have come to you for legal advice. They believe that the noise and outdoor loitering by
convicted felons have become more or less intolerable, and they want to know whether
they can move out. You begin doing a big of digging, and soon find that the entire
neighborhood-including both Lance's lot and the city's lot-are covered by a restrictive
covenant that limits use of the land to single-family houses only. As you are doing your
research, the Talents call to tell you that, while they were gone one weekend, one of
their plywood boards fell out of the window that it was covering, and substantial rain
entered the house, damaging the carpet and a few items of furniture. They also tell you
that they have found a group of students (law
students they say) who might be willing to "take over" their lease, if this is possible.
Identify and discuss the legal issues raised by these facts. In the course of your
answer, explain the relative rights of the parties. Also explain in full what options the
Talents might have at this point against Lance and the city.
4.
(30 minutes) In 1880, the Illinois Central Railroad constructed a rail line
through the central part of the state. To make this possible, it purchased interests in
land from existing land owners. In the deed that Illinois Central typically used, the
landowner-grantor transferred to the railroad a 100-foot-wide section of land "as a
railroad right of way." The railroad paid an amount equal to the full fair market value
of the land.
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In 1979, the Illinois Central ceased using the corridor for railroad purposes, and
arranged to sell it to a local group, Prairie Pathways, which was interested in both the
preservation of prairie remnants (often found along railroads) and the promotion of
recreational trails for hiking and biking. Prairie Pathways began using the trail for this
purpose as soon as the rails and the underlying ties were removed from the rail bed. In
1990, to facilitate this type of adaptive re-use of old railways, a federal statute was
passed expressly authorizing preservation and recreation groups (like Prairie Pathways)
to use abandoned rail corridors "for purposes of recreation and the preservation of
biological resources."
One central Illinois landowner not pleased about this is John Harper, whose
land is crossed by the Prairie Pathways corridor. He comes to you for legal advice,
wanting to know whether he has to accept this pathway. The pathway along his
property is quite flat, and he could easily plow it up entirely and add the full 100-footwide strip to his cornfield, which adjoins the pathway on both sides. As a lesser
alternative, he is willing to leave a hiking trail down the middle of the corridor, but
would like to farm the land on either side of the trail (all, that is, but a 20-foot-wide
strip down the center of the 100-foot wide corridor). If he did this, he would destroy
nearly all of the high quality prairie that has grown along the old corridor.
What legal arguments could Harper assert, and against whom, to gain what he
wants? How likely is he to succeed on each argument?
University of Illinois
FINAL EXAMINATION
PROPERTY, SECTION B
FALL 1995
PROFESSOR BALL

NAME

(1) Do not turn this cover page until instructed to do so.
(2) Put your name. but not your exam number. at the top of this page. Put your
exam number, but not your name. on EACH blue book At the end of the exam, turn
in both the questions and your answers. Place the exam questions in one pile and the
blue books in another; do not place the exam inside the blue books.
(3) This is a 3 hour, 15 minutes test. It is completely closed book, except for
those of you who have received permission to use a foreign language dictionary.
(4) Please write legibly. I cannot give credit for something I cannot read.
(5) Please write only on one side of the page. If you use more than one blue
book, please number them consecutively (g, "1 of 3," "2 of 3"). For typed
exams, please double space.
(6) The exam has four different sections with different weights. Although not
everyone will spend the same amount of time on each section, you may wish to use the
following as a guide:
Essay Question 1 (22%): 40 minutes
Essay Question 1 (33%): 60 minutes
Essay Question m (33%): 60 minutes
Multiple Choice Section (12%): 20 minutes
The additional 15 minutes are intended to provide you with some added flexibility with
your time and to give you an opportunity to review what you have written.
(7) Multiple choice questions: Put your answers in the blue book. not on the test

sheet.
(8) Good luck and thanks for a great semester.

UMKC LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 65:4

ESSAY QUESTION 1 (22%)
(Suggested time: 40 minutes)
Len Lewis owns a building with two commercial spaces. In one of the commercial
spaces Lewis operates a clothing store. On January 1, 1992, Lewis leased the other
space to Tina Taft for five years at $ 1,000 a month. The lease agreement states that
the "lessee shall not assign or sublet or otherwise transfer her interests without the prior
consent of lessor." Taft, who opened a toy store in the premises, began, in the second
week of January, 1992, to complain to Lewis about what she referred to as "inadequate
heat." Lewis has an old furnace in the basement of the building. During the winter
months, the furnace keeps the temperature inside the building at no higher than 64
degrees Fahrenheit. During the coldest winter days, the temperature inside the building
rises to no higher than 60 degrees Fahrenheit. After Taft complained to Lewis about
the heat, he explained to her that he simply could not afford to buy a new furnace.
On December 15,1994, Taft informed Lewis that she would be leaving the premises
on January 1, 1995, because of the "continued problems with the heat." Taft further
informed Lewis that "I have found a new tenant for you who is willing to sublet the
premises for the remaining two years of the lease at $ 1,000 a month. Her name is
Betty Bell and she will be opening a fruit and vegetable store in the premises." Lewis,
barely able to contain his anger, responded as follows: "That is unacceptable to me.
I can get more than $ 1,000 a month from a new tenant, and in any event, a fruit and
vegetable store will bring to my building cockroaches and assorted vermin. I do not
consent to this sublease. I will hold you liable for all future rents until the expiration
of your lease on January 1, 1997." Taft vacated on January 1, 1995, and the space has
remained empty ever since.
In March 1995, Lewis comes to your office seeking legal advice. After he tells you
the above, he also mentions that in October, 1994, he was working in his clothing store
when a customer by the name of Fred Foyer came up to him and showed him a gold tieclip with three large diamonds. Foyer told Lewis that he had found the tie-clip in the
store's bathroom on the floor near the sink. Lewis had never before seen the tie-clip.
Lewis told Foyer the following: "Why don't you leave it with me in case the owner
comes back to claim it?" Foyer did as Lewis suggested. No one has claimed ownership
of the tie-clip. Foyer recently asked Lewis to return the tie-clip and Lewis refused to
do so.
Lewis has asked you to write him a memorandum concerning his rights and liabilities
arising from the above facts. Do not assume facts not provided. If crucial facts are
missing, you can explain in your memorandum how these facts may affect the rights
and liabilities of the parties.
** END OF QUESTION **
ESSAY QUESTION 11 (33%)
(Suggested time: 60 minutes)
Doug Dell has been in the business ofbreeding, raising, and selling St. Bernard
dogs for twenty five years. Dell conducts his business in his home on Maple Street in
Kent City. For the last twenty five years, Dell has been making sufficient money from
the selling of the dogs to pay all of his business costs and still make between $25,000
to $30,000 in profits a year.
Five years after Dell started his business, Kent City enacted a zoning ordinance
restricting property use on Maple Street to "single family dwellings" and explicitly
prohibiting "any and all commercial activity." Shortly after the new zoning ordinance
went into effect, several individuals, including Mr. Peters, Ms. Petro, and Ms. Perry,
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purchased plots of land on Maple Street and proceeded to build themselves single
family dwellings. Twenty years later, Peters, Petro, and Perry brought an action against
Dell seeking an injunction arguing that his business constituted a nuisance because the
St. Bernards barked loudly at all hours of the day and night. Dell in response
contended that his dogs did not create a nuisance, but that even if they did, the nuisance
was legalized by prescription.
The trial court, after conducting a trial without a jury, concluded that Dell's
business did constitute a nuisance because of the constant noise made by the dogs. The
trial court also concluded as a matter of law that a nuisance cannot be legalized by
prescription. The trial court issued an injunction ordering Dell to abate the nuisance
within 90 days. Dell appeals to the State Supreme Court arguing that a private
nuisance can be legalized by prescription. He also argues that the trial court erred in
issuing an injunction and should have instead awarded damages to the plaintiffs.
Please answer the following two questions:
(1) Do you think the State Supreme Court should hold that a private nuisance
can be legalized by prescription? (In answering the question you should discuss the
policy rationales behind (i) adverse possession/prescriptive rights and (ii) the law of
nuisance).
(2) If the State Supreme Court were to hold that a nuisance cannot be legalized by
prescription, should it affirm the trial court's issuance of the injunction?
** END OF QUESTION **
ESSAY QUESTION 111 (33%)
(Suggested time: 60 minutes)
The Devlin International Corporation has two subsidiaries engaged in
commercial activities in the state of Kent. One subsidiary, the Devlin Real Estate
Company (DREC), is in the land development business. The other subsidiary, the
Devlin Satellite Company (DSC), manufactures and sells TV satellite dishes. The
satellite dishes manufactured by DSC are 18 inches wide, considerably smaller than the
dishes manufactured by any of DSC's competitor's.
In 1984, DREC purchased Greenacre, a large tract of undeveloped land in Kent City
located between North Street and South Street. DREC divided Greenacre into twelve
plots as shown below:
In 1985, DREC sold all twelve lots in consecutive numerical order to twelve separate
individuals. Lots 1 - 5 were sold with the following two covenants:
Covenant A: "No building shall be erected upon the property unless it is a residential
dwelling."
Covenant B: "No satellite dish may be attached to any erected structure unless the
said satellite dish is an 18 inch satellite manufactured by the Devlin Satellite Co. This
covenant shall run with the land and shall be binding on the purchaser, his successors
in interest and assigns."
DREC sold Lots 6 -12 with covenant "B" but not with covenant "A."
Alan Adams in 1985 purchased Lot 1 from DREC; as mentioned above, the
deed contained covenants "A" and "B." Also in 1985, DREC sold Lot 6 to Bob Baker,
Lot 7 to Carl Cash, and Lot 8 to David Davis; as mentioned above, all three deeds
contained covenant "B" but none contained covenant "A."
In 1990, Ellen Ellis purchased Lot 7 from Carl Cash; the deed included
covenant "B." Also in 1990, Ellis negotiated an easement with David Davis, the owner
of Lot 8, for access to South Street. The easement allows for the "use of a private
roadway across Lot 8 for ingress and egress from Lot 7." After the roadway easement
was recorded, Ellis built herself a home on Lot 7 and purchased a satellite dish
manufactured by the ACME Corporation. While the satellite dish built by ACME is
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several times larger than the one made by DSC, it is considerably cheaper. Ellis had
the satellite dish installed on top of her new house on Lot 7.
In January, 1995, Ellis purchased Lot 6 from Bob Baker. The deed from Baker
to Ellis did not contain any covenants restricting use. After purchasing Lot 6, Ellis
hired workers who began to build a large shed on her new lot. Ellis plans to use the
shed to make beer; once the beer is made, she intends to sell it to a wholesaler for
profit. In building the shed, Ellis's hired workers have used the roadway easement over
Lot 8 to get access to Lot 6 (through Lot 7) from South Street.
In February 1995, with one third of the shed completed, Adams (the owner of
Lot 1) brought an action against Ellis seeking an injunction prohibiting her from
building the shed on Lot 6 and ordering her to remove the large ACME satellite dish
from the top of her house on Lot 7. At the same time, Davis (the owner of Lot 8)
brought an action against Ellis contending misuse of the roadway easement.
Discuss the rights and liabilities of Adams, Davis, and Ellis. Do not assume
facts not provided. If crucial facts are missing, you can explain how these facts may
affect the rights and liabilities of the parties.
** END OF QUESTION **
Cornell Law School
Professor Shiffrin
Constitutional Law
December 14, 1995
INSTRUCTIONS
This is a three hour open book examination, but you will not be permitted to start
writing your answers during the first hour. During the first hour, you should think
about the questions and about how you plan to organize your responses. During the
first hour, you may outline your planned answers on separate scratch paper or on the
examination itself.
Please place your answers to the separate questions in separate bluebooks. Write on
only one side of a page and skip every other line.
There are two questions. You may assume that the questions will be read together.
You should assume that Question I is worth 60% and Question H is worth 40%
(although I reserve the right to weight them differently). For each question, you should
assume you are clerking for a Supreme Court Justice who especially wants to know the
arguments that can be advanced on all sides with respect to the issues implicated by the
questions. The Justice wants to know the state of existing law on the questions
involved, but the Justice also wants to know how the cases should be decided in your
judgment and why they should be decided that way. The Justice is a maverick who is
willing to dispense with precedent when it seems reasonable to do so. You should not
discuss first amendment issues. If you think that further facts are needed to resolve any
issues, you should explain what they are. Do not assume issues away, however.
In each of the fact situations below, the lower courts have upheld the challenged
statutes or ordinances.
I.
The Municipal School District in State Z has adopted a number of policies raising
constitutional issues.
(a). The district prohibits married couples from working in the same building. Oscar
applies to work as a teacher in the high school. His application is denied because his
wife teaches in the school. Oscar maintains that the denial of his application violates
his constitutional rights.
(b). The district prohibits sexual relations between employees working in the same
building in the school district. Bill and Harriet both teach in the district's high school,
and both admit that they are sexually active with each other. Bill was married at the
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time he and Harriet commenced relations. He has since moved out and is living with
Harriet. Bill and Harriet have been fired; they maintain their constitutional rights have
been violated.
(c). The district maintains vending machines containing condoms in the junior high
schools and the high school. The parents of a fourteen year old girl maintain that
making condoms available for the child violates their constitutional rights to raise the
child as they see fit.
II.
In an effort to limit the spread of graffiti, city X in State Z has outlawed the sale of
paint spray cans. The producers of paint spray cans are predominantly located out of
state. In an effort to combat a paint shortage some years ago and to minimize city
unemployment, City X operates a paint factory (that does not produce spray cans).
Economists suggest that the ordinance will have a slight impact increasing sales of the
factory (although sales will also increase for out of state factories as well). Moreover,
it is believed that graffiti will be reduced to some extent. City X will only hire residents
of the city in its factory.
(a). John Smith is the owner of a spray paint factory in state A. SP corporation owns
a spray paint factory in state A. They both assert that City X's ordinance violates the
Constitution.
(b). Mary Jones is a resident of State A. She has applied to work in City X's paint
factory and her application has been rejected because she is not a resident of City X.
She maintains that the denial of her application violates the Constitution.
END
STANFORD UNIVERSITY
School of Law
Final Examination in Constitutional Law H
Fall 1995
Professor Kathleen M. Sullivan
December 15, 1995
8:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m.

Time: 7 2hours
Four Questions (choose any Three)
INSTRUCTIONS

1. This is a one-day take-home exam. It is open-book. In answering the questions,
you may consult any materials you wish, but you may not consult any person.
2.
There are FOUR questions offered, but you should CHOOSE ONLY THREE
questions to answer - any three you like. Each question you choose to answer will
count equally for one-third of the grade.
3.
There is a word limit for each question. Your answer to EACH of the three
questions you choose to answer should not exceed 750 words. Do not write more than
750 words on any one question even if you write less than 750 words on any other.
Serious over length will be penalized in grading.
4. If there is any material fact that you think ambiguous or missing, please state what
it is and why it matters.
5. If you type or word-process your exam answers, please double-space. Ifyou write,
please use dark ink, use only the front side of each blue-book page, and double-space.
6.
Please limit your answers to issues arising under the speech, press and religion
clauses of the First Amendment. Ignore any other constitutional or other issue that
might seem present.
7.
Please note the honor code acknowledgment on the last page of the exam.
GOOD LUCK!
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QUESTION I
At long last the Telecommunications Deregulation Act of 1999 ("TDA") is
enacted by Congress and signed into law by the President. The seven regional
telephone companies have long had the technological capacity to transmit video as well
as voice signals over the lines they own and operate, but prior telecommunications acts
had barred them from providing video programming to subscribers in their respective
telephone service areas, on the ground that permitting them to do so would enable them
to monopolize video programming. The TDA for the first time lifts this ban on video
programming by the telephone companies, citing "the increased competitiveness of the
video programming market." But this deregulation comes at a price. Deploring the rise
of "indecent" video programming in various media in recent years, and blaming it for
"widespread moral and social disintegration," the TDA requires any telephone
company that chooses to offer video programming to scramble the signals of any
program that it judges to depict "sexual or excretory functions in a patently offensive
manner," unscrambling such signals only upon affirmative subscriber request. The
nation's numerous cable operators and Internet service providers ("ISPs," which
transmit information and images over a worldwide network of linked computers) are
covered by other provisions of the TDA but are explicitly exempted from the indecency
provision. Findings accompanying the Act note that cable operators have already
provided various parental control options as part of their subscriber packages, while
ISPs exercise "virtually no editorial discretion" over subscribers' transmission of
images over their systems.
You are a special assistant to the Attorney General of the United States. She
has asked you to prepare a concise memo outlining the First Amendment challenges
that the government should expect to be raised against this "indecency" provision of
the TDA, and the government's best defenses.
QUESTION II
Congress enacts and the President signs the Congressional Campaign Reform
Act of 1998 ("CCRA"). The Act is supported by extensive findings suggesting that
political advertising is devoted more to personal attacks and brief "spot ads" than to
articulate debate of the issues, and that the dominance of out-of-state funding of
congressional candidacies over local funding sources has weakened representatives'
responsiveness to their own home constituencies. The Act provides as follows:
In order to combat the negative effects of current campaign finance and spending
practices on the quality of political debate and democratic representation, the
following restrictions shall govern all elections for United States Representatives and
Senators, subject to criminal penalty:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

YALE LAW SCHOOL

Professor Kate Stith
Fall 1995

FINAL EXAMINATION
You have four hours in which to complete this examination. This is an open-book
examination. You may write, type, or use a computer.
You are urged to be concise in your answers and to avoid unnecessary repetition. The
approximate weight for grading purposes is noted for each of the three questions.
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QUESTION ONE (40%)

Consider the following hypothetical, 1998 news report:
Washington, D.C. September 23, 1998:
Seeking to reduce the costs of basic welfare aid and medical care for the indigent the
U.S. Senate today narrowly passed an amendment to the federal Medicaid law which
prohibits payment for childbirth services to any woman presently receiving Medicaid
benefits who has already borne three children. The measure prohibits use of state
funds as well as federal funds. Sponsors expect the funding ban to reduce the number
of children born to indigent families.
This is the second piece of legislation in three years aimed at reducing births
among welfare recipients. In 1996, following the lead of several states Congress
enacted legislation that denies an increase in welfare payments (from federal or state
sources) when a woman presently receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) has another child.
Among the strongest opponents of the Senate bill were anti-abortion Senators, who
complained that the prohibition on public funding of births would lead to an increase
in the incidence of abortion. Current Medicaid law permits states to pay for abortions
for poor women.
Is the bill passed by the Senate unconstitutional? Explain. Be sure to address the
strongest legal arguments aganst your position, as well as the arguments supporting
your position.
QUESTION TWO (25%)
Consider the following hypothetical, which is, of course, based on recent events:
In connection with its investigation of Whitewater and related events, the U.S.
Senate votes to subpoena certain documentary notes from the White House. The White
House, which has already provided voluminous documents, announces that it will not
comply with this particular subpoena. The Senate moves in federal district court in
Washington to enforce its subpoena. The district court denies the motion, holding that
the documents are protected by "executive privilege." The matter is now on appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
It is stipulated that the notes at issue (a) were taken by a long-time political
adviser of the President who is employed as an associate in the Office of White House
Counsel, and (b) reflect political and legal analysis by both the adviser and the
President concerning Whitewater and the investigations thereof. It is further stipulated
that (c) the President's participation in the Whitewater investment itself was entirely
terminated prior to his assumption of the Office of President.
You are a law clerk to a judge on the D.C. Circuit who is assigned to the panel
hearing the appeal. Your judge asks you to write a brief memorandum laying out the
salient constitutional issues in the case. Pleasewrite the memorandum. Note: you are
not expected to address any issue of attorney-client privilege.
QUESTION THREE (35%)
Answer either A or B in full. In addition, you may (for "extra credit" and if you
have time) give a brief answer to the other question:
A. Alexander Nardone, a resident of Minnesota, has been indicted in federal
district court in Minnesota for violating a federal law enacted in 1992 that makes it a
crime to "wilfully fail to pay a child support obligation with respect to a child who
resides in another state." The statute applies only when an obligation of at least $5000
has been past due for more than one year.
The indictment ofNardone alleges that he and Nancy Peck were divorced in the
State of Illinois in 1990, that the divorce decree requires that he pay $8000 per year to
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Peck in support of their minor child, that following the divorce he moved to Minnesota
and she moved to Connecticut, and that in each of the years 1993 and 1994 he paid less
than $2000 in child support. Nardone contests certain key factual allegations in the
indictment; in addition, he asserts that the statute itself is unconstitutional under I&pp
v. United States.
You are a law clerk for the District Judge assigned to the Nardone case. She
asked you to examine the history of the 1992 federal law. In your research thus far, you
have discovered that (a) for many years, there have been inter-state compacts regarding
enforcement of child support obligations, as well as other interstate financial
obligations established by court order; (b) the child-support compact has been partially
successful (for instance, the amount of money collected pursuant to the inter-state
compact grew from one billion dollars in 1976 to five billion dollars in 1990); (c) in
addition to the criminal prohibition, the 1992 federal law established a commission to
study ways to improve interstate collection of child support obligations; (d) in a 1990
survey, nearly 60 percent of custodial parents in interstate cases reported receiving
payments occasionally, seldom or never, and (e) since 1989, the annual deficit, in
uncollected child support is about $5.1 billion (including intrastate failure to pay).
All of the foregoing facts were discussed in the legislative history of the 1992
federal law. You also discovered numerous statements in the legislative history of the
federal law indicating that at least some of the lawmakers who voted for it did not
understand the broad scope of the new prohibition. For instance, several sponsors of
the bill stated that the law would make it a crime "to cross state boundaries in order to
avoid child support obligations," when by its terms the law criminalizes the existence
of child support debt whenever the child lives in a different state. There is no allegation
in the Nardone indictment that the defendant moved to Minnesota for the purpose of
avoiding child support obligations.
You have told your judge about your findings, and she responded that it was not clear
to her which of these facts was relevant to the constitutional issue. She asks you to
draft a quick memorandum to her explaining your initial thinking on the
constitutionality of the law, and noting any further factual matters that need to be
researched. Pleasewrite the memorandum.
B. In the past decade, the amount of garbage produced by the residents of
Jefferson Township has increased greatly, while federal and state regulation of garbage
disposal has also increased. Responding to these environmental and regulatory
demands, Jefferson Township arranged for the construction of a garbage incinerator to
replace the bursting, unsanitary landfill owned by the Township. Although the new
incinerator is owned and operated by a private company (Incin Co.), the Town
effectively finances the incinerator out of tax revenues. Specifically, the Township has
enacted a "flow control" ordinance, which requires that all garbage generated in the
Township be disposed of in the Incin Co. incinerator. In turn, by contract with the
Township, Incin Co. charges a weekly fee to the Township, based on the amount of
garbage dumped. Additionally, the Township has entered into a contact with private
garbage haulers to pick up all residential garbage within the District and to deliver the
garbage to the Incin Co. incinerator.
There is another privately owned incinerator company near to Jefferson Township.
That company (Muck Brothers, Inc.) is seeking to expand its business and was an
unsuccessful bidder for the Jefferson Township garbage contract. Muck Brothers has
now threatened to bring suit alleging that Jefferson Township's "flow control"
ordinance, its contract with Incin Co., and its contracts with the private garbage haulers
all violate the Constitution.
Jefferson Township's top legal officer has hired you to write an opinion
memorandum concerning the constitutionality of the Township's actions.
Please write the memorandum.
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Property (Kauper)
Monday, May 8, 1995
Michigan
8:30-11:30 a.m.
You will be given three (3) hours for this examination. The examination is open
book. You may use the course casebook, your class notes and other materials you have
prepared or annotated. The examination consists of three (3) questions, with ten (10)
numbered pages (including this page). Except as specified below, you should answer
all questions in terms of general common law principles.
In answering each question, assume that the state has a Married Women's Property
Act. It also has a statute providing that no joint tenancy shall be created unless the
grant expressly provides that the interests created shall be a joint tenancy; in the
absence of such expressed intention, the grant shall be construed to create a tenancy in
common. The state also has a statute providing:
"A landlord may not bring or threaten to bring an action for possession in
retaliation against a tenant for making a bona fide complaint about building
conditions to a governmental agency charged with housing code enforcement;
provided, however, that this provision shall not apply if tenant is in default in
rent."
Housing codes are in effect. The state has summary eviction and forcible entry and
detainer statutes. You should assume that unless a question specifically indicates
otherwise it has no other landlord-tenant legislation.
I
(60 minutes)
In 1988 Phillip Pane was the owner in fee simple absolute of Blackacre, a two acre
tract on which was located his home, a substantial garage, and a small storage building.
He had owned Blackacre for five years. Blackacre did not front on a public roadway.
Another tract, Greenacre, which lies directly to the south of Blackacre, fronts on its
south side on Allen Road, which runs east and west. In 1984 Greenacre was owned by
Roberta Rowe, who still owns it. In 1984, Rowe, by a properly executed and recorded
deed, granted Pane the right to use an existing driveway which ran from Allen Road to
the northern edge of Greenacre, thus giving Pane access to Allen Road from Blackacre.
Rowe also used, and continues to use, the same driveway to reach her own garage
which is located on the northern edge of Greenacre.
In 1988, Pane conveyed Blackacre by a properly executed and recorded deed to
"Thomas Todd and Valerie Vance, husband and wife, with right of survivorship." The
deed does not mention the driveway across Greenacre. Todd and Vance were legally
married. Both were employed at the time they purchased Blackacre. The purchase
price for Blackacre was $100,000. Todd and Vance paid $20,000 in cash, with the
$80,000 balance coming from a loan secured by a mortgage from a local bank. Shortly
before the purchase of Blackacre, but after her marriage to Todd, Vance had received
a substantial inheritance from her father. While Todd and Vance had previously
handled their financial affairs through a single joint bank account to which both
contributed their earnings, Vance put the inheritance from her father into a separate
account in her own name. Of the $20,000 cash payment made on Blackacre, $15,000
came from Vance's separate account. The remaining $5,000 came from their joint
account. Until they separated, the couple made all mortgage and tax payments from
their joint account. The same was true for improvements and repairs, except that a
small addition to the house costing $20,000 was paid for from Vance's account.
In 1991, Vance and Todd separated, although they remained legally married until the
time of Vance's death in 1994. At the time of their separation, Todd moved out of
Blackacre. He lost his job and was desperate for cash. In January, 1992, Todd
conveyed by a properly executed and recorded deed "all my right, title and interest in
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Blackacre to Wilbur Warren and his heirs." Warren paid Todd $3,000 for this interest.
From the time he moved out until his conveyance to Warren, Todd made no further
contributions to the mortgage, taxes or upkeep on Blackacre. He has made no such
contributions since. The joint bank account was closed at the parties' separation.
During this period Vance paid $1,000 in mortgage payments, and $500 in tax
payments. There were no major repairs or improvements during this period.
Vance continued in possession and continued to make all the mortgage and tax
payments which, starting with the conveyance to Warren and ending with her death
amounted to another $4,000 in mortgage payments and $3,000 in taxes. She also paid
$12,000 to construct an addition to the garage in order to house two antique
automobiles she had purchased. Until the time of her death in 1994, she was unaware
of the deed from Todd to Warren. She paid nothing to Warren, and he paid nothing
with respect to Blackacre. Warran made no effort to advise her of his interest.
In August, 1992, Vance purchased the fee interest in Whiteacre, a one acre tract which
abutted Blackacre to the north. The northern edge of Whiteacre ran along Bates Road,
which ran east and west. With her purchase of Whiteacre Vance had access for
Blackacre to a public road by crossing Whiteacre. She put in a driveway across
Whiteacre to Bates Road for this purpose. She was therefore willing, when approached
by Rowe, to close the driveway across Greenacre which she had used until then. Rowe
wished to build an addition to her house across the existing driveway. She agreed to
pay Vance $3,000 in order to close the driveway. In 1993, upon receipt of this
payment, Vance by a properly executed and recorded deed "released, surrendered and
conveyed" to Rowe all of her interest in the driveway. Rowe then built her home
addition across the driveway.
In March, 1994, Vance died. Under the terms of her validly executed will, Blackacre
was left to Yolanda Young in fee, and Whiteacre was left in fee to Amos Arbor. The
mortgage on Blackacre was paid off by Vance's executor. Young promptly moved
onto Blackacre. Shortly thereafter Arbor barricaded the driveway across Whiteacre,
and has refused to permit Young to reach Bates Road across his property. While Rowe
is willing to grant Young a new right of way from Blackacre across Greenacre to Allen
Road, he will do so only upon receipt of $5,000, which Young does not want to pay.
At the moment, Young has negotiated with another neighbor who is permitting her to
cross his land to get to Bates Road, but this neighbor has made clear that his
permission, which was given orally, is temporary. In the time she has been in
possession Young has made no mortgage or tax payments.
The following actions have now resulted.
1. Warren has now appeared on the scene. He has filed an action against Young to
recover possession of Blackacre. Young, in turn, insists that she, and not Warren, is
the owner of Blackacre. She also claims that even if Warren has some interest in
Blackacre, which she denies, it is no more than a one-half interest, and is in fact less
because Vance made disproportionate contributions to the purchase price ofBlackacre,
as well as for taxes, improvements and mortgage payments while she and Todd
occupied Blackacre as well as after their separation. Warren, in turn claims that he
owns only one-half or some lesser fractional share of Blackacre Young owes him rent
for the period she has been occupying Blackacre. Discuss all issues these actions
present.
2. Warren has filed an action against Rowe asking for an injunction to reopen the
driveway under the right granted by Rowe to Pane, and requiring that Rowe remove any
encroachments over the right of way as originally granted. How should this action be
decided, and why? Discuss.
3. Young has filed an action against Arbor seeking an injunction to prohibit Arbor
from denying Young access from Blackacre across Whiteacre to Bates Road along the
driveway built by Vance across Whiteacre. Warren has filed a similar action. Discuss
all issues these actions present.
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II
(90 minutes)
In 1988 Blackacre was an empty parcel of land owned in fee simple absolute by Betty
Beck. Blackacre abuts Ryan Road, which runs east and west Blackacre is immediately
to the north of Ryan Road. In that year Acme Development Co. Acquired Blackacre
from Beck, taking title in fee simple absolute from Beck in a properly executed and
recorded deed.
In 1985 Whiteacre, a vacant parcel of land abutting Blackacre on the north, was
owned in fee simple absolute by Cornelius Conn. Conn died in that year, leaving
Whiteacre by a properly executed will "to Debra Dale and her heirs, but if no child of
Debra Dale gives birth to a child within twenty-five years to my residual legatee." The
last clause of Conn's will provided that "all the rest, residue and remainder of my
property shall go to Ebenezer East." At the time Conn died, Dale had one child,
Elizabeth Ryan. Elizabeth was then childless, but had a son, Robert Ryan, in 1987.
In 1988 Dale conveyed Whiteacre to Acme in fee simple absolute with a properly
executed and recorded deed. Debra Dale died in 1991, leaving all her property by a
properly executed will to Elizabeth Ryan.
Acme constructed a large apartment building on Blackacre. The building contains
four retail stores fronting on Ryan Road on the first floor, and fifty apartment units on
the five floors above. The building, which Acme calls "heartland," is built entirely on
Blackacre. It fronts on Ryan Road, with the rear of the building sitting just one foot
short of the line dividing Whiteacre and Blackacre. Whiteacre contains a paved parking
lot for the use of the tenants in Heartland. As designed, the main entrance to Heartland
faces Ryan Road. A fire exit door also faces Ryan Road. Another entrance is at the
rear of the building and provides direct access to the parking lot on Whiteacre.
Acme uses a standard form lease for all of the apartments in Heartland. It has never
had trouble keeping Heartland full, and has refused to negotiate any changes in its form
lease. The apartments are either two or three bedrooms. Rents range from $500 to
$800 per month. All leases are for two years, commencing from the date on which the
tenant is entitled to take possession. All apartment leases contain, inter alia, the
following provisions: (1) Acme may terminate the lease if the tenant fails to pay rent
by the first of each month or for breach of any other covenant by the tenant; (2) if the
tenant abandons the premises, or is evicted for failure to perform, the tenant may be
held liable for any loss incurred by the balance of the lease, at the election of the
landlord; (3) landlord agrees to maintain the premises in compliance with the applicable
housing code; (4) tenant agrees (subject to the obligation of the landlord to maintain
the premises in compliance with the housing code set out in (3) above), to maintain the
apartment and surrender it upon termination of the lease in as good condition as when
leased; (5) tenant agrees not to assign or sublease without the landlord's consent; (6)
landlord agrees to supply heat, air conditioning, water sewage service, electricity and
elevator service; and (7) landlord agrees to maintain all common areas (which the lease
does not describe) in good condition.
Acme does not use this form lease for the retail units on the first floor. These leases
are all separately negotiated. Each of the leases runs for a term of five years,
commencing on the date at which the tenant is entitled to possession. Each of these
retailer leases contain the following common provisions: (1) Acme may terminate the
lease for failure to pay the monthly rent on time, or for the breach by the tenant of any
other lease covenant; (2) tenant agrees to use the leased premises only for the purposes
set forth in the lease; (3) tenant agrees to pay a monthly rental based on a set amount
plus a percentage of its monthly gross receipts; (4) landlord does not warrant the
fitness of the premises for any purposes; assign or sublet without Acme's consent; (7)
tenant agrees that heat, water and electricity shall be at its expense.
One of the retail shops was leased to Fred Farr on August 1, 1993. (None of the other
retail leases are involved in this question.) The lease to Farr provided that Farr may use
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the leased premises only for "the retail sale of books, magazines and newspapers," and
for no other purpose. The monthly rental was stated to be $1000 plus 2 percent of
Farr's gross receipts. Farr operated a bookstore in the leased premises until September,
1994 when he was taken quite ill. He then sought to turn in the business over to
someone else. In November, 1994, George Gage agreed to buy Farr's business, on the
condition that he get a lease of sufficient length of make up five years. On December
1, 1994, Farr granted Gage the balance of his existing lease (with Acme's consent),
reserving a right to terminate the arrangement if Gage defaulted "in any of the
obligations under the lease." On the same day Acme granted Gage a new lease to
commence on August 1, 1995, and end on November 30, 1999. This new lease is on
the same terms as Acme's lease to Farr except that it contains no use restriction.
The following additional events have now occurred. Helen Hall moved into
Apartment 47 under a lease which commenced on June 1, 1994 with a monthly rental
of $600. In August, 1994, she was assaulted in her apartment by an unknown assailant
who was seen entering the building through the rear door adjacent to the parking lot.
Hall suffered significant injuries, and decided to vacate her apartment. She moved out
in late September after an angry argument with the management of Acme, which
refused to terminate her lease or to pay her medical expenses. She is now living
elsewhere. As soon as her apartment was vacant, Acme showed it to a number of other
prospective tenants. Acme relet the apartment under a standard two year lease
commencing on February 1, 1995 to John James. James turned out to be a disaster.
James failed to pay rent to Acme on March 1. And on the evening of March 5, 1995,
James was drunk and took an axe to the kitchen cupboards, the walls and various other
fixtures in the apartment. Acme's building manager came to investigate, saw the
damage (which will cost some $4,000 to repair), and ordered James out of the
apartment. Two nights later James vacated the apartment. His whereabouts are
presently unknown. The apartment has not yet been repaired because Acme has
insisted that Hall pay for the repairs. She has refused. The management has made no
effort to relet the damaged apartment, which is currently vacant.
Following the assault on Helen Hall, and after further reports of unauthorized persons
entering the building through the rear entrance, in September, 1994 Acme placed a
twenty-four hour guard on the front entrance, and locked the rear entrance. As a result,
tenants can reach the parking lot only by going out the front entrance and walking
around the building to the parking lot at the rear. (There is no street parking permitted
on Ryan Road.) Most of the tenants have not raised objections, but two have insisted
that the rear door be reopened. Acme has refused. Jennifer Jones, whose lease on
Apartment 32 began on October 1, 1994, with a monthly rental of $700, protested that
Acme is required to provide access to the parking lot through the rear door, and that she
cannot be required to exit through the front and walk all the way around the building
in the rain and the snow to reach her car. Karl Kane, who leased Apartment 27 on July
1, 1994, has made even more strenuous objection. Kane, although able to drive his car,
is confined to a wheelchair. It is very difficult for him to use the front entrance. He
asked Acme either to reopen the rear door or provide him with a key so that he can use
the door himself. Acme, however, has been sufficiently concerned about the safety of
its other tenants and about potential liability if others are assaulted that it has refused
both requests. Finding this situation unacceptable, Kane moved out of his apartment
on February 1, 1995 and has refused to pay any further rent. The rent reserved in
Kane's lease was $800 per month.
There have been still further problems. In January, 1995, Acme leased Apartment 33
to Laurie Lyle, the lease to commence on March 1, 1995. The apartment was in need
of some renovation before Lyle moved in. Acme agreed to do the necessary work.
During mid-February, a fire broke out in Apartment 33 as a result of the negligence of
the contractor hired by Acme to do the renovation work. The damage was extensive,
and could not be repaired by March 1. Acme advised Lyle that it could not permit her
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to move in on March 1 because until the damage was repaired the unit was not in
compliance with the housing code. It offered to waive the rent until the apartment was
brought into compliance with the code and to pay her for temporary housing during the
period. Lyle refused to accept this offer, declared the lease terminated, and took
another apartment elsewhere.
Apartment 41 was leased to Myron Mott commencing on August 1, 1994. Apartment
41 is a particularly desirable apartment because of the view from its living room
window. At the time of leasing, Acme's manager explained to Mott that because of the
building's structure, the central air conditioning in Apartment 41 was inadequate, and
that it both could not and would not do anything to correct the situation. The normal
rental on the apartment was $600 per month but because of the air condition problem
Acme offered to reduce the rent to $500 per month. Mott, who wanted the view, agreed
to accept the apartment on these terms. She told Acme she could easily get by in hot
weather by opening the windows. In November, 1994, Mott's employer transferred her
to another city. With Acme's consent, Mott assigned the balance of her lease to Nathan
Norby. Neither Acme nor Mott advised Norby of the air conditioning problem. Norby
could see that the unit appeared to have air conditioning, and did not inquire further
about it. During a hot spell in February, 1995 it became apparent to Norby that the air
conditioning did not work and he demanded that it be repaired. Acme told him that it
could not be done, that Mott had so been advised and that the rent had been reduced as
a result. Norby suffers from severe allergies and needs to be in air-conditioned
facilities. Norby refused to pay any further rent, and is now three months in default.
Finally, we return to the bookstore. After Gage took over the bookstore he began to
sell hard core pornographic books & magazines in addition to the other books and
magazines he sold. Business began to pick up. He also allowed the use of his
bookstore in the evenings as the headquarters of the local Socialist Workers Party, of
which he is chairman. Other tenants of the building, along with persons who lived
elsewhere in the community, protested to both Gage and Acme about his sales of
pornography. The store was picketed regularly. As a result, Gage's sales declined
sharply. When Farr owned the store, the average monthly rental he paid Acme, which
he always paid in a timely fashion, was about $1600 (the base $1000 plus, on average,
$600 as 2% of his gross receipts). Gage continued to pay the rent monthly directly to
Acme, but by March 1995 sales were so bad that the monthly rental had fallen to
$1100. Acme demanded that Gage stop selling pornography, and that it cease allowing
use of the store by the Socialist Workers Party which has as one of its main goals the
passage of a local rent control ordinance). Gage refused both demands.
Out of these facts the following actions have resulted.
1. Ebenezer East has filed an action against Acme to recover possession of
Whiteacre. How should this action be decided, and why? Discuss.
2. Acme has filed an action against Hall to recover rent on Apartment 47 from March
1, 1995 through June 30, 1996, and damages in the amount necessary to cover the
repairs needed as a result of James' drunken binge. Hall has filed a counterclaim
against Acme seeking to recover her damages resulting from the injuries suffered when
she was assaulted. Discuss all issues these actions present.
3. Jennifer Jones has filed an action against Acme seeking an injunction ordering
Acme to reopen Heartland's rear door. Is she entitled to such an order? Discuss.
4. Acme has filed a summary eviction action against Kane, asserting that Kane has
failed to pay rent. How should this action be decided, and why? Discuss.
5. Acme has filed an action against Lyle seeking to recover all of the rent due on
Apartment 33 from March 1, 1995 until the end of February, 1997. Is Acme entitled
to all or any part of this rent? Discuss.
6. Acme has filed an action against both Mott and Norby to recover the rent due and
owing on Apartment 41. Do either, or both, owe such rent to Acme? Discuss.
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7. Acme has filed two actions with respect to the bookstore. First, it has filed a
summary eviction action against Gage, asserting that it has the right to do so because
of Gage's sale of pornographic material and the use of the premises by the Socialist
Workers Party. Second, it has filed an action against Farr to recover monthly rental
paid by Gage. In addition, Acme seeks to recover from Gage and/or Farr all rent for
the bookstore through July, 1995. How should these actions be decided, and why?
Discuss.
8. Finally, howeveryou have decided the issues posed in 1 above, assume that a court
has already concluded that East is entitled to possession of Whiteacre and that East has
closed the parking lot. A group ofHeartland tenants has now filed action against Acme
for damages based on the unavailability of parking. Two other tenants have been
withholding $200 per month from their rent for the same reason. Acme has moved to
evict the latter two tenants. How should these two actions be decided and why?
Discuss.
III
(30 minutes)
California and a number of other western states have community property law systems
which govern the marital property rights of married couples. Traditionally, community
property systems have been thought to stand in sharp contrast to those governing
marital property rights in other common law states. It has now been asserted that over
the past thirty years the law governing material property rights in non-community
property states is, as a practical matter, the same as, or at least moving close to, the law
applied in community property states. Do you agree? What developments support this
proposition? To what extent do significant differences remain? Discuss.
T.E. Kauper
Exam No.
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
Reading Time: 1 hour
Exam Time: 2 hours

Professor Blumstein
Fall Semester, 1994

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-I (AI)
PLEDGE
In signing your exam number on your examination and/or blue book you are attesting
that you have not given and will not give or receive any unauthorized aid on this
examination and that you have complied with the groundrules established concerning
the use of materials in the examination room.
You are permitted to have with you in the examination room your casebook,
supplement, any notes you have taken for the course, and outlines you have prepared
for the course yourself. Commercial outlines and outlines prepared by other students
are not permitted even if annotated by you. Copies of typed or computer-generated
outlines must be provided to Renee Hawkins or Judy Bennett if they are to be used in
the examination room.
There are four questions. The first question is allotted 40 minutes; the second question
is allotted 50 minutes; the third and fourth questions are allotted 15 minutes each. The
questions will be weighed according to the suggested time allocations indicated for each
question.
You are expected to turn your examination in on time. Late examinations are subject
to appropriate penalty through grade reduction.
Please be sure to organize your answers carefully and to read through the problems
closely. Write on evry other line; use only one side of each page: start each new
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question in a separate blue book. Write neatly in ink or use a typewriter. These are
simple rules I expect you to observe scrupulously. I will not read examinations that do
not substantially comply with these groundrules or that are illegible.
For your information, I often read examinations question-by-question rather than
reading through an entire exam of a single student. Thus, be sure to treat each question
as an autonomous unit.
*Students will be permitted a one-hour reading period in advance of commencing the
examination. During that time, they can read through the examination, organize and
outline their answers. But they may not actually begin writing the examination until
that one-hour period has elapsed. These examinations, therefore, will be picked up 3
hours after they are distributed.
I.
(40 Minutes)
Assume that the Congress enacts the following legislation:
(1) Any citizen who alleges that he or she is the victim of knowing and intentional
sexual harassment perpetrated by the President of the United States may bring an
action for damages and/or for injunctive relief in a federal court of competent
jurisdiction. This provision shall apply to conduct of the President that occurs while
the President is in office or to conduct that occurred before the President took office.
(2) To avoid frivolous litigation, a party bringing such a claim against the President
must establish in the Complaint or in pre-trial proceedings, to the satisfaction of the
judge, that he or she has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits in order to
proceed. In the absence of such a showing, the judge shall dismiss the suit against the
President.
(3) Any trial on the merits in such an action will take place after the President leaves
office, and no such claim shall serve as the basis for an impeachment inquiry while the
President is in office.
Identify, analyze, and discuss the constitutional issues raised by the foregoing
legislation.
II.
(50 Minutes)
The State of Harmony owns and operates a dumpsite for hazardous wastes.
That dumpsite is also certified to receive low-level nuclear waste, which, by stipulation,
is primarily generated by medical schools in their teaching and research activities.
Although no law or regulation of iarmony has barred the operation of other dumpsites
for hazardous or low-level nuclear wastes, no other such dumpsites exist in Harmony.
Indeed, assume there are very few of these dumpsites, particularly for low-level nuclear
wastes, in the nation.
Recently enacted legislation in Harmony prohibits any dumpsite in Harmony,
existing or future, from receiving low-level nuclear waste. The asserted rationales are
public safety (the danger of transporting nuclear waste to the dumpsite and the risk of
accident or terrorism at the site) and environmental protection (concern about the
poisoning of the ground and the seepage into the ecosystem and the water supply).
Because of its anti-vivisection laws (which bar experimentation on animals),
Harmony has no medical school. Therefore, it produces relatively little low-level
nuclear waste as compared to states that have medical schools. As a result of the
Harmony ban on the receipt of low-level nuclear waste, medical schools in other states
must ship their low-level nuclear waste much further distances to far-away dumpsites.
This necessitates long trips through other states, often through densely populated areas.
It is stipulated that, in the absence of the ban, Harmony would be the desired dumpsite
for substantial quantities of low- level nuclear waste from out-of-state. It is even
possible, although the evidence on this point is inconclusive, that privately operated
dumpsites for low-level nuclear waste could be developed in Harmony because of
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suitable soil conditions. Whether such private dumpsites could obtain local land-use
permits is unclear, however.
Laboratory Resources International (LRI) is an international conglomerate
headquartered in the State ofNature that operates a laboratory in the State of Harmony
and another laboratory in the State of Nature. Those laboratories produce a small
amount of low-level nuclear waste that must be shipped to dumpsites out of Harmony
for dumping, even though the dumpsite in Harmony would be the most economically
efficient site for LRI to use.
LRI consults your law firm about its prospects of bringing a constitutional challenge
under the Commerce Clause to Harmony's ban on the receipt of low-level nuclear waste
at the dumpsite owned and operated by the State of Harmony. Identify, analyze, and
discuss the issues that would be presented by such a challenge by LRI.
III
(15 Minutes)
Assume that Congress enacts legislation to confer on the President greater
flexibility in carrying out his responsibilities. Under this legislation, the President may
reject an identified portion of a bill by not having to implement it. Congress could
block that decision of the President by a majority vote of both the House and the
Senate. What constitutional problems might be posed by such legislation?
IV
(15 Minutes)
Make the argument (and provide a brief critique of the argument) that the
President should have authority to fire, at his discretion, all policymaking officials of
the executive branch (including members of the independent regulatory agencies such
as the Federal Trade Commission).
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
Professor Brown
Fall 1994
Section A-3
2 hours
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Instructions:
1. This examination consists of 3 pages, including this cover page. Please check to be
sure you have all of the pages.
2.This is an OPEN BOOK examination: you may refer to any materials that you wish.
3. The suggested time allocations for each question take into account time needed to
prepare a well-organized, well-reasoned answer. It is a good idea to sketch out a rough
outline of your answer on scratch paper before writing in the bluebook. You should
spend a good deal of your time thinking through your answers in advance.
4. Please write on one side of the bluebook page and skip lines.
5. GOOD LUCK and Happy Holidays.
QUESTION I
(1 HOUR and 15 MINUTES)
Over the last few years, several states (not including Tennessee) have adopted
what has come to be known as a" drop-out driver law". Under these laws, persons
under the age of 18 are denied a driver's license if they have left school before
completing high school. If a person under the age of 18 already has a driver's license
and drops out before completing school, the license is suspended until the person
reaches age 18.
In each of the roughly 16 states that have adopted such a law, the statutory
preamble recites extensive legislative findings that failure to complete high school
substantially limits a person's economic and personal prospects in life, that such
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persons often end up imposing costs on society in excess of their ability to contribute
to society, and that the threat of loss of a driver's license is the most effective device
available for motivating teenagers to complete their secondary education. Experience
in states that have these drop-out driver laws confirms the effectiveness of the measure
in reducing the drop-out rate. For example, Kentucky's prior drop-out average of
5,000 per year fell to approximately 2,400 after implementing the drop-out driver law.
Moreover, 450 Kentucky teenagers who had dropped out prior to passage of the law
returned to school in order to reinstate their suspended licenses. Studies across the
country show that Kentucky's experience is typical.
Congress has decided that the empirical evidence is compelling enough to make
this effort a national priority. As a result, it passed, and the President signed into law,
an amendment to the Federal Highway Appropriations Act (FHAA) that directs the
Secretary of Transportation to withhold 10% of the federal highway funds allotted to
any state that fails to adopt a drop-out driver law within one year after the date of the
amendment. The amendment contains a preamble that essentially duplicates the
language and legislative findings in the preambles of the existing state drop-out driver
statutes.
Paul Rhodes is a licensed Tennessee driver, aged 16 and a half years. He dropped out
ofhigh school when he turned 16, in order to support his wife, child, and invalid mother
by driving a delivery truck. He now quite reasonably fears that the Tennessee state
legislature will comply with the FHAA by enacting a drop-out driver law that will result
in suspension of his driver's license and loss of his livelihood. Paul has filed suit in
federal court seeking an injunction prohibiting the Secretary of Transportation from
enforcing the FHAA amendments against Tennessee, on the ground that the statute
violates the U.S. Constitution.
Discuss the issues presented by Paul's suit, including arguments on both sides.
QUESTION I1

(45 MINUTES)
Article I section 7, of the Constitution, reads, in part:
"Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the
United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his
Objections to that House in which it shall have o who shall enter the Objections
at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such
Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be
sent,together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise
be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become
a Law."
Section 5 provides:
"Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members
for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a
Member."
The new, feisty, Republican Congress implements two measures to help reduce
waste and spending in Congress:
1. It passes a statute, signed by the President, which permits the President to single
out specific portions or lines that he finds objectionable in a bill, sign the rest of the
legislation, and excise the objectionable portions. Congress can then enact those
excised portions into law, if it chooses to do so, with a majority vote of both Houses.
The measure is seen as a boon to the efforts to curb wasteful spending by exposing
specific measures to the light of a full vote.
2. The House of Representatives, where tax bills are constitutionally required to
originate (Art. I, sec. 7, cl. 1), has long had an internal rule providing that all bills to
be voted on by the House must first be approved for debate by the House Rules
Committee. The House passes a new additional procedural rule providing that no bill
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containing a tax may be considered by the Rules Committee for such approval unless
it has garnered 60% in a preliminary vote of the entire membership of the House.
With regard to each of these two new measures, please discuss whether the
Supreme Court, if presented with the question, would uphold the constitutionality of
the measure, and the reasons underlying its analysis.
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use. The charter makes no provision for compensation, but the city government assents
to the charter. Is it constitutional? Why?
7. "A uniform tax imposed by a State on all sales made in it, whether the goods sold
are the produce of that State enacting the law or of some other State, is valid." Is that
a sound proposition? Why?
8. Can the New York legislature repeal the law for executing Kemmler by electricity
and substitute a law under which he may be hanged, or imprisoned for life? Assume
that ex post facto laws are constitutional there. Give your reasons.
9. A State enacted that all lawyers and physicians shall take out and pay for a license,
and in default thereof shall not be permitted to practise or to continue practising their
professions. Assuming the ordinary provisions to be in the constitution, is this valid?
Why?
10. A statute enacts that the judges of the Supreme Court shall prepare the headnotes
for the official reports of their decisions. Making the same assumption as in the last
question, is this valid ? Why?
1883.
1895 Contracts [Williston, or Langdell, or Ames]
1. A wrote B a proposal for a contract of partnership, setting forth terms and
conditions. B replied promptly: "Iam preparing to make the arrangements with you on
the terms you name." A received the letter. Is there a contract between the parties?
2. A, by letter, offered to sell B a piece of land, stating the offer would remain open a
week. The next day A wished to revoke the offer, and on that day and the following
days made all possible endeavor to find B or to communicate with him, and sent a letter
of revocation to B's house. B, however, had closed his house and left without leaving
his address. Within a week B telegraphed his acceptance of the offer, being at the time
in ignorance of A's wish to revoke it. The telegram was duly received. Is there a
contract?
3. A offered to sell B a horse, the offer to remain open till June 20. On June 21 B
accepted the offer by letter. On June 23 a servant of A led into B's yard the horse and
offered to deliver him to B, who refused to accept him. What are the rights of the
parties?
4. A had a claim against B and C for money lent, and against D for the non-delivery
of a horse according to contract. All the claims were barred by the statute of
limitations. B said to A: "I shall pay you half that debt in monthly instalments." C said
to E: I owe A some money and I am going to pay it." E repeated this to A. D said to A:
"I will deliver your horse to you at once." What are A's rights?
5. A, for good consideration, promised B to pay C a debt B owed him, and A informed
C of the agreement. Thereafter B released A from his promise by a duly executed
release under seal. What are C's rights?
6. A agreed to sell and deliver on July 1 certain goods, and B agreed to buy and pay for
them on that day. June 30 B wrote A:
"I shall not fulfil my contract." July 2 A sued B. At the trial B offered evidence to
prove (1) that A had made no tender of the goods, (2) that on June 30 A had not in his
possession goods which would fulfil the requirements of the contract, and that from the
peculiar character of the goods it would have been impossible for A to have obtained
them by July 1. The evidence was objected to as immaterial and irrelevant and the court
excluded it. Should it have been admitted?
7. A, an inventor and applicant for letters patent, assigned his invention to B, who
agreed in consideration thereof to pay all expenses in obtaining the patent, to use all
reasonable efforts to put the patented article on the market, to manage the business for
the joint benefit of both, to advance all requisite funds and look to the business for
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repayment. After part performance of this agreement, B died and C was appointed his
administrator. What are the rights of the parties?
8. A, B, and C owned property near a building belonging to D. In order to increase the
value of their property A, B, and C severally agreed to pay D $200 a year if he would
lease his building to the United States for a post office at a nominal rent D leased his
building accordingly, the low rent being the chief inducement to the United States for
taking the building. Can D recover the sums promised by A, B, and C?
9. A made a contract with B for the repayment of money lent with 12 per cent interest
The contract was within the province of a statute against usury. The statute declared
that all usurious contracts were void. Before the money was due according to the terms
of the contract the statute was repealed. What are the rights of the parties?
1895 Criminal Law - Peale
Defendant, the head of a labor organization, ordered a couple of workmen, who were
servants merely at will, to refuse any longer to work for their employer A, until the
latter should induce a friend of his to pay higher wages to his servants. The result of the
order was a strike; and many ill-disposed persons, none of them strikers, took
advantage of the occasion to commit acts of violence upon the property of A.
Defendant, though he expected this result, did not wish it, and ordered the strikers to
take no part in it. Is he guilty of a crime?
1908 Sales - Williston
B went into a ready-made clothing establishment kept by A, and selected a suit of
clothes, the price of which was $25. The clothes were not a perfect fit, and B said he
would not take them unless certain alterations were made, and declined to pay the price
until the alterations were made. A said they should be made within twenty-four hours
and B agreed to return the next day and pay the price and take the clothes. The
alterations were made on the same day on which the parties had this conversation. During the following night a fire destroyed A's shop and the suit of clothes in question. A
now brings suit against B for the price. Can he recover?
1926 Contracts - Page
A planned to publish a book containing pictures of the Prince of Wales, expecting to
sell it to various residents of Boston, New York, and Long Island, in view of an
announced visit of the prince to these shores. B, a bookseller, contracted to buy from
A 1000 copies of the book, and C, a clothing-merchant, contracted to insert an advertisement of "The Wales Knicker." The book had been published when the visit of the
prince was called off. B refuses pow to buy the books, and C refuses to pay for the
advertisement. Very few copies are being sold. What are the rights ofA ?
1926 Criminal Law - Pound
Indictment for assault with intent to do great bodily harm. The evidence is that A and
B were in an automobile, A driving very' fast. B said to A, "Ibet you can't run over that
dog.'-' A said, "Watch me," and steered for the dog, going as fast as he could. At that
moment P, whose dog it was, came around the comer and was hit by- the car and badly
injured. Motion to direct a verdict. What ruling?
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1935 Property II - Joseph Warren

Give reasons in all cases. Thirty pages in a suitable maximum.
George R. Gray by will after providing for his wife and the children of a deceased
brother directed his executors, "to divide the balance of the said one-half of said residue
into the number of shares that I have brothers and sisters, who survive me, and to pay
over as soon as conveniently may be done, the said shares to my said brothers and
sisters, with the exception of the shares to John Norman Gray and Albert Howard
Graham Gray. The shares intended for the benefit of John Norman Gray and Albert
Howard Graham Gray shall be invested by my trustee and the income from each share
paid to each of said brothers during their respective lifetime, and if any special
circumstances arise, which in the sole discretion of my trustee justifies the drawing on
the principal of the said two shares or either of them going to the said John Norman
Gray and Albert Howard Graham Gray, my trustee is hereby empowered to draw on
said principal and pay it out for the benefit of these two brothers; and whatever amount
may remain of the share of either of said brothers at his death, to divide the balance of
said share equally among his surviving brothers and sisters other than either the said
John Norman Gray or Albert Howard Graham Gray."
The testator was survived by three brothers John Norman, Farquharson, and Albert
Howard Graham.
The testator told his attorney that he wanted to provide for Albert and Norman and to
see that their interests were properly safeguarded but the attorney understood the
testator to say, "John Norman Gray" and "Albert Howard Graham Gray." Should this
evidence be admitted and should the property be distributed?
1956 Constitutional Law - Brown, Freund and Howe
On March 5, 1956 the Governor of South Carolina approved a Bill passed by the
Legislature of that State requiring all wholesale and retail establishments in the State
dealing in Japanese textile goods, or garments made therefrom, to display prominently
so as to be visible and clearly legible throughout their establishments a sign or signs
reading "Japanese Textiles Sold Here." By resolution the Legislature requested other
southern and New England states, where the textile industry is important, to adopt
similar legislation. Alabama has since done so. The legislation imposes substantial
fines for violations.
Importers of Japanese textiles, who have been developing a growing market in this
country because of slightly, but appreciably, favorable price differentials report that
orders and re-orders from wholesalers and retailers in South Carolina and Alabama
have fallen off to zero since the enactment of this legislation. In April, 1956 the
Japanese Ambassador in Washington delivered to the Secretary of State a Note reciting
these facts, stating that he was informed that this legislation was at best of questionable
validity and protesting that in any event it was in contravention of those provisions of
the 1953 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the
United States which, in Art. XVI, state: "Products of either Party shall be accorded,
within the territories of the other Party, national treatment and most-favored-nation
treatment in all matters affecting internal taxation, sale, distribution, storage and use."
[The Ambassador's Note omitted reference to the Protocol to the Treaty which, in § 7,
permits regulation of the sale of goods to comply with marking requirements "to assure

2. Reprinted from BERNARD JOSEPH RUBENSTEIN, RuBENSTEIN'S ARRANGEMENT OF HARVARD
LAW EXAMINATIONS: Bills and Notes, Business Organizations II, Equity II, Evidence, Property II, Sales,
Trusts (By Harvard A.B., LL.B., Private Tutor of Harvard Law Students, Author of several Law Texts).
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that the true geographic or commercial origin of such goods is correctly represented."]
The Note concludes:
"In view of the foregoing, the Ambassador, under instructions from the
Government of Japan, has further the honor to request the Government
of the United States urgently to take appropriate measures to meet this
regrettable situation and to prevent similar situations from arising in
other states."
You are on the Legal Staff of the State Department. Prepare, for the Secretary's
consideration, an analysis of the legal aspects of the situation presented, together with
your recommendations as to the tenor of the Secretary's reply to the Japanese Note.
1956 Legislation (b) - Braucher
Check the best statement:
A lawyer who is retained to perform legal services in seeking the enactment of a private
bill by Congress
(a) is guilty of a federal crime if he contracts for a fee contingent on success,
is engaged in unethical practice if he charges a fee,
regularly finds that any bill enacted contains provisions limiting his fee
properly offer to pay fair compensation to a Congressman who sponsors
and supports the bill, subject only to any limitation enacted as part of the bill;
-

-(b)
-(c)

-(d)may

Taxation, 1956 - Griswold
Commander Edward Whitehead has a luxurious red beard, and is well-known as a
corporate executive and a photographers' model. The Commander is invited to appear
on a television show. One of the other participants is a wealthy sportsman. During the
course of the show, the sportsman says to him: "Commander, if you will let me shave
off your beard, I will give you $100,000." In considering this, the Commander wants
to know what the tax consequences would be if he received the $100,000. He comes
to you for advice. Give it.
Property I, 1956 - Casner
Jane Zendman bought a diamond ring for $12,000 at an auction held at the gallery of
Brand, Inc., on the Boardwalk in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Harry Winston, Inc., a
diamond merchant located in New York City, claims ownership of the ring. Brand and
Winston had done business together for years. It was the custom of Harold Brand, the
owner and proprietor of Brand, Inc., to visit Winston's premises in New York several
times a month and select article that were later sold at the gallery in Atlantic City. In
October of 1947, Brand chose the ring - later purchased by Miss Zendman - advising
that he wished to show it to a customer, and, at his request, that one item was mailed
to the gallery in New Jersey. Accompanying it was a memorandum, reciting that the
goods were only for Brand's examination and that no title was to pass "until you have
made your selection, notified us ofyour agreement to pay the indicated price [$11,000]
and we have indicated our acceptance thereof by sending to you a bill of sale."
Upon receipt of the ring, Brand placed it in one of its public show windows, such
display being with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner Winston. The ring
remained on display until, more than a month later, it was put up at auction and, after
some bidding, "knocked down" and sold to Miss Zendman for $12,500. She received
a bill of sale from Brand and knew nothing about the written memorandum or the
circumstanced under which Brand had obtained possession. Sometime in January
1948, Winston discovered that Brand had sold the ring to Miss Zendman and, on
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February 2nd, demanded its return. On the following day, an involuntary petition in
bankruptcy was filed against Brand.
Section 23 of the Uniform Sales Act is in force in New Jersey and New York Personal
Property Law, Section 104, is identical. Section 23 is as follows:
"Subject to the provisions of this act, where goods are sold by a person who is not
the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under the authority or with the consent
ofthe owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless
the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller's authority
to sell."
The decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Zendman v. Harry Winston, Inc.,
305 N.Y. 180 (1953) was based on the facts recited above. Miss Zendman sought a
declaratory judgment as to the title to the ring and Winston filed a counterclaim for
replevin.
Give your opinion as to how this case should have been decided and set forth the
reasons in support of your conclusion.
PART 3. SELECTED EXAMINATION QUESTIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS:
TRANSITIONS IN EXAMINATION STYLES AT COLUMBIA
Questions for First Year Papers: Real and Personal Property
Columbia, June 6, 1894
Give reasonsfor your answers.
1. Describe the evolution of the fee, or feud, from its beginning to its present form.
What was subinfeudation,and how was it affected by legislation? To what extent does
it still survive?
2. What were the modes by which lands could be conveyed at common law? What
characteristic had they in common? How did the Statutes of Uses and of Enrolments
affect conveyancing?
3. X, having three sons, devised his lands to them as follows: to A for life, remainder
to the heirs of B for life, remainder to U for life. A conveys the lands in fee simple in
the lifetime of B and C. What is the effect of the conveyance on his own estate? On
those of the remaindermen respectively? Who is the reservioner, and what is the effect
of A's alienation upon him? What would be the present operation of such a
conveyance, and how has this result been brought about?
6. In an action of ejectment brought to recover possession of a tract of 1250 acres of
land, defendant shows (1) that he entered under a will devising the property to his wife
under the description of testator's "Rock Hill Farm;" (2) that he and his wife had been
in possession for upwards of twenty years; (3) that his possession had consisted in the
habitual cultivation of a tract of about 250 acres, and in cutting fire-wood in the woodlands forming a part of the farm. The plaintiff claimed under a later will, which was
duly established; he proved that the farm consisted of two distinct tracts of land: "farmlands," a part of which was occupied by the defendant, and "wood-lands," which law
at some distance from the other parcel. He showed that the defendant had himself been
in possession less than twenty years, and that he took the estate as tenant by the curtesy
from his wife, who had been the original disseisor. What are the rights of the parties?
Would it have made any difference if the order of succession had been reversed, the
husband taking the lands under the will, and the wife succeeding as doweress?
8. (a) Land is conveyed by a deed which describes its boundary line as running from a
point 100 rods west of a certain highway to a stake standing by the west side of said
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highway, thence along said highway to another stake and stones on the west side of the
same, thence westerly at right angles with the highway 100 rods, etc. The highway is
six rods wide. What is the length of the grantee's side-line?
(b) What presumption arises when land is conveyed bounded upon a stream or
highway? Upon the sea-shore? Upon a private way? Upon a "paper" road, - never
actually laid out? How may this presumption be rebutted? What conflicting views
have the courts taken upon this point?

Harlan Fiske Stone, Trusts, 1922
If a candidate for graduation in June, 1922, write above your name on the cover of your
answer book Candidate for Graduation-June, 1922
First give your conclusion, then state your reasons. Answers should not exceed two
pages in length. Books not complying with these requirements will be marked only "C"
or "F."
1. B owed A $1,000. B at A's request and on A's agreeing to relinquish his debt,
notified C that he, B, held $1,000 in trust for C. At that time B had no money but
shortly after he inherited $1,000 with which he purchased Blackacre, a piece of
unproductive land. B paid from salary earned by B, to C, at intervals, sums of money
which he represented to be income from the trust. At the end of seven years Blackacre
was worth $2,000 and B was bankrupt. What are the rights of the parties?
2. A devised land and buildings worth more than $10,000 to B, subject to a charge of
$10,000 in favor of C. B exchanged the land with X, who knew nothing of the charge,
for Whiteacre. Whiteacre was worth $8,000 and the buildings on it were worth $4,000.
B then sold Whiteacre to W for $53,000 who had notice of the charge. The buildings
on Whiteacre then burned. What are the rights of C?
3. X having given to A a covenant to convey Whiteacre to A offered to give to A a
similar covenant to convey Blackacre to A ifA would render certain specified services.
A assigned all his "right, title and interest" in and to "the covenants and to Whiteacre
and Blackacre" to B in trust for C. A retained possession of the covenant relating to
Whiteacre. Thereafter he rendered the services and X executed and delivered to A the
covenant with respect to Blackacre. What are C's rights?
4. A orally declared himself trustee of Blackacre and the proceeds thereof, if sold, for
B. A carried out the trust for a time, paying to B the rents and profits of Blackacre.
Thereafter X, A's wife, who knew of the trust, persuaded A to convey one-half of
Blackacre to her and to sell the other half. A invested the proceeds in Whiteacre which
he afterward conveyed to X as a gift. What are B's rights?
5. A, the owner of a promissory note, not yet due, for $1,000 declared himself trustee
of the note for X, a volunteer. A then endorsed the note "Pay $500 of this note to Y,"
signed A, and delivered it to Y as security for a loan of $500. Y had no notice of any
claim by X. What are the rights of the parties?
(b) Suppose Z, the maker, had paid Y $500 without notice of the declaration in favor
of X. What would your answer be?
6. A, trustee for B, deposited $2,000 of the trust funds in the X Savings Bank in A's
name as trustee for Z. The X Bank at A's request then applied $1,000 of the deposit
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in satisfaction of A's mortgage on Blackacre to the X Bank. Both A's and X Banks
property being liquidated in insolvency proceedings what are the rights of B and Z?
7. A, trustee for B, an infant, loaned trust moneys to X, whose credit rating was of the
highest, on his demand note payable to A as trustee for B, secured by stock collateral
having a market value of three times the face of the note. Seven years later B came of
age. X has not paid the note and the collateral has become worthless. What are the
rights of A and B?
8. A, trustee for B, pursuant to his powers as trustee leased a store, trust real estate,
to X, A covenanting in the lease to keep the leased premises in repair. A in violation of
the covenant neglected to repair certain shelving in the leased premises which fell and
damaged X's merchandise. A being personally insolvent what are X's rights?
Sales, Mid-Year Examination, January, 1928,
Columbia, Llewellyn
PART-I
To be given first. Time two hours.
If a candidate for graduation in February 1928, write above your name on the cover of
your answer book "Candidate for Graduation, February, 1928." The student may use
his casebook, the mimeographed materials, and any notes of his personal manufacture.
Use not more than 40 minutes on Question 1 and divide the balance of your time
between Questions 2 and 3. Thinkfirst, and don't write untilyou see where you are
going. It is not necessary to finish any question. State the law before you discuss or
criticize it. State any facts you find it desirable to assume.
1. B was a jobber in groceries working a limited territory. - S was a canner
whose trade was national. On June 1, 1923, B and S signed a written agreement
whereby B agreed to buy and S to sell all B's requirements of canned fruits and

vegetables for the following two years, price to be seller's opening price for the season,
but B to receive the benefit of any lowering in S's quotations before shipment; sizes,
qualities, kinds, and quantities for any month to be specified by B before the 10t' of
such month, otherwise S to have option not to ship. On June 15, B placed a large order
with S for July shipment. On July 1, S announced an opening price list well above the
market, filled B's order, and billed B accordingly. B took and used part of the shipment,
which he needed once, but contested the bill; the balance he rejected. B, on July 5,
placed a second order, conditioned on some reduction of S's price. S refused to lower
his price for B or other of his customers in like case, who together accounted for 80 per
cent of S's output. B can take the goods at S's price and still do business at a profit, but
the margin to him will be much less than is customary in the line. S's goods command
no important premium from the retailer or the consumer.
Is B liable in regard to any of the goods ordered or shipped, and to what extent?
Is he liable for damages for not ordering more goods out? If he has or should be held
to the contract for the future, can you advise him of any way to reduce or end his
liability?
2. S had the "New York agency" for the sale of Atlas steam boilers. He made
contracts for their sale in his own name, and collected the price. He paid the Atlas Co.
For each boiler ordered, irrespective of his own collections, although the boilers were
often on his instruction, shipped direct to a purchaser. B was solicited by S to put an
Atlas boiler into the plant B was constructing. B gave the specifications he required,
including ability to stand 150 pounds pressure. S said: "The Atlas 2XX is exactly what
you want. A contract was signed calling for delivery to B of one Atlas Giant 2XX
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boiler: the contract contained the clauses: "To stand 150 lbs. pressure safely. Money
back if B not satisfied after test." When installed, the Atlas Giant 2XX boiler (which
had been shipped direct by the Atlas Co.) had a defective pressure gauge, so that in the
higher ranges it registered forty to sixty pounds under the true pressure. B's engineer
looked the boiler over and reported: "It looks good; it looks quite O.K" A
painstakingly careful inspection would have revealed the defect. On the second day of
use it became necessary to use full pressure; the engineer, misled by the gauge, raised
the pressure to 200 lbs., believing he was only reaching 150. The boiler burst, injuring
X, Y and Z (the entire force of engine room helpers) and damaging the building. B
promptly notified S, saying: "rm going to see my lawyer. I'll hold you to the limit" S
claims the price, urging that the boiler complied with the contract, that it cannot in any
event be returned in statu quo, and that the test which burst it was improper and due
to B's negligence. He has brought suit. The law of the state makes B liable to the
engine room force, but leaves them free to pursue other remedies, if any, at their option.
X is suing B. Y is suing S. Can Y or Z recover? Can S? Advise B as to his rights and
course of action.
3. S of Bayonne made three contracts to sell, and B of Philadelphia, to buy naphtha.
The terms of each contract were identical: one carload 10 dollars a barrel f.o.b.
Bayonne, less freight charges to Philadelphia; terms net 30 days. (a) the first carload,
shipped out according to contract, was destroyed by accident en route. S claims the
price. B damages for non-delivery.
(b) Before the second carload was shipped, S heard that B was in financial
difficulties, took a bill of lading to his own order with sight draft attached, and present
it to B through a Philadelphia bank. B refused to honor the draft, and brought suit
against S for non-delivery, attaching the naphtha in the hands of the carrier. S
contested the attachment. B then offered to call off all legal action on either carload if
S would deliver on 15 days' credit. S agreed. The attachment was dissolved, and S
instructed the carrier to deliver the naphtha to B. The carrier had on June 1just placed
the car on B's siding and B had begun to affix pumps for unloading, when orders from
S reached the carrier to withhold delivery; S had heard of B's insolvency, which
supervened on May 31. S now insisted on cash against delivery. B's trustee (who had
all B's rights) on June 2 offered, "expressly reserving all his rights, however," to pay
cash if the naphtha proved, on inspection, up to contract, and asked S to have a test
made by a local chemist. S refused. The market on June 2 was $10.50 a barrel for
naphtha of this grade. During the negotiations, however, it suddenly broke, dropping
to $8.00 a barrel on June 15, and S, fearing further decline, resold the carload at that
price without notice to B's trustee. The demurrage charges of the railroad came to an
additional dollar per barrel. B's trustee believes he has an action either in trover or for
non-delivery. S believes he has a claim for damages of $3.00 a barrel to prove against
B's estate.
(c) B's trustee (as he had legal power to do) insisted on performance ofthe third
contract, the market for naphtha having more than recovered, and on demand S he
remitted the price. S was engaged in loading the car, and had filled it three quarters full.
He had asked the railroad to make out the bill of lading straight to B's trustee as soon
as the measurement and loading was completed; but this bill of lading had yet been
signed or delivered by the railroad. At this juncture the naphtha in the car and in S's
tanks was attached by a creditor of S. S then became insolvent. It developed later that
the naphtha being loaded was of a lower grade than that called for by the contract. B's
trustee intervened in the attachment proceeding, claiming the naphtha in the car, and
an undivided share of that in the tank. Discuss the claims and rights at the parties.
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Federal Courts and the Federal System - Final Examination - April 1976
Columbia, Wechsler

ANSWERS MUST BE WRITTEN IN INK OR TYPEWRITTEN.
IF YOU ARE A CANDIDATE FOR GRADUATION IN MAY, 1976, WRITE
PROMINENTLY ON THE FIRST SHEET OF YOUR EXAMINATION ANSWER
"CANDIDATE FOR GRADUATION IN MAY 1976."
Instructions:
This is an open-book, take-home examination. You may consult any published
sources you like, and of course your notes, but you will be expected to conform with
the required pledge that you have not discussed examination questions with anyone or
given or received any aid in answering the questions.
Do not permit your answers to exceed the specified length. Ealain your answers.
There is a premium on clarity, brevity, organization and good prose. Place your
number at the top of each page ofyour answer. It is recommended that you keep a copy
of your answer for the unlikely contingency that your answer is lost.
The examination should be handed in to the Chief Proctor no later p.m. on the
following dates: degree candidates, Friday, April 30 in Room F; non-degree
candidates, Thursday, May 6 in the Dean's Office.
[Question Number] I [Space Maximum: 750 words]
In 1-4y1p V. St. Vincent Hospital 369 F. Supp 948 (D.. Mont. 73), the plaintiffs%
a married couple, sued in the United States District Court to enjoin the hospital, a
charitable non-profit Catholic institution, from refusing to permit the plaintiffs'
physician to perform a sterilization procedure on the woman after completing a contemplated Caesarean delivery of her second child. The hospital was the recipient of
federal and state grants of funds and was the only institution in the area in which the
plaintiffs lived.
In the view that the receipt of public funds gave the hospital a public character and
that Griswold and Roe conferred as against public authorities the right of competent
adults to elect sterilization, the Court granted a preliminary injunction. Immediately
thereafter Congress enacted Section 401(b) (2) (A) ofthe Health Programs Extension
Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 95, providing that a hospital's receipt of federal funds under the
Public Health Service Act (the source of St. Vincent's public funding) "does not
authorize any court or any public official or other public authority to require.., such
entity" to "make its facilities available for the performance of any sterilization
procedure or abortion if the performance of such procedure or abortion in such facilities
is prohibited by the entity on the basis of religious beliefs moral convictions .... "
Upon the enactment of the statute the Court dissolved the injunction and dismissed
the complaint, saying that "there can be no doubt that Section 401 (b) which restricts
the course and power of inferior federal is a valid exercise of Congressional power.
Under Article I of Constitution, Congress can establish such inferior courts as it
chooses. Its power to create those courts includes the power to invest them with such
jurisdiction as it deems appropriate for the public. Lcker v. Phillips .. [Further,]
Congress is free to legislate with respect to remedies the inferior Federal courts may
grant. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. H

....
"

1. Assuming that the complaint asserted a substantial federal claim on the merits and
that the plaintiff could establish jurisdictional amount was the judgment of dismissal
correct?
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2. The legislative history of Section 401(b) makes clear that the enactment was
inspired by the temporary injunction granted in the IaJ case and that the purpose of
Congress was to terminate it if it could. Do these facts have any bearing on the
correctness of the decision?
3. If the plaintiffs had brought suit in a Montana state court and the defendant
invoked Section 401(b) in support of a motion to dismiss the complaint, what issues
should the court resolve?
[Question Number] II [Space Maximum: 900 words]
The decision and opinions of the Supreme Court in Vachon v. New Hampshire, 415
U.S. 478 (1974), are reproduced hereafter. [Ed. note: footnotes were provided in the
exam, which reproduced the opinion as a photocopy from the U.S. Reports advance
sheets. The footnotes are largely omitted here.]
VACHON v. NEW HAMPSHIRE
No. 73-573
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
[414 U.S. 478; 94 S.Ct. 664; 1974 U.S. LEXIS 148; 38 L. Ed. 2d 666]
January 14, 1974
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.
On the basis of evidence that a 14-year-old girl bought a button inscribed "Copulation Not Masturbation" at
a store operated by him, appellant was convicted of "wilfully" contributing to the delinquency of a minor in
violation of aNew Hampshire statute. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. Held: An independent
examination of the trial record pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 40 (lXd)(2) discloses that evidence is
completely lacking that appellant personally sold the girl the button or that he was aware of the sale or
present in the store at the time, a fatal void in the State's case that was not filled by appellant's concession at
trial that he "controlled the premises" at the time. A conviction based on a record completely lacking any
relevant evidence as to a crucial element of the offense charged violates due process.

PER CURIAM. A 14-year-old girl bought a button inscribed "Copulation Not
Masturbation" at the Head Shop in Manchester, New Hampshire. In consequence,
appellant, operator of the shop, was sentenced to 30 days in jail and fined $100 after
conviction upon a charge of"wilfuly" contributing to the delinquency of a minor in
violation of New Hampshire's Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169:32 (Supp. 1972).' In affirming the
conviction, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the "wilfully" component of
the offense required that the State prove that the accused acted "'oluntarily and
intentionally and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.' 113 N.
H. 239, 242, 306 A. 2d 781, 784 (1973). Thus, the State was required to produce
evidence that appellant, knowing the girl to be a minor, personally sold her the button,
or personally caused another to sell it to her. Appellant unsuccessfully sought
dismissal of the charge at the close of the State's case on the ground that the State had
produced no evidence to meet this requirement, and unsuccessfully urged the same
ground as a reason for reversal in the State Supreme Court. We have reviewed the
transcript of the trial on this issue, pursuant to Rule 40 (1)(dX2) of the Rules of this
Court.
Our independent examination of the trial record discloses that evidence is completely
lacking that appellant personally sold the girl the button or even that he was aware of
the sale or present in the store at the time. The girl was the State's only witness to the
3. The statute provides in pertinent part:
"Anyone.. . who ...has knowingly or wilfully done any act to... contribute to the
delinquency of [a] child, may be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars
or by imprisonment for not more than one year or both."
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sale. She testified that she and a girl friend entered the store and looked around until
they saw "a velvet display card on a counter" from which they "picked out [the] pin."
She went to some person in the store with the button "cupped in [her] hand" and paid
that person 25 cents for the button. She did not say that appellant was that person, or
even that she saw him in the store. Rather, she testified that she could not identify who
the person was. We therefore agree with Justice Grimes, dissenting, that "there is no
evidence whatever that the defendant sold the button, that he knew it had been sold to
a minor, that he authorized such sales to minors or that he was even in the store at the
time of the sale." 113 N. H., at 244, 306 A. 2d, at 785. This fatal void in the State's
case was not filled by appellant's concession at trial that he "controlled the premises on
July 26." That concession was evidence at most that he operated the shop; it was in no
way probative of the crucial element of the crime that he personally sold the minor the
button or personally caused it to be sold to her.
In these circumstances, the conviction must be reversed. "It is beyond question, of
course, that a conviction based on a record lacking any relevant evidence as to a crucial
element of the offense charged.. . violate[s] due process." Harris v. United States, 404
U.S. 1232, 1233 (1971). (DOUGLAS, J., in chambers); Thompson v. Louisville, 362
U.S. 199 (1960); Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596 (1968); see also Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 44 (1966).
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the New Hampshire Supreme
Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE
WHITE join, dissenting.
Appellant Denis M. Vachon operates the Head Shop in Manchester, New Hampshire,
where he sells various beads, dresses, posters, and the like. In July 1969, a 14-year-old
girl, accompanied by her girl firiend, went to the shop seeking to purchase a button or
pin like the one purchased by her friend the previous week. She found the button,
inscribed "Copulation Not Masturbation," and purchased it from a salesperson in the
store. It was conceded in the New Hampshire courts that appellant was in control of
the premises where the sale was made. At ajury-waived trial, appellant was convicted
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a statutory offense proscribed in these
words:
"Anyone ... who shall knowingly or wilfully encourage, aid, cause, or abet, or connive
at, or has knowingly or wilfully done any act to produce, promote, or contribute to the
delinquency of[a] child, may be punished... ." N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169:32 (Supp.
1972).
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed appellant's conviction. 113 N. H.
239, 306 A. 2d 781 (1973).
The Court decides that appellants conviction under this statute violates rights secured
to him by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, concluding on the
basis of its "independent examination of the trial record" that "evidence is completely
lacking that appellant personally sold the girl the button or even that he was aware of
the sale or present in the store at the time."
I
In one sense there can be no doubt that the Court's conclusion is based upon an
"independent examination of the trial record," since the claim sustained here was
neither made in constitutional form to the Supreme Court ofNew Hampshire, nor even
presented by appellant in his jurisdictional statement in this Court.
A litigant seeking to preserve a constitutional claim for review in this Court must not
only make clear to the lower courts the nature of his claim, but he must also make it
clear that the claim is constitutionally grounded. Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203
(1945). The closest that appellant came in his brief on appeal to the Supreme Court of
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New Hampshire to discussing the issue on which this Court's opinion turns is in the
sixth section (at 17-18), which is headed: "The State's failure to introduce any evidence
of scienter should have resulted in dismissal of the charge following the presentation
ofthe State's case." Appellant in that section makes the customary appellate arguments
of insufficiency of the evidence and does not so much as mention either the United
States Constitution or a single case decided by this Court. The Supreme Court of New
Hampshire treated these arguments as raising a classic state law claim of insufficient
evidence of scienter; nothing in that court's opinion remotely suggests that it was
treating the claim as having a basis other than in state law.
The Court purports to decide the scienter question on the basis of Rule 40 (1)(dX2)
of the Rules of this Court, which provides:
"1.Briefs of an appellant or petitioner on the merits shall be printed as
prescribed in Rule 39, and shall contain in the order here indicated "(dX2) The phrasing of the questions presented need not be identical
with that set forth in the jurisdictional statement or the petition for
certiorari, but the brief may not raise additional questions or change the
substance of the questions already presented in those documents.
Questions not presented according to this paragraph will be
disregarded, save as the court, at its option, may notice a plain error not
presented."
The very language of this rule makes it clear that it applies to this Court's review of
cases in which it has previously either noted probable jurisdiction or granted certiorari.
The cases cited by the Court in support of what it does here are therefore necessarily
cases in which review had been granted and which had been orally argued; in addition,
each of those cases arose in the federal courts. See Columbia Heights Realty Co. v.
Rudolph, 217 U.S. 547 (1910); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941);
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313
(1971).
Whatever the import of Rule 40 (1XdX2) in cases arising in the federal courts, it
surely does not give this Court the power to simply ignore the limitations placed by 28
U. S. C. § 1257 on our jurisdiction to review final judgments of the highest court of a
State. That jurisdiction permits review in this Court by appeal where a state statute has
been upheld against a federal constitutional challenge, or by writ of certiorari where a
federal constitutional challenge is "specifically set up or claimed" in state court. Our
prior cases establish that we will "not decide federal constitutional issues raised here
for the first time on review of state court decisions." Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S.
437,438 (1969). See Crowell v. Randell, 10 Pet. 368 (1836). Since the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire was not presented with a federal constitutional challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, resolution ofthis question by the Court is inconsistent with
the congressional limitation on our jurisdiction to review the final judgment of the
highest court of a State.
II
Even if appellant's sufficiency-of-the-evidence contention in the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire could be said to have been presented as a federal constitutional claim
based on Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960), I would nonetheless be unable
to join in the Court's disposition of it. In Thompson, the only state court proceedings
reaching the merits of the case were in the Louisville Police Court from which there was
no right of appeal to any higher state court, and there was therefore no state court
opinion written which construed the statute under which Thompson was convicted.
This Court therefore had no choice but to engage in its own construction of the statute
and upon doing so it concluded that the record was "entirely lacking in evidence to
support any of the charges." Id., at 204. Thompson was obviously an extraordinary
case, and up until now has been saved for extraordinary situations; it has not heretofore
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been broadened so as to make lack of evidentiary support for only one of several
elements of an offense a constitutional infirmity in a state conviction.
Here, however, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire construed the state statute
defining contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and held that the evidence adduced
at the trial was sufficient to support a finding on each element of that offense. While
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire did say, as the Court indicates, that the State
was required to prove that the accused acted "'voluntarily and intentionally and not
because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason,"' 113 N. H., at 242, 306 A. 2d,
at 784, it said this in a context of several paragraphs of treatment of the elements of the
offense. Just as those reading and relying upon our opinions would be ill-advised to
seize one phrase out of context, I think we are ill-advised to so treat the opinion of the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire. That court had several observations to make about
the statutory offense which bear on the issue of "wilfulness" upon which this Court
focuses:
"It is uncontested that the defendant was in control of the premises
where the sale was made. There was evidence that a girl friend of this
minor had previously purchased there a pin 'like that.' These pins were
displayed on a card on a counter. The trial court saw the minor and had
an opportunity to conclude whether her minority should have been
apparent to whoever sold the pin. The court could find that the
defendant was aware of the character of the pins which were being
offered for sale and sold in his establishment.
"Defendant is charged with wilfully contributing to the delinquency of
a minor by selling or causing to be sold to her the button in question.
To act wilfully is 'o act voluntarily and intentionally arid not because
of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.' [Citations omitted.]
The trial court could properly find and rule that the sale of this button
to the minor was intentional. The trial court could further conclude that
the seller of this type of button should have realized that it would tend
to be harmful to the morals of the purchaser or others. R. S.A. 169:32
(Supp. 1972). This would warrant a finding and ruling that the
defendant wilfully contributed to the delinquency of this minor as
charged in the complaint. [Citations omitted.]" Id., at 242, 306 A. 2d,
at 784.
The Court simply casts aside this authoritative construction of New Hampshire law,
seizes one phrase out of context, and concludes that there was no evidence to establish
that the appellant "[knew] the girl to be a minor, personally sold her the button, or
personally caused another to sell it to her." The word "personally" is the contribution
of this Court to the New Hampshire statute; it is not contained in the statute, and is not
once used by the Supreme Court ofNew Hampshire in its opinion dealing with the facts
of this very case. Indeed, the entire thrust of the opinion of the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire is that appellant need not personally have sold the button to the minor nor
personally have authorized its sale to a minor in order to be guilty of the statutory
offense. The only fair reading of the above-quoted language from the Supreme Court
ofNew Hampshire is that the word "wilfully" in the statute does not mean "personally,"
and the facts that the appellant controlled and operated the shop, that the same type of
pin had been previously purchased at the shop, and that the pins were prominently
offered for sale were sufficient evidence on the issue of willfulness.
This may seem to us a somewhat broad construction of the language "wilfully" or
"knowingly," though our own cases make it clear that we are dealing with words which
may be given a variety of meanings by their context:
"The difference between willful failure to pay a tax when due, which is
made a misdemeanor, and willful attempt to defeat and evade one,
which is made a felony, is not easy to detect or define. Both must be

19971

SHEPPARD-APPENDIX

willful, and willful, as we have said, is a word of many meanings, its
construction often being influenced by its context. United States v.
Murdock, 290 U.S. 389. It may well mean something more as applied
to nonpayment of a tax than when applied to failure to make a return.
Mere voluntary and purposeful, as distinguished from accidental,
omission to make a timely return might meet the test of willfulness."
Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497-498 (1943).
But since our authority to review state court convictions is limited to the vindication of
claims of federal rights, we must take the meaning of the statute, and of the words
"wilfully" and "knowingly" which it uses, as given to us by the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire. I would have thought such a proposition well settled by our prior
decisions:
"We of course are bound by a State's interpretation of its own statute
and will not substitute our judgment for that of the State's when it
becomes necessary to analyze the evidence for the purpose of
determining whether that evidence supports the findings of a state
court." Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 166 (1961).
We do have constitutional authority in appropriate cases to hold that the State's
construction of its statute is such that the statutory language did not give a criminal
defendant fair warning of the conduct which is construed to be embraced within it.
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347
(1964). But this is a far cry from our own rewriting of a state statute in order to make
it require a highly specific intent, and then turning around and saying that there was no
evidence before the state courts to prove the kind of intent which we have said the
statute requires. I would at least note probable jurisdiction over the appeal and set the
case for oral argument. Since the Court instead chooses, without ever having heard
argument, to rewrite the New Hampshire statute and substitute its interpretation for that
of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, I dissent.
1. Did the Supreme Court properly take jurisdiction on AR n from the New
Hampshire Supreme Court?
2. If you were a law clerk to a Justice when the case was in the Court and he asked you
for your views, would you have recommended that he subscribe to the er ciam or the
dissent or that he write something on his own, and if the latter, what?
3. On the remand, is there anything that the New Hampshire Supreme Court could
properly have done or said to vindicate its judgment that the statute is violated by a
person in control of premises on which obscene material is offered for sale and in fact
sold to a minor?
[Question Number] Ill [Space Maximum: 600 words]
Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure deals with derivative actions by
shareholders and requires, inter ali, that the complaint allege that "the plaintiff was a
shareholder.., at the time of the transaction of which he complains."
In Bangor Punts Operations v. Ban-or & A.R. Co. 417 U.S. 703, 708 n. 4 (1974),
Mr. Justice Powell said:
"The 'contemporaneous ownership requirement in shareholder derivative actions was
first announced in Hawes v. Oakland 104 U.S. 450 (1882), and soon thereafter
adopted as Equity Rule 97. This provision was later incorporated in Equity Rule 27
and finally in the present Rule 23.1. After the decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), the question arose whether the contemporaneous ownership
requirement was one of procedure or substantive law. If the requirement were
substantive, then under the regime of Eie it could not be validly applied in federal
diversity cases where state law permitted a noncontemporaneous shareholder to
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maintain a derivative action. See 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice M23.1. 31-23.1.15 [2].
Although most cases treat the requirement as one of procedure, this Court has never
resolved the issue. Ibid."
1. If the validity of the requirement is challenged in a shareholder's action arising solely
under state corporation law, with jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, when
no such requirement is imposed by the state of the governing law, what should the
ruling be?
2. If the shareholder's action referred to above was brought in a state court and
properly removed by the defendant and the contemporaneous ownership rule is held
applicable and valid, should the District Court dismiss the action or remand to the state
court?
[Question Number] IV [Space maximum: 900 words]
The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence under the
chairmanship of Milton S. Eisenhower reported in 1969. One of its major
recommendations was that Congress enact legislation "that would confer jurisdiction
upon the United States District Courts to grant injunctions, upon the request of the
Attorney General or private persons, against the threatened or actual interference by
any person, whether or not under color of state or federal law, with the rights of
individuals or groups to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, peaceful assembly
and petition for redress of grievances."
Senators Hruska and Hart, who were members of the Commission, thereupon
introduced S.3976, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., providing in major part as follows:
CERTAIN CONDUCT UNLAWFUL
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person or group, except as
authorized by law, to interfere, either willfully by the use of physical
force, by the use of disruptive noise with specific intent to interfere, or
by the unreasonable withholding or limitation under color of Federal or
State law of any required permit, license, or other permission (1) with the orderly conduct of any meeting, address, discussion,
worship, or other assembly, or with the free passage of persons Or the
conduct of business or research in any street, building, or other place
incidental to the exercise of the constitutional rights of religion, speech,
press, assembly, or petition; or
(2) with the exercise by any person or group, by demonstration,
picketing, publication, or other means, of the rights of free speech, free
press, peaceable assembly, or petition to the Government for redress of
grievances.
ENFORCEMENT BY PERSONS AGGRIEVED
SEC. 3 (a) Any individual, group, institution, or other public or private
person who claims to have been injured, or who believes that he will be
irreparably injured, by conduct in violation of section 2 of this Act, may
bring a civil action for appropriate relief.
(b) The United States district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
civil actions under this Act. A civil action under this Act may be
brought without regard to the amount in controversy in the United
States district court for the district in which the unlawful conduct is
alleged to have occurred or to be about to occur.
(c) In any civil action under this Act, the district court may grant as
relief, as it deems appropriate, any permanent or temporary injunction,
temporary restraining order, or other order, and may award damages
together with court costs.
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(d) Upon timely application in any civil action under this Act brought
in a United States district court, the court shall permit the Attorney
General to intervene if he certifies that the case is of general public
importance.
The bill was promptly attacked on constitutional grounds, namely, that insofar as the
bill purports to make unlawful the conduct of private as distinguished from official
individuals or groups, not acting under color of federal or state law, it exceeds the
power of Congress. You are a law assistant to one of the sponsors of the bill and he has
asked you to consider whether there is any way the bill can be revised to meet the
constitutional objection (whether or not you believe that it has merit). Specifically,
since the conduct that it is the purpose of the bill to prevent (breaking up meetings, etc.)
is bound to be unlawful under state law even if it is not unconstitutional, the important
goal is not the federal declaration of illegality but the enlistment of the federal courts
in its prevention.
Is there any way the bill can be revised to serve this purpose? If so, how? If not, why
not?
[Question Number] V [Space Maximum: 400 words]
Would the enactment of the Proposed Federal Court Jurisdiction Act (Judicial Code
Pamphlet, p. 631) lead to a different result in such a case as:
1. Qmily v. First National Bank in Meridian Casebook, p. 884?
2. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. Casebook, p. 891?

PART 4. SELECTED EXAMINATION QUESTIONS:
TRANSITIONS IN EXAMINATION STYLES AT MICHIGAN
University of Michigan, Department of Law
Questions on Common Law Pleading
Second Semester, 1895-96
1.

Define an action. What are the classes of actions. Define each. How were real
actions divided.

2.

What is the real distinction between real and personal actions.

3.

Name the superior courts of the common law, give the jurisdiction, and number
ofjudges in each. Have these courts encroached upon the jurisdiction of each
other. How.

4.

How were actions commenced originally (a) in the courts of King Bench (b) in
the common pleas (c) in the exchequer.

5.

What was this original writ. Out of which court did it issue. Was it under seal.
To whom was it directed. What did it contain. What was its object. What was
the effect of a failure to comply with this writ..

6.

Were there different forms of original writ. How many.

7.

What were the different writs used in real actions. Define each.

8.

Name the modem mixed actions.
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9.

What can you say of the action of forcible entry and detainer.

10.

May a judgment in the action of "forcible entry and detainer" be plead in bar
of an action of ejectment.

11.

What can you say of the possession necessary to maintain this action. Must the
possession be actual. May it be constructive. May one in wrongful possession
have benefit of this action.

12.

What can you say of the force necessary in order to maintain this action. Will
a mere trespass be sufficient. Is entry by means of keys a forcible entry. May
this action be maintained where the original entry was lawful. When. When
not.

Constitutional Law, May 26, 1924
Please do not repeat the questions. Give only your answers. Give reasons in all cases
as clearly and concisely as possible. Discuss all reasonably possible constitutional
objections to the legislation involved in these questions.
I.
A state constitution provides that "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation." A railroad company built its road along one side of A's
farm but did not at any point cross the boundary line with its road-bed. Cinders from
the many passing locomotives caused A some inconvenience and injuriously affected
certain crops. The jarring caused by passing trains shook down much earth from a
railway embankment at a certain place, upon A's land and so diverted water in a ditch
running parallel to the road as to flood a part of A's farm after heavy rains. Has A any
remedy?
II.
A state statute subjects all who are "engaged in mining or producing iron or other
ores" within the state to the payment of an "occupation tax" equal to 6% of the value
of the ore mined or produced during the preceding year. B is engaged in mining ore.
Practically all of his output is mined to fill existing contracts with persons outside the
state, and passes at once into the channels of interstate commerce. Steam shovels sever
the ore from its natural bed and lift it directly into cars, which are then run into the
railroad yards, where they are put into trains which start the ore on its interstate
journey. Must B pay the tax?
I.
The A Co. deeded a lot with a residence upon it to B, expressly reserving to the
grantor the right to mine and remove all coal under the surface, the grantee taking the
premises with the risk and waiving all claims for damages that might arise from mining
the coal. Thereafter the legislature passed an act forbidding the mining of coal in such
way as to cause a subsidence of structures used as human habitations. Can the act be
applied to B's land?
IV.
A state statute created a drainage district, describing it by bounds, and provided for
taxing all property therein, for the construction of a sewer for house drainage only.
Plaintiff brought an action to cancel the assessment as to his property, on the ground
that his land was so situated that it could not benefit from the improvement, unless the
district would construct a branch sewer not yet planned, and that he had had no notice
and had been given no hearing upon the fixing of the boundaries of the district or the
assessment of the tax. Should he succeed?
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V.
A state statute imposed what it called an "occupation tax" of 2% upon all premiums
paid by corporations of the state and by foreign corporations doing business in the
state, to insurance companies outside ofthe state not authorized to do business with the
state. Is the statute valid?
VI.
A city having legislative authority therefor, constructed subways, tunnels and roadbeds and leased this property to a railroad company, to operate as a public railroad.
Thereafter the company became insolvent, and the state legislature thereupon passed
a special Act, creating a board of trustees to take over and operate the railroad, and to
pay dividends if earned, to the stock holders. The statute also provided for the
assessment of taxable property in the city to meet a deficit if any should arise from
operation of the road. The rentals provided for in the lease were to be paid to the city
from net earnings, if any. Was this action constitutional?
VII.
Suppose an Act of Congress by Sec. 1 conferred upon the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction in all cases brought by municipal corporations of one state against
municipal corporations of another state; and by Sec. 2 conferred original jurisdiction
upon the District Courts, in all cases brought by or against foreign ambassadors and
ministers; and by Sec. 3 gave to the parties in cases arising under Sec. 2, the right to
appeal such cases from the District to the Supreme Court. Discuss the validity of the
statute.
VIII.
A state constitution provides that juries shall be made up of "citizens of the state, of
the age of 21 years or above." The state supreme court had construed this clause to
mean "male citizens" of the required age. What if any effect has the adoption of the
"equal suffrage" amendment to the U.S. Constitution upon the eligibility of women to
jury service in said state?
Ix.
The "Pure Food Act" of Congress requires manufacturers of canned foods to attach
labels to the cans, giving in a described manner the contents thereof, in the case of all
such products carried in interstate commerce. A state pure food act requires a different
and somewhat conflicting label on all canned goods offered for sale within the state.
At what time, if any, may the state labels be attached to canned goods, brought in from
other states (a) to the separate cans, and (b) to the wooden boxes in which such cans
are packed?
X.
Would a state statute authorizing a state commission, created for that purpose, to
acquire under eminent domain, all slaughter-houses in the state slaughtering annually
more than 1,000 animals for food purposes, and to maintain and operate such plants,
and to sell meat and the by-products at "reasonable prices, the cost of production and
marketing considered," be valid?
END
University of Michigan
Law School,
Constitutional Law
May 25, 1935
Pleasedo not repeat the questions. Give only your answers. Give reasons in all
cases as clearly and concisely as possible. Discuss all reasonably possible
constitutionalobjections to the legislationinvolved in these questions.
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I
A state statute provided for the allowance of a reasonable attorney's fee not exceeding
$25 to successful plaintiff in any suit in which an attorney is actually employed upon
a claim not exceeding $250 against any person or corporation doing business in the
state, for personal services rendered, labor or material furnished, or for overcharges on
freight or express by such person or corporation, where such claim is not paid within
thirty days after demand, and the recovery is for the full amount claimed. A railway
company operating its lines in that state and adjoining states had judgment for the full
amount claimed by plaintiff and a $25 attorney's fee entered against it. Is the judgment
good?
Another statute concerns the furnishing of cars by railways to shippers, and provides
that when cars applied for, in accordance with the statute, are not duly furnished, the
railway company shall be liable to the shipper for a penalty of $10 a day for each car
not furnished, and for a reasonable attorney's fee. Shippers who fail to load cars within
two days after they are placed at their disposal are liable to the company for a similar
penalty, but not for attorney fees. Is ajudgment carrying attorney fees against a railway
good?
II
A state statute provides that in every attachment suit brought in any of the courts of
the state by non-residents of said state, the plaintiff shall file an indemnity bond in
favor of the defendant, the bond to be for an amount equal to double the value of the
property attached, and to be approved by the court, before the issuance of the
attachment writ. Residents of the state bringing attachment were not required to file
indemnity bonds, unless the judge of the court so decided and then in an amount to be
fixed in the discretion of the judge.
P, a non-resident, sued D, a resident, for an amount claimed to be due upon D's
promissory note, but by mistake of P's lawyer, and through inadvertence of the judge,
who had not observed thst P was a non-resident, the bond was filed in conformity with
that section of the statute relating to resident plaintiffs in attachment and it was for an
amount fixed by the judge at less than double the value of the property attached. Three
months after the filing of the suit, it was dismissed on defendant's motion for noncompliance with the statute. The statute of limitations on the cause of action had run
one month before the dismissal. A month after the dismissal of the suit, the state
legislature passed an act directing the court to reinstate the case when and if the
plaintiff should file a proper bond within thirty days after the passage of the Act. D,
at the appropriate time, objects to the reinstatement. Discuss the validity of both
statutes.
1II
The Detroit Street Railway Company is incorporated under a Michigan statute, and
is authorized to operate cars in certain Detroit streets, after securing appropriate
franchises from Detroit for a period of thirty years. It is required to maintain its tracks,
cars and equipment in good condition, to provide adequate service for the districts it
serves and charge fares at not to exceed six cents each. The Company secured proper
franchises from the City of Detroit to operate its lines for the period of thirty years.
After the Company had operated for five years, the Mayor of Detroit, alleging that the
Company was not maintaining "adequate service" for certain neighborhoods and was
violating the provision as to fares, because it refused to give transfers from one to
others of its lines, issued an order suspending the right of the Company to operate, and
directed the police to enforce the order. Is the order valid?
IV
The National Recovery Act of Congress, after declaring the existence of an economic
emergency, authorizes the President, upon the application by one or more trade or
industrial associations or groups, to approve a code or codes of fair competition for the
trade or industry, if the President finds (1) that such association or group imposes no
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inequitable restrictions on admission to membership; and (2) that such code or codes
are not designed to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises;
provided that such code or codes shall not permit monopolies or monopolistic
practices.
The Act further declares that after the President has approved any such code, the
provisions thereof shall be the standards of fair competition for such trade or industry,
and that any violation thereof shall be deemed an unfair method of competition in
commerce. It further provides that whenever the President shall find that destructive
wage or price cutting, or other activities contrary to the policy of the Act are being
practiced in any trade or industry, and, after such public notice and hearings as he shall
specify, shall find it essential to license business enterprises, in order to make fair codes
or fair competition, no person shall, after the date fixed by the President, engage in or
carry on any business in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, unless he shall
have first obtained a license pursuant to such regulations as the President shall
prescribe.
The shoe manufacturing industry was organized conformably to the Act, and adopted
a Code which, among other things, contained a schedule of wages and hours of labor
for employees. M, a manufacturer, is found guilty by the code authorities of violation
of this schedule, fined and "ordered" to conform. The finding supporting the code of
schedule of wages is that "this schedule of wages is reasonable and fair to employers
and employees". M claims that compliance with the schedule would involve him in loss
and insolvency. He imports leathers from other states and sells his finished product
throughout the country. His manufacturing is all done in Ohio. Is the order valid?
V
During the period prior to 1900, the R telephone company had established a system
of long distance telephone communication over large parts of the states of Iowa and
Missouri. It also owned and controlled local telephone exchanges in many cities and
towns in this territory. The American Telephone and Telegraph Company by license
and stock ownership controlled the R company so that the latter, with its local and long
distance lines, became allied to the Bell system extending throughout the United States.
There also existed in the two states named many independent local telephone exchanges
which competed with the local exchanges of the R company. Said competition was not
comprehensive and complete because the independent exchanges were not connected
with each other by long distance lines and hence could not give long distance service
to their patrons. The R company refused to permit the independent exchanges to use
its long distance lines.
For the purpose of furnishing long distance service to these independent exchanges,
the U company was organized as an independent long distance company. It expended
several million dollars in constructing its lines, and made contracts with the
independent local exchanges providing for an interchange of business so as to develop
a comprehensive and adequate independent telephone system which competed with the
Bell system; and by 1910 was furnishing long distance service for one thousand
independent exchanges. In the latter year the R company changed its policy and
solicited exchange of business with the local independent companies. Several
independent companies entered into contracts with the R company despite the fact
known to all parties that the contracts of the U company with all of the independent
companies provided that for points reached by that company the independent
companies should give their long distance business exclusively to it. The U company
gave much lower rates than did the R company, but its lines did not reach so wide a
territory, though they were being rapidly extended.
The U company filed bills for injunction, asking that the independent companies be
restrained from entering into contracts with the R company, setting up the above facts
and alleging that the purpose of the R company associated in soliciting business of the
local independent exchanges was to create a complete monopoly in the telephone
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business and that such would be the effect if the new contracts were allowed to stand.
Defendants demur. The R Company was incorporated under the laws of Maine and a
statute of that state forbade monopoly and restraint of trade. Should the demurrer be
sustained under either the Maine Act or the Sherman Anti-Trust statute?
VI
P, a manufacturer in Detroit, contracts to sell one hundred automobiles to B, a dealer
of New York, fifty of said cars to be delivered at his place of business in New York and
fifty at his plant in Jersey City. To save transportation expense, P ships the parts of the
cars "knocked down": to his own assembling plant in New York, there to be "set up"
ready for delivery. The cars arrive in New York March 1. New York property taxes
become due April 1. On that day all of the cars are still in P's New York plant.
Twenty of them are set up and marked and put aside for delivery to B in New York
whenever he shall ask for them; twenty more are ready and set aside and marked for
delivery to B in Jersey City, as soon as the transportation company has trucks available
to take them to Jersey City, the order for said trucking having been given already. The
remaining sixty cars are still being set up in P's New York plant. B has not paid for
the cars. Can the New York taxes be enforced against either P or B, as to any or all of
these cars?
VII
A shot and killed B. After arrest and arraignment he pleaded guilty. As the law stood
when the homicide was committed it was provided that if the defendant pleaded guilty,
sentence of death should not be pronounced unless the jury in their verdict should find
that the killing was deliberate and premeditated. Before A's trial the law was so
changed as to provide that where the plea was guilty ajury should be impanelled to try
the question whether or not the killing was deliberate and premeditated and the sentence
made to depend upon their verdict. The new procedure was followed in A's case. The
jury found that the homicide was deliberate and premeditated and A was sentenced to
death. Decide the case on appeal.
VII
Eighty retail dealers in hardware, some of them doing business in the state of
Michigan and the others in the state of Ohio, organized an association under an
agreement which recited that "recognizing that we as retail dealers cannot meet
competition from those from whom we buy, we pledge ourselves as members of this
association to buy only from manufacturers and wholesalers who do not sell direct to
consumers, where there are retail hardware dealers who carry stocks commensurate
with the demands of their communities, and we pledge ourselves not to buy from
hardware commission merchants, agents and brokers who sell to consumers but do not
carry stocks, nor from a manufacturer who sells to such hardware commission
merchant, agent or broker". The association was open to any reputable hardware
dealer. The agreement and by-laws provided no penalty for violation ofthe pledge and
it is not shown that any was ever imposed. The association made no schedule of prices
at which its members should either buy or sell, but prices were stiffened and raised by
the activities of the Association. The state of Michigan on relation of its AttorneyGeneral filed a bill to enjoin the Michigan dealers from continuing membership. The
Attorney-General ofthe United States filed a bill for the dissolution of the Association.
Decide the cases.
IX
A state legislature having constitutional authority therefor caused the issuance of state
bonds for the building of a railway within the state to be operated by the state. The
bonds provided for their payment in gold coin of the United States of the then specified
weight and fineness. A purchased some of these bonds. After the purchase Congress
passed an Act authorizing the President of the United States, in his discretion, to reduce
the weight of the dollar by not more than thirty per cent. On the maturity of the bonds
the State tendered the specified number of dollars of a weight reduced 20%, in
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accordance with an order to that effect issued by the President under authority of the
Act mentioned. Meantime, A had sold his bonds to Ohio for their full face value. Ohio
refuses to receive the specified number of reduced dollars in full payment and sues to
recover a number of dollars equivalent in value to the amount specified in the bond.
Decide the case.
X
A state legislature created a state commission for the conservation of petroleum and
allied products, and authorized it to make rules and regulations designed for the
intelligent, just and economic production of petroleum and associated products.
Among other provisions the Commission ordered that where several persons own
separate lots in a common oil field, such owners shall be allowed to drill wells and
pump or otherwise withdraw oil or gas only upon permits issued by the Commission,
and then in such quantities as should be specified. The Commission further provided
that the oil and gas taken from such common and regulated pools or fields should be
measured and that each I owner should be paid from the sales his pro rata share of the
proceeds, as determined by sound engineering methods. W, who is the owner of wells
capable of producing far more oil than he was allowed to take under these regulations,
contests the validity of the Act and the regulations referred to.
First Year Property
May 31, 1935

I
A's car was stolen by B. Later is was levied on as B's property and sold on execution
sale to satisfy a judgment of a creditor of B. C Who bought at the sale had no notice
of A's ownership. After C had improved the car by putting on two new tires, a new
horn and a new battery, A sued B in trover and secured a judgment for the value of the
car at the time of the defendant's conversion. This judgment being unsatisfied, A
thereafter sued C in an action in the nature of replevin. C counterclaims for the value
of the horn, tires and battery. What decision?
U
While engaged in painting A's barn, B observed in an abandoned bird's nest under the
eaves three twenty dollar bills. Reaching as far as he could with his paint brush, he
knocked the nest down so that the bills fell on land of C adjoining A's farm. B then
climbed down and picked up the money. A admitted that he knew nothing about the
bills. But when it appeared that the real owner could not be found, A sued B in
replevin for the bills. At the trial it appeared that A had bought the farm in January and
taken possession shortly thereafter; that the barn was painted by B the following
March; and that the eaves in which the bills were found projected above land of C.
How should the court decide?
IIl
A purchased a new car of a dealer B, trading in his old car as half the purchase price
and giving his unsecured note for the balance. B was induced to make the sale to A
only on the representations of the latter that the used car traded in had been driven
carefully by no one but A and that the mileage, 3500 miles, indicated by the
speedometer represented the total distance which the car had been driven. But as A
well knew, the car had been used for taxi service prior to the time when he acquired it,
and had been drive some 25,000 miles. Some time after A bought the new car, he took
it to C's garage for repairs. A few days later B discovered the fraud which had been
practiced on him, and demanded the new car back, indicating his willingness to return
the used car which A had traded in. C, however, refused to give up the car he had
repaired until his charges had been paid. B thereupon sued C in replevin. What
decision?
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IV
A had $800 on deposit in a savings account in X bank. A lived at the home of B, and
C, the daughter of B, was a great favorite with A. One evening while Mr. and Mrs. B
and A were sitting at the dining room table in their home, A referred to his bank
account and said: "I've got a will here** I understand I have got to have two
signatures". Thereupon, at the request of A, Mr. and Mrs. B. signed the following
document as witnesses: "Dear Carlotta: I give to you my money in X bank. (Signed)
A". As soon as this instrument was signed by the witnesses, A put it in his bank book
and stepped into the parlor where C was, saying, "Carlotta, I will give you this", and
he handed her the bank book with the quoted document folded inside. Though A was
apparently in good health at the time, he died two months later, leaving one sister, the
defendant, who resided in Denmark. C filed a petition for the probate of the quoted
document as a will, but probate was denied because of ineffective attestation. The
administrator of A's estate starts an action in court designed to determine whether the
savings account should be paid to C, or whether it should be distributed to A's
surviving relatives. What result?
V
In 1600, A, owning Blackacre in fee simple, without consideration executed and
delivered to his brother B a deed in which the conveying language was to the effect that
the grantor A "bargains and sells Blackacre to the use of B so long as he shall reside
on the premises, remainder to the use of the heirs of B". B lived on the premises for
his lifetime and died devising the land to C, who then entered. B's only heir D sues C
in an action in the nature of ejectment. What decision?
VI
L, the owner in fee of Blackacre, leased the premises to T for ninety-nine years.
Thereafter, but before the ninety-nine year term had expired, L and T got together and
executed a new lease of the same premises, the new lease running for a term of fifty
years. The new lease contained a provision to the effect that the lease was made subject
to the condition that in case the sale of intoxicating liquors should become illegal, then
"this lease shall thereupon become null and void, and the lessor or his successors may
re-enter upon the premises and repossess themselves of the same as if this lease had not
been made". Ten years after the new lease took effect, the sale of intoxicating liquors
became unlawful by virtue of a constitutional amendment, and thereupon L went upon
the premises and demanded possession thereof from T, who refused to leave. L now
sues T in ejectment. What result?
VII
At the request of A, a form deed was signed by 0, the deed naming A as grantee. At
the time 0 signed the deed it contained no description of any land to be effected
thereby. That part of the deed was left blank. A took the deed away with him, and
after procuring the description of the land owned by 0, which was typewritten on a
separate piece of paper, he pasted this typewritten description onto the deed in the
blank space where the description would normally be found. A then persuaded a notary
public to fill out and sign and seal the certificate of acknowledgment as if 0 had
appeared before him. A then took the deed to plaintiff bank, which loaned money to
A, taking as security for the loan a mortgage by A on the premises described in the
deed. The bank knew nothing of the circumstances just related. A, having failed to pay
the debt secured by the mortgage, the bank proceeded to foreclose and 0 claims the
premises free of any mortgage lien. What result?
VIII
A executed a deed of Blackacre to B and his heirs, the deed containing full covenants
of title. As a matter of fact, at the time of the execution of this deed, Blackacre was
owned by X instead of by A. Later on, however, A bought the land from X, who gave
him a deed therefor, and shortly thereafter A died. The land was vacant at that time,
and P, the only child of A, (who had died intestate) took possession. Not long
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thereafter, the defendant entered into possession, ousting P from the land. In an action
now by P against defendant in'ejectment, the latter seeks to rely upon the above facts,
showing that the right to the possession of the premises is in B, and that, therefore, P's
action should fail. What result?
IX
0, the owner in fee of four tracts of land, was confined to a hospital suffering from
the effects of a severe fall. She also had irregular heart action from which her doctors
expected sudden death at any time. In that situation she sent for her undertaker, who
at her request prepared four deeds in favor of four grantees, relatives of O's deceased
husband. 0 properly executed these deeds and handed them to the undertake saying:
"Take those papers and keep them, and then in a few days when I get better I will be
up and get them". The following day her condition was obviously worse and an
intimate friend who then visited her testified that 0 said that she knew she was dying
and that "I have made some deeds and they are all right, and I am only sorry that I
haven't time to make arrangements for my personal property". She later sent for her
minister who prayed for her, and she expired early the next morning. In an action by
the grantees in these four deeds to recover possession of the land, which action was
contested by O's heirs, the foregoing facts appeared, and also that 0 had a strong
prejudice against wills, having a firm belief that wills could be broken, as her mother's
had been. It further appeared that she had conceived a hatred of her own relatives on
account of injustices to which she thought they had subjected her in early life. What
result?
X
On February 10th, 0, the owner in fee of Blackacre, executed and acknowledged a
written contract to sell it to B for $10,000, of which one-half was paid in cash, balance
to be paid in installments as stated in the contract. This contract was not recorded. On
April 5th, 0 executed a deed, effective in form, conveying Blackacre to X and his heirs.
X paid value therefor and knew nothing of the arrangement between 0 and B. On April
20th, B recorded his contract, and a month later, when he had tendered the balance of
the purchase price, demanded a deed from 0 and X. The latter refused, and B sued to
compel the giving of the deed. It may be understood that a statute of the State where

the land is provides: "All deeds, mortgages and other instruments affecting the title to
land shall be acknowledged and recorded in the county in which the land lies, and if not
so recorded within ninety days of the time of execution, they shall be void as to all
subsequent purchasers for value without notice." What result?
Constitutional Law
P.C. Kauper
May 30, 1950
The first part of this examination consists of objective questions printed separately.
The second part consists of the five essay questions printed below.
I
The statutes of State M governing elections and the qualifications of voters provide,
inter alia, that no person shall be eligible to vote in any state election unless he is a
citizen of the United States and unless he is properly registered as a voter at the city
clerk's office.
At an election for state officers held in State M, X was refused a ballot by Y, the
election official, on the ground that he was not a citizen of the United States and also
on the further ground that he had not registered in advance. X thereafter brought a civil
suit for damages in the state court against Y for alleged unlawful denial of X's right to
vote. In his suit X claimed that he was a citizen of the United States by birth; he also
claimed that he had properly registered in advance and that the city clerk had failed to
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keep a proper record of his registration. The case reached the supreme court of State
M which held that X stated no cause of action. The state supreme court found that X
had not proved his citizenship since evidence in the record did not prove his birth in this
country; it also found that X had not proved his advance registration as required by
statute.
Sec. 1257 of the Federal Judicial Code, defining the appellate jurisdiction of the
United States Supreme Court, reads as follows:
"Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in the question the validity of a statute of any state on
the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.
(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States
is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in question on the
ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States,
or where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the
Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised under,
the United States."
Under the language of the Judicial Code quoted above, does the Supreme Court ofthe
United States have jurisdiction to review the state supreme court's decision in X's
case?
II
X, a Negro, was indicted on a manslaughter charge in a state court. It was alleged in
the indictment that X through the grossly negligent and careless driving of his
automobile had run down a pedestrian named Y and caused his death. The grand jury
which indicted X consisted of both Negroes and whites. X, who was competently
represented by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty and asserted his right under state
law to a jury trial. Six Negroes were included in the venire of persons called for trial
jury service. Under state law the prosecutor and defense were each allowed ten
peremptory challenges in their examination of jurors. The prosecutor in this case
exercised his right of peremptory challenge to exclude all six of the Negroes on the
venire. As a result X was tried by ajury of all white persons.
At the trial the prosecutor did not produce any eye-witness of the alleged negligent
homicide. The one witness called by the state testified that after he had turned the
corner at the intersection where the homicide was alleged to have occurred, he saw X
getting out of his car to examine Y's body which was lying a few feet from the front
wheel of X's car. The same witness testified that he had smelled liquor on X's breath
at that time.
X did not take the stand on his own behalf. The trial court gave the jury the usual
instruction that they were not to find the defendant guilty unless they were satisfied
beyond all reasonable doubt as to his guilt. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. The
trial judge imposed a prison sentence of five years, the minimum allowed by statute in
case of conviction on a manslaughter charge.
An appeal was taken by X to the state supreme court alleging a number of legal errors
in the trial court proceeding, including some that raised questions under the
Constitution of the United States. (It may be assumed that X's attorney in the course
of the trial made timely and proper objections and motions to preserve the right to
review of all legal questions raised in the course of the trial.) The state supreme court
on review affirmed the judgment. It held that there was no legal error in the selection
of the petit jury; that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilty by the
jury on the negligent homicide charge; that in any event the evidence supported a
finding that the defendant was guilty of the crime of driving a car while intoxicated an offense which under state law also carried a minimum penalty of five years in prison.
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Does X have any substantial basis for petitioning the Supreme Court of the United
States to review his case on the ground of denial of constitutional rights?
III and IV
A municipal ordinance of the City of Centerville in State M provides that no public
meeting or assembly shall be held in the municipal park unless the persons sponsoring
such a meeting shall first secure from the chief of police a license authorizing the same.
A license fee of $1 is required to be paid at the time application is made for the license.
The chief of police is required under the ordinance to grant the permit unless he finds
the proposed meeting will conflict with a previously scheduled and licensed meeting in
the park or unless he finds that the proposed meeting because of its anticipated size will
interfere with the general public's enjoyment and use of the park's recreational
facilities. The ordinance further provides that in all cases where a license is issued, the
municipal police shall give maximum protection to the meeting when held and directs
the chief of police to deputize as many assistants as needed in order to preserve order
and protect the meeting. In case a meeting is held or attempted to be held in the
municipal park in violation of the licensing requirement, each person sponsoring such
a meeting or attempted meeting is subject to a fine of $100 and 30 days jail sentence.
A meeting of Jehovah's Witnesses was advertised to be held on Sunday afternoon in
the municipal park of Centerville. X, a resident of Centerville and leader of the local
group of Witnesses, sponsored the meeting. No attempt was made to secure a license
as required by the ordinance. The advertised meeting was in the nature of a regional
rally of Jehovah's Witnesses. Members of the sect residing in the nearby town of
Smithville in State R were invited to attend.
On the Sunday afternoon when the meeting was scheduled to be held, a group of
hostile residents of Centerville under the organized direction and effort of A, B and C,
blockaded the road leading from Smithville to Centerville and attempted to prevent the
caravan of cars carrying Smithville Witnesses from entering Centerville. Violence
ensued and assaults were made on the Witnesses. However, the Witnesses succeeded
in breaking through the blockade and proceeded to the municipal park in Centerville
where they then assembled with the local group of Witnesses and started to conduct a
religious assembly which was to consist of hymns, prayers and addresses. But again
the same group of hostile residents led by A, B and C, interrupted the meeting,
assaulted the speakers on the platform, including X, and in the end forced a disorderly
breaking-up of the meeting. P, the local chief of police, and other police officers were
present and witnessed the entire affair but made no attempt to give protection to the
meeting or to arrest those who interfered with the meeting.
As a result of this incident the following three proceedings are now instituted. Give
your opinion on the question raised with respect to each of them:
(1) X is arrested and tried in the municipal court of Centerville on the charge of
sponsoring a meeting attempted to be held in the municipal park without having applied
for a license as required by the ordinance. Does X have a valid defense under the
Constitution of the United States?
(2) X institutes a damage action in the federal district court against P, the chief of
police, under the authority of Sec. 43 of Title 8 of the U.S. Code, reading as follows:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
Does X have a valid basis for a damage action under this statute?
(3) The federal district attorney initiates a criminal proceeding in the federal district
court against A, B and C under authority of Sec. 19 of the U.S. Criminal Code, reading
as follows:
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If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen
in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the
same ....
they shall be fined not more than $5,000 and imprisoned not more than ten
years ......
Is there a valid basis for indicting A, B and C under this criminal statute?
V
A statute of State M makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate in the hiring
and discharge of employees on the ground of race, religion or national ancestry.
Violation of the statute is made a criminal offense. The statute provides that in a
proceeding brought in a state court against an employer for alleged violation of the
statute, where the complaining witness charges that he was denied ajob because of his
race, religion or national ancestry, evidence shall be admitted to determine the
numerical proportion in the community of the racial, religious or ancestral group to
which the complaining witness belongs and by reference to which the discrimination
is alleged. The statute further provides that in the event it is determined that the
employer does not employ a proportionate number of employees in such a group equal
to the groups proportion in the community, the employer shall be found guilty of
violating the statute.
The Y Products Corporation which operates a small factory in the City of Brownville
in State M, is now charged with a violation of the statute on the ground that in refusing
employment to X, a citizen of Japanese ancestry, it discriminated against him because
of his national ancestry. Evidence was introduced at the trial court showing that 5%
ofthe residents of Brownville were persons of Japanese ancestry and that the defendant
Corporation employed only 2% of persons of such ancestry. In defense the Corporation
challenged the constitutionality of the statute on several grounds. It was permitted to
introduce evidence which showed that X was not qualified for the position he had
applied for; also that under a union contract it had with its employees, the job
classifications that could be filled by persons of Japanese ancestry were limited and that
the hiring of X for the position he had wanted would have violated the union agreement.
The trial court overruled the constitutional objections to the statute and instructed the
jury to consider the evidence and return a verdict in accordance with the terms of the
statute. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and the court imposed the statutory fine
of $1,000 on the defendant Corporation.
Does the Corporation have any substantial basis under the Federal Constitution for
appealing the case on the ground of invalidity of the statute?
Property
Allan F. Smith & Ralph W. Aigler
June 1, 1950
I
A state statute provides: "The owner of any motor vehicle shall be responsible for any
damages caused by the negligent operation thereof, regardless of whether said owner
is himself driving said vehicle at the time such damages are caused."
On January 1, 1943, Black was the owner of a certain Ford car. It was taken on that
date by Clark, who repainted it and used it for his own personal and business purposes
until January, 1948. During that month Clark negligently drove the Ford into P's car.
Through the police, Black learned that the Ford was in a local garage, and without
Clark's consent he repossessed it. Two days later, he was sued by P, who asked
judgment for the damages caused by the negligent operation of the car. The statute of
limitations for actions to recover personal property is four years. Can P recover from
Black? Why or why not?
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II
John Jones left his 1948 Ford sedan in a parking lot owned and operated by D. The
lot was merely an unenclosed vacant comer lot in the business district of Detroit. Two
driveway entrances were cut through the curbs on each side of the lot, and a small
building housed the attendant. Plaintiff left his car, with the keys in it, in the lot about
9:00 am., telling the attendant he would return about 6:00 p.m. He received a check
with a number on it, and a similarly numbered check was placed on the car windshield.
The attendant parked the car. It was customary for patrons to pay charges at the
attendant's building and then drive their cars away themselves.
About 3:00 p.m., X appeared at the attendant's building with a letter reading as
follows:
"To the parking lot owner: The bearer of this letter is my brother. Please allow him
to use the keys to my car to remove some things from the back of the car. My car is
a '48 Ford, license JX-43-44, and the parking check I hold is numbered F-4374-49.
You will greatly oblige me by doing so."
The letter was signed "John Jones."
D himself was in charge. He found the car in question, verified the parking check
number, the license number, and checked the registration slip which was attached to the
steering wheel. He found the car was registered in the name of John Jones. He
thereupon gave the keys to the bearer of the letter and returned to the building. About
five minutes later, X returned to the building carrying a small cloth sack and a suitcase.
He returned the keys to D, and thanked him for his co-operation. John Jones picked up
his car at 6:00 p.m.
X was an imposter. The letter was a forgery. The suitcase, reasonably valued at
$25.00, belonged to Jones, and the cloth sack contained jewelry owned by Jones,
having a value of $ 10,000. Jones brings suit against D to recover $10,025.00. Can he
recover? Why or why not?
III
0 was the owner in fee of Blackacre on which there is a ten-story hotel. One of the
passenger elevators needed replacing. 0 made an arrangement for the purchase of such
elevator from the Otis Elevator Company, the purchase price of $ 10,000 being payable
$1,000 in cash, the remainder payable in three years, secured, as to the latter sum, by
chattel mortgage. The elevator was delivered to the premises by the company by March
1st, and installed March 5th. On February 29th the mortgage was duly executed by 0
and recorded March 18th in the office of the County Clerk of the county in which 0
resides. On March 12th 0 sold and conveyed Blackacre to P, who paid value therefor,
knowing nothing about the circumstances of the installation or of the unpaid purchase
price of the elevator.
A statute of the state declares that "chattel mortgages shall be deemed fraudulent and
void as to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees of the chattels mortgaged, unless the
mortgage shall be recorded within thirty days in the office of the County Clerk of the
county of the residence of the mortgagor."
On maturity of the debt for which the mortgage was given as security, it was unpaid,
and the Elevator Company, pursuant to a provision in the mortgage authorizing the
mortgagee in such event to repossess himself of the subject matter, started the work of
removal. P started action to restrain the company from continuance of such work.
What result?
IV
Blackacre and Whiteacre are adjoining lots. In 1927, the former was owned and
occupied by A, the latter by B, the two being brothers. In that year, A completed a
building on Blackacre, the wall on the side towards Whiteacre being built up to the line
between the two lots. The windows in that wall were of the casement type, opening
outward. When opened these windows swung in an arc over Whiteacre. They were
often opened and left open. No communication ever took place between A and B
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regarding this encroachment. In 1940, B died, leaving a will by which he devised
Whiteacre to X for life, remainder to Y in fee. After B's death, the operation of the
windows continued as before until the present time. X died in 1946. Y is now erecting
a building on his lot designed to occupy its full width. Realizing that when erected this
building will prevent the use of his windows as he has been using them since 1927, A
starts suit to enjoin Y from such interference. What result?
V
0 is the owner in fee simple of Blackacre. He wants to place the legal ownership
thereof in T in fee and the equitable ownership in fee in B. He consults you as a lawyer
as to what he should do to bring about that result. How would you advise him if you
were face with the question in
(a). 1500?
(b). 1550?
(c). 1800?
VI
Pursuant to a valid written contract for the sale of Blackacre from V to P, V signed
a warranty deed with all the formalities required in the state. Under an agreement
executed by V and P, the deed was given to John P. Absconder, with instructions that
he was to keep it until P had paid the sum of $2,000, and then he was to give P the
deed. The payments of $100 a month were to be made to Absconder and by him
remitted to V. For 18 months P paid the amounts regularly. Mr. Absconder, however,
remitted only $200 to V, and has now disappeared, leaving no assets or forwarding
address. P tenders $200 and demands the deed. V insists that he will give him the deed
only upon the payment of $1,800. What would be your opinion? Why?
VII
D, owner in fee simple of the land described below, executed and delivered an
effective conveyance thereof to P. The deed described the premises as follows: "The
Northeast Quarter of Section 9, Township 2, North, Range 6, East, County of X, State
of Y, except the South thirty feet thereof, reserved for road purposes." The deed was
properly recorded. D also owned the Southeast Quarter of the above mentioned Section
9. Two years after the execution of the deed, D began to erect a barn which was to be
located principally on the Southeast Quarter, but extending some twenty feet into the
south thirty feet of the Northeast Quarter of Section 9, described above. Has P any
grounds upon which he may prevent the erection of the barn?
VI
A state statute provides: "The term 'heirs' or other technical words of inheritance
shall not be necessary to create and convey an estate in fee simple, and every estate in
lands which shall be granted, conveyed or devised, shall be deemed a fee simple unless
it appears that by express limitation, by construction or by operation of law that a
lesser estate has been granted."
0, owner of Blackacre, executed and delivered an effective conveyance thereof, in
which he conveyed Blackacre, "To P so long as P shall continue to operate a retail store
thereon." P continued to operate a retail store on Blackacre until his death on January
10, 1950. His widow is still operating the store, claiming a common law dower interest
in Blackacre. 0 brings an action of ejectment to recover possession of Blackacre.
What result? Why?
Ix
A state statute provides: "In cases where, by the common law, any person or persons
might become seized of lands in fee tail, such estate tail shall be and remain an absolute
estate in fee simple to the issue of the first donee in tail."
By an effective deed 0 conveyed Blackacre to "X and the heirs of his body." At the
time of the conveyance X had two children, A and B. On June 3, 1944, while X was
still living, A and his wife executed and delivered a warranty deed, with the usual
covenants, in which he purported to convey to P an undivided one-half interest in
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Blackacre. A died intestate in 1947, leaving surviving a widow W and child C. X died
intestate in 1949. Your client asks you to tell him what person or persons he should
negotiate with to buy Blackacre. What is your advice? Why?
X
A owns Lots 1 and 2, Smith's Subdivision, City of X, Y County, state of your
preference. A and his family live on Lot 2, and B wants to buy Lot 1. They have
agreed on the following terms:
(1) B will pay $2,000 for the lot.
(2) A is to have the right to use the westerly six feet of Lot 1 as part of a common
driveway.
(3) B is to have the right to use the easterly six feet of Lot 2 as a part of a common
driveway.
(4) A cannot furnish an abstract of title, but B is willing to accept a deed by which
A will guarantee that he, A, owns the lot; that there are no mortgages or
judgment liens on the land; and that if anything ever happens in the future so
that B or his successors lose the land, A will have to make good the damages.
(5) B is married and wants to own the land with his wife, C, so that it will all
belong to the survivor of himself and his wife.
(A) Draw the deed which will accomplish the desires of A and B.
Tell in detail how you will have the deed executed, explaining your reasons for
(B)
your requirements.
Constitutional Law
Paul C. Kauper

May 24, 1960

This examination consists of eight essay questions.
1.
Congress enacts a Fair Election Code containing inter alia the following provision:
"Every person eligible to vote at a general election to fill a national or state office
shall be entitled to absent himself from his place of employment for the purpose of
voting for a period of two hours during the time polls are open, without penalty or
deduction of wages on account of such absence, provided that the period may be
designated by the employer."
An employer denying a person the statutory right or penalizing the exercise of it is
subject to fine.
Thereafter, on the day of an election for state officers the polls are open in Ann Arbor,
Michigan, from 7:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. The regular hours of employment for the office
force of the Pioneer Insurance Co. in this city are 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. with an hour
off for lunch. The company authorizes dismissal of all office employees at 4:00 p.m.
on election day for the purpose of enabling them to vote. Several employees
nevertheless leave at 3:00 p.m. and suffer deductions of an hour's compensation each.
The company is charged with violating the statute.
Does the company have any substantial constitutional arguments it may assert in
defense? Discuss.
II.
In 1804 the United States with the consent of the Tuscarora Indians who then lived
in North Carolina arranged the sale of their lands in North Carolina under an agreement
with this tribe whereby they agreed to move to upper New York on land purchased for
them by the United States out of the proceeds of the sale of the North Carolina land.
The land purchased for their ownership and occupancy in New York consisted of about
4,000 acres. In connection with the acquisition of this land and the settling of the
Tuscaroras there, the United States entered into a treaty with the tribe which contained
the following clause:
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"Now the United States acknowledges all the lands within the aforementioned
boundaries to be the property of the Tuscarora Nation, and the United States will
never claim the same, nor disturb the Tuscarora Nation in the free use and enjoyment
thereof; but it shall remain theirs, until they choose to sell the same to the people of
the United States. .. "
A Congressional statute adopted in 1834 provides as follows:
"No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim
thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or
equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the
Constitution."
The State of New York is now interested in developing a public power project that
will utilize the water power potential of the Niagara River. This is a large project and
will require the flooding of a very large ground area in order to develop the reservoir
planned as part of the project. Under this plan the flooded lands will include about
1000 acres of the land owned by the Tuscaroras.
Under the Federal Power Act of 1935 the Federal Power Commission is authorized
to grant licenses to public and private agencies for the development of water power
projects on navigable waters of the United States, and in this connection is authorized
to empower licensees to exercise the power of eminent domain to the extent needed to
carry out the licensee's project as approved by the Commission. The State of New
York applies to the Federal Power Commission for a license to develop the water
project on the Niagara River and incident thereto asks for authority to condemn the
1000 acres of land owned by the Tuscaroras.
After hearing and over the objections of the Tuscarora Indians the Commission grants
the license and condemnation authority to the State of New York as requested.
Determinations of the Commission are subject to review for errors of law by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Do the Tuscarora Indians have any substantial
basis for attacking the legality of the Commission's action? Discuss. (It may be
assumed that all objections were properly raised in the first instance before the
Commission.)
III.
Police of the City of Lewisburg in State K entered a cafe where they observed that D
was dancing by himself in that part of the cafe reserved for dancing. D would dance
for a while, then rest, then resume his dancing. Patrons sitting in the cafe were mildly
amused and voiced no objections to the owner of the cafe. Upon inquiry by the police,
the owner of the cafe stated that D had not had any drinks, that he had been there about
half an hour, and that he had no objections to D's action so long as he did not offend
his patrons. The police recognized D as a person who had previously successfully
resisted several arrests on minor charges by demanding counsel and the right to a
hearing. They questioned D about his presence in the cafe, and he stated that he was
simply passing the time while waiting for a bus. The police thereupon arrested him on
a charge of loitering, and when D, without offering physical resistance, resorted to
spirited argument in objecting to the arrest, the police further charged him with
disorderly conduct.
The loitering charge was based on the local ordinance which provides as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person.., who cannot give a satisfactory account of
himself... to sleep, lie, loaf or trespass in or about any premises, buildings, or other
structures within this city, without first having obtained the consent of the owner or
controller of said premises, structure, or building..."
The disorderly conduct ordinance simply reads that "whoever shall be found guilty of
disorderly conduct in the city shall be fined..."
D was tried before a municipal court judge on these two charges. The evidence
consisted solely of the facts as stated above. Notwithstanding the request of D's
counsel that the case be dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence and that a conviction
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would result in denial of D's constitutional rights, thejudge found D guilty and ordered
him to pay a fine of $100 or, in the alternative, to spend 60 days in the municipal jail.
Under local law no appeal is permitted in any case from a conviction by a municipal
judge unless the fine exceeds $100 or the jail sentence exceeds 60 days.
D's attorney applies to the state supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus, but this
is denied on the ground that the court has no authority to issue the writ under these
circumstances. However, the state supreme court grants a stay of execution of the
sentence for thirty days to permit D to pursue any remedy available to him in order to
raise his claim of denial of federal constitutional right.
Does D have any basis for attacking his conviction, and what remedy, if any, may he
have in order to get his case before the United States Supreme Court?
IV.
State R levies an excise tax on the privilege of purchasing common carrier
transportation tickets at the rate of 5%of the purchase price paid by the passenger for
the ticket. Under the statute the duty is imposed on the carrier selling the ticket to
collect the tax by adding it to the price of the ticket and to forward the tax so collected
to the state authorities.
The City of Smithville in State R levies a municipal business tax on all persons doing
business in the city at the rate of 3% of gross receipts derived from the business.
X operates a travel agency in Smithville. He has contractual arrangements with a
number of steamship companies that operate between the United States and foreign
countries, whereby he is authorized to sell steamship tickets, subject to approval at the
home office. He receives a commission on all tickets sold at the rate of 10% of the
ticket price.
During 1959 X sold tickets for the National Steamship Lines as well as for other
steamship companies. National, which is incorporated in New York, has no office,
furniture, or employees in State R. Pursuant to the company's instructions, X did not
include the 5%tax as part of the price of tickets sold for the company. State R now
brings a proceeding against National in the state court of the county where X operates
his travel agency to collect the tax which under the statute should have been charged
to the customers who bought the tickets. Under the statute any company selling
transportation tickets is made personally liable for the tax in case it fails to collect the
same as part of the purchase price. The suit is commenced by serving process on and
sending notice by registered mail to National Steamship Lines.
A suit is also brought by City of Smithville against X to collect the 3% business
receipts tax which X failed to pay with respect to the commissions he received in 1959
for his services in selling transportation tickets.
Do National Steamship Lines and X have any substantial constitutional defenses they
may assert in these proceedings? Discuss.
V.
The City of Centerville in State M adopted a master plan for the development of the
city's resources and at the same time enacted a zoning ordinance which implemented
the general plan and which classified all land in the city with respect to permissible land
uses. One land use established by the ordinance is M-1 which permits use of the land
for purpose of light industry only. The city is very much interested in attracting new
light industry in order to increase employment and add to the tax base.
0 owns a substantial piece of undeveloped land which is classified as M-1. He has
no intention of developing a factory which fits the light industry definition. X
Manufacturing Co. has approached him and made an offer for the purchase of the land
which it would like for purpose of light industrial use, but 0 feels that he would rather
hold on to the land since he is sure that with the city's future development he will get
a substantially higher price for it five years from now. This matter is called to the
attention of the city council which then enacts an ordinance which provides that if the
City Planning Commission, after a hearing, determines that a present owner's failure
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to develop land as permitted under the zoning ordinance will interfere with the city's
economic development as projected by the master plan, the Commission may direct the
sale of this land at a fair price to be determined by the Commission and on such terms
as it sees fit, to any person who is interested in buying and who agrees to develop the
land in accordance with the use for which the land is zoned. The ordinance further
provides that the Commission may in such case grant the prospective purchaser an
option to purchase the land at the fair price determined by the Commission, provided,
however, that the option period may not extend beyond three years.
Acting under this authorization and following a hearing, but over O's objection, the
Planning Commission grants X Manufacturing Co. an option to buy O's land for
$75,000, subject to the conditions (1) that before the company can exercise the option
it must secure the Commission's approval of its plan for the factory it proposes to
develop and to post bond or other security to assure that it will go ahead with its plans
when approved, and (2)that the option will expire unless exercised within three years.
0 now files a declaratory judgment proceeding in the federal district court, naming the
City and X Manufacturing Co. as defendants, and asking for a declaration that the
City's action in forcing the option agreement on him is invalid under the Constitution
of the United States, and that the option is null and void. Does 0 state a good case?
Discuss.
VI.
The owner of a department store operates a lunch counter as part of the store's
services and facilities. The management has no rules restricting who may patronize the
store generally, but it permits only white persons to be served at the lunch counter.
A group of Negro students enter the store and sit down at vacant seats at the lunch
counter. The waitresses refuse to serve them, but the Negroes persist in occupying the
seats. The manager of the store then calls the police who arrest the Negroes on a
charge of criminal trespass. The Negroes are tried by the circuit court of the state and
found guilty and given jail sentences. They appeal the case to the state supreme court,
raising questions on the interpretation both of the state's criminal trespass statute and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The state supreme court
affirms the conviction. In meeting the arguments of the appellants, the state supreme
court holds (1) that the criminal trespass statute makes it a crime for anyone to enter,
occupy or stay on property contrary to the expressed will of the owner; (2) that
although as a matter of state law, any person who engages in a business establishment
and holds himself out to the public to do business has an obligation to serve all the
public, nevertheless, he may at his discretion refuse to serve any particular class or
classes of people if he has reason to believe that his business will otherwise be injured;
(3) that in any event the owner's policy in this case in restricting the use of his
luncheon facilities to white persons was in accord with the state's general policy of
requiring racial segregation in public places. The court concluded that the recognition
and enforcement of the owner's property rights raised no question under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Negro defendants apply to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari to review the state supreme court's affirmance of their conviction. The
Supreme Court grants the application.
What issues may be raised before the Supreme Court in this review proceeding, and
how should it dispose of the case? Discuss.
VII.
A statute of State M makes it a criminal offense for any person to sell to any person
below 18 years of age any book, magazine, or other publication which because of its
contents, including any part thereof, tends to corrupt the morals of youth.
D operates a store which carries a large stock of books and magazines. Two months
ago he received a communication from the police office stating that the chief of police
in conjunction with the local prosecuting attorney had determined that the books listed
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in the communication were books that came within the prohibition of the statute
referred to above. The chief of police stated that the sales of any of these books would
lead to arrest and prosecution under the statute. Included in the list was the book
"Forbidden Allurement" which D had for sale in his store.
Four weeks later D sold a copy of "Forbidden Allurement" to a young man. D made
no inquiry about his age. Do had not read the book and was not familiar with its
contents. The book in some of its passages vividly depicts sexual relations in a context
of violence and crime. D is now arrested and prosecuted in the state court for violating
the statute. In the hearing before the local court, the prosecutor tenders the book in
evidence, calls the court's attention to the objectionable passages, and proves that D
had received notice from the chief ofpolice that the book was on the proscribed list that
D sold the book to the young man in question, and that the young man was 17 years old
What constitutional defenses, if any, may D assert in this proceedings
ViI
New York State levies an income tax on all the income of persons residing in the state,
regardless of source, and on the income earned within the state by nonresidents.
Nonresidents are taxed at the same rate as residents except that they are not allowed the
benefit of any personal exemptions or deductions in determining their taxable New
York income. With respect to income by way of compensation for services, the New
York law requires employers to withhold the income tax from salaries and wages and
account for the same to the state tax authorities.
The taxation by New York of income earned in New York by nonresident commuters
who work in New York but live in other sates has provoked the ill-will of neighboring
states who have threatened various forms of reprisal measures.
To meet this situation New York amends its income tax law to provide that effective
January 1, 1961, it will exempt from its income tax law income earned in New York
by a nonresident who is taxable on that income by his home state, provided that New
York is authorized by that state to compel the employer to withhold the tax and remit
the same to the employee's home state. In response to this New York legislation, New
Jersey, which does not levy a general income tax, passes a statute which levies a tax on
income earned in New York by New Jersey residents, this tax to go into effect on
January 1, 1961. The tax is levied on the same basis, with the same exemptions and
deductions, and at the same rate as the New York income tax. The New Jersey statute
authorizes New York to impose on employers the duty of withholding the New Jersey
income tax from salaries and wages paid persons who are New Jersey residents.
What constitutional objections, if any, may be urged against this arrangement when
it goes into effect, and who would have standing to raise the question? Discuss.
END
Property (Section 1)
O.L. Browder

May 15, 1970

I.
Griffith owned Lots 42 and 43 in a certain subdivision. He lived in a house on Lot 42.
Lot 43 was vacant. Griffith laid out a driveway along the side of Lot 42 which was
adjacent to Lot 43. He also grew a hedge along the outer edge of the driveway, which
extended the full length of Lot 42 from front to rear. In 1952 Griffith duly executed
and delivered a deed describing Lot 43 to Eddy. Eddy took possession and built a
house thereon. Nothing was said between them about the boundary between the two
lots, but after the conveyance Griffith continued to use the driveway and trimmed the
hedge.
In 1962 Griffith died leaving a will which devised Lot 42 to his son Samuel. Within
a year the decree of distribution of the probate court awarded Samuel title to Lot 42.
Samuel took possession and within two months leased Lot 42 to Thayer for a term of
five years. In 1968, at the end of Thayer's term, Samuel took possession of the lot and
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made it his place of residence. The driveway continued to be used by these successive
occupants of Lot 42.
In 1969 Eddy decided to sell Lot 43, and before doing so, had a survey made of his
lot. The survey showed that the driveway and hedge encroached five feet onto Lot 43.
Thereupon Eddy began suit to quiet his title to Lot 43. The applicable period of
limitation for actions to recover possession of land is 15 years.
What defenses, if any, might Samuel assert against this suit? Discuss.
II.
Murphy owned a tract of land which he duly platted and subdivided into 495 lots. He
sold 69 lots, each deed containing the following restriction, among others:
"Clause 4. No building of more than two apartments shall be erected
on less than sixty (60) feet of frontage, except lots 134, 135, 136, and
137."
Later Murphy died devising by his will the remaining lots to his two sons. The sons
issued deeds to 354 other lots, which contained the same restrictions imposed in the
original 69 deeds, except that clause 4 was amended to read as follows:
"No building of more than two apartments shall be erected except on
lots no. 134, 135, 136, 137."
The remaining 72 lots were sold by the Murphy sons, the deeds containing only the
statement that they were "subject to restrictions record."
One Potter bought Lot 67, which was one of the original 69 lots. One Pierce bought
Lot 254, which was one of the second group of 354 lots. One Dobbins bought Lot 165,
which was one of the third group of 72 lots.
(a) Dobbins undertook to build on his lot a building consisting of more than two
apartments, but the frontage of this lot was 75 feet. In other words, this building would
not violate the restriction imposed in the deeds to the original 69 lots, if applicable, but
would violate the restriction imposed on the second group of 354 lots, if applicable.
Until this time only single family dwellings had been built on any lot. Does either
Potter or Pierce have the right to object to the building which Dobbins proposes to
build on his lot? Explain.
(b) Suppose Pierce, whose lot had a frontage of 55 feet, undertook to build there on
a building consisting of four apartments. Again assume that until this time only single
family dwellings had been built on any lot. Would Potter have standing to object?
Explain.
In.
Grimes owned a parcel of land which he contracted to sell to Evans. The contract
called for delivery of a deed by Grimes, naming Evans as grantee, to the Fidelity
Abstract and Title Company, and for payments to be made on the purchase price by
Evans to the company over a period of five years, upon completion of which, at any
time during the five-year period, Evans was to be entitled to receive Grimes' deed.
Grimes' wife, Helen, was not a party to this contract. The contract was not recorded.
Grimes prepared and signed a deed to Evans, which was also signed by Helen Grimes,
had the deed duly acknowledged, and delivered it to the title company. Evans took
possession of the land as provided by the terms of the contract.
Three years later Grimes died leaving a will by which he left all his real estate to his
son George, and which named his wife Helen executrix of his estate. Helen was duly
appointed executrix, and she listed the above land in the inventory of Grimes' estate.
She renounced her interest in certain personal property given her by the will, and
elected to take dower in all of the testator's real estate, as she was permitted to do by
the law of the state. Then she went to the title company and persuaded an employee to
return the Evans deed to her, saying that the deed no longer was any good. In due
course the probate court decreed a life estate in Helen in the land in question, with a
remainder in the testator's son George. Soon thereafter Helen and George joined in a
contract with one Bonner to convey this land to him in fee simple, in consideration of

1997]

SHEPPARD-APPENDL

the promise by him to pay the purchase price stated therein. At this time Bonner had
no knowledge of the contract with Evans.
Soon thereafter Bonner discovered that Evans was in possession of the property,
asked Evans what claims he had upon the property, and told him what had happened.
Evans informed Bonner of his contract with Grimes. Evans then tendered to the title
company the balance of the purchase price under his contract and demanded delivery
of Grimes' deed. When told that the deed was no longer in their possession, he sought
advice as to his rights and remedies in respect to the land in question. How would you
advise him?
IV.
One Simms, aged 86, entered a hospital for an operation. After entering the hospital
and before the operation, Simms directed an attorney to prepare a power of attorney in
favor of his nephew, Clay Smith. A written power of attorney was prepared, signed by
Simms, and delivered to Smith. It authorized Smith to act for Simms in making
deposits and withdrawals in all of Simms' bank accounts and to provide for the
support, care, and maintenance of Simms.
Upon the suggestion of a bank official, Smith opened an account in a bank in the
name of "L. Clay Smith, Trustee." Funds from all accounts in Simms' name were
withdrawn by Smith and deposited in this account. Smith drew several checks on this
account to pay expenses and bills of Simms and to provide him money for his personal
use.
Simms died two months after entering the hospital, without having recovered from his
operation.
Smith filed a claim against Simms' estate by which he asserted that the balance of
$25,400 in the account at Simms' death was his by way of gift. Testimony was heard
from the attorney who prepared the power of attorney that when directions were given
to prepare that instrument, Simms said further that all his funds on deposit should be
placed in one account and that "if there is anything in that account after I get through
all of this and after Clay has taken care of me, I want Clay to have whatever remains
of the cash in the bank." Two other witnesses testified that they heard Simms tell Clay
Smith, "I expect you to have whatever is left."
The probate court disallowed the claim on the ground that no valid gift had been
made. If the statements attributed to Simms are taken as having been proven, is there
a basis for challenging the court's ruling on appeal? Discuss.
END
Constitutional Law
Grant S. Nelson
May 1970
This is a closed book examination. You will have three hours to complete the
examination. The examination contains five questions, each with a suggested allotted
time. The suggested time for each question is intended as a guide to aid you in
budgeting your time over the entire examination and is indicative of the approximate
grading value of each question.
Please note the precise form of the question in each case and comply therewith.
Answer the question upon the basis of the facts given. If additional facts appear to be
necessary to give an adequate answer, state what these facts would be and why they
would be important. Consider all the issues presented by each fact situation; do not
stop just because you feel that a court would clearly resolve one issue in such a way as
to make consideration of the other issues unnecessary. Point this out, but go on to
discuss the other issues.
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I
(50 minutes)
This question consists of 8 statements. With respect to each statement state your
views as to its validity and justify your position in a brief comment and analysis.
Primary credit will be given to your comment and analysis. You should devote no more
than a few sentences to each statement.
a) The "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution gives Congress power to
enact any legislation which will promote the "general welfare" of the people of the
United States.
b) In determining the validity of a particular state regulation of an instrument of
transportation under the commerce clause, the degree to which the state regulation is
consistent with the regulations imposed by other states is a relevant and often important
factor.
c) In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Stell Corp., the Supreme Court could have ruled in

favor of the government on the commerce clause issue on a much narrower basis than
was actually used.
d) In United States v. Butler, the Court adopted a "Madisonian" view of the federal

spending power.
e) A federal excise tax conditioned specifically on an activity or a product being
unlawful under state law will be held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme
Court.
f) Marburyv. Madison exemplifies a case where the United States Supreme Court
could have reached the desired result on a narrower ground, but instead chose to reach
its result by establishing a broad constitutional principle.
g) A state may not constitutionally apply its ad valorem property tax to an interstate
railroad with respect to the land and fixed tangible assets of the railroad permanently
located in the taxing state unless the value is apportioned to reflect the railroad's
intrastate operations in the taxing state.
h) "Under the Compact Clause... the federal questions are the execution, validity
and meaning of federally approved state compacts. The interpretation of the meaning
of the compact controls over a state's application of its own law through the Supremacy
Clause and not by any implied federal power to construe state law ...
II
(40 minutes)
An Arizona statute provides that no vegetables or fruit produced in the state shall be
shipped out of the state unless crated in accordance with regulations issued by the
Commissioner of Agriculture and labeled "Quality Produce Grown in Arizona, The
Sunshine State." Under the authority of this statute the Commissioner has issued
regulations relating to the crating of cantaloupes grown in the state designed to secure
the shipment of only ripe, suitable cantaloupes and also to require that the crating be
done in such a way that the product be evenly distributed in the crate and that there be
no deception or fraud practiced by putting only the better products on top. The
California statute similarly provides that no produce grown in California shall be
shipped out of state except in accordance with crating regulations issued by its
Commissioner of Agriculture and labeled to show it was grown in California. The
California law further provides that any fruit crated but not grown in the state shall not
be shipped out of state except in accordance with crating regulations issued by the
Commissioner and shall carry a label showing it was crated in California and giving the
name and address of the shipper.
A federal statute gives the United States Secretary of Agriculture the authority to
prescribe crating requirements for all produce moving in interstate commerce and to
require labeling which will identify the product and the name and location of the
shipper. Under this authority the Secretary has issued regulations which provide
crating standards for all cantaloupes shipped to wholesalers and retailers in interstate
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commerce and require a labeling to show the name and location of the shipper. The
crating standards are the same as those prescribed under the Arizona and California
regulations.
Quality Fruit Producers, a California corporation with its principal land holdings,
processing plants and home office in Sun Valley, California, is engaged in the
production and marketing of high quality fruit which is shipped throughout the United
States. Cantaloupes are one of its principal products. In 1964 it purchased an
extensive tract of land in Arizona near the California border in order to increase its
cantaloupe production. The land acquisition, clearing and irrigation equipment costs
totaled $2,000,000.
This land yields a very high quality cantaloupe known as Pot-of-Gold. Indeed, this
particular variety, grown only in Arizona because of the unusually favorable soil and
weather conditions there, is considered the best cantaloupe grown in all the Southwest
and commands the best market. Since the company also grows cantaloupes in
California and has a large cooling, processing and crating plant in California only about
thirty miles from the Arizona border, it has until recently shipped all its Arizona-grown
cantaloupes in bulk by truck to its California plant where the cantaloupes are cooled,
inspected, sorted, and crated in accordance with the California requirements and labeled
Pot-of-Gold Cantaloupe, Quality Fruit Producers, Sun Valley, California.
The Arizona authorities now insist that under the Arizona statute the company must
process and crate its Arizona-grown cantaloupes in Arizona, subject to Arizona
inspection, crating and labeling requirements, including the requirement that it be
labeled "Grown in Arizona the Sunshine State", so that distributors, retailers and
consumers will be sure to identify this high quality cantaloupe as an Arizona product.
The company asserts that in order to comply with this requirement it will have to build
a processing, cooling and crating plant in Arizona at a cost of $200,000, duplicating
the plant in nearby California. The Arizona authority now brings suit in the state court
to enjoin the company from shipping any Arizona-grown cantaloupes from the state
except in conformity with the Arizona statute and regulations.
What defense or defenses may the company assert? Discuss.
in
(45 minutes)
In August 1963, Harry Beret, an Army Captain assigned to an American military
advisory mission in Asialand shot and killed an Army Sergeant in a night spot in
Coupville, the capital of Asialand. Both Beret and the victim were off-duty and on a
rest and relaxation leave from their duties as advisors to Asialand armed forces fighting
insurgents in the rural areas of the country.
At the time of the above incident, an Executive Agreement dated July 15, 1962, was
in effect between the United States and Asialand under which exclusive jurisdiction was
conferred on American courts-martial with respect to "any activity by American
servicemen in Asialand constituting an offense under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice of the United States in force as of the date of this agreement." The Agreement
among other things further provided that the United States would initiate proceedings
to exercise that jurisdiction in all instances involving violence whenever reasonably
requested to do so by the Asialand government. As a result of such a request, Beret
was charged with murder under the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("Uniform
Code").
Beret was tried two months later in Coupville by a U.S. Army General Court-Martial,
was found guilty under the murder provision of the Uniform Code and was sentenced
to life imprisonment. During the course of the trial, the government offered evidence
tending to establish that the killing resulted from animosity created by the mutual
interest of both Beret and the victim in a local young woman. Beret's conviction was
approved at all military appellate levels and was finally upheld four years ago by the
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United States Court of Military Appeals. Beret has now served 62 years of his
sentence.
A few days ago Beret requested the legal assistance of our law firm in seeking release
from confinement. I am considering the initiation of a habeas corpus proceeding in an
appropriate federal district court challenging the jurisdiction of the court-martial that
tried Beret. Will I be successful? Explain fully and be sure to discuss all constitutional
issues and problems reasonably raised by the above fact situation.
IV
(35 minutes)
You are a legal research assistant to a United States Senator and the Senator has
informed you about his concern over the safety and environmental problems associated
with the recent onslaught of snowmobiles in certain parts of the country. Snowmobiles
are small snow vehicles utilized primarily for recreational purposes, and, in particular,
to gain access in winter to remote wooded areas. Such vehicles generally are used
personally by their owners in their state of residence, although a very small percentage
of the vehicles are used by ranchers and others for commercial purposes. Although the
manufacturers of these vehicles have been incorporating additional safety and antipollution devices annually in new models, the Senator is convinced that federal
regulatory legislation is needed to insure that after the initial purchase, each owner will
be required to install the latest safety and anti-pollution devices as they are
subsequently developed by technological advances. A summary of this proposed
legislation follows below.
Under the proposed legislation every owner (present and future) of a snowmobile in
the United States will be required to equip his snowmobile with such "additional safety
devices" as the Research Council of the American Recreation Vehicle Association
(ARVA) determines from time to time to be "necessary or highly desirable for safety
purposes." ARVA is a non-profit industry research group financed by the major
manufacturers of recreation vehicles. In order to control air pollution and its effects on
wildlife and vegetation, the legislation provides that each such owner of a snowmobile
shall keep his vehicle equipped with a pollution control device that at all times complies
with the then current pollution emission standards established from time to time by the
United States Public Health Service as being "conducive to the protection of the natural
environment." Any wilful failure to comply with the statute will be a misdemeanor.
Please advise the Senator as to whether Congress would have power to enact such
proposed legislation and as to any other constitutional problems inherent in such
legislation. Include any suggestions as to steps he should take in the legislative process
that would enhance the chances that the legislation ultimately would be upheld in the
courts.
V
(10 minutes)
Reggie Righteous, a federal taxpayer and citizen of the United States has brought an
action in a federal district court against the Secretary of Defense, challenging on
constitutional grounds appropriations and expenditures for the Viet Nam conflict.
Reggie has asked for a declaratory judgment that the appropriations and expenditures
are unconstitutional and a permanent injunction against such action in the future. A
motion to dismiss has been filed by the defendant emphasizing non-substantive
grounds for dismissing Reggie's action. What are those non-substantive grounds?
How should the court rule on them? Discuss very briefly.
END
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PART 5. SELECTED EXAMINATION QUESTIONS:
RECENT EXAMINATIONS
Constitutional Law
Professor Tribe - Harvard
December 15, 1996
EXAM INSTRUCTIONS
This is a take-home, open-book exam. You may use any material you wish in
preparing your answer. There is one question. Your answer should not exceed 2,000
words. Concise answers will be rewarded in grading; unduly long answers will be
penalized. Please type if at all possible, but whether you write or type, use only e
other line and one side of each page. If you write, please make an extra effort to be
legible. If your handwriting is hard to read, please consider printing.
Please do not talk to anyone about the question or your answer. Good luck.
Ames is the fifty-first State of the United States. Orange, a suburban area with a
population of around 35,000 near a major city in Ames, is a largely bedroom
community most of whose adults must commute to their jobs between 20 and 30
minutes away in the city. Some of Orange's residents work locally; many more would
do so if suitable jobs were available in Orange.
Under the Ames Constitution, Orange is governed as a privately owned, for-profit
corporation which is authorized, subject to preemption by state legislation, to
promulgate municipal rules regulating private conduct within its borders; to raise
operational revenues by incurring debt through sales of municipal bonds, by levying
taxes on real and personal property, by operating or investing in profit-making
businesses, and by selling shares of stock to interested investors; and to operate local
police, fire, transportation, and other basic municipal services. The Ames Constitution
specifies that each such corporation is to be governed by a five-member board of
directors, to be called its "Board of County Commissioners," elected by the
corporation's shareholders on a one vote per share basis. The 100,000 outstanding
shares of Orange stock are owned by three shareholders: a large microchip company,
a babyfood manufacturer, and a church.
A multi-billion dollar Silicon Valley giant, Apple Computer, Inc., proposes to build
a $100 million office complex on a 130-acre site in Orange that Apple would like to
lease from Orange. As inducement, Apple offers to sell Orange an equity interest in
Apple Computer, Inc., in the form of a substantial block of (attractively discounted)
Apple stock, and submits a business plan that promises to provide over 3,500 hightech, high-wage jobs for Orange residents by the year 2,000. Apple's office complex
would include space for numerous businesses, as well as a large shopping mall
featuring the latest in interactive information services and video games.
To make this plan financially attractive for Apple, the firm says it must receive a
significant abatement on the amount it would otherwise have to pay under the property
tax that Orange levies on every commercial establishment owning or leasing land there.
Specifically, Apple would need to have its property taxes reduced by $500,000 per year
for each of the first five years of its Orange operation. The Orange Board of County
Commissioners is glad to lease the 130-acre site to Apple; is eager to buy the equity
interest offered by Apple; and is considering Apple's request for a five-year, $2.5
million property tax abatement. But three things about Apple concern various
members of the Orange Board of Commissioners:
First, Apple confers employee health benefits not only on the spouses and children of
all its employees but also on their unmarried partners, regardless of sex, whenever the
employees designate such partners as "long-term companions." This has led some
commissioners to object that "Apple's health policy undermines traditional family
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values - not to mention how it encourages sodomy and extramarital sex, both of which
internal policies and will simply abandon its plans to launch an office complex in
Orange, accepting an offer from Mexico City to locate its new facility there instead,
unless the tax abatement is unconditionally approved, the special fee is rescinded, and
the municipal rule is repealed.
The Orange Board rejects Apple's ultimatum. Because this decision threatens to hurt
both the fiscal health and the reputation of Ames, the state's Governor -- after
unsuccessfully trying to persuade the State Legislature to preempt the actions taken by
the Orange Board - calls the White House to urge President Clinton to telephone all
five members of the Board of Commissioners personally. The Governor reminds
President Clinton ofhis "campaign pledge to promote tolerance and economic growth"
and pleads with him to "jawbone some sense into these fools."
The President seeks the advice of Attorney General Janet Reno as to his legal
authority to pressure the Orange County Board of Commissioners into changing its
vote. He hopes to invoke a long-ignored Act of Congress, passed in 1866, that says:
"The President may rescind congressionally authorized and appropriated federal
expenditures in any state or locality that declines to exercise its fiscal or rule-making
powers in a manner the President deems to be required by the United States
Constitution,"
The President's plan is to inform the county commissioners that some $15 million in
currently projected 1994-95 federal expenditures for Orange (mostly in connection with
the space program) will be canceled within a month unless the commissioners promptly
reverse themselves on the three matters of concern to Apple - the tax abatement, the
special fee, and the rule.
The Attorney General, however, tells the President that, much as she would like to
give him a green light, "principles of federalism and separation of powers are too
important for me to ignore here." "Besides," she adds, "even if the commissioners are
being stupid or bigoted, there's nothing in the Constitution that requires a corporation
like Orange to give Apple a bite of its revenue pie, or to let businesses in its midst
interfere with the adoption choices of their employees." "Infact," the Attorney General
concludes, "I'm not at all sure that the U.S. Constitution even permits the managers of
companies that receive tax benefits to interfere with the parental decisions ofthose they
hire."
The President has serious doubts about the adequacy of this analysis and asks his
White House Legal Counsel for a memo on the constitutional principles at stake and
how he should resolve them. He tells his Counsel:
"You know I used to teach constitutional law, but that was some years ago, and the
Court has changed course on lots of things since then. I guess it might help to have a
sense of how individual Justices would approach this problem, but what I really need
is some thoughtful guidance on what the Constitution itself tells me here, partly about
the relevant structural issues -- like my authority to apply this 1866 Act of Congress
to impose my constitutional conclusions on Orange - but especially about substance:
Would the Orange Board's denial of the tax and other economic benefits involved in
this situation in fact violate any substantive constitutional prohibition? Would the
recently enacted Orange rule be constitutionally enforceable against Apple? What
about the Attorney General's remark that the Constitution might itself prevent
companies that get tax benefits from interfering with the parental decisions of their
employees? I have enough time to read only 2,000 words on all this, so you'd better
stay within that limit in your memo to me. Unfortunately, I need it by the close of
business today, since I'm leaving tonight for a summit meeting on world trade."
Please prepare the memo requested by the President.
END
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Property I
Professor Michelman - Harvard
January 12, 1994
OVERALL WORD LIMIT. The combined length ofall your answers to all the Parts
may not exceed 3,000 words. This is equivalent to twelve double-spaced pages if you
type or word-process using 12-point fixed-width type and normal margins. In any case,
monitoring the length of your answers is your responsibility. I will deal with
substantial violations of the word limit by disregarding whatever portion of an
offending exam exceeds the limit.
The word limit may push you to prune extraneous and non-responsive material out of
your answers. Clear and orderly presentation of the basic points about a problem
should be your first aim, before getting into more extended refinements and more
marginal possibilities. An answer that includes material not directly relevant to a full
response to the problem or question presented is not as good as an answer that is free
of such material.
PART I
Some Background Facts
(The "Background Facts are mainly relevant to Question I-C, but you should read
them before tackling any of the Questions in Part I.)
Oscar died in 1940. At the time of his death, Oscar owned in fee simple absolute a
certain 500-acre parcel of wooded land in Green County (hereafter called "the parcel"
or "the land"). By his will, Oscar devised the parcel
"to my son Albert and his wife Alice and their heirs as tenants by the entireties,
believing that they and each of them will cherish the land as nature made it and
treat it with the same respect as I have done. "
At this time, Albert and Alice had been living together since 1935, ostensibly as a
married couple (as they were to do until 1955 when Alice died). However,
unbeknownst to Oscar and just about everyone else, the two were never formally
married.
In 1950, Albert executed a will. This will included the following provision:
"My 500-acreparcel of land in Green County, received by will from Oscar in
January 12, 1940, 1 hereby devise to my beloved daughter Bess, as long as she
remains a resident of Green County, Ames; and in case my saiddaughtershall ever
remove her residencefrom Green County, title to the said parcel shall then
immediatelypass to the National Society for the Preservationof Wildlife.
Albert's 1950 will further included a residuary clause proving as follows:
"Any interests that I may own in any property, otherwise undisposedof by this
will, I hereby give, bequeath, and devise to Opus University."
Apart from Albert's will just mentioned, neither Albert nor Alice ever made any deed,
will, lease, or other instrument purporting to affect in any way the title to the parcel.
During the lifetimes of Albert and Alice, neither Albert nor Alice nor anyone else ever
entered or occupied the land, which was left undisturbed in its natural state.
Alice died in 1955, leaving no will.
Albert died in 1960, survived by his daughter Bess.
At the time of Albert's death in 1960, the parcel was still vacant, wooded, and
undisturbed from its natural state. Thereafter, neither Bess nor anyone else ever
entered, occupied, or disturbed the land, except as specifically described below. Bess
remained a resident of Green County, Ames, from her birth until her death in 1989.
QUESTION I-A
In 1965, Bess executed and delivered to the Green County Conservation Society
(GCCS) a deed to the parcel. By this deed, Bess granted the parcel
to the Green County ConservationSociety in fee simple, it being a condition of
this grant thatneither the Society nor any successor shall ever improve the land or

UMKC LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 65:4

alter itfrom its naturalstate, or allow the land to be improved or altered,but shall
devote the land to preservation of the naturalhabitatand wildlife for the benefit
and enjoyment of the Christianpublic of Green County.
The Green County Conservation Society (GCCS) was then, and remains to this day, a
private organization supported by gifts from private donors.
At the time of her grant to GCCS in 1965, Bess owned one and only one other parcel
of land -- a residence in Green County about five miles distant from the 500 acre
parcel.
For the first several years after receiving the deed from Bess, the GCCS left the parcel
completely alone. In 1973, the GCCS cleared and graded a small area on the parcel
(less than one-quarter acre), adjacent to one of its edges, for use as a parking lot
capable of holding about 30 cars, and also cleared some footpaths through brush
growing on the land to make it easier for visitors to get into the land for walks, birdwatching, and the like. Members of the public were thereafter made welcome by the
GCCS to use the parking lot and footpaths whenever they liked, as long as they stayed
on the cleared areas and left undisturbed the plant and animal life on the land. GCCS
made no attempt to restrict entry to Christians. In the succeeding years, modest
numbers of people including non-Christians - averaging about fifty visitors each week,
year 'round - came to the land and complied with the rules set by GCCS. Bess was not
consulted about the parking lot, footpaths, or invitation to the public, and she never
said anything to anyone about any of these matters. Bess herself visited the land
infrequently, only two or three times during her lifetime after granting the land away
in 1965.
Suppose it is now 1978. Bess is still alive. You are the legal assistant to the
Executive Director of the GCCS. The Director wants to know whether Bess might
have any plausible claims for any form of relief against the GCCS, based on the abovedescribed 1965 deed and arising out of GCCS's manner of using, and allowing others
to use, the parcel since 1973. The Director is getting ready for a Board meeting and
wants a quick, preliminary response. With regard to any plausible claims Bess may
have, the Director also wants to know what lines of resistance and defense may be
available to GCCS, along with your best preliminary guess as to the likely outcome of
any litigation that might be brought by Bess against GCCS. The Director has
specifically said to you: "I know you're pressed for time right now, so be sure to tell me
what lines of analysis and argument you think may need further consideration even if
you can't fully work them through today. Remember, I'm a lawyer, too, so you don't
have to spell everything out for me as you might to a non-lawyer. Also, let me make
it as clear as I can that, right now, I only want to hear about possible claims that Bess
may have against GCCS (even if there may be other conceivable claimants to interests
in this land), so for purposes of this inquiry please just assume that Bess was the sole,
rightful owner of the parcel (in fee simple absolute) when she made her deed to GCCS
in 1965."
Please prepare a draft of your memorandum responding to the Director's inquiry.
QUESTION I-B
Now add the following to the facts you already have.
Bess never asserted any claims against GCCS. Instead, in 1980, Bess executed and
delivered to GCCS a deed by which she "conveyed, quitclaimed,and released" to
GCCS
"whatever right,title, or interestI may own in [theparcel], including any interest
I may own in the nature of a real covenant or equitable servitude."
Late in 1992, the GCCS, badly strapped for funds, sold the parcel to the DEF
Corporation. DEF promptly fenced in the land, shut out public visitation, and began
clearing, grading, and hard-topping the land for use as an industrial site. The
governmental authorities of Green County are so anxious to have DEF's industrial
development on the land, as a counter to a serious problem of unemployment in Green
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County, that they have negotiated with DEF a partial forgiveness of County real estate
taxes on the land for the first ten years of industrial operations on the site.
As a direct consequence of DEF's alterations of the parcel, rain water that used to be
absorbed harmlessly into the ground has been diverted into the bed of a stream, causing
that stream to overflow in a torrent on land owned by Charles, one mile distant from
the parcel, causing great damage to Charles's house.
You now work as an associate of DEF's General Counsel. On your desk this morning
you find a note from the Counsel. Attached to the Counsel's note is a history of the
parcel recounting the events and transactions detailed in Questions I-A and I-B of this
exam. The counsel's note asks: "What can you tell me before leaving work today about
our possible liabilities to Charles? Please tell me what claim or claims Charles might
conceivably assert against DEF, indicate our possible responses and defenses, give me
your preliminary assessment of the likely outcome, and tell me about any additional
facts we may need to find out or additional legal research we may need to do in order
to make a fully informed assessment. Thanks."
Please prepare a draft of your response to the Counsel's inquiry.
QUESTION I-C
Refer again to the "Background Facts" above, and also keep in mind the later history
of the parcel recounted in Questions I-A and I-B. Now add the following to the facts
you already have.
First, Bess died in 1989.
Second, it seems that Albert was a prominent figure during his lifetime in Green
County. Recently Albert's unpublished memoirs have come to light, revealing the fact
that Albert and Alice were never married. DEF's General Counsel now wants to know
whether this revelation, or any other part of the history contained in the "Background
Facts "might conceivably give rise to any outstanding claims to entitlements of any
kind respecting the parcel, which could cause trouble for DEF. Counsel inquires:
"Does this history suggest any claims that anyone might press to any sort of entitlement
to the parcel? If so, please tell me who the possible claimants might be, what claim or
claims each possible claimant might assert, based on what transaction(s) or event(s),
indicate our possible lines of response, and tell me any additional facts we may need
to find out or additional legal research we may need to do in order to make a fully
informed assessment of the situation. Again, my thanks."
Please prepare a draft of your response to the Counsel's inquiry.
END
The University of Chicago
The Law School
Property II
Professors Israel and Kauper
June 9, 1995

I
The Elementary Education Aid Act passed by Congress appropriates money to be
spent by public school boards in expanding and improving their educational programs
by various means which contribute particularly to meeting the special educational needs
of educationally deprived children, defined as children coming from families with
annual income of less than $3,000. The federal statute authorizes and requires school
boards that receive grants from the federal government to make the benefits of these
special educational programs, financed with federal funds, available to all children
attending schools within the boundaries of the public school district, including children
attending private schools. The federal statute stipulates, however, that the control of
expenditures of all funds must remain in the public school board, that no part of the
federal funds may be used to finance the acquisition of facilities and equipment for
private schools or to finance sectarian religious teaching.
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A local school board in State M has received a grant from the federal government to
enable it to engage in some special educational programs. Under one program it will
hire remedial English teachers who will give special training during the school day at
public schools to children with reading deficiencies. Children from private schools,
including parochial schools, will be permitted to enroll in the public schools for the
limited purpose of attending these classes. Under a second program, the public schools
will send out speech therapists to all schools in the district, including parochial schools,
on a regular schedule in order to give special attention to children with speech
difficulties. Federal funds will be used to rent rooms at parochial schools in order to
provide facilities for the speech therapy instruction.
The Constitution of State M provides that no public funds or property shall be used,
directly or indirectly, in aid of parochial schools or sectarian education. This provision
has been strictly construed by the supreme court of the state which has in the past
invalidated the use of tax-raised funds to provide bus transportation and free textbooks
for children attending parochial schools.
T, a local taxpayer and a parent of children in the public schools, brought a suit in the
federal district court against the local school board, alleging that the proposed use of
the federal funds and the administration of the same by the public school board,
especially in so far as the benefits are made available to children attending parochial
schools, violates both the United States Constitution and the Constitution of State M.
He requests a decree enjoining the school board from extending the benefits of these
special educational programs to any parochial school children. The district court held
(1) that there would have been a violation of the state constitution but the force of the
federal act made the state constitution inapplicable under the supremacy clause and (2)
there was no violation of the federal constitution.
Discuss the possible dispositions of the case on review by the Supreme Court. (It may
be assumed that all constitutional issues were properly raised in the proceedings
below.)
II
John Smith was recently expelled from the Michiganda Educational Association
(M.E.A.) and he has hired you to represent him in attacking the constitutionality of his
expulsion. The M.E.A. is a non-profit organization incorporated under the laws of
Michiganda with a membership of approximately 98% of all the teachers employed in
the state's public schools. Although a state statute prohibits all state employees from
joining a labor union, that statute specifically exempts the M.E.A. from this
prohibition. In fact, the state presently recognizes the M.E.A., by virtue of a collective
bargaining agreement, as the exclusive bargaining agent for all the teachers in the state.
The agreement gives the association, inter alia, a veto power over any proposed
changes in curriculum, teacher's hours, working conditions, etc.
All action of the M.E.A. is taken by an executive council that is composed of one
representative from each of the state's 17 counties, the representative in each case
being elected by all of the teacher-members in his county. The state recognizes the
additional work burden carried by a county representative by assigning him a lighter
teaching load. During the past year, your client, Smith, an ardent segregationist, was
elected to the executive council. Soon after his election, Smith made the following
announcement to the newspapers: "Acting as a private citizen of the United States, I
have drafted a petition to the United States Senate requesting that it start impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice ofthe Supreme Court on the ground that he has
violated his oath of office by forcing the mongrelization of the races at the direction of
his superiors in the Kremlin. I urge all patriotic citizens to support me in this venture."
The executive council of the M.E.A. called an immediate session and questioned
Smith about his petition. Smith attempted to support his allegations against the Chief
Justice by reference to an article, generally regarded as totally false, in a publication of
a well-known "hate" group, The World Fascist Party. Although Smith apparently had
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acted in good faith, the council felt that his action had seriously injured the M.E.A.'s
image and its announced position in favor of integration. A motion was made to expel
Smith from the M.E.A. and it carried by a vote of 16-1 (only Smith voting against it).
Smith believes the M.E.A. will reinstate him as a member if the action of the council
is shown to violate his rights under the federal constitution. Prepare a memo on his
behalf noting the weaknesses as well as the strengths of your arguments.
I
The government of Slobonia, a nation engaged in a nationalization program, sues in
a federal district court of the United States to recover 3 tons of sugar which it
expropriated while the sugar was still in Slobonia and which the owner, 0, an American
citizen who owns a sugar refinery in Slobonia, subsequently managed to ship out of
Slobonia and has in his possession on a vessel at a wharf in the United States. (The
jurisdiction of the federal court is based on the Article III power to decide controversies
between citizens and foreign states.)
A treaty between Slobonia and the United States, executed in 1945, provides that
Slobonia will not under any circumstances expropriate property of American citizens.
The Slobonian confiscation decrees provide for compensation in case of expropriation
but the value is measured in a depreciated currency and compensation is paid in nonnegotiable bonds payable at the end of thirty years out of net profits from the
government's operation of the sugar refineries.
Immediately after the suit was instituted by the government of Slobonia against 0 to
recover the sugar, Congress enacted a law which provides that in any proceeding
brought in a federal court by a foreign government resting on a claim based on
expropriation ofproperty owned by an American citizen, the federal court shall dismiss
the proceeding if it finds that the expropriation violated the accepted rules of
international law. The statute moreover explicitly states that the rule that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation is a rule of
international law. The statute provides, however, that if the President of the United
States files a written statement with the court saying that it would embarrass and
prejudice the President's handling of foreign affairs for the court to pass on the legality
of the foreign government's act of expropriation, the court shall not entertain any
defense based on this ground.
In the proceeding initiated by the Slobonian government, the defendant 0 tenders as
a defense that the act of expropriation was contrary to treaty and international law.
Slobonia offers proof that no principle of international law forbids expropriation
without compensation so long as aliens and citizens are treated the same way. But at
this point the court receives a statement from the President of the United States in
which he asserts that the State Department, in the process of negotiating with Slobinia
with respect to protection of American property interests, already has accepted the
validity of the expropriation act,and that a decision by the court passing on the legality
of the expropriation of O's property would prejudice the Executive Department in its
further dealings with Slobinia.
Prepare a memorandum advising the district judge on the constitutional issues
presented by this case and the possible course or courses of action open to him.
IV
On May 1, 1965, Julie Jones received the following letter from the Washington
County Prosecutor: "At the request of Judge Justice, I have examined the record in
Jones v. Haven, a paternity action brought by yourself on behalf of your child. On the
basis of that record, I have filed in Circuit Court an information (copy attached)
charging you with violation of state code §1240. That section makes it a misdemeanor
(punishable by a maximum of 30 days imprisonment) to give birth to an illegitimate
child. Please note that conviction under §1240 will bar further prosecution under
§1242 which makes it a misdemeanor (same punishment) to commit adultery. Knowing
that you are indigent, the court has appointed John Student, a 3rd year law student at
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State U. to represent you. Arraignment is set for May 10th. Please call me if that date
is inconvenient."
On May 10th, Julie appeared in court with Student. She pleaded not guilty and
requested ajury trial. The case was assigned to Judge Justice and went to trial on May
15th. The prosecutor introduced into evidence (1) a doctor's certificate reporting the
birth on March 15th of Allen Jones to Julie Jones, (2) a birth certificate for Allen Jones
listing his mother as single and father unknown, (3) the following portion of the
transcript in Jones v. Haven, a civil case decided on April 15th in favor ofthe plaintiff:
Judge Justice, "Miss Jones, since you brought this suit by yourself and have no
lawyer, I feel that I should advise you of your rights. Are you aware, for example, of
your privilege against self incrimination."
Witness Jones, "Yes."
Judge Justice, "Very well, please tell your story."
Witness Jones, "Last month, I had a little boy. Although he and I aren't married,
Mr. Haven is the father. I first met him at... etc."
Julie introduced no evidence on her behalf and did not take the stand. In charging the
jury, Judge Justice stressed (1) Julie was not required to take the stand and her failure
to do so cannot be held against her, and (2) although, as presiding judge in Jones v.
Haven, he had ruled in favor of Julie, the standard of proof there was considerably
different from that in a criminal case, so an acquittal would not be inconsistent with the
previous verdict.
The jury found Julie guilty and the judge sentenced her to 3 days in jail. The state
supreme court affirmed without opinion and the case is now before the United States
Supreme Court on certiorari.
What constitutional issues are presented. Discuss. (It may be assumed that Student
raised all relevant objections at the trial and appellate levels.)
END
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
COLLEGE OF LAW
Examination Questions
Fall 1995
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
(Law 313), Section B
Monday, December 11, 1995
[A - M: Room D; N-Z: Room C; Typing: Rooms G, J, & K]
Read All Instructions Before Starting the Exam
PART II: Professor Rotunda
10:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m.
This examination consists of TWO PARTS, weighed equally. This is Part II, which
consists of two essay questions. This part will be passed out at 10:00 a.m. and
collected at 11:30 am. This is an OPEN BOOK exam. That is, you may bring in your
casebook and supplement, your own notes, or any outlines prepared by you or by other
students so long as you have not purchasedthe study aid. You MAY NOT bringwith
you any commercial outlines or hornbooks. If you have any such material with you,
leave them in the front of the room until after you have turned in your examination.
PLAN the answer before writing. Credit will be given for clarity, good organization,
and conciseness. Do not consider yourself to be paid by the word. If added facts are
needed to answer a question, articulate your assumptions of facts and alternative
assumptions of fact and answer the question as to all such assumptions. Discuss all
issues reasonably raised in the problem even though your resolution of a prior issue in
the problem may technically make decision ofthe other issues moot. However, lengthy
displays of irrelevant learning, even if erudite, will be penalized. Please use your time
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not only to answer the question but TO THINK. Remember: ORGANIZE YOUR
ANSWER.
AS A COURTESY TO YOUR FELLOW STUDENTS, IF YOU LEAVE THIS
EXAMINATION EARLY, PLEASE DO SO QUIETLY. If you leave the room before
you finish the examination, you may not take the examination or your answers with
you. Once you handin this essay answer, you may not retrieve itfor any reason.
BEGIN EACH ESSAY IN A SEPARATE BOOK. Please write on only one side (the
right side) of the paper (except for inserts), and use a pen (or typewriter) for this
portion of the examination. Then it will be easier for me to read your essay. If you use
more than one examination book to answer an essay, mark each book clearly: e.g.,
"book I of 2 books." That way, I will be able to find all of your books in case they are
separated. Write your examination number on each booklet. [Ifyou forget your
examination number, use your socialsecurity number.] It is also a good idea to use
tried and true writing techniques such as paragraphs, margins, complete sentences, etc.
Please avoid unusual abbreviations.
Before you begin this examination, please reread lines 31-40.
ESSAY I
[ONE HOUR; this essay will constitute one-third of the final exam.]
[Write on one side of the page only.]
The States of East Dakota (hereinafter "Dakota") and West Carolina
(hereinafter "Carolina") are historic and competitive rivals. The competition is
unbalanced, because East Dakota is a State blessed with more natural resources, a
larger population, and a more educated citizenry.
SearMart, a national retailing chain, is headquartered in Dakota. The
headquarters office employs over 5,000 employees. Carolina, in an effort to attract
more business, is encouraging SearMart to move its headquarters to (and build its new
SearMart Tower in) Carolina. Carolina promised SearMart that, if it relocates, it will
give SearMart a property tax holiday for 5 years (i.e., there will be no property tax on
the new SearMart Tower for 5 years). In addition, Carolina will contribute $40 million
towards the $160 million construction costs for the new SearMart tower, and build a
new highway to this new building.
Dakota is reluctant to engage in competitive bidding with Carolina because other
companies also located in Dakota might get similar ideas. Therefore, Dakota's
congressional delegation lobbied Congress to enact legislation to kill Carolina's
proposal. Congress, in response to Dakota's lobbying, enacted a law that created a
Commission to study the problem. The Commission, under this legislation, is to study
the problem and then propose a bill to Congress. The Speaker of the House and the
Senate Majority leader each nominated four people (two Democrats and two
Republicans ), half of whom must be members of Congress. The legislation creating
the Commission also provided that Congress (after receiving the Commission's
recommendation) must then approve or disapprove of the Commission's proposal on
an up or down vote. That is, no one would be allowed to propose any amendments to
this legislation unless two-thirds of each House voted to suspend its rules and allow
amendments.
The Commission's hearing showed that many states and localities are giving
tax holidays and other benefits in an effort to attract business from other states or from
different parts of the same state. In addition, states and localities are also raising taxes
and spending that tax money to attract major team sports (such as national baseball,
football or basketball leagues). The tax money is then used to help construct buildings
like the proposed SearMart Tower or major sports stadiums. Sometimes it is also used
to build highways to the new stadiums, or other buildings to make them more
convenient. Witnesses testified before the Commission that - if the states and localities
were not competing against each other in this way - then state and local taxes could be
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lower or the taxes could be used for worthier purposes, such as increased support for
grade schools or for higher education, instead of being used for tax holidays, or sports
stadiums, or private buildings.
The Commission proposed a new federal law. The proposed law prohibits any state
(or locality) from offering any more tax holidays in an effort to entice businesses or
major league sports teams to their state (or locality) from other states (or localities).
It also prohibits any businesses or major league sports teams from accepting any tax
holidays if they are used to entice the businesses or major league sports teams to
relocate to another state (or locality). It also provides that if the state accepts any
federal highway funds, it cannot spend any funds to build new highways to the new
buildings or stadiums. Also, if the state or locality accepts federal highway funds, it
cannot grant property tax holidays to businesses or major league sports teams that are
enticed from other states or localities. It also provided that, if states have raised extra
tax money in an expectation of using that money to lure businesses or major sports
teams, then the states must now use that money to increase state support for higher
education.
The proposed law was hotly debated in Congress, and a 55% majority of the Senate
went on record as opposing the provision of the Bill that would apply to major league
sports. However, under the rules under which the Senate (and House) were operating,
no amendments could be proposed unless two-thirds ofthe Senate (and House) agreed.
This condition was not met. Thus, both Houses of Congress voted on the Bill on an up
or down vote with no amendments allowed. The law was passed, the President signed
it, and it went into effect.
DISCUSS THE LAW THAT CONGRESS ENACTED. This question raises various
issues, and so it is important to organize your answer so that you can discuss these
issues in a logical order. If you think that the law may raise one or more constitutional
problems, also discuss whether Congress might avoid these problems.
ESSAY 2
[Begin this essay in a new examination book.]
[Write on one side of the page only.]
[ONE-HALF HOUR; this essay will constitute one-sixth of the final exam)
Assume the following. Congress and the President, in an effort to compromise their
dispute regarding the balancing of the budget, decide to reenact the law invalidated in
Bowsher v. Synar [casebook, p. 300]. However, to respond to the majority's complaint,
the new law provided that the Comptroller General is removable only at the initiative
of Congress and only by impeachment.
DISCUSS.
University of Illinois
Property §A
Fall 1995
Prof. Freyfogle
FINAL EXAMINATION
1.

This is a closed notes, closed book exam. You may not use any materials in

answering it. The time indications on the questions are only estimates of how long you

ought to spend on each question; you need not follow them exactly, but don't fall too
far behind.
2.
Write your examination number on the front cover of each exam booklet that
you use, along with a notation ofthe number of booklets that you have used (e.g., Book
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1 of 3, Book 2 of 3). Do not write your name or your social security number anywhere
on your answers. There is no need to return the exam questions.
3. This is a three-hour exam. Please be prompt in turning in your answers. I will be
available throughout the exam in my office, Room 134, to answer questions.
4. This exam includes a total of 4 pages, including this cover page. Before beginning
the exam, please check to make sure you have all of the pages.
Good luck!
1.
(50 minutes) In November of this year, Hal approached landowner Lance and
asked whether he could gain permission to enter Lance's land to do some hunting.
Lance was willing to allow it, but only if Hal paid money. After some negotiation, Hal
and Lance signed a short, written agreement in which Hal agreed to pay $200 and
Lance gave to Hal the "exclusive right to hunt on Lance's land from December 1
through December 8, 1995." Immediately upon signing the agreement, Hal paid the

$200.
During the first few days of December Hal did some hunting without incident
On December 5, he returned to hunt on Lance's land, this time bringing his friend,
Hank, with him. While they were hunting, Hank spotted and shot a wild turkey,
wounding it but not so much that the turkey could not fly into the underbrush. Hank
and Hal went after the turkey, and soon got snarled in the dense brush. While they were
looking, Hank noticed something strange, on the ground, close to Hal's foot. He
shouted to Hal to look down. Hal did so, and noticed a very expensive pair of
binoculars, partially covered by dirt. Hal picked up the binoculars, and then worked his
way out of the brush. Because it was lunchtime, Hank and Hal hopped in their truck
and headed into a nearby town for lunch.
About an hour later, Hank and Hal returned from lunch, with Hal wearing the
binoculars around his neck. As they were walking on Lance's land, intending to
continue hunting and to look for the turkey that Hank had shot, they saw Lance
approaching them. In Lance's hand was a dead turkey. Lance stared at them coldly.
To make conversation, Hal mentioned that he had found the binoculars. Lance simply
responded: "Is that so." Hank then said, "Well, I see you found my turkey." Lance
simply scowled, and said: "I think you guys have done about enough hunting on my
land, and I want you off, right now." Hal objected, but Lance seemed sufficiently angry
that he decided not to press the point. Both Hal and Hank then departed.
Identify and discuss the legal issues by these facts. What rights do the relative
parties have? What remedies might the parties have against one another?
2.
(30 minutes) As a young associate in a hot-shot Washington, D.C., law firm,
you have been given an unusual assignment. The newly independent African nation of
Zantu (a client of your firm) is in the process of revising its laws. One issue that has
arisen is the matter of wildlife. The northernmost province in Zantu has extensive
wildlife populations, including reasonably large numbers of grazing and browsing
animals (antelopes, zebra, giraffes, etc.) that roam over large areas in the province. The
land in Zantu is largely owned by a few dozen private landowners, with each owning
one or more large tracts of land. You have been asked the following: Ignoring any
customs and laws (including constitutional protections for property) that might already
be in effect in Zantu, what are the principal options that Zantu has in writing laws
dealing with the ownership of wildlife? What are the chief advantages and
disadvantages of each of these options? Which option would you recommend for
Zantu?
3.
(70 minutes) In March of 1993, Alice and Bob Talent signed a lease covering
a single family home in a Midwestern university community. The landlord-owner was
Sarah Lance. The lease was a periodic tenancy from year to year, beginning July 1,
1993. The lease contained two pertinent clauses, one stating that the tenants could not
sublet without the landlord's consent, the other stating that tenants would be
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responsible for "ordinary repairs." Just before the lease began, Lance moved to New
York City, where she intended to study wildlife populations (particularly populations
of the familiar urban tenant, Ratus ratus).
During the first year of the lease, all was fine. The Talents made occasional
repairs, but none was particularly expensive. In July, 1994, the house next door was
purchased by the city. The city proceeded to remodel the house, adding a new wing, a
third floor, and a 6-car garage that covered nearly the entire lot. In October of 1994,
the city began operating a half-way house for recently released felons, including felons
convicted of violent crimes and serious narcotics offenses. Some of the felon-tenants
were reasonably behaved, but many were exceedingly noisy, playing loud music at all
hours of the day and night. Some of the tenants seemed to have extraordinary numbers
of visitors, and at times every parking spot within several hundred meters was taken.
Many of the tenants would congregate on the sidewalk and street, including the
sidewalk in front of the Talents' rented home.
During the winter of 1994-95 the Talents viewed the situation as tolerable,
given that the weather was cold, windows were closed, and few people stayed outside
very long. By late spring 1995, the problem become severe. The Talents found it
uncomfortable to sit outside anywhere near the half-way house, and they complained
regularly to the city about the noise. In July, 1995, several rocks were thrown through
the windows of the Talents' rented home. The first time they repaired the window with
a new window; after that they simply began putting up plywood over the broken
windows. In August, they began complaining also to Lance, demanding that Lance do
something about the situation. In October, the Talents' car tires were slashed, and a
tape deck was stolen from their car while it was parked in their garage. When asked
about it, the city claimed that its investigation produced no evidence who had engaged
in the criminal conduct.
As their frustration increased, the Talents began to look closely at the half-way
house next door. They realized that the large garage seemed to encroach on Lance's
land, and they immediately notified Lance of the situation. At Lance's request (and
expense), the Talents hired a surveyor, who determined that indeed the city's garage
intruded some 3 feet into the side yard of Lance's lot. Once the city learned about the
problem, it immediately offered to pay Lance for the right to maintain the garage. After
a brief negotiation, Lance agreed to the compensation, and a deed was signed allowing
the city to maintain the garage.
While this was happening, the Talents were getting increasingly angry, and they
have come to you for legal advice. They believe that the noise and outdoor loitering by
convicted felons have become more or less intolerable, and they want to know whether
they can move out. You begin doing a big of digging, and soon find that the entire
neighborhood-including both Lance's lot and the city's lot-are covered by a restrictive
covenant that limits use of the land to single-family houses only. As you are doing your
research, the Talents call to tell you that, while they were gone one weekend, one of
their plywood boards fell out of the window that it was covering, and substantial rain
entered the house, damaging the carpet and a few items of furniture. They also tell you
that they have found a group of students (law
students they say) who might be willing to "take over" their lease, if this is possible.
Identify and discuss the legal issues raised by these facts. In the course of your
answer, explain the relative rights of the parties. Also explain in full what options the
Talents might have at this point against Lance and the city.
4.
(30 minutes) In 1880, the Illinois Central Railroad constructed a rail line
through the central part of the state. To make this possible, it purchased interests in
land from existing land owners. In the deed that Illinois Central typically used, the
landowner-grantor transferred to the railroad a 100-foot-wide section of land "as a
railroad right of way." The railroad paid an amount equal to the full fair market value
of the land.
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In 1979, the Illinois Central ceased using the corridor for railroad purposes, and
arranged to sell it to a local group, Prairie Pathways, which was interested in both the
preservation of prairie remnants (often found along railroads) and the promotion of
recreational trails for hiking and biking. Prairie Pathways began using the trail for this
purpose as soon as the rails and the underlying ties were removed from the rail bed. In
1990, to facilitate this type of adaptive re-use of old railways, a federal statute was
passed expressly authorizing preservation and recreation groups (like Prairie Pathways)
to use abandoned rail corridors "for purposes of recreation and the preservation of
biological resources."
One central Illinois landowner not pleased about this is John Harper, whose
land is crossed by the Prairie Pathways corridor. He comes to you for legal advice,
wanting to know whether he has to accept this pathway. The pathway along his
property is quite flat, and he could easily plow it up entirely and add the full 100-footwide strip to his cornfield, which adjoins the pathway on both sides. As a lesser
alternative, he is willing to leave a hiking trail down the middle of the corridor, but
would like to farm the land on either side of the trail (all, that is, but a 20-foot-wide
strip down the center of the 100-foot wide corridor). If he did this, he would destroy
nearly all of the high quality prairie that has grown along the old corridor.
What legal arguments could Harper assert, and against whom, to gain what he
wants? How likely is he to succeed on each argument?
University of Illinois
FINAL EXAMINATION
PROPERTY, SECTION B
FALL 1995
PROFESSOR BALL

NAME

(1) Do not turn this cover page until instructed to do so.
(2) Put your name. but not your exam number. at the top of this page. Put your
exam number, but not your name. on EACH blue book At the end of the exam, turn
in both the questions and your answers. Place the exam questions in one pile and the
blue books in another; do not place the exam inside the blue books.
(3) This is a 3 hour, 15 minutes test. It is completely closed book, except for
those of you who have received permission to use a foreign language dictionary.
(4) Please write legibly. I cannot give credit for something I cannot read.
(5) Please write only on one side of the page. If you use more than one blue
book, please number them consecutively (g, "1 of 3," "2 of 3"). For typed
exams, please double space.
(6) The exam has four different sections with different weights. Although not
everyone will spend the same amount of time on each section, you may wish to use the
following as a guide:
Essay Question 1 (22%): 40 minutes
Essay Question 1 (33%): 60 minutes
Essay Question m (33%): 60 minutes
Multiple Choice Section (12%): 20 minutes
The additional 15 minutes are intended to provide you with some added flexibility with
your time and to give you an opportunity to review what you have written.
(7) Multiple choice questions: Put your answers in the blue book. not on the test

sheet.
(8) Good luck and thanks for a great semester.
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ESSAY QUESTION 1 (22%)
(Suggested time: 40 minutes)
Len Lewis owns a building with two commercial spaces. In one of the commercial
spaces Lewis operates a clothing store. On January 1, 1992, Lewis leased the other
space to Tina Taft for five years at $ 1,000 a month. The lease agreement states that
the "lessee shall not assign or sublet or otherwise transfer her interests without the prior
consent of lessor." Taft, who opened a toy store in the premises, began, in the second
week of January, 1992, to complain to Lewis about what she referred to as "inadequate
heat." Lewis has an old furnace in the basement of the building. During the winter
months, the furnace keeps the temperature inside the building at no higher than 64
degrees Fahrenheit. During the coldest winter days, the temperature inside the building
rises to no higher than 60 degrees Fahrenheit. After Taft complained to Lewis about
the heat, he explained to her that he simply could not afford to buy a new furnace.
On December 15,1994, Taft informed Lewis that she would be leaving the premises
on January 1, 1995, because of the "continued problems with the heat." Taft further
informed Lewis that "I have found a new tenant for you who is willing to sublet the
premises for the remaining two years of the lease at $ 1,000 a month. Her name is
Betty Bell and she will be opening a fruit and vegetable store in the premises." Lewis,
barely able to contain his anger, responded as follows: "That is unacceptable to me.
I can get more than $ 1,000 a month from a new tenant, and in any event, a fruit and
vegetable store will bring to my building cockroaches and assorted vermin. I do not
consent to this sublease. I will hold you liable for all future rents until the expiration
of your lease on January 1, 1997." Taft vacated on January 1, 1995, and the space has
remained empty ever since.
In March 1995, Lewis comes to your office seeking legal advice. After he tells you
the above, he also mentions that in October, 1994, he was working in his clothing store
when a customer by the name of Fred Foyer came up to him and showed him a gold tieclip with three large diamonds. Foyer told Lewis that he had found the tie-clip in the
store's bathroom on the floor near the sink. Lewis had never before seen the tie-clip.
Lewis told Foyer the following: "Why don't you leave it with me in case the owner
comes back to claim it?" Foyer did as Lewis suggested. No one has claimed ownership
of the tie-clip. Foyer recently asked Lewis to return the tie-clip and Lewis refused to
do so.
Lewis has asked you to write him a memorandum concerning his rights and liabilities
arising from the above facts. Do not assume facts not provided. If crucial facts are
missing, you can explain in your memorandum how these facts may affect the rights
and liabilities of the parties.
** END OF QUESTION **
ESSAY QUESTION 11 (33%)
(Suggested time: 60 minutes)
Doug Dell has been in the business ofbreeding, raising, and selling St. Bernard
dogs for twenty five years. Dell conducts his business in his home on Maple Street in
Kent City. For the last twenty five years, Dell has been making sufficient money from
the selling of the dogs to pay all of his business costs and still make between $25,000
to $30,000 in profits a year.
Five years after Dell started his business, Kent City enacted a zoning ordinance
restricting property use on Maple Street to "single family dwellings" and explicitly
prohibiting "any and all commercial activity." Shortly after the new zoning ordinance
went into effect, several individuals, including Mr. Peters, Ms. Petro, and Ms. Perry,
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purchased plots of land on Maple Street and proceeded to build themselves single
family dwellings. Twenty years later, Peters, Petro, and Perry brought an action against
Dell seeking an injunction arguing that his business constituted a nuisance because the
St. Bernards barked loudly at all hours of the day and night. Dell in response
contended that his dogs did not create a nuisance, but that even if they did, the nuisance
was legalized by prescription.
The trial court, after conducting a trial without a jury, concluded that Dell's
business did constitute a nuisance because of the constant noise made by the dogs. The
trial court also concluded as a matter of law that a nuisance cannot be legalized by
prescription. The trial court issued an injunction ordering Dell to abate the nuisance
within 90 days. Dell appeals to the State Supreme Court arguing that a private
nuisance can be legalized by prescription. He also argues that the trial court erred in
issuing an injunction and should have instead awarded damages to the plaintiffs.
Please answer the following two questions:
(1) Do you think the State Supreme Court should hold that a private nuisance
can be legalized by prescription? (In answering the question you should discuss the
policy rationales behind (i) adverse possession/prescriptive rights and (ii) the law of
nuisance).
(2) If the State Supreme Court were to hold that a nuisance cannot be legalized by
prescription, should it affirm the trial court's issuance of the injunction?
** END OF QUESTION **
ESSAY QUESTION 111 (33%)
(Suggested time: 60 minutes)
The Devlin International Corporation has two subsidiaries engaged in
commercial activities in the state of Kent. One subsidiary, the Devlin Real Estate
Company (DREC), is in the land development business. The other subsidiary, the
Devlin Satellite Company (DSC), manufactures and sells TV satellite dishes. The
satellite dishes manufactured by DSC are 18 inches wide, considerably smaller than the
dishes manufactured by any of DSC's competitor's.
In 1984, DREC purchased Greenacre, a large tract of undeveloped land in Kent City
located between North Street and South Street. DREC divided Greenacre into twelve
plots as shown below:
In 1985, DREC sold all twelve lots in consecutive numerical order to twelve separate
individuals. Lots 1 - 5 were sold with the following two covenants:
Covenant A: "No building shall be erected upon the property unless it is a residential
dwelling."
Covenant B: "No satellite dish may be attached to any erected structure unless the
said satellite dish is an 18 inch satellite manufactured by the Devlin Satellite Co. This
covenant shall run with the land and shall be binding on the purchaser, his successors
in interest and assigns."
DREC sold Lots 6 -12 with covenant "B" but not with covenant "A."
Alan Adams in 1985 purchased Lot 1 from DREC; as mentioned above, the
deed contained covenants "A" and "B." Also in 1985, DREC sold Lot 6 to Bob Baker,
Lot 7 to Carl Cash, and Lot 8 to David Davis; as mentioned above, all three deeds
contained covenant "B" but none contained covenant "A."
In 1990, Ellen Ellis purchased Lot 7 from Carl Cash; the deed included
covenant "B." Also in 1990, Ellis negotiated an easement with David Davis, the owner
of Lot 8, for access to South Street. The easement allows for the "use of a private
roadway across Lot 8 for ingress and egress from Lot 7." After the roadway easement
was recorded, Ellis built herself a home on Lot 7 and purchased a satellite dish
manufactured by the ACME Corporation. While the satellite dish built by ACME is
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several times larger than the one made by DSC, it is considerably cheaper. Ellis had
the satellite dish installed on top of her new house on Lot 7.
In January, 1995, Ellis purchased Lot 6 from Bob Baker. The deed from Baker
to Ellis did not contain any covenants restricting use. After purchasing Lot 6, Ellis
hired workers who began to build a large shed on her new lot. Ellis plans to use the
shed to make beer; once the beer is made, she intends to sell it to a wholesaler for
profit. In building the shed, Ellis's hired workers have used the roadway easement over
Lot 8 to get access to Lot 6 (through Lot 7) from South Street.
In February 1995, with one third of the shed completed, Adams (the owner of
Lot 1) brought an action against Ellis seeking an injunction prohibiting her from
building the shed on Lot 6 and ordering her to remove the large ACME satellite dish
from the top of her house on Lot 7. At the same time, Davis (the owner of Lot 8)
brought an action against Ellis contending misuse of the roadway easement.
Discuss the rights and liabilities of Adams, Davis, and Ellis. Do not assume
facts not provided. If crucial facts are missing, you can explain how these facts may
affect the rights and liabilities of the parties.
** END OF QUESTION **
Cornell Law School
Professor Shiffrin
Constitutional Law
December 14, 1995
INSTRUCTIONS
This is a three hour open book examination, but you will not be permitted to start
writing your answers during the first hour. During the first hour, you should think
about the questions and about how you plan to organize your responses. During the
first hour, you may outline your planned answers on separate scratch paper or on the
examination itself.
Please place your answers to the separate questions in separate bluebooks. Write on
only one side of a page and skip every other line.
There are two questions. You may assume that the questions will be read together.
You should assume that Question I is worth 60% and Question H is worth 40%
(although I reserve the right to weight them differently). For each question, you should
assume you are clerking for a Supreme Court Justice who especially wants to know the
arguments that can be advanced on all sides with respect to the issues implicated by the
questions. The Justice wants to know the state of existing law on the questions
involved, but the Justice also wants to know how the cases should be decided in your
judgment and why they should be decided that way. The Justice is a maverick who is
willing to dispense with precedent when it seems reasonable to do so. You should not
discuss first amendment issues. If you think that further facts are needed to resolve any
issues, you should explain what they are. Do not assume issues away, however.
In each of the fact situations below, the lower courts have upheld the challenged
statutes or ordinances.
I.
The Municipal School District in State Z has adopted a number of policies raising
constitutional issues.
(a). The district prohibits married couples from working in the same building. Oscar
applies to work as a teacher in the high school. His application is denied because his
wife teaches in the school. Oscar maintains that the denial of his application violates
his constitutional rights.
(b). The district prohibits sexual relations between employees working in the same
building in the school district. Bill and Harriet both teach in the district's high school,
and both admit that they are sexually active with each other. Bill was married at the
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time he and Harriet commenced relations. He has since moved out and is living with
Harriet. Bill and Harriet have been fired; they maintain their constitutional rights have
been violated.
(c). The district maintains vending machines containing condoms in the junior high
schools and the high school. The parents of a fourteen year old girl maintain that
making condoms available for the child violates their constitutional rights to raise the
child as they see fit.
II.
In an effort to limit the spread of graffiti, city X in State Z has outlawed the sale of
paint spray cans. The producers of paint spray cans are predominantly located out of
state. In an effort to combat a paint shortage some years ago and to minimize city
unemployment, City X operates a paint factory (that does not produce spray cans).
Economists suggest that the ordinance will have a slight impact increasing sales of the
factory (although sales will also increase for out of state factories as well). Moreover,
it is believed that graffiti will be reduced to some extent. City X will only hire residents
of the city in its factory.
(a). John Smith is the owner of a spray paint factory in state A. SP corporation owns
a spray paint factory in state A. They both assert that City X's ordinance violates the
Constitution.
(b). Mary Jones is a resident of State A. She has applied to work in City X's paint
factory and her application has been rejected because she is not a resident of City X.
She maintains that the denial of her application violates the Constitution.
END
STANFORD UNIVERSITY
School of Law
Final Examination in Constitutional Law H
Fall 1995
Professor Kathleen M. Sullivan
December 15, 1995
8:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m.

Time: 7 2hours
Four Questions (choose any Three)
INSTRUCTIONS

1. This is a one-day take-home exam. It is open-book. In answering the questions,
you may consult any materials you wish, but you may not consult any person.
2.
There are FOUR questions offered, but you should CHOOSE ONLY THREE
questions to answer - any three you like. Each question you choose to answer will
count equally for one-third of the grade.
3.
There is a word limit for each question. Your answer to EACH of the three
questions you choose to answer should not exceed 750 words. Do not write more than
750 words on any one question even if you write less than 750 words on any other.
Serious over length will be penalized in grading.
4. If there is any material fact that you think ambiguous or missing, please state what
it is and why it matters.
5. If you type or word-process your exam answers, please double-space. Ifyou write,
please use dark ink, use only the front side of each blue-book page, and double-space.
6.
Please limit your answers to issues arising under the speech, press and religion
clauses of the First Amendment. Ignore any other constitutional or other issue that
might seem present.
7.
Please note the honor code acknowledgment on the last page of the exam.
GOOD LUCK!
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QUESTION I
At long last the Telecommunications Deregulation Act of 1999 ("TDA") is
enacted by Congress and signed into law by the President. The seven regional
telephone companies have long had the technological capacity to transmit video as well
as voice signals over the lines they own and operate, but prior telecommunications acts
had barred them from providing video programming to subscribers in their respective
telephone service areas, on the ground that permitting them to do so would enable them
to monopolize video programming. The TDA for the first time lifts this ban on video
programming by the telephone companies, citing "the increased competitiveness of the
video programming market." But this deregulation comes at a price. Deploring the rise
of "indecent" video programming in various media in recent years, and blaming it for
"widespread moral and social disintegration," the TDA requires any telephone
company that chooses to offer video programming to scramble the signals of any
program that it judges to depict "sexual or excretory functions in a patently offensive
manner," unscrambling such signals only upon affirmative subscriber request. The
nation's numerous cable operators and Internet service providers ("ISPs," which
transmit information and images over a worldwide network of linked computers) are
covered by other provisions of the TDA but are explicitly exempted from the indecency
provision. Findings accompanying the Act note that cable operators have already
provided various parental control options as part of their subscriber packages, while
ISPs exercise "virtually no editorial discretion" over subscribers' transmission of
images over their systems.
You are a special assistant to the Attorney General of the United States. She
has asked you to prepare a concise memo outlining the First Amendment challenges
that the government should expect to be raised against this "indecency" provision of
the TDA, and the government's best defenses.
QUESTION II
Congress enacts and the President signs the Congressional Campaign Reform
Act of 1998 ("CCRA"). The Act is supported by extensive findings suggesting that
political advertising is devoted more to personal attacks and brief "spot ads" than to
articulate debate of the issues, and that the dominance of out-of-state funding of
congressional candidacies over local funding sources has weakened representatives'
responsiveness to their own home constituencies. The Act provides as follows:
In order to combat the negative effects of current campaign finance and spending
practices on the quality of political debate and democratic representation, the
following restrictions shall govern all elections for United States Representatives and
Senators, subject to criminal penalty:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

YALE LAW SCHOOL

Professor Kate Stith
Fall 1995

FINAL EXAMINATION
You have four hours in which to complete this examination. This is an open-book
examination. You may write, type, or use a computer.
You are urged to be concise in your answers and to avoid unnecessary repetition. The
approximate weight for grading purposes is noted for each of the three questions.
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QUESTION ONE (40%)

Consider the following hypothetical, 1998 news report:
Washington, D.C. September 23, 1998:
Seeking to reduce the costs of basic welfare aid and medical care for the indigent the
U.S. Senate today narrowly passed an amendment to the federal Medicaid law which
prohibits payment for childbirth services to any woman presently receiving Medicaid
benefits who has already borne three children. The measure prohibits use of state
funds as well as federal funds. Sponsors expect the funding ban to reduce the number
of children born to indigent families.
This is the second piece of legislation in three years aimed at reducing births
among welfare recipients. In 1996, following the lead of several states Congress
enacted legislation that denies an increase in welfare payments (from federal or state
sources) when a woman presently receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) has another child.
Among the strongest opponents of the Senate bill were anti-abortion Senators, who
complained that the prohibition on public funding of births would lead to an increase
in the incidence of abortion. Current Medicaid law permits states to pay for abortions
for poor women.
Is the bill passed by the Senate unconstitutional? Explain. Be sure to address the
strongest legal arguments aganst your position, as well as the arguments supporting
your position.
QUESTION TWO (25%)
Consider the following hypothetical, which is, of course, based on recent events:
In connection with its investigation of Whitewater and related events, the U.S.
Senate votes to subpoena certain documentary notes from the White House. The White
House, which has already provided voluminous documents, announces that it will not
comply with this particular subpoena. The Senate moves in federal district court in
Washington to enforce its subpoena. The district court denies the motion, holding that
the documents are protected by "executive privilege." The matter is now on appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
It is stipulated that the notes at issue (a) were taken by a long-time political
adviser of the President who is employed as an associate in the Office of White House
Counsel, and (b) reflect political and legal analysis by both the adviser and the
President concerning Whitewater and the investigations thereof. It is further stipulated
that (c) the President's participation in the Whitewater investment itself was entirely
terminated prior to his assumption of the Office of President.
You are a law clerk to a judge on the D.C. Circuit who is assigned to the panel
hearing the appeal. Your judge asks you to write a brief memorandum laying out the
salient constitutional issues in the case. Pleasewrite the memorandum. Note: you are
not expected to address any issue of attorney-client privilege.
QUESTION THREE (35%)
Answer either A or B in full. In addition, you may (for "extra credit" and if you
have time) give a brief answer to the other question:
A. Alexander Nardone, a resident of Minnesota, has been indicted in federal
district court in Minnesota for violating a federal law enacted in 1992 that makes it a
crime to "wilfully fail to pay a child support obligation with respect to a child who
resides in another state." The statute applies only when an obligation of at least $5000
has been past due for more than one year.
The indictment ofNardone alleges that he and Nancy Peck were divorced in the
State of Illinois in 1990, that the divorce decree requires that he pay $8000 per year to
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Peck in support of their minor child, that following the divorce he moved to Minnesota
and she moved to Connecticut, and that in each of the years 1993 and 1994 he paid less
than $2000 in child support. Nardone contests certain key factual allegations in the
indictment; in addition, he asserts that the statute itself is unconstitutional under I&pp
v. United States.
You are a law clerk for the District Judge assigned to the Nardone case. She
asked you to examine the history of the 1992 federal law. In your research thus far, you
have discovered that (a) for many years, there have been inter-state compacts regarding
enforcement of child support obligations, as well as other interstate financial
obligations established by court order; (b) the child-support compact has been partially
successful (for instance, the amount of money collected pursuant to the inter-state
compact grew from one billion dollars in 1976 to five billion dollars in 1990); (c) in
addition to the criminal prohibition, the 1992 federal law established a commission to
study ways to improve interstate collection of child support obligations; (d) in a 1990
survey, nearly 60 percent of custodial parents in interstate cases reported receiving
payments occasionally, seldom or never, and (e) since 1989, the annual deficit, in
uncollected child support is about $5.1 billion (including intrastate failure to pay).
All of the foregoing facts were discussed in the legislative history of the 1992
federal law. You also discovered numerous statements in the legislative history of the
federal law indicating that at least some of the lawmakers who voted for it did not
understand the broad scope of the new prohibition. For instance, several sponsors of
the bill stated that the law would make it a crime "to cross state boundaries in order to
avoid child support obligations," when by its terms the law criminalizes the existence
of child support debt whenever the child lives in a different state. There is no allegation
in the Nardone indictment that the defendant moved to Minnesota for the purpose of
avoiding child support obligations.
You have told your judge about your findings, and she responded that it was not clear
to her which of these facts was relevant to the constitutional issue. She asks you to
draft a quick memorandum to her explaining your initial thinking on the
constitutionality of the law, and noting any further factual matters that need to be
researched. Pleasewrite the memorandum.
B. In the past decade, the amount of garbage produced by the residents of
Jefferson Township has increased greatly, while federal and state regulation of garbage
disposal has also increased. Responding to these environmental and regulatory
demands, Jefferson Township arranged for the construction of a garbage incinerator to
replace the bursting, unsanitary landfill owned by the Township. Although the new
incinerator is owned and operated by a private company (Incin Co.), the Town
effectively finances the incinerator out of tax revenues. Specifically, the Township has
enacted a "flow control" ordinance, which requires that all garbage generated in the
Township be disposed of in the Incin Co. incinerator. In turn, by contract with the
Township, Incin Co. charges a weekly fee to the Township, based on the amount of
garbage dumped. Additionally, the Township has entered into a contact with private
garbage haulers to pick up all residential garbage within the District and to deliver the
garbage to the Incin Co. incinerator.
There is another privately owned incinerator company near to Jefferson Township.
That company (Muck Brothers, Inc.) is seeking to expand its business and was an
unsuccessful bidder for the Jefferson Township garbage contract. Muck Brothers has
now threatened to bring suit alleging that Jefferson Township's "flow control"
ordinance, its contract with Incin Co., and its contracts with the private garbage haulers
all violate the Constitution.
Jefferson Township's top legal officer has hired you to write an opinion
memorandum concerning the constitutionality of the Township's actions.
Please write the memorandum.
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Property (Kauper)
Monday, May 8, 1995
Michigan
8:30-11:30 a.m.
You will be given three (3) hours for this examination. The examination is open
book. You may use the course casebook, your class notes and other materials you have
prepared or annotated. The examination consists of three (3) questions, with ten (10)
numbered pages (including this page). Except as specified below, you should answer
all questions in terms of general common law principles.
In answering each question, assume that the state has a Married Women's Property
Act. It also has a statute providing that no joint tenancy shall be created unless the
grant expressly provides that the interests created shall be a joint tenancy; in the
absence of such expressed intention, the grant shall be construed to create a tenancy in
common. The state also has a statute providing:
"A landlord may not bring or threaten to bring an action for possession in
retaliation against a tenant for making a bona fide complaint about building
conditions to a governmental agency charged with housing code enforcement;
provided, however, that this provision shall not apply if tenant is in default in
rent."
Housing codes are in effect. The state has summary eviction and forcible entry and
detainer statutes. You should assume that unless a question specifically indicates
otherwise it has no other landlord-tenant legislation.
I
(60 minutes)
In 1988 Phillip Pane was the owner in fee simple absolute of Blackacre, a two acre
tract on which was located his home, a substantial garage, and a small storage building.
He had owned Blackacre for five years. Blackacre did not front on a public roadway.
Another tract, Greenacre, which lies directly to the south of Blackacre, fronts on its
south side on Allen Road, which runs east and west. In 1984 Greenacre was owned by
Roberta Rowe, who still owns it. In 1984, Rowe, by a properly executed and recorded
deed, granted Pane the right to use an existing driveway which ran from Allen Road to
the northern edge of Greenacre, thus giving Pane access to Allen Road from Blackacre.
Rowe also used, and continues to use, the same driveway to reach her own garage
which is located on the northern edge of Greenacre.
In 1988, Pane conveyed Blackacre by a properly executed and recorded deed to
"Thomas Todd and Valerie Vance, husband and wife, with right of survivorship." The
deed does not mention the driveway across Greenacre. Todd and Vance were legally
married. Both were employed at the time they purchased Blackacre. The purchase
price for Blackacre was $100,000. Todd and Vance paid $20,000 in cash, with the
$80,000 balance coming from a loan secured by a mortgage from a local bank. Shortly
before the purchase of Blackacre, but after her marriage to Todd, Vance had received
a substantial inheritance from her father. While Todd and Vance had previously
handled their financial affairs through a single joint bank account to which both
contributed their earnings, Vance put the inheritance from her father into a separate
account in her own name. Of the $20,000 cash payment made on Blackacre, $15,000
came from Vance's separate account. The remaining $5,000 came from their joint
account. Until they separated, the couple made all mortgage and tax payments from
their joint account. The same was true for improvements and repairs, except that a
small addition to the house costing $20,000 was paid for from Vance's account.
In 1991, Vance and Todd separated, although they remained legally married until the
time of Vance's death in 1994. At the time of their separation, Todd moved out of
Blackacre. He lost his job and was desperate for cash. In January, 1992, Todd
conveyed by a properly executed and recorded deed "all my right, title and interest in
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Blackacre to Wilbur Warren and his heirs." Warren paid Todd $3,000 for this interest.
From the time he moved out until his conveyance to Warren, Todd made no further
contributions to the mortgage, taxes or upkeep on Blackacre. He has made no such
contributions since. The joint bank account was closed at the parties' separation.
During this period Vance paid $1,000 in mortgage payments, and $500 in tax
payments. There were no major repairs or improvements during this period.
Vance continued in possession and continued to make all the mortgage and tax
payments which, starting with the conveyance to Warren and ending with her death
amounted to another $4,000 in mortgage payments and $3,000 in taxes. She also paid
$12,000 to construct an addition to the garage in order to house two antique
automobiles she had purchased. Until the time of her death in 1994, she was unaware
of the deed from Todd to Warren. She paid nothing to Warren, and he paid nothing
with respect to Blackacre. Warran made no effort to advise her of his interest.
In August, 1992, Vance purchased the fee interest in Whiteacre, a one acre tract which
abutted Blackacre to the north. The northern edge of Whiteacre ran along Bates Road,
which ran east and west. With her purchase of Whiteacre Vance had access for
Blackacre to a public road by crossing Whiteacre. She put in a driveway across
Whiteacre to Bates Road for this purpose. She was therefore willing, when approached
by Rowe, to close the driveway across Greenacre which she had used until then. Rowe
wished to build an addition to her house across the existing driveway. She agreed to
pay Vance $3,000 in order to close the driveway. In 1993, upon receipt of this
payment, Vance by a properly executed and recorded deed "released, surrendered and
conveyed" to Rowe all of her interest in the driveway. Rowe then built her home
addition across the driveway.
In March, 1994, Vance died. Under the terms of her validly executed will, Blackacre
was left to Yolanda Young in fee, and Whiteacre was left in fee to Amos Arbor. The
mortgage on Blackacre was paid off by Vance's executor. Young promptly moved
onto Blackacre. Shortly thereafter Arbor barricaded the driveway across Whiteacre,
and has refused to permit Young to reach Bates Road across his property. While Rowe
is willing to grant Young a new right of way from Blackacre across Greenacre to Allen
Road, he will do so only upon receipt of $5,000, which Young does not want to pay.
At the moment, Young has negotiated with another neighbor who is permitting her to
cross his land to get to Bates Road, but this neighbor has made clear that his
permission, which was given orally, is temporary. In the time she has been in
possession Young has made no mortgage or tax payments.
The following actions have now resulted.
1. Warren has now appeared on the scene. He has filed an action against Young to
recover possession of Blackacre. Young, in turn, insists that she, and not Warren, is
the owner of Blackacre. She also claims that even if Warren has some interest in
Blackacre, which she denies, it is no more than a one-half interest, and is in fact less
because Vance made disproportionate contributions to the purchase price ofBlackacre,
as well as for taxes, improvements and mortgage payments while she and Todd
occupied Blackacre as well as after their separation. Warren, in turn claims that he
owns only one-half or some lesser fractional share of Blackacre Young owes him rent
for the period she has been occupying Blackacre. Discuss all issues these actions
present.
2. Warren has filed an action against Rowe asking for an injunction to reopen the
driveway under the right granted by Rowe to Pane, and requiring that Rowe remove any
encroachments over the right of way as originally granted. How should this action be
decided, and why? Discuss.
3. Young has filed an action against Arbor seeking an injunction to prohibit Arbor
from denying Young access from Blackacre across Whiteacre to Bates Road along the
driveway built by Vance across Whiteacre. Warren has filed a similar action. Discuss
all issues these actions present.
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II
(90 minutes)
In 1988 Blackacre was an empty parcel of land owned in fee simple absolute by Betty
Beck. Blackacre abuts Ryan Road, which runs east and west Blackacre is immediately
to the north of Ryan Road. In that year Acme Development Co. Acquired Blackacre
from Beck, taking title in fee simple absolute from Beck in a properly executed and
recorded deed.
In 1985 Whiteacre, a vacant parcel of land abutting Blackacre on the north, was
owned in fee simple absolute by Cornelius Conn. Conn died in that year, leaving
Whiteacre by a properly executed will "to Debra Dale and her heirs, but if no child of
Debra Dale gives birth to a child within twenty-five years to my residual legatee." The
last clause of Conn's will provided that "all the rest, residue and remainder of my
property shall go to Ebenezer East." At the time Conn died, Dale had one child,
Elizabeth Ryan. Elizabeth was then childless, but had a son, Robert Ryan, in 1987.
In 1988 Dale conveyed Whiteacre to Acme in fee simple absolute with a properly
executed and recorded deed. Debra Dale died in 1991, leaving all her property by a
properly executed will to Elizabeth Ryan.
Acme constructed a large apartment building on Blackacre. The building contains
four retail stores fronting on Ryan Road on the first floor, and fifty apartment units on
the five floors above. The building, which Acme calls "heartland," is built entirely on
Blackacre. It fronts on Ryan Road, with the rear of the building sitting just one foot
short of the line dividing Whiteacre and Blackacre. Whiteacre contains a paved parking
lot for the use of the tenants in Heartland. As designed, the main entrance to Heartland
faces Ryan Road. A fire exit door also faces Ryan Road. Another entrance is at the
rear of the building and provides direct access to the parking lot on Whiteacre.
Acme uses a standard form lease for all of the apartments in Heartland. It has never
had trouble keeping Heartland full, and has refused to negotiate any changes in its form
lease. The apartments are either two or three bedrooms. Rents range from $500 to
$800 per month. All leases are for two years, commencing from the date on which the
tenant is entitled to take possession. All apartment leases contain, inter alia, the
following provisions: (1) Acme may terminate the lease if the tenant fails to pay rent
by the first of each month or for breach of any other covenant by the tenant; (2) if the
tenant abandons the premises, or is evicted for failure to perform, the tenant may be
held liable for any loss incurred by the balance of the lease, at the election of the
landlord; (3) landlord agrees to maintain the premises in compliance with the applicable
housing code; (4) tenant agrees (subject to the obligation of the landlord to maintain
the premises in compliance with the housing code set out in (3) above), to maintain the
apartment and surrender it upon termination of the lease in as good condition as when
leased; (5) tenant agrees not to assign or sublease without the landlord's consent; (6)
landlord agrees to supply heat, air conditioning, water sewage service, electricity and
elevator service; and (7) landlord agrees to maintain all common areas (which the lease
does not describe) in good condition.
Acme does not use this form lease for the retail units on the first floor. These leases
are all separately negotiated. Each of the leases runs for a term of five years,
commencing on the date at which the tenant is entitled to possession. Each of these
retailer leases contain the following common provisions: (1) Acme may terminate the
lease for failure to pay the monthly rent on time, or for the breach by the tenant of any
other lease covenant; (2) tenant agrees to use the leased premises only for the purposes
set forth in the lease; (3) tenant agrees to pay a monthly rental based on a set amount
plus a percentage of its monthly gross receipts; (4) landlord does not warrant the
fitness of the premises for any purposes; assign or sublet without Acme's consent; (7)
tenant agrees that heat, water and electricity shall be at its expense.
One of the retail shops was leased to Fred Farr on August 1, 1993. (None of the other
retail leases are involved in this question.) The lease to Farr provided that Farr may use
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the leased premises only for "the retail sale of books, magazines and newspapers," and
for no other purpose. The monthly rental was stated to be $1000 plus 2 percent of
Farr's gross receipts. Farr operated a bookstore in the leased premises until September,
1994 when he was taken quite ill. He then sought to turn in the business over to
someone else. In November, 1994, George Gage agreed to buy Farr's business, on the
condition that he get a lease of sufficient length of make up five years. On December
1, 1994, Farr granted Gage the balance of his existing lease (with Acme's consent),
reserving a right to terminate the arrangement if Gage defaulted "in any of the
obligations under the lease." On the same day Acme granted Gage a new lease to
commence on August 1, 1995, and end on November 30, 1999. This new lease is on
the same terms as Acme's lease to Farr except that it contains no use restriction.
The following additional events have now occurred. Helen Hall moved into
Apartment 47 under a lease which commenced on June 1, 1994 with a monthly rental
of $600. In August, 1994, she was assaulted in her apartment by an unknown assailant
who was seen entering the building through the rear door adjacent to the parking lot.
Hall suffered significant injuries, and decided to vacate her apartment. She moved out
in late September after an angry argument with the management of Acme, which
refused to terminate her lease or to pay her medical expenses. She is now living
elsewhere. As soon as her apartment was vacant, Acme showed it to a number of other
prospective tenants. Acme relet the apartment under a standard two year lease
commencing on February 1, 1995 to John James. James turned out to be a disaster.
James failed to pay rent to Acme on March 1. And on the evening of March 5, 1995,
James was drunk and took an axe to the kitchen cupboards, the walls and various other
fixtures in the apartment. Acme's building manager came to investigate, saw the
damage (which will cost some $4,000 to repair), and ordered James out of the
apartment. Two nights later James vacated the apartment. His whereabouts are
presently unknown. The apartment has not yet been repaired because Acme has
insisted that Hall pay for the repairs. She has refused. The management has made no
effort to relet the damaged apartment, which is currently vacant.
Following the assault on Helen Hall, and after further reports of unauthorized persons
entering the building through the rear entrance, in September, 1994 Acme placed a
twenty-four hour guard on the front entrance, and locked the rear entrance. As a result,
tenants can reach the parking lot only by going out the front entrance and walking
around the building to the parking lot at the rear. (There is no street parking permitted
on Ryan Road.) Most of the tenants have not raised objections, but two have insisted
that the rear door be reopened. Acme has refused. Jennifer Jones, whose lease on
Apartment 32 began on October 1, 1994, with a monthly rental of $700, protested that
Acme is required to provide access to the parking lot through the rear door, and that she
cannot be required to exit through the front and walk all the way around the building
in the rain and the snow to reach her car. Karl Kane, who leased Apartment 27 on July
1, 1994, has made even more strenuous objection. Kane, although able to drive his car,
is confined to a wheelchair. It is very difficult for him to use the front entrance. He
asked Acme either to reopen the rear door or provide him with a key so that he can use
the door himself. Acme, however, has been sufficiently concerned about the safety of
its other tenants and about potential liability if others are assaulted that it has refused
both requests. Finding this situation unacceptable, Kane moved out of his apartment
on February 1, 1995 and has refused to pay any further rent. The rent reserved in
Kane's lease was $800 per month.
There have been still further problems. In January, 1995, Acme leased Apartment 33
to Laurie Lyle, the lease to commence on March 1, 1995. The apartment was in need
of some renovation before Lyle moved in. Acme agreed to do the necessary work.
During mid-February, a fire broke out in Apartment 33 as a result of the negligence of
the contractor hired by Acme to do the renovation work. The damage was extensive,
and could not be repaired by March 1. Acme advised Lyle that it could not permit her
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to move in on March 1 because until the damage was repaired the unit was not in
compliance with the housing code. It offered to waive the rent until the apartment was
brought into compliance with the code and to pay her for temporary housing during the
period. Lyle refused to accept this offer, declared the lease terminated, and took
another apartment elsewhere.
Apartment 41 was leased to Myron Mott commencing on August 1, 1994. Apartment
41 is a particularly desirable apartment because of the view from its living room
window. At the time of leasing, Acme's manager explained to Mott that because of the
building's structure, the central air conditioning in Apartment 41 was inadequate, and
that it both could not and would not do anything to correct the situation. The normal
rental on the apartment was $600 per month but because of the air condition problem
Acme offered to reduce the rent to $500 per month. Mott, who wanted the view, agreed
to accept the apartment on these terms. She told Acme she could easily get by in hot
weather by opening the windows. In November, 1994, Mott's employer transferred her
to another city. With Acme's consent, Mott assigned the balance of her lease to Nathan
Norby. Neither Acme nor Mott advised Norby of the air conditioning problem. Norby
could see that the unit appeared to have air conditioning, and did not inquire further
about it. During a hot spell in February, 1995 it became apparent to Norby that the air
conditioning did not work and he demanded that it be repaired. Acme told him that it
could not be done, that Mott had so been advised and that the rent had been reduced as
a result. Norby suffers from severe allergies and needs to be in air-conditioned
facilities. Norby refused to pay any further rent, and is now three months in default.
Finally, we return to the bookstore. After Gage took over the bookstore he began to
sell hard core pornographic books & magazines in addition to the other books and
magazines he sold. Business began to pick up. He also allowed the use of his
bookstore in the evenings as the headquarters of the local Socialist Workers Party, of
which he is chairman. Other tenants of the building, along with persons who lived
elsewhere in the community, protested to both Gage and Acme about his sales of
pornography. The store was picketed regularly. As a result, Gage's sales declined
sharply. When Farr owned the store, the average monthly rental he paid Acme, which
he always paid in a timely fashion, was about $1600 (the base $1000 plus, on average,
$600 as 2% of his gross receipts). Gage continued to pay the rent monthly directly to
Acme, but by March 1995 sales were so bad that the monthly rental had fallen to
$1100. Acme demanded that Gage stop selling pornography, and that it cease allowing
use of the store by the Socialist Workers Party which has as one of its main goals the
passage of a local rent control ordinance). Gage refused both demands.
Out of these facts the following actions have resulted.
1. Ebenezer East has filed an action against Acme to recover possession of
Whiteacre. How should this action be decided, and why? Discuss.
2. Acme has filed an action against Hall to recover rent on Apartment 47 from March
1, 1995 through June 30, 1996, and damages in the amount necessary to cover the
repairs needed as a result of James' drunken binge. Hall has filed a counterclaim
against Acme seeking to recover her damages resulting from the injuries suffered when
she was assaulted. Discuss all issues these actions present.
3. Jennifer Jones has filed an action against Acme seeking an injunction ordering
Acme to reopen Heartland's rear door. Is she entitled to such an order? Discuss.
4. Acme has filed a summary eviction action against Kane, asserting that Kane has
failed to pay rent. How should this action be decided, and why? Discuss.
5. Acme has filed an action against Lyle seeking to recover all of the rent due on
Apartment 33 from March 1, 1995 until the end of February, 1997. Is Acme entitled
to all or any part of this rent? Discuss.
6. Acme has filed an action against both Mott and Norby to recover the rent due and
owing on Apartment 41. Do either, or both, owe such rent to Acme? Discuss.
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7. Acme has filed two actions with respect to the bookstore. First, it has filed a
summary eviction action against Gage, asserting that it has the right to do so because
of Gage's sale of pornographic material and the use of the premises by the Socialist
Workers Party. Second, it has filed an action against Farr to recover monthly rental
paid by Gage. In addition, Acme seeks to recover from Gage and/or Farr all rent for
the bookstore through July, 1995. How should these actions be decided, and why?
Discuss.
8. Finally, howeveryou have decided the issues posed in 1 above, assume that a court
has already concluded that East is entitled to possession of Whiteacre and that East has
closed the parking lot. A group ofHeartland tenants has now filed action against Acme
for damages based on the unavailability of parking. Two other tenants have been
withholding $200 per month from their rent for the same reason. Acme has moved to
evict the latter two tenants. How should these two actions be decided and why?
Discuss.
III
(30 minutes)
California and a number of other western states have community property law systems
which govern the marital property rights of married couples. Traditionally, community
property systems have been thought to stand in sharp contrast to those governing
marital property rights in other common law states. It has now been asserted that over
the past thirty years the law governing material property rights in non-community
property states is, as a practical matter, the same as, or at least moving close to, the law
applied in community property states. Do you agree? What developments support this
proposition? To what extent do significant differences remain? Discuss.
T.E. Kauper
Exam No.
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
Reading Time: 1 hour
Exam Time: 2 hours

Professor Blumstein
Fall Semester, 1994

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-I (AI)
PLEDGE
In signing your exam number on your examination and/or blue book you are attesting
that you have not given and will not give or receive any unauthorized aid on this
examination and that you have complied with the groundrules established concerning
the use of materials in the examination room.
You are permitted to have with you in the examination room your casebook,
supplement, any notes you have taken for the course, and outlines you have prepared
for the course yourself. Commercial outlines and outlines prepared by other students
are not permitted even if annotated by you. Copies of typed or computer-generated
outlines must be provided to Renee Hawkins or Judy Bennett if they are to be used in
the examination room.
There are four questions. The first question is allotted 40 minutes; the second question
is allotted 50 minutes; the third and fourth questions are allotted 15 minutes each. The
questions will be weighed according to the suggested time allocations indicated for each
question.
You are expected to turn your examination in on time. Late examinations are subject
to appropriate penalty through grade reduction.
Please be sure to organize your answers carefully and to read through the problems
closely. Write on evry other line; use only one side of each page: start each new
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question in a separate blue book. Write neatly in ink or use a typewriter. These are
simple rules I expect you to observe scrupulously. I will not read examinations that do
not substantially comply with these groundrules or that are illegible.
For your information, I often read examinations question-by-question rather than
reading through an entire exam of a single student. Thus, be sure to treat each question
as an autonomous unit.
*Students will be permitted a one-hour reading period in advance of commencing the
examination. During that time, they can read through the examination, organize and
outline their answers. But they may not actually begin writing the examination until
that one-hour period has elapsed. These examinations, therefore, will be picked up 3
hours after they are distributed.
I.
(40 Minutes)
Assume that the Congress enacts the following legislation:
(1) Any citizen who alleges that he or she is the victim of knowing and intentional
sexual harassment perpetrated by the President of the United States may bring an
action for damages and/or for injunctive relief in a federal court of competent
jurisdiction. This provision shall apply to conduct of the President that occurs while
the President is in office or to conduct that occurred before the President took office.
(2) To avoid frivolous litigation, a party bringing such a claim against the President
must establish in the Complaint or in pre-trial proceedings, to the satisfaction of the
judge, that he or she has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits in order to
proceed. In the absence of such a showing, the judge shall dismiss the suit against the
President.
(3) Any trial on the merits in such an action will take place after the President leaves
office, and no such claim shall serve as the basis for an impeachment inquiry while the
President is in office.
Identify, analyze, and discuss the constitutional issues raised by the foregoing
legislation.
II.
(50 Minutes)
The State of Harmony owns and operates a dumpsite for hazardous wastes.
That dumpsite is also certified to receive low-level nuclear waste, which, by stipulation,
is primarily generated by medical schools in their teaching and research activities.
Although no law or regulation of iarmony has barred the operation of other dumpsites
for hazardous or low-level nuclear wastes, no other such dumpsites exist in Harmony.
Indeed, assume there are very few of these dumpsites, particularly for low-level nuclear
wastes, in the nation.
Recently enacted legislation in Harmony prohibits any dumpsite in Harmony,
existing or future, from receiving low-level nuclear waste. The asserted rationales are
public safety (the danger of transporting nuclear waste to the dumpsite and the risk of
accident or terrorism at the site) and environmental protection (concern about the
poisoning of the ground and the seepage into the ecosystem and the water supply).
Because of its anti-vivisection laws (which bar experimentation on animals),
Harmony has no medical school. Therefore, it produces relatively little low-level
nuclear waste as compared to states that have medical schools. As a result of the
Harmony ban on the receipt of low-level nuclear waste, medical schools in other states
must ship their low-level nuclear waste much further distances to far-away dumpsites.
This necessitates long trips through other states, often through densely populated areas.
It is stipulated that, in the absence of the ban, Harmony would be the desired dumpsite
for substantial quantities of low- level nuclear waste from out-of-state. It is even
possible, although the evidence on this point is inconclusive, that privately operated
dumpsites for low-level nuclear waste could be developed in Harmony because of
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suitable soil conditions. Whether such private dumpsites could obtain local land-use
permits is unclear, however.
Laboratory Resources International (LRI) is an international conglomerate
headquartered in the State ofNature that operates a laboratory in the State of Harmony
and another laboratory in the State of Nature. Those laboratories produce a small
amount of low-level nuclear waste that must be shipped to dumpsites out of Harmony
for dumping, even though the dumpsite in Harmony would be the most economically
efficient site for LRI to use.
LRI consults your law firm about its prospects of bringing a constitutional challenge
under the Commerce Clause to Harmony's ban on the receipt of low-level nuclear waste
at the dumpsite owned and operated by the State of Harmony. Identify, analyze, and
discuss the issues that would be presented by such a challenge by LRI.
III
(15 Minutes)
Assume that Congress enacts legislation to confer on the President greater
flexibility in carrying out his responsibilities. Under this legislation, the President may
reject an identified portion of a bill by not having to implement it. Congress could
block that decision of the President by a majority vote of both the House and the
Senate. What constitutional problems might be posed by such legislation?
IV
(15 Minutes)
Make the argument (and provide a brief critique of the argument) that the
President should have authority to fire, at his discretion, all policymaking officials of
the executive branch (including members of the independent regulatory agencies such
as the Federal Trade Commission).
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
Professor Brown
Fall 1994
Section A-3
2 hours
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Instructions:
1. This examination consists of 3 pages, including this cover page. Please check to be
sure you have all of the pages.
2.This is an OPEN BOOK examination: you may refer to any materials that you wish.
3. The suggested time allocations for each question take into account time needed to
prepare a well-organized, well-reasoned answer. It is a good idea to sketch out a rough
outline of your answer on scratch paper before writing in the bluebook. You should
spend a good deal of your time thinking through your answers in advance.
4. Please write on one side of the bluebook page and skip lines.
5. GOOD LUCK and Happy Holidays.
QUESTION I
(1 HOUR and 15 MINUTES)
Over the last few years, several states (not including Tennessee) have adopted
what has come to be known as a" drop-out driver law". Under these laws, persons
under the age of 18 are denied a driver's license if they have left school before
completing high school. If a person under the age of 18 already has a driver's license
and drops out before completing school, the license is suspended until the person
reaches age 18.
In each of the roughly 16 states that have adopted such a law, the statutory
preamble recites extensive legislative findings that failure to complete high school
substantially limits a person's economic and personal prospects in life, that such
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persons often end up imposing costs on society in excess of their ability to contribute
to society, and that the threat of loss of a driver's license is the most effective device
available for motivating teenagers to complete their secondary education. Experience
in states that have these drop-out driver laws confirms the effectiveness of the measure
in reducing the drop-out rate. For example, Kentucky's prior drop-out average of
5,000 per year fell to approximately 2,400 after implementing the drop-out driver law.
Moreover, 450 Kentucky teenagers who had dropped out prior to passage of the law
returned to school in order to reinstate their suspended licenses. Studies across the
country show that Kentucky's experience is typical.
Congress has decided that the empirical evidence is compelling enough to make
this effort a national priority. As a result, it passed, and the President signed into law,
an amendment to the Federal Highway Appropriations Act (FHAA) that directs the
Secretary of Transportation to withhold 10% of the federal highway funds allotted to
any state that fails to adopt a drop-out driver law within one year after the date of the
amendment. The amendment contains a preamble that essentially duplicates the
language and legislative findings in the preambles of the existing state drop-out driver
statutes.
Paul Rhodes is a licensed Tennessee driver, aged 16 and a half years. He dropped out
ofhigh school when he turned 16, in order to support his wife, child, and invalid mother
by driving a delivery truck. He now quite reasonably fears that the Tennessee state
legislature will comply with the FHAA by enacting a drop-out driver law that will result
in suspension of his driver's license and loss of his livelihood. Paul has filed suit in
federal court seeking an injunction prohibiting the Secretary of Transportation from
enforcing the FHAA amendments against Tennessee, on the ground that the statute
violates the U.S. Constitution.
Discuss the issues presented by Paul's suit, including arguments on both sides.
QUESTION I1

(45 MINUTES)
Article I section 7, of the Constitution, reads, in part:
"Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the
United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his
Objections to that House in which it shall have o who shall enter the Objections
at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such
Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be
sent,together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise
be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become
a Law."
Section 5 provides:
"Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members
for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a
Member."
The new, feisty, Republican Congress implements two measures to help reduce
waste and spending in Congress:
1. It passes a statute, signed by the President, which permits the President to single
out specific portions or lines that he finds objectionable in a bill, sign the rest of the
legislation, and excise the objectionable portions. Congress can then enact those
excised portions into law, if it chooses to do so, with a majority vote of both Houses.
The measure is seen as a boon to the efforts to curb wasteful spending by exposing
specific measures to the light of a full vote.
2. The House of Representatives, where tax bills are constitutionally required to
originate (Art. I, sec. 7, cl. 1), has long had an internal rule providing that all bills to
be voted on by the House must first be approved for debate by the House Rules
Committee. The House passes a new additional procedural rule providing that no bill
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containing a tax may be considered by the Rules Committee for such approval unless
it has garnered 60% in a preliminary vote of the entire membership of the House.
With regard to each of these two new measures, please discuss whether the
Supreme Court, if presented with the question, would uphold the constitutionality of
the measure, and the reasons underlying its analysis.

